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When we started our preparation for this project 
only a year ago, our prime concerns were the 
deepening of the social and economic asymme-
tries between the North and the South under the 
impact of the financial crisis, with Germany and 
Italy providing an example of existential impor-
tance for the EU as a whole. Both of us had resided 
in the two countries for prolonged periods in the 
past, and we had never witnessed such a surge in 
antagonistic feelings on both sides of the Alps as 
occurred during the Euro crisis. This can even be 
measured: while it had been common in Germany, 
at the beginning of the crisis, to talk about the 
PIIGS states (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain), with Italy figuring among them as an 
important member,2 the percentage of Italians 
having a positive image of Germany crashed only 
from 75 to 65 per cent during the immediate crisis 
period, and now the majority of the Italians thinks 
that Germany has too much influence in Europe 
and that it uses this influence at the expense of 
Southern Member States.3 While our application 
for funding was still pending, we witnessed two 
crucial events that increased the pertinence of 
our project way beyond our expectations. First, 
on the 24 September 2017, for the first time in 
post-war German history, a far right party entered 
the German Bundestag with a landslide victory, 
receiving 14 per cent of the popular vote and 100 
parliamentary seats. Second, only five months 
later in Italy, the far-right Lega party and the Movi-
mento Cinque Stelle emerged as the big winners 
from the Italian federal elections of the 4th of 
2 This notion has disappeared from the public discourse; it 
re-surfaced somewhat modified in Commissioner Oettingers 
comments on the plans of the present Italian government; see, 
for references, the contribution of K. Mangold, F 1.
3 Olmastroni, F. / Pellegata, A. (2017): Once we were friends. 
EU support and reciprocal views between Germany and Italy. 
http://www.euvisions.eu/friends-support-reciprocal.
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7March 2018. Forming a previously unthinkable 
coalition between right-wing and left-wing popu-
lism, they entered into government. We are not 
so naïve as to believe that the variety of Europe’s 
crises could be understood and adequately anal-
ysed as though these were isolated events. The 
course of Italy’s economic and social policy has so 
obviously been affected by the migration burdens 
that Italy has had to shoulder and the lack of Euro-
pean solidarity; the bitter disappointment could 
be turned into populist critique of the constraints 
that European rule imposes upon national poli-
cies and the public announcement of disobedi-
ence by members of the Italian government. In a 
similar vein, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
in Germany had been founded as an anti-Euro 
rescue party, which catalysed quickly through the 
immigration crisis of 2015 into a xenophobic far-
right populist party, sharing many positions with 
the Italian Lega. While the parties and alliances in 
both countries had capitalised very much upon 
the antagonisms between Italy and Germany and 
their positions during the Euro crisis by building 
on nationalist sentiments, today we have reached 
a true anti-climax when one observes that the 
intensification of tensions are accompanied by the 
founding of new alliances and a contagion towards 
formerly non-populist and non-far right parties in 
both countries: “Europe does not want migrants, 
it wants our money” (Luigi Di Maio); “Migration 
is the Mother of all problems” (Horst Seehofer). 
Both the AfD in Germany and the Lega in Italy 
share two major targets against which they direct 
their rage: European integration, especially in the 
economic realm, and immigration. We refrain, 
however, from attempting to disentangle all these 
interdependencies, but hope that our study of the 
two exemplary cases of Italy and Germany will 
provide us with some answers to the question of 
what led us down this road. We believe that the 
approach which we have pursued in our design 
of this project provides illuminating insights of 
lasting importance.
II. The Challenge of Euro-
pean Varieties
It is difficult to identify uncontroversial state-
ments in the crisis literature. Among them, 
however, is the - at first sight - counter-intuitive 
factum brutum that, notwithstanding the enor-
mous efforts of Europe’s crisis politics, the econ-
omies and welfare systems of the EU did not 
converge, these differences became instead more 
pronounced. We owe the most influential expla-
nations of this phenomenon to the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) studies initiated by the seminal 
volume of Peter A. Hall and David Soskice.4 Their 
message was that different countries in Europe 
have developed different institutional complemen-
tarities that give them specific economic advan-
tages.5 The crisis drastically showcased a strong 
variety of this within the co-ordinated market 
economies of Europe. VoC scholars amended 
their theories, underlining the differences in wage-
bargaining regimes or union-membership density 
between Northern and Southern countries. What 
the original VoC literature had neglected was that 
all European co-ordinated market economies had 
been subject to far-reaching trends of liberalisa-
tion since the 1980s that had been enacted to over-
come the low growth of the stagflation crisis of the 
late 1970s. All countries liberalised, albeit in very 
different ways which set them on very different 
growth paths in the 1990s and 2000s. From 
these findings the new growth model literature 
emerged, pointing especially to the divergences 
between the Southern, internal demand-driven 
growth led, and the Northern, external demand-
driven growth led Member States of the EU/Euro-
zone. The EMU, with its hard currency approach, 
benefits some of these models but puts stress on 
4  Hall, P.A., and Soskice, D. (2001): Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
5  Hall, Peter A. (2014): “Varieties of Capitalism and the Euro 
Crisis”, West European Politics 37 (6) (August 14): 1223-1243: 
id., (2012): “The Economics and Politics of the Euro Crisis”, 
German Politics, 21:4, 355-371.
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8others.6 Even the Commission, traditionally a 
fierce defendant of the convergence approach, has 
recently underlined European diversities. In its 
White Paper for a multi-speed Europe, it pleads 
for differentiated integration.7 The merits of the 
Varieties of Capitalism approach, upon which 
the scholarly debate builds, are, in many respects, 
undeniable. However, we distance ourselves from 
the one-dimensional reliance on efficiency consid-
erations in the evaluation of institutional comple-
mentarities.8 In a similar vein, we also think that 
the material interest kernel of the growth model 
perspective is still incomplete. We believe that 
more attention should be devoted to the ideational 
and cultural side of the diversities of Europe’s 
organised types of capitalism. These diversities 
span across the fields of economic, social and legal 
theory, and have evolved in iterative relation with 
norms, institutions, politics, and cultural historical 
trajectories for centuries. The economy unfolds 
not only within a set of institutions that are ratio-
nally trimmed to maximise profits, but these insti-
tutions themselves evolve within a cultural envi-
ronment composed of ideas, ideologies, traditions 
and the collective sentiments of their people.
Could such a broadening of analytical perspec-
tives help us to understand better why the asym-
metry between the North and the South of Europe 
6 Armingeon, K., Guthmann, K., and Weisstanner, D. (2015): 
“How the Euro Divides the Union: The Effect of Economic 
Adjustment on Support for Democracy in Europe”, Socio-Eco-
nomic Review 14(1): 1 26. First published online: 12 November 
2015. DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwv028; see, also, Armingeon, K., 
and Baccaro, L. (2014): “Germania: l’indomabile trading state”, 
Quaderni di rassegna sindacale - Lavori[check]”, 15: 2, 19-45; 
English version: Armingeon, K., and Baccaro, L. (2014): “The 
Crisis and Germany: The Trading State Unleashed”, in: Eber-
lein, B., and Schneider, V. (eds): Complex Democracy. Varieties, 
Crisis, and Transformations, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 165-184.
7  “White paper on the future of Europe. Reflections and sce-
narios for the EU27 by 2025”, COM(2017) 2025 of 1 March 
2017. See, for a scholarly discussion, Schmidt, V. (2017): 
“Inventing a New Future for Europe: Differentiated Integration 
with more EU and more Member-States?”, Ms. Boston (on file 
with authors).
8  Streeck, W. (2005): “Requirements for a useful Concept of 
Complementarity”, in: Crouch, C., Streeck, W., Boyer, R., Am-
able, B., Hall, P.A., and Jackson, G., “Dialogue on ‘Institutional 
Complementarities and Political Economy’”, Socio Economic 
Review 3, 359-382.
has re-erupted and become a core problem for the 
European integration project?9 This is the query 
which we sought to pursue with the help of the 
contributors to the Vigoni conference. It is a long-
term agenda. We could not, and did not, expect 
a comprehensive coverage of the many aspects 
and dimensions of the diverging socio-economic 
approaches and needs in both Southern and 
Northern Europe, or an ideational convergence of 
the analyses which our contributors were invited 
to submit. We would, however, like to substan-
tiate our own move from the varieties and growth 
model studies in order to a focus on economic 
cultures. This move is anything but idiosyncratic. 
The concept of “economic cultures” has been 
defined and defended by both economic histo-
rians10 and path-breaking comparative law schol-
arship.11 One important aspect which is underlined 
in both disciplines is the resistance of economic 
cultures against the imposition of changes, which 
can render interventions meaningless or even 
destructive. Werner Abelshauser submits that the 
imposition of structural reforms through which 
Europe’s crisis politics seeks to accomplish socio-
economic convergence risks, instead, de-stabi-
lising the targeted economies further.12 Gunther 
Teubner has submitted corresponding objec-
9  See, recently, Scharpf, F.W. (2016): “Forced Structural Conver-
gence in the Eurozone - Or a Differentiated European Mon-
etary Community”, MPIfG Discussion Paper 16/15, available 
at: http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp16-15.
pdf (last accessed 21 June 2017).
10  Abelshauser, W. (2003): Kulturkampf: Der deutsche Weg in 
die Neue Wirtschaft und die amerikanische Herausforderung, 
Berlin: Kadmos. Abelshauser, W., Gilgen, D. and Leutzsch, A. 
(eds) (2013), Kulturen der Weltwirtschaft, Göttingen: Vanden-
hoek und Ruprecht.
11  Teubner, G. (2001): “How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Differences”, in: Hall. P.A., and Soskice, D. (eds), Varieties 
of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 417-441.
12  Abelshauser, W. (2018): “Europa in Vielfalt einigen. Eine 
Denkschrift“, in: Atkinson, A.B., Huber, P.M., James, H., 
Scharpf, F.W. (eds), Nationalstaat und Europäische Union. Eine 
Bestandsaufnahme, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016, 275-294, 
available at: http://wwwhomes.uni-bielefeld.de/wabelsha/
Denkschrift.pdf (last accessed 21 June 2017); id., “Viele Wege 
führen nach Rom”, FAZ, Nr. 61, 30.3.2017, 6.
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9tions against legal unification politics.13 Both of 
them refrain - in this respect fully in line with 
the messages of VoC studies - from a ranking of 
the models that they have discerned; they high-
light their specific advantages, instead. The differ-
ence is that the economic cultures approach does 
not solely focus on institutional configurations 
(VoC) and sectoral interests (growth models) but 
also includes a distinctively historical perspective 
that sheds light on the political evolution of these 
economies and how it is embedded in national 
cultures, traditions, and economic ideas.14 More-
over, while VoC research is firmly in the hands of 
political economists and sociologists, the notion 
of economic cultures is more integrative, synthe-
sising history, law, politics, sociology, anthro-
pology, and cognitive science. It seems to us to 
be especially odd that law is left by the wayside 
in most political and social analyses of European 
forms of capitalism. We ask ourselves, how should 
the abundance of proposals to better the socio-
economic aspects of the state of integration be put 
into practice without thinking through their legal 
practicality and implementation. Accordingly, one 
of the objectives of our conference was to build a 
bridge between the VoC, the growth model, and 
the economic cultures perspectives.
What we suggest is that Europe should stop 
lamenting about its diversity. It should, instead, 
learn to take the fortunate motto of the ill-fated 
constitutional Treaty of 2004 seriously and learn 
to establish its unitas in diversitate.15 We even 
expect that this learning process has the potential 
to generate political, social and economic benefits.
13  N. 10 above.
14  Another leading authority in this regard is Alexander Nützen-
adel, whose research includes intensive studies of the Italian 
economy; suffice it here to name two projects: “Programmare 
il miracolo economico?” Industriepolitik in Italienzwischen 
Boom und Krise, 1958-1973”, (DFG, 2011-2013); “Experience 
and Expectation: Historical Foundations of Economic Behav-
ior”, (DFG, 2015-2022); see https://www.geschichte.hu-berlin.
de/de/bereiche-und-lehrstuehle/sozial-wirtschaftsgeschichte/
forschung (last accessed 21 June 2017).
15  CT 2ßß4 by Motto of the Draft Constitutional Treaty 2004
III. The Individual 
Contributions
Our overriding concern is a renewal of the debate 
on Europe’s diversity. The challenges are manifold. 
We distinguish between thematic, conceptual, 
and normative dimensions. What is certainly not 
unique, but still quite innovative about our agenda 
is the multi-dimensional approach to the integra-
tion process. We deal with “Europeanisation” in 
the conventional sense of the establishment of 
European rules, policies, and governance prac-
tices. The EU, we have internalised this message 
since way back, is a multi-level system. We are, 
of course, also aware of implementation studies 
which have highlighted the failings or unevenness 
of the European praxis. Our focus on the German-
Italian discrepancies highlights a phenomenon 
which the “ever more Europe” mantra of Euro-
pean studies tends to neglect. “More Europe” has 
an discomforting destructive potential. What is 
perceived as a new accomplishment of the process 
may generate disintegrative effects.16 Indeed, 
what we document is that our two cases, Italy and 
Germany, have, in the structure of their econo-
mies, not converged, but rather grown apart since 
Maastricht. What we highlight is that disintegra-
tion is not only bad within a Member State, but 
may also – and here the tensions between Italy and 
Germany are of exemplary importance – affect 
the Union as a whole: the “ever closer Union” is 
characterised by ever more hostility. Last, but not 
least, we have to take into account what is left of 
the political “ownership” of the Member States. 
We disagree with qualifications of this residual 
power as an obstacle to smooth implementation. 
We believe that it would, instead, be important to 
16  See, for a general debate, Annegret Eppler and Henrik 
Scheller (eds), Europäische Desintegration in Zeiten der 
Krise. Zur Konzeptionalisierung europäischer Desintegra-
tion, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2013; on the case of EMU, 
see Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Costs of Non-disintegration: 
The Case of the European Monetary Union”, in: Chalm-
ers, D., Jachtenfuchs, M., and Joerges, C. (eds), The End 
of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 29-49.
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take cultural diversities into account.17
This latter observation concerns our core theo-
retical message to which we will return in the 
following comments on the individual contribu-
tions.
A) The political economy of 
Germany and Italy
Today, we have a plethora of rivalling explana-
tions of why the Eurozone crisis happened.18 All of 
them agree on one point: the currency union was 
too heterogeneous for a single currency. But what 
is it really that makes these economies and their 
demands to a common regulatory framework, 
market and currency so different and have they 
converged over time? In Part One of our collec-
tion, we unleash five political economists to come 
to terms with this question, by comparing the 
Italian and German political economies.
Philip Manow19 gives us a meticulous account 
of the transformation of the German political 
economy during the past twenty years. He argues 
that the tradition of supply-side corporatism 
in Germany enabled socio-economic actors to 
co-ordinate wage restraint and to embark on 
painstaking structural reforms that, together, 
successfully transitioned the German economy 
from its position as sick man to that of the strong 
man of Europe during the 2000s and 2010s. Here, 
17  As we will underline, the trenches between the disciplines are 
as deep as ever; there are very few lawyers who have followed 
the Variety of Capitalism studies. Among the few, the most 
famous is Gunther Teubner. His discovery of the resistance 
of legal cultures against imposed unification (“Legal Irritants: 
Good Faith in British Law”, (1998) 61 Modern Law Review, 11-
32) was re-published at the best conceivable location: see n.10 
above.
18  The latest account we became aware of is Ashoka Mody’s 
EuroTragedy. A Drama in Nine Acts, Oxford, OUP, 2018. 
Ashoka’s reconstructions reach  far beyond economic oc-
curences. His chapter 8 on Italy ( pp. 318-360) documents his 
precise awareness of the specifics of Italy’s institutional and 
political constellations - and their apparently irresolvable prob-
lems. 
19  Philip, Manow, “The German Political Economy under the 
Euro – and a Comparison to the ‘Southern Model’”, (2018), A 
1.
Manow defends the German reforms against 
many internal and external critics by arguing that 
it has led to “dualisation” but not to a decrease in 
the social protection of the core of the workforce. 
Moreover, in contrast to what the critics antici-
pated, the structural reforms did not lead to a dete-
rioration of the well-protected core of the work-
force, but, instead, made it larger. Today, Germany 
has, together with Sweden, the second most active 
workforce, and differs, in this respect, remarkably 
from Italy. Manow acknowledges that the trans-
formation of the German model has put severe 
stress on the Southern European political econ-
omies. Germany had a tradition of coping with 
hard currency while the demand-led regimes of 
the South are penalised by the Euro. They cannot 
devaluate any longer. The introduction of the Euro 
and the Eurozone crisis have cemented these two 
different political economic models in Europe: an 
export-oriented Northern model and an internal-
demand-driven Southern model. Manow sees two 
ways forward for the Eurozone: 1. Painstaking 
structural reforms in the South backed through 
heavy transfers form the North or, 2. The split of 
the Eurozone into two different currency zones.
Donato Di Carlo challenges this view and the 
underlying assumptions of the growth model 
perspective in Manow’s account. Comparing wage 
development and wage-setting institutions for 
the public sector in Italy and Germany, he points 
out that it is not wage restraint and co-ordina-
tion between the social partners which led to 
the freezing of public sector wages in Germany 
but the idiosyncratic wage-setting dynamics in 
German federalism. In Italy, in contrast, he argues 
it is not due to un-coordinated bids by multiple 
trade unions that first strongly increased and 
later cut public-sector wages, but, instead, the 
political geography of Italy, where parties in the 
South must rely heavily on the votes form public-
sector employees, which is decisive. The implica-
tions elaborated in Di Carlo’s study for the current 
trend in political economy, towards the growth 
model perspective, are huge: wage restraint is 
not part of an intelligent design. A growth model 
INTRODUCTORY EXPLANATIONS
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or regime does not exist; instead, unintended 
outcomes created through institutional configu-
rations of the German polity (federalism) condi-
tioned parts of the new export-orientation of the 
German economy. Hence, also the accusations 
from Southern European countries waged against 
the German export surplus fall short. The co-ordi-
nation power that the growth model perspec-
tive ascribes to all actors does not exist. Di Carlo 
returns to this with a second contribution in the 
Annex.20
Margarita Estevez-Abe, who is among the origina-
tors of the Varieties of Capitalism school, provides 
us with a glance form the outside helping us to 
come to terms with the controversial discussion 
about the German export-led growth regime.21 
Using Japan as a counterfactual allows her to 
control for the impact of a unified currency zone. 
Estevez-Abe shows that Germany does not only 
hide behind the EU when it gets accused of trade 
deficits by the US and other international actors 
but that Germany, benefited enormously form the 
Euro. The Euro made German exports cheaper. 
Hence, the German role within the single currency 
has not only led to tensions between North and 
South in Europe but has triggered heavy geo-polit-
ical stress. Merkel’s reply to Donald Trump cited 
as the opener in Estevez-Abe’s fascinating study 
nails it: “You can’t do a trade deal with Germany, 
only the EU.”
While the first three contributions to this volume 
deal with economic institutions (Manow), polit-
ical institutions (Di Carlo) and economic inter-
ests (Estevez-Abe), Federico Bruno analyses in 
the fourth contribution the prevalent economic 
ideas that led Italy and Germany into the forma-
tion of the Eurozone and guided them through 
the economic crisis.22 Assessing the explanatory 
value of idiosyncratic socio-economic ideas such 
20  Donato Di Carlo, “Germany is Quietly Rebalancing its 
Economy – But this will not Fix the Eurozone’s Flaws“ (2018). 
Annex 3.
21  “Geo-Politics of Exporting Too Much: Contrasting Trajecto-
ries of Germany and Japan”.
22  “Ideational differences between Italian and German govern-
ments during the crisis”.
as ordoliberalism and Italian style Keynesianism, 
Bruno concludes that the influence of ideas can 
only be understood if they are put into the context 
of the political landscape and electoral coalitions 
in both countries. Like Di Carlo, Bruno points at 
the importance of political and electoral coalitions 
for Italian Eurozone positions. The focus is hereby 
on the political split of the country between 
North and South. National traditions of economic 
thought matter, not as direct causal factors, but 
because they are used as cues to the electorate.
What we have assembled so far are contributions 
from different analytical and methodological 
angles in which institutions, interests and ideas 
all feature separately as explanatory variables. 
This calls for synthetisation. In the last contri-
bution to Part One, Josef Hien introduces the 
concept of cultural political economy to integrate 
the above laid out approaches to the crisis.23 For 
the rest of social science, culture as an explana-
tory variable is (often not unfoundedly), accused 
of being a residual category that is evoked when all 
other explanations fail. However, the strength of a 
cultural political economy is that it can integrate 
the trichotomy between institutions, interests, 
and ideas. As in Weber’s famous switchmen meta-
phor, it is not interest, ideas or institutions that 
determine action, but all of them together. When 
interest, institutions and ideas all point in the same 
direction, they form a self-reinforcing compound, 
an amalgam that is very hard to overcome or to 
break up, even for a superpower like the EU. Hien 
uses neo-Weberian theory to build an integrative 
analytical framework to explain from a long-term 
historical-sociological perspective why Italy and 
Germany seem to be set on different tracks. With 
a special focus on the diverging cultural back-
ground of both countries, Hien re-constructs the 
pathways of both political economies since the 
1950s, explaining how they could end up in such 
different positions today.
All five contributions in Part One of our collection 
show that Italy and Germany have grown apart, 




rather than converged, during the past 30 years. 
Now, we will look at divergences across specific 
sectors of the economy in Part Two.
B) Sectors of the Political 
Economy of Italy and Germany
Part One of the present collection showed us how 
the divergences of the German and Italian political 
economies play out on the aggregated level, but 
we know little about how the divergences manifest 
across different sectors of the economy. We have 
selected the housing-construction sectors and the 
banking sectors as prime infrastructural back-
bones of both systems. These are supplemented 
with a comparative study on family cultures and 
family policy in both cases. Albeit not an economic 
sector in the strict traditional sense (though child 
and elderly care employ ever more people) and a 
policy-field that is usually side-lined in the main-
stream political economy literature, we want to 
highlight its cross-sectoral implications since it 
is central to the functioning of the economy as a 
whole, structuring the supply of young and skilled 
workforce.
Sebastian Kohl and Alexander Spielau target the 
“forgotten sector” of housing and construction, 
as they call it in their contribution.24 Pointing to 
its impact on employment and GDP growth, they 
observe that it is strange that classical political 
economy sidesteps it. Kohl and Spielau point out 
that housing and construction differs dramatically 
between both countries and that it plays a central 
role in both economies. While the existence of a 
large rental stock reinforces the export led-growth 
model of Germany, the large homeownership 
rates in Italy fuel into an internal demand-driven 
economy in Italy. This led to different demands and 
requirements that both countries have towards the 
single currency. In a meticulously well-informed 
and detailed study, the authors follow the trajecto-
ries of the housing sectors of both countries from 
WW II till today, putting the thesis of distinct 
24  Sebastian Kohl and Alexander Spielau, “Worlds Apart: the Di-
vergences of Southern European Housing-construction Econo-
mies and Northern European Export Economies” (2018).
clusters of Southern-European housing-construc-
tion economies and Northern-rental-export econ-
omies on the agenda.
With the banking sector, we look at another crucial 
infrastructural backbone of the Italian and German 
economy. Frederik Traut scrutinises the interven-
tions in both countries during the banking crisis.25 
Somewhat unexpectedly, he finds that Germany, 
in staunch neglect of its supposed ordoliberal 
orientation, intervened heavily once its banking 
sector got into trouble during the great financial 
crisis. In the case of IKB, a bank specialised in 
lending to small and medium-size enterprises, the 
government injected 7 bn Euros out of fear that 
the failing of the bank would bring down the rest 
of the economy. After this and other large-scale 
bail-outs in Germany, the government was eager 
to promote a harsh bail-in regulation at European 
level. In Italy, due to better banking supervision, 
the government did not have to intervene in the 
banking sector. However, once the financial crisis 
gave way to a global recession, this changed due 
to many non-performing loans that Italian banks 
had given to companies now hit by the recession. 
Italy therefore faced a hidden, longer and time-
lagged banking crisis, in contrast to Germany. 
With the new European regulation in place that 
the Germans had pushed for, the Italian govern-
ment saw its hands tied once the slow-boiling 
crisis became ever more evident in Italy. Traut 
argues, convincingly in our view, that the Italian 
government had no other option than to circum-
vent the new regulation giving its banks the same 
medicine that the German banks had obtained 
from their government before, facing, however, 
strong criticism from Germany. Lucia Quaglia’s 
contribution corroborates Traut’s findings.26 She 
scrutinises the policy-process around the estab-
lishment of the banking union, pointing out 
that Germany’s and Italy’s preferences and posi-
tions were at odds, representing the North-South 
cleavage within the European Union, in which the 
25  “Banking Crisis Interventions in Germany and Italy: The Un-
pleasant Case of the New European Bank Resolution Frame-
work.”




decisive difference was in the fact that Germany 
had already overcome its banking crisis. Traut’s 
and Quaglia’s findings resonate well with Kohl and 
Spielau’s: the different impact and unfolding of the 
banking crisis stems from the structural difference 
between the banking and lending sectors in Italy 
and Germany, that evolve from the differences in 
the housing and construction sectors.
The Varieties of Capitalism and growth model 
perspectives neglect family policy and family 
cultures, which are crucial to understand the 
widening gap between Italy’s and Germany’s 
socio-economic profiles. Agnes Blome sheds light 
on the staunchly diverse paths that the two coun-
tries have followed since the 1990s. In the early 
1990s, Italy and Germany shared similar conser-
vative cultures and institutions concerning early 
childcare and the employment of women with 
children.27 In both countries, female employ-
ment rates hovered just above 50 per cent. In the 
2000s, Germany embarked on a reform trajectory 
abolishing the male-breadwinner-centred family 
policy model that had been in place for over half 
a century by introducing parental leave schemes 
and early child-care coverage for under three-
year-olds. Blome shows how a change in cultural 
values after the 1990s accelerated the German 
reform trajectory, while Italy did not experience 
such a change in values. As a result, the mothers 
employment rates in Italy have only moved from 
54 to 56 percentage points during the past 30 years 
while the German mothers employment rate is 
with over 70 per cent, the second highest in the 
EU.
We see now that both economies reacted differ-
ently not only when one looks at them from an 
aggregated perspective as we did in Part One, but 
also across different sectors of the economy, as we 
showed in Part Two. This, as we will now show in 
Part Three, has impacted strongly on the attitudes 
that German and Italian citizens have towards 
each other, and how they perceive their country’s 
relation to the European Union.
27  “Maternal employment, attitudes toward gender equal-
ity and work-family policies. German-Italian Discrepan-
cies”?
C) German and Italian Percep-
tions, Differences and Misgivings
So far our collection shows that both countries 
have grown apart since the 1990s. The differences 
in institutions, interests and culture that set both 
economies apart have a dire impact on the feeling 
of citizens towards one another. The adverse feel-
ings to one another and towards the EU have also 
re-structured the party systems in both countries. 
The backdrop to these attitudinal changes is the 
different experience of the crisis and of the struc-
tural reform process connected to it.
Alessandro Pelegatta shows how the widening gap 
between Italy and Germany in institutions, social 
structure and political attitudes is mirrored in the 
attitudes of the citizens of both countries towards 
one another.28 This view is strongly associated 
with the feelings that the citizens of both countries 
have towards the EU. Italian citizens tend to blame 
Germany for the Euro crisis and for the bad Italian 
economic situation. They think that Germany is 
abusing its power in Europe and that its behaviour 
has made the crisis worse. The EU, in this sense, 
has become a project dominated by Germany. 
Moreover, the countries have reversed their posi-
tions regarding their position towards European 
integration. While, traditionally, Italians have 
been in favour of integration while Germans were 
sceptical, the past decade saw the inversion of 
these positions.
Hanspeter Kriesi illuminates how this fed into 
the new party system configurations in Italy and 
Germany.29 He embeds the two most recent elec-
tions in Germany and Italy into the wider Euro-
pean picture and the trends of party-system 
change, pointing to profound tensions between 
the élites and the people in both countries, which 
have given rise to populist challenger parties. The 
flaring up of the party systems has made govern-
ment formation difficult and while Germany opted 
for the old grand-coalition model, Italy has now 
28  “Italy and Germany during the Crisis. Support of the EU and 
Reciprocal Views.”
29  “The Political Space in Italy and Germany during the Crisis: 
Italian and German Populism Compared.”
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an all populist government. Both, Kriesi argues, 
are unstable. The grand coalition model because 
it “ain’t so grand no more”, combining only 53 per 
cent of votes. The Italian government coalition 
is unstable due to the tensions between the two 
populist parties on ideological issues.
Providing the background for the populist surge, 
Filippo Taddei takes issue both with the term and 
demand for structural reforms.30 Having been 
involved as practitioner in the Jobs Act reform in 
Italy, he launches a powerful argument that struc-
tural reforms, as demanded by Northern European 
states from Southern European countries in crisis, 
can only be structural if they can marshal polit-
ical and popular consensus at home. Comparing 
the Fornero Pension Reform of 2011 with the Jobs 
Act of 2015, two structural reforms enacted in 
Italy during the crisis, Taddei concludes that “only 
reforms investing political capital and gathering 
consensus in their scope can persist in time and 
affect ordinary economic and social behaviour”. 
He thereby provides a clue as to why the struc-
tural reforms in Italy, seen by the population as 
imposed from the North, have led to anti German 
and anti-EU feelings, as described by both Pele-
gatta and Kriesi. It also explains why these reforms 
are about to be partly rolled back by the new 
populist government, and makes a strong case for 
the counter-productivity of octruating structural 
reforms from the outside.
Manos Matsaganis looks at the impact of the 
European crisis and its aftermath in the European 
South with a special focus on the Italian (non-) 
recovery.31 Analysing and comparing economic 
indicators both pre- and post-crisis, Manos find-
ings are shocking. Portugal, but none of the other 
Southern European countries are back to pre-
crisis levels of economic performance. Besides the 
worst-case scenario of Greece, Italy is the second 
worst off. Matsaganis hints at the co-evolution of 
political extremism in the European South (except 
in Portugal) with the way in which the crisis was 
handled in terms of structural reforms by the EU 
30  “European Integration and Political Ownership: Fiction and 
Reality behind Structural Reforms and Risk Sharing.”
31  “The Political Economy of Recovery in Southern Europe.”
and Northern European governments. This links 
well into the first-hand practitioner insights that 
Filippo Taddei provides for the Italian case, in 
which he theorises form his experiences about the 
necessity of domestic political ownership as a pre-
condition for a successful structural reforms in the 
European South.
Ilaria Madama and Matteo Jessoula’s contribu-
tion shows how the Europe 2020 framework is 
implemented in very different ways in national 
contexts.32 The authors give us a wonderful study 
of the contrasting implementation of poverty and 
social exclusion policies in Italy and Germany 
during the first five cycles of the European semester. 
This also shows that the differences between 
welfare-state institutions in Italy and Germany 
have become broader, instead of narrower, over 
the past two decades. Both countries fight poverty 
very differently under the same European provi-
sions. Germany distorted the policy framework to 
fit with its century old traditions and institutions 
of poverty relief and social exclusion policies. In 
Italy, in contrast, the targets and the institutions 
that Brussels proposed were fully embraced since 
the country had only a weak social exclusion and 
poverty relief policy before. The contribution not 
only provides a rigid analysis of the policy process, 
but also theorises when and how EU programmes 
are implemented or re-formulated to fit national 
traditions and culture.
What we have seen in Part Three of our collection 
is that the structural and widening differences 
between both countries have an impact on public 
opinion, party systems, and government forma-
tion. With the assessment of structural reforms 
in Italy and the diverging ways in which the EU 
provisions are implemented in both countries, we 
have also come to a first idea of about why, after 30 
years of accelerated and forceful socio-economic 
integration in Europe, the two countries are still 
“worlds apart from one another”.
32  “Accommodating EU’s Influence vs Protecting National Sover-
eignty. The Fight Against Poverty in Italy and Germany at the 
Time of ‘Europe 2020’.”
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D) The Legacy of the Welfare 
State in Europe
Ever since Alan Milward’s seminal study on The 
European Rescue of the Welfare State33 “Social 
Europe” and the search for a “European Social 
Model” keeps irritating the students of European 
integration – conceptually, empirically, and politi-
cally. Milward’s rescue thesis was published in the 
year which witnessed the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the move towards a common currency. 
It is difficult to read these events as a “rescue 
operation” and Bo Stråth, Milward’s successor at 
the EUI History Department, had good reasons 
to underline that this Union was no longer the 
Europe of Milward.34 And yet, in a paradoxical 
sense, Milward’s thesis has regained topicality. In 
his October 2014 speech to the European Parlia-
ment, European Commission President elect, Jean-
Claude Juncker, spoke of his wish for Europe to 
be “triple-A on social issues”, putting social issues 
further up on the agenda.35 Pamela Pansardi36 
shows that it was not only this speech but that 
all his speeches are decisively more pro welfare 
in their vocabulary than those of the previous 
Barroso Commission. What this was supposed to 
mean was codified in the European Pillar of Social 
Rights,37 and subsequently solemnly supported 
by the Commission, the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament.38 This is definitely a spectacular 
return of “the social” on the European agenda. 
Both Florian Rödl39 and Vladimir Bogoeski40 
33  Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, New 
York: Routledge 1992.
34  Bo Stråth, “Still the Europe of Milward? On the Need for a 
New Long-Term Historical Understanding of Today’s Europe”, 
UCL Working Paper No. 1/2011, London 2011.
35  “A New Start for Europe”, Strasbourg, 15 July 2014, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-567_en.htm.
36  “A ‘more political’ leadership for the President of the Commis-
sion? A mixed-methods language based analysis.”
37  Ibid.
38  Proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, Gothen-
burg, 17 November 2017.
39  “An Alternative to the Constitution of the EU’s Single Mar-
ket”?
40  “The EU Political Culture of Total Optimism is not Dead: The 
Case of the European Pillar of Social Rights.”
are not impressed, however. Rödl lists the many 
obstacles against the realisation of a common 
social legislative agenda and opts for a re-orien-
tation of the conceptualisation of the function 
of the economic freedoms which would inhibit 
their instrumentalisation for a de-regulation of 
national social accomplishments. Bogoeski reads 
the proclamation of the Social Pillar as an exer-
cise in whitewashing, an example of what Giando-
menico Majone has characterised as the European 
élites’ “political culture of total optimism”.41 The 
Pillar is soft indeed. This softness contrasts mark-
edly not only with the above-mentioned jurispru-
dence of the CJEU and the imposition of internal 
devaluation in Europe’s austerity politics, but 
even, as Francesco Costamagna underlines, with 
the implementation of the European Semester.42 
His observations document that the perception 
of a great diversity of socio-economic conditions, 
to which the semester responds, is counteracted 
by the uniformity of neoliberal recipes which 
orient the management of the semester. These 
tensions are an acid test for our assumptions on 
the resilience of national economic cultures. Two 
contributions are illuminating here. As Marcel 
Hadeed, in his analysis of the Reception of the 
“Social Pillar” shows, the weight attributed by 
the German government and its Fachbürokratie 
to this noble initiative, is “en quelque façon nul”.43 
This seems, in the sphere of social policy, all the 
more remarkable as Minister for Labour and 
Social Affairs, Hubertus Heil, is a Social Demo-
crat and by no means from the right wing of 
that party. Hadeed cites the German Finance 
Minister, also a Social Democrat, assuring us that 
“a German finance minister is a German finance 
minister regardless of his party card”. The agenda 
of the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs is not 
41  “The Deeper Euro-Crisis or: The Collapse of the EU Political 
Culture of Total Optimism,” Working Paper, 2015, available at: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/35281.
42  “Industrial Relations and Labour Law in the EU Economic 
Governance Mechanisms: The Cases of Italy and Germany”.




that of the conservative coalition partner, but it 
is entirely German in the definition of its priori-
ties. An important determinant in Germany is its 
fiscal federalism which has institutionalised a low-
wage equilibrium. The Italian pattern is character-
ised by conditions which favour the toleration of 
inflationary wage increases. Is it at all conceivable 
that Europe can create the “institutional determi-
nants of balanced wage growth”? The fundamental 
dilemma of national political autonomy is a risk 
for the priorities of European governance that 
have been established. The control of these condi-
tions, however, would require extremely complex 
and demanding responses. And a recipe that may 
work for the German-Italian case, will hardly work 
in the entire Union.
E) The Demise of Law
A little more than two decades ago, just a few years 
after a, then, young post-Ernst Haas generation of 
political scientists, had (re-) discovered the inte-
gration process as a worthwhile academic topic, 
Christian Joerges urged these newcomers “to 
take the law seriously”.44 Those years witnessed 
a “golden age” of interdisciplinary studies, with 
legal scholarship exploring more curiously then 
ever the operation of legal actors, the context, and 
the impact of legal prescriptions; political scien-
tists were - often enough - inspiring such innova-
tive endeavours. By now, these times are gone. The 
reasons or this are complex and somewhat para-
doxical. The earlier interdisciplinary co-operation 
rested on the implicit transdisciplinary assump-
tion that integration was a good thing which 
deserved to be promoted. After a decade of finan-
cial crisis, this seems no longer so unquestionable. 
The prevailing attitude in other disciplines is quite 
similar. Lawyers observe and meticulously docu-
ment the establishment of a new “crisis law”. Polit-
ical scientists observe and document with great 
precision the growth of European powers and 
governance practices. Both disciplines hesitate 
44  “Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and 
the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration”, 
European Law Journal, 2 (1996), 105-135.
to confirm that this new constellation is here to 
stay and would deserve this quasi-constitutional 
importance. These new uncertainties are accom-
panied by another tectonic shift in the contest 
of disciplines. Thanks to the preoccupation of 
European élites with the financial crisis, econo-
mists occupy the driver’s seat when it comes to 
providing practical advice. The paradigms and 
rationality criteria of economics, however, are 
distinct and not really reconcilable with those 
of the social sciences, let alone, the normative 
concerns of lawyers, and certainly not akin to the 
kind of agenda which we are pursuing.45
Both the disciplinary composition of our partici-
pants and the substance of their comments mirror 
this constellation quite faithfully. Only three econ-
omist attended the conference.46 The number 
of lawyers still seems considerable. There is not 
much left, however, of the once widespread belief 
that law would be both “the agent and the object 
of integration”.47 The contributions that we have 
assembled in section F are anything but affirma-
tive. Katharina Mangold’s48 comments on the 
role of the Commission touch upon a very sensi-
tive issue of general importance. She takes issue 
with Commissioner Oettinger’s comments on 
Italian politics. This is well argued. However, the 
Commission is, next to the ECB, the most impor-
tant example for what Paul Tucker characterises 
as an “unelected power”.49 The Commission has to 
compensate for its democratic deficit by expertise 
and objectivity. And yet, even where it acts as a 
45  The only transdisciplinary approach we are aware of 
is “Constitutional economics” as inspired by James 
Buchanan and defended in particular by the “third gen-
eration” of the Freiburg school; see most prominently 
Lars Feld, “Eine Europäische Verfassung aus polit-öko-
nomischerSicht”, ORDO – Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 54 (2003), 289-317.
46  Frederik Traut, see Section C 3.
47  Dehousse, R., and Weiler, J.H.H., “The Legal Dimension”, 
in: Wallace, W. (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration, 
London: Pinter, 242-260.
48  “The EU Commission as ‘Honest Broker’? German and Italian 
Perspectives on an Administrative Body”.
49  Tucker, P. (2018), Unelected Power. The Quest for 
Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State, 
Princeton NJ-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018.
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“guardian of the Treaty”, it cannot avoid exerting 
power and should, precisely for this reason, act 
more prudently than Oettinger did. The other 
lawyers address more general discrepancies 
between the legal design of the integration project 
and its actual functions and performance. Their 
object is the transformation of the Union in the 
course of the financial crisis. They all diagnose the 
failings of the “integration through law” agenda. 
These failings have a long history. They became 
dramatically apparent, when the Union under-
took its “turn to governance”, which was essentially 
meant to overcome the limits of European powers 
where the need to take action seemed urgent.50 
President Mario Draghi’s proclaimed readiness 
to do “whatever it takes”51 is evidence of the same 
strategy.52 Nicole Scicluna53 underlines the author-
itarian and coercive mode of the European crisis 
management and adds that the imposed inte-
gration strategy may end up in disintegration 
through the erosion of the legitimacy of the Euro-
pean project. Both Christian Joerges54 and Karl-
Heinz Ladeur55 address the same concerns, albeit 
in different ways. In Joerges’ understanding, the 
democratic deficiency of Europe’s crisis politics 
stems, in the last instance, from its disregard of the 
legitimate political ordering of “the economic” in 
constitutional democracies.56 Ladeur’s account is 
less “legalistic”. He underlines the interdependence 
50  Joerges, C, “Integration through de-legislation? An irritated 
heckler”, European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No. 
N-07-03, available at: http://www.connex-network.org/eu-
rogov/pdf/egp-newgov-N-07-03.pdf.
51  Verbatim at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/
html/sp120726.en.html.
52  Draghi wisely added that this occurred “within our mandate”.
53  “Integration-through-crisis as a distinct integrative mode: 
Placing expediency ahead of democracy”?
54  “The Challenge of Socio-Economic Varieties to the Law 
of European Integration”.
55  “The End of the Universality of Norms as a Model for Europe 
–The Error of “Seeing like a State” (J. S. Scott) in the Postmod-
ern Condition”.
56  The diagnosis of a crisis of law is compatible with 
Scicluna’s findings; see, also, C. Joerges and C. Kreuder-
Sonnen, “European Studies and the European Crisis: 
Legal and Political Science between Critique and Com-
placency”, European Law Journal, 23 (2017): 118-139.
of formal rules and “social norms”, which, only in 
their complementarity, ensure the functioning of 
economic and political systems. His conceptuali-
sation is an exercise in sociological jurisprudence 
with great affinities to Hien’s notion of economic 
cultures.57 And it should be apparent that there is 
no contradiction between such perceptions of an 
erosion of legalism and a disintegration of Euro-
pean studies with the insistence of the contribu-
tors to section D on the viability of legal protection 
against marketisation processes which threaten 
the social existence of workers.
F) Justice, Security, Finances 
and Solidarity
Throughout all of the contributions we observe 
concerns about the future of Europe which explic-
itly or at least implicitly assume that the present 
state of the Union should not be petrified as its new 
normalcy. The pertinent suggestions, however, all 
operate in the shadow of Hegel’s Ohnmacht des 
Sollens (powerlessness of the ought). Where we 
imagine the contours of a better European future, 
we are plagued by scepticism. Does it really make 
sense to come up with proposals which seem so 
obviously unrealistic? We suggest that it does. We 
believe that even “unrealistic” proposals can help 
us to understand Europe’s present better; we also 
believe that Europe’s presence is characterised by 
such high uncertainties that complacency with 
regard to the presence is anything but comforting.
The three contributions in the present section F 
pursue very different strategies.
Libraries have been filled with literature on the 
democratic deficit of the EU. Glyn Morgan,58 
however, focuses on another issue, the problem 
of justice. Constitutionalists tend to address this 
issue in the context of the powers of the EU either 
in the realm of labour law and welfare politics, 
or in the context of constitutional commitments, 
such as the Sozialstaatsklausel of the German 
Basic Law. Both the debates on welfare politics 
57  A 4.
58  “Is the EU Unjust”?
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and the debate between Habermas and Streeck, as 
re-constructed by Joerges,59 testify to a difficulty 
of fundamental importance: Is a European Sozi-
alstaat at all conceivable or can Sozialsaatlichkeit 
be realised only by nation states? Morgan’s shift to 
“justice” bypasses this dichotomy. The European 
project, he submits, can be and should be justi-
fied by the security that it ensures for the citizens 
of the Union. This is a defence of “deep” integra-
tion, albeit an unconventional one. Members of 
a polity which ensures their security “owe each 
other the duty to guarantee the conditions of secu-
rity. This duty will have distributive implications, 
but different distributive implications than within 
a nation-state”.
Tiziano Zgaga’s essay departs from a dense and 
instructive re-construction of the Commission’s 
proposal for a European Minister of Economy 
and Finance.60 Whoever remembers the remark of 
the former President of the Bundesbank, Helmut 
Schlesinger, in the proceedings on the Maastricht 
Treaty before the Bundesverfassungsgericht “that a 
currency union, especially between States which 
are oriented towards an active economic and social 
policy, can ultimately only be realised in common 
with a political union (embracing all essential 
economic functions) and cannot be realised inde-
pendently thereof or as a mere preliminary stage 
on the way to it”,61 will remain impressed but 
disappointed. There is enormous ingenuity in the 
Commission’s proposals. There are also unset-
tled constitutional and political issues such as the 
growth of ever more “unelected power”.62 Zgaga 
addresses these in the second section of his essay. 
His own views are close to Schlesinger’s position. 
Of particular interest in the present context is his 
re-construction of the German and the Italian 
position. Unsurprisingly, these diverge drastically. 
59  F 3.
60  “A European Minister of Economy and Finance: Assessing the 
Commission’s Proposal and Comparing Germany’s and Italy’s 
Position”.
61  2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 155. English transla-
tion: Manfred Brunner and Others v. The European Union 
Treaty [1994] 1 Common Market Law Reports 57 (para. 92).
62  See n. 50 above.
Zgaga’s analysis of the reasons is revealing with 
respect to the importance of the cultural determi-
nants of economic policy. There is a strong touch 
of ordoliberalism in the German resistance, inter-
estingly one which is not identical with party affil-
iations: “Everywhere in Europe I said: a German 
finance minister is a German finance minister…”63
The distinction between justice “within” and justice 
“between” the Member States, which Morgan 
underlines, was of no concern in the homoge-
neous world of the old EEC. This changed with 
the enlargements of the Union. What emerged as 
a concern then became dramatic after the estab-
lishment of the EMU and the discipline imposed 
on the members of the Eurozone. We have to (re-)
solidarise Europe in order to defuse the still viru-
lent crisis and its impact - both within and between 
the Member States, argue Maurizio Ferrera and 
Carlo Burelli.64 Their finding is that EMU has 
created interdependencies and dynamics which 
are beyond our control. Their notion capturing 
this state of affairs is the “complex adaptive system 
(CAS)”. The tragedy is that the “properties of a 
CAS are not merely causally active but become 
irreducible and irreversible”. “Solidarity” is a 
commitment enshrined in Article 2 TEU. It has to 
be fleshed out – and then implemented in a Union 
of ever deepening diversity and conflicts.
63  Social Democrat Olaf Scholz (minister of finance) on 22 
March 2018, cited in Hadeed, D 4.




We have included in this Annex, two contributions 
which were not presented at the Vigoni confer-
ence. They represent, in our view, the spectre of 
options which we have to face. Claus Offe and 
Maurizio Ferrera’s opt for a turn to solidarity. Such 
a turn, they add, is unlikely to occur deliberately; 
Europe will nevertheless be forced into it.65 Di 
Carlo closes the Annex, showing how Germany is 
quietly re-balancing its economy.66
65  “Order in the Eurozone”. Claus Offe has elaborated his views 
in: Europe Entrapped, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015, and 
“Europe Entrapped. Does the EU have the Political Capacity 
to Overcome its Current Crisis?”, European Law Journal 19 
(2013): 595-611.
66  “Germany is quietly Rebalancing its Economy – But this will 
not Fix the Eurozone’s Flaws.”
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1. Germany in the Euro Area 
– A New Equilibrium?
In this paper, I ask how German wage setting 
and, more generally, how Germany’s production 
regime functions in the euro area. This also allows 
me to compare the German export-led growth 
model with the French or Italian models. The 
paper primarily covers the first decade of the new 
millennium, a time that not only saw the creation 
of the euro area and, with it, a fundamental trans-
formation of the basic economic parameters 
within which the German model previously func-
tioned. Starting in 2008 and triggered by the insol-
vency of Lehman Brothers, the world economy 
also experienced a profound economic crisis—
the Great Recession. Although the comparisons 
with the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 
early 1930s that are frequently drawn (Eichen-
green 2012; O’Rourke and Taylor 2013) appear a 
bit exaggerated, the depth and impact of the finan-
cial crisis seem to render it largely unrivalled by 
most other post-World War II crashes. The deep 
economic slump in the wake of the Lehman bank-
ruptcy subsequently spilled over into a dramatic 
challenge to the euro area, manifested in the 
severe sovereign debt crisis of some of its member 
countries and, consequently, in a persistent reces-
sion (Scharpf 2011; Hall 2012; De Grauwe 2013; 
Hancké 2013; Streeck and Schäfer 2013; Iversen, 
Soskice et al. 2016; Iversen and Soskice 2018). This 
67* Paper prepared for presentation at the “Responses of European 
Economic Cultures to Europe’s Crisis Politics” Conference at 
Villa Vigoni, 25-27 June 2018. The paper draws on the manu-
script Social Protection, Capitalist Production. The Bismarckian 
Welfare State in the German Political Economy, 1880-2015, 
forthcoming with OUP.
crisis shook and continues to shake the founda-
tions of an economic structure to which Germany 
had adapted over the previous ten years.
A break-up of the currency zone, today less likely 
than in 2009–2011 but still a possible scenario, 
would have fundamental and unpredictable reper-
cussions for the German economy and the coun-
try’s public finances. Currently, the crisis lingers 
on and is expected to remain with us in the coming 
years, since European recovery would presup-
pose that the euro area’s serious structural defects 
(EMU as an “incomplete” currency union; see De 
Grauwe 2012) be repaired. As long as this does not 
occur, any “return to normalcy” remains unlikely. 
A high level of government debt and a low level 
of competitiveness in southern Europe appar-
ently either require a complete change of the euro 
area’s institutional set-up - possibly a split into 
two different currency zones, one representing 
the northern export-led growth model under 
a strong euro, the other the southern demand-
driven, consumption-based economic model with 
continuous depreciations - or will be resolved in 
a drawn-out process of structural adjustment and 
a prolonged recessive period in the periphery, 
possibly eased by massive transfers from the euro 
area’s less burdened northern members (Iversen 
and Soskice 2018). As gloomy as both scenarios 
appear in economic terms, it remains wholly 
uncertain whether either option would even find 
enough support to render it politically sustainable
The paper addresses the question of how the 
German economy has fared in these new and 
profoundly challenging times. In this context, I 
will address the following more specific puzzles.
• If the interplay between an independent 
central bank with a non-accommodating 
monetary policy, on the one hand, and a quasi-
corporatist system of wage coordination, on 
the other, was so central to the functioning 
of Modell Deutschland after the breakdown 
of Bretton Woods (Scharpf 1987; Hall 1994; 
Hall and Franzese 1998), how have unions and 
employers responded to the new environment 
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where the ECB’s monetary policy could no 
longer be exclusively targeted at German wage 
settlements, but was set with euro area-wide 
inflation in mind (Hancké 2013)? 
• If the generous German welfare state is 
designed in such a way that the “social part-
ners” could use or, for that matter, often abuse 
it for their particularistic needs (Streeck 2009), 
how did this close production-protection 
nexus survive the fundamental reform of the 
Bismarckian welfare state through what was 
known as the Agenda 2010 under Chancellor 
Schröder? How has Germany managed to 
avoid the emerging low-wage sector under-
mining the country’s high-skill/high-produc-
tivity/high-wage regime—as unions always 
had feared? In other words: Can the German 
system function under conditions of dualisa-
tion (Palier and Thelen 2010; Emmenegger, 
Häusermann et al. 2012)? Apparently the 
answer is yes, but how exactly?68
• Finally, how can we explain Germany’s initial 
economic troubles, which prevailed until 
around 2005, its quite spectacular subsequent 
comeback, plus its almost complete mirror 
image—namely the impressive boom in most 
southern member countries of the euro area 
up until the financial crisis (Italy seems to be 
an exception here since the Italian economy 
already stagnated since the early 2000s) and 
the bust ever since? What can the framework 
proposed here contribute to such an expla-
nation, particularly with its emphasis on the 
interaction between social protection and 
capitalist production in the continental polit-
ical economies (see Section 4)? 
68   I will only briefly touch on the political fallout of these 
developments. One of the political consequences/outcomes 
of the profound welfare reforms was the rise and then firm 
establishment of a new radical alternative to the left wing of 
the SPD. This affected the “strategic configuration of parties” 
(Kitschelt) in the German party system (Schumacher 2011)
(Schumacher 2011; Arndt 2013). See also (Schwander and 
Manow 2016).
In my attempt to answer these questions, I use the 
label “supply-side corporatism” (Wolfgang Streeck) 
to help me describe the deeply ingrained mecha-
nisms by which the German political economy 
adjusts to a high interest rate environment. These 
mechanisms were employed when the German 
economy experienced its first adjustment crisis in 
response to the new monetary regime under the 
euro. I then address in some detail the profound 
welfare and labour market reforms that were a 
central part of this adjustment process (together 
with wage moderation), namely what was known 
as the Agenda 2010 (see Section 2). Subsequently, I 
analyse the changes in Germany’s wage bargaining 
system under the new monetary opportunity 
structure, and how the welfare reforms have been 
conducive to the adjustment of wage coordination 
(see Section 3). Lastly, this gives me the oppor-
tunity to compare the two political economies in 
the euro area (the continental and the southern 
growth models) and to sketch how they function 
under the single currency (see Section 4). I relate 
my description of the functioning logic of these 
two political economies to the argument devel-
oped in previous papers, i.e., to an account of the 
interplay between welfare states, types of capi-
talism, and party competition (cf. Kersbergen and 
Manow 2009; Manow 2009; Manow 2013; Manow 
2015; Manow, Palier et al. 2017). This enables us to 
locate the German political economy in a broader 
comparative framework.
2. The Agenda 2010 – The End 
of the “Bismarckian Promise”
Probably the most significant reform of the 
German welfare state in recent years was the 
groundbreaking Agenda 2010 reform, including 
the highly controversial labour market reforms 
(Hartz reforms) enacted under the red/green 
(SPD/Greens) coalition with Gerhard Schröder as 
Chancellor (Hassel and Schiller 2010; Arndt 2013: 
99; cf. 99-126). Given that the relatively peaceful 
industrial relations in Germany have always been 
predicated on the welfare consensus between 
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both Social and Christian Democracy, for many 
Germany in the early 2000s represented the Euro-
pean country where social reform was least likely 
(Kitschelt 2001)—despite the apparent malfunc-
tioning of the German economy, as was mani-
fested in low growth and high unemployment. 
Therefore, the comprehensive welfare reforms 
enacted by the red/green coalition in 2002 and 
2003 came as a surprise to many observers.
In the early 2000s, Germany struggled with low 
growth and high unemployment. It was a time 
when Germany was labelled the “sick man of 
Europe.” Real GDP growth had plummeted from 2 
percent in 1998 and 1999 to 0.5 and 0.4 percent in 
2002 and 2003, respectively. In 2005, the German 
economy was almost stagnant at 0.2 percent. In 
2004/2005, unemployment came close to a stag-
gering 12 percent and, in absolute terms, reached 
the critical five-million threshold.
The fact that Germany faced economic problems 
almost immediately after the introduction of the 
new currency was no coincidence, but rather 
the consequence of the high real interest rates 
that accompanied the Euro(see Krugman and 
Obstfeld 2012: 767, Figure 20.8): “Before 1999, 
Germany had not only the lowest nominal interest 
rates, but also the lowest real interest rates. With 
entry into the Monetary Union, however, these 
comparative advantages were lost. Since nominal 
interest rates converged whereas German infla-
tion rates continued to be lower, real interest 
rates in Germany actually became the highest 
in the euro area. As a consequence, economic 
growth was lower in Germany than almost any 
other EMU member country, unemployment 
increased dramatically from 2000 to 2005, as did 
social expenditures, whereas tax revenues fell by 
2.4 percentage points between 2000 and 2004” 
(Scharpf 2011: 13). In the rest of the euro area, 
credit-fueled higher demand, higher growth, 
and a housing bubble, particularly in Spain and 
Ireland, drove inflation and thereby forced real 
interest rates down (Krugman and Obstfeld 2012). 
The divergence between higher- and lower-infla-
tion countries that had already been predicted as 
early as 1992 in the famous Walters Critique of the 
common currency evolved exactly as anticipated 
(Walters 1992; Carlin 2013).
The crisis could also be explained by the fact that 
German capital flowed to the south immediately 
after the introduction of the common currency. 
Today we are aware that this movement was driven 
by the mistaken belief that capital within the euro 
area—with its uniform interest rate, common 
fiscal rules, and lack of exchange rate risks—could 
be safely shifted to where the “economic action” 
was, i.e., where high growth rates and there-
fore high returns on investments prevailed.69 The 
consumption and construction boom in southern 
Europe was fuelled by what, from the perspective 
of the periphery, were exceptionally low interest 
rates and this attracted German capital, thus rein-
forcing the boom. The ECB, forced to pursue a 
“one size fits all” monetary policy in a currency 
area where both an overheated economy (Spain or 
Ireland, for instance) and an economy in recession 
(such as Germany) soon existed side by side, inev-
itably selected an interest rate that was too low to 
dampen the Spanish or Irish construction craze, 
but that was already too high for Germany’s bleak 
economy (and has subsequently been dubbed 
a “one size fits none” rate). At a time when high 
growth rates, high employment, and rising real 
wages in the south seemed to be signs of exactly the 
economic convergence process that optimists had 
expected from the single currency - evidence of 
what is known in economics as the Balassa-Samu-
elson effect (Illing, Jauch et al. 2012) - Germany 
had to undergo a politically and economically 
painful process of structural reform. 
At that time, however, Germany’s economic slump 
in the year 2000 was not perceived as having much 
to do with the euro. Further, even if political actors 
had been aware of the underlying causes (which 
in all likeliness they were not), they still had to 
avoid at all costs de-legitimising the new currency, 
which had been introduced against the will of 
the majority of Germans. Instead, the dominant 
discourse held the prevailing labour market inflex-
ibility and high non-wage labour costs, a dysfunc-
69  Martin Wolf dryly comments: “Why anybody should 
have imagined that Greek and German government debts were 
equivalent is not easy to comprehend” (Wolf 2014: 47).
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tional welfare state, and, in general, a significant 
political reform gridlock (Reformstau) responsible 
for the poor state in which Germany’s economy 
found itself at the start of the new millennium.
Of course, not all of Germany’s poor economic 
performance at the time can be blamed on the 
new currency. It is quite apparent that Germa-
ny’s GDP growth had been sluggish and its labour 
market performance poor even before the intro-
duction of the euro. This was primarily part of the 
long-term economic fallout of a set of circum-
stances that were to repeat themselves after 1999 
for the entire country, namely, the entry of the 
former East German states into the new currency 
zone of unified Germany at an exchange rate that 
was far too high.70 It was also due to the fact that 
the German production model in general and the 
German welfare state in particular were tailored 
to the needs of a manufacturing sector that now, 
at best, produced stagnant employment, while the 
German growth model seemed much less well 
adjusted to the needs of the increasingly impor-
tant service economy (Wren 2013).
When unemployment finally surpassed the four-
million mark in 2002, politicians and the public 
were alarmed. Yet unemployment continued to 
increase: in 2005, 4.86 million people were without 
employment. This was the annual average, but in 
the early months of that year the total number of 
unemployed had actually passed the symbolically 
important five-million mark. What is more, long-
term unemployment was also a pressing problem. 
This pointed to the need to reform the job place-
ment program of the unemployment insurance 
and to reconsider whether the passive character 
of German labour market policies did not actu-
ally provide the unemployed with rather perverse 
incentives: “A full 32.8 percent of jobless workers 
between 1995 and 1999 had been on the rolls for 
more than a year, reflecting the ineffectiveness of 
the BA’s [Federal Labour Office’s] job placement 
70  What subsequently developed was high unemployment, 
a massive increase in public spending (active and passive 
labour market policies), a unification boom, and the Bun-
desbank’s harsh monetary reaction, which led to a prolonged 
period of poor economic growth and low employment .
services” (Vail 2010: 104) and also reflecting the 
dependency trap inherent in generous benefit 
levels and long drawing periods so typical of 
Germany’s social insurance system, a system 
tailored to insider interests and specifically to 
preserving their labour market and income status. 
Moreover, poorly camouflaged by the fact that 
many jobseekers were channeled through expen-
sive work-creation schemes or training courses 
of highly dubious usefulness was the fact that not 
only was unemployment high, but employment 
was also low. The high number of early retirees 
completes this rather gloomy picture.
Various labour market stimuli failed to tackle these 
problems. Efforts to find solutions in tripartite 
negotiations with the social partners - the tradi-
tional corporatist approach that both the outgoing 
Kohl government and the incoming Schröder 
government had attempted -  proved wholly inad-
equate. Kohl’s belated and half-hearted reform 
attempts were a far cry from the “radical retrench-
ment” as which it has been labelled in the liter-
ature (Beramendi, Häusermann et al., 2015: 40), 
anyway. The social partners were more interested 
in protecting their position within Germany’s 
corporatist political economy than in responding 
to the virulent labour market crisis. During the 
red/green coalition’s second term (after a narrowly 
won election in 2002), the failure to confront these 
problems within a tripartite framework was ulti-
mately the catalyst for a bold attempt to enact 
profound labour market and welfare reforms 
without the social partners’ consent. The reforms 
were designed to “wrest authority from neo-
corporatist labour market institutions, which had 
failed to devise effective responses” to the severe 
employment and unemployment problems of the 
times (Vail 2010: 102). This is what the Agenda 
2010 and the Hartz reforms accomplished. They 
therefore decisively withdrew from the corporatist 
model that had dominated the German political 
economy for the last 50 years and in important 
respects reneged on the “Bismarckian promise” 
that had prevailed in the previous five decades.
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I refrain here from providing a detailed account 
and full evaluation of the Agenda 2010 measures - 
given that there are already a plethora of detailed 
assessments (Clasen 2005; Clegg and Clasen 2006; 
Clegg and Clasen 2006; Eichhorst and Kaiser 
2006; Hassel and Schiller 2010; Vail 2010; Arndt 
2013; Carlin, Hassel et al. 2014; Hassel 2014; 
Schwander and Manow 2016). A simple outline of 
the major reform measure must suffice. The first 
two Hartz laws, enacted in 2003, placed a stronger 
emphasis on labour market activation through 
the introduction of personnel service agencies 
(Personal service Agenturen, PSA), and opened 
activation measures, previously limited to recipi-
ents of earnings-related benefits, up to everyone 
(Carlin, Hassel et al., 2014: 63). At the same time, 
benefit requirements were tightened: once a spell 
of unemployment lasts longer than 18 months, the 
unemployed are now forced to accept any avail-
able job, regardless of their qualifications and 
previous pay (Koch, Kupka et al. 2009). Avail-
ability and entitlement criteria were also tight-
ened, and the annual adjustment of benefits was 
abolished (Eichhorst and Kaiser 2006). Addition-
ally, the reforms comprised a number of smaller 
policy measures promising to increase labour 
supply and to make accepting employment worth-
while. Measures included the reduction of social 
contributions on low-paid jobs and marginal 
employment (what were known as “minijobs”). 
Another activation measure was the introduction 
of what were dubbed “Me Inc.” or “Ich-AGs”, i.e., 
a measure facilitating the creation of small (also 
single person) enterprises. The third Hartz law 
reformed the public placement agency (Public 
Employment Service) in order to improve its case 
management and the placement of jobseekers.
The last and by far the most controversial and 
important part of the reform, the Hartz IV law, 
sharply reduced the drawing period for the 
generous earnings-related unemployment benefit 
(Arbeitslosengeld I) from a maximum of 32 to 
12 months (18 months for older unemployed 
persons). After this period, the unemployed have 
to rely on the flat-rate, means-tested benefit, Arbe-
itslosengeld II (also known as Hartz IV), which 
corresponds roughly to the level of the former 
social assistance, i.e., it does not take the level of 
prior earnings into account, and by consequence 
also not the length of the prior period of employ-
ment and contribution payment. 
As a consequence, the reform fused the previ-
ously separated systems of social assistance and 
unemployment insurance. “This meant that status 
protection of the long-term unemployed was abol-
ished in favour of a joint flat-rate benefit for all 
jobseekers not entitled to unemployment insur-
ance benefit, i.e., with prior employment shorter 
than the waiting period or after expiry” of Arbe-
itslosengeld I (Eichhorst and Kaiser 2006: 9). It 
cannot be stressed too much that this represented 
a very substantial attack on insider interests. At 
the same time, due to the reform, benefit recipi-
ents have to accept any job offer to prove their will-
ingness to work, even jobs paid so poorly that the 
wage will remain below the social assistance level. 
Wages are then topped up by transfer payments.
Considering that the “old” welfare system had 
been geared primarily to the protection of status, 
income, and the qualifications of skilled workers, 
these measures clearly represented a major break 
with Germany’s “Bismarckian tradition” and 
violated the interests of the workers in the indus-
trial core - a traditional SPD support base. The 
reform qualifies as a “dramatic shift from the 
status-preserving earnings-related principle to the 
means-tested basic-income principle for the long-
term unemployed” (Carlin, Hassel et al. 2014: 
63). These reforms therefore represent a signifi-
cant break with cherished principles of Germa-
ny’s welfare system. It is no surprise then that they 
met with vehement union protest and were highly 
contested within the Social Democratic Party. In 
fact, they were enacted against a sizeable intraparty 
opposition of “traditionalists” clinging passion-
ately to Germany’s established Bismarckian ways. 
From this it also becomes clear that one of the 
key aims of the Agenda 2010 was precisely not to 
“sharpen the lines between social insurance (for 
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those who had paid the social contributions) and 
social assistance and in-work benefits for those 
excluded from the normal labour market and for 
whom the state was asked to take responsibility” 
(Palier and Thelen 2010: 122). The objective was 
the exact opposite, namely to blur these lines. To 
interpret the welfare reforms, as Thelen and Palier 
do, as an attempt to protect the industrial core 
model of the German political economy is there-
fore wholly misguided (see also Carlin, Hassel et 
al. 2014: 66; Beramendi, Häusermann et al. 2015: 
40).71
Despite the reforms—or because of them (see 
below)—Germany violated the Maastricht three-
per-cent budget deficit criterion in the years 2002 
to 2005, in the midst of the recession. “There was 
not just a little irony in this fact, since in the early 
1990s it had been German negotiators who had 
pushed to include an Excessive Deficit Proce-
dure in the Maastricht Treaty” (Eichengreen 
2007: 372). In the ensuing conflict with the Euro-
pean Commission, Germany and France success-
fully negotiated a less restrictive application of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. In retrospect, many 
interpret this as the euro area’s “original sin” (cf. 
James 2012: 18), which paved the way for a period 
of low fiscal discipline and which ultimately - in 
the wake of the financial crisis in 2008/2009 - alleg-
edly led to the profound sovereign debt crisis that 
threatened and still threatens to tear the euro area 
apart. Although Greece’s entry into the euro area, 
based on grossly forged budget data, is certainly a 
serious contender for the “original sin” award, and 
although the crisis of the Eurozone in its essence 
never has been a sovereign debt crisis (Baldwin 
and Giavazzi 2015), it is true that the outcome of 
the conflict between France and Germany, on the 
one side, and the Commission, on the other, made 
future sanctions against other euro area members 
who violate the Maastricht criteria hard to justify 
and quite unlikely to be imposed. In fact, in 2005 
“the disciplinary mechanism was softened, many 
71  The fact that unions/works councils and employers/
firms in fact frequently protected the core workforce through 
plan-level agreements is another issue.
processes became merely discretionary, and new 
procedural provisions made it harder to take 
action against noncompliant states” (James 2012: 
18). As Paul De Grauwe dryly states: “For all prac-
tical purposes, the Pact had become a dead letter” 
(De Grauwe 2014: 227).72
Politically, the German government saw its viola-
tion of the Stability and Growth Pact as the conse-
quence of the pending welfare state reforms. As 
Chancellor Schröder later explained, the red/
green coalition was confronted with a dilemma:73 
embarking upon a policy of structural reform by 
pursuing a highly unpopular welfare reform and 
simultaneously aggravating the recession with 
a strict policy of fiscal consolidation would have 
simply spelt political disaster and certain electoral 
suicide. Forced to choose, the Schröder govern-
ment opted for the long-term structural change: 
welfare reform. In retrospect, it is probably fair to 
say that Schröder was proven right - economically, 
if not politically -  since he was voted out of office 
in 2005 anyway.
72  De Grauwe (2013) also caustically comments on the 
regulations of the old and the new Stability and Growth Pact: 
“Up to now, these sanctions have never been applied. The 
reader will be surprised at so much political naiveté from the 
drafters of the Stability and Growth Pact when they believed 
that such sanctions could ever be enforced” (De Grauwe 2014: 
217).
73  SPIEGEL: “The ECB accuses you of having softened 
the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact.” Schröder: “This 
critique has to be taken seriously. But one has to put it into 
perspective. We strengthened the growth aspect of the Pact 
with that reform. Specific burdens, such as the costs related to 
German reunification, now had to be taken into account. More 
importantly however, countries which undertook difficult 
structural reforms had more leeway to stimulate growth. For 
us Germans, this was key, since we had initiated the Agenda 
2010. In Germany, we were confronted with a stagnating 
economy. At the same time we were very determined to push 
this reform through and to adjust the welfare state to the 
changed circumstances. Hence, we needed to emerge from 
stagnation with the help of an economic stimulus package. 
In this situation we were forced, also because of the welfare 
reforms, to emphasize the growth component of the Pact. In 
the end this proved to be successful. We did our homework 
with the Agenda 2010. This is one of the reasons why we came 
through the crisis better than others. Countries such as France 
or Italy are now forced to catch up under much more unfavor-
able circumstances” (Spiegel, “Europa muss aufwachen,” 5 
September 2011.
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The combination of structural reforms, rational-
ization in firms, and the wage moderation prac-
ticed by unions ultimately led Germany out of 
the recession, particularly in combination with 
the much higher growth and more specifically 
the much higher wage growth in Europe’s south. 
German GDP grew at an impressive rate of 4.1 and 
3.1 per cent in 2006 and 2007, respectively, before 
the financial crisis hit the German export-based 
economy unusually hard. However, even the 
Lehman crisis only temporarily interrupted the 
revival of Modell Deutschland. As soon as global 
demand returned, German companies were able 
to overcome the massive external shock caused by 
the financial crisis. The country came out of the 
recession much faster than the UK or most other 
euro area members - although the subsequent 
recession in Europe’s periphery did not leave 
German growth unaffected, of course (see Figure 
3).
The labour market also weathered the storm 
remarkably well (Burda and Hunt 2011; Eichhorst 
and Tobsch 2014: 3). The level of unemployment 
sank steadily and today (September 2017) is at 
around 5.5 per cent (national figures; according 
to the ILO definition the German unemploy-
ment rate is 3.7 per cent) - less than half of the 12 
per cent unemployment that was recorded at the 
peak of the crisis in 2005. Today’s figure of around 
2.45 million unemployed and 800,000 open jobs 
prompt German labour market experts to consider 
a full employment scenario to be possible in the 
foreseeable future (see Figure 2).74
Significantly, the higher labour market flexibility 
resulting from the Agenda 2010 reforms did not - 
as reform critics had claimed - come at the cost of 
undermining the “normal” segment of the labour 
market. In the private sector there is a relatively 
high probability that people will transfer from the 
non-standard segment of the labour market to its 
regular core. This regular core appears to have been 
strengthened rather than weakened by the reform. 
74  Of course, the massive influx of almost one million 
immigrants in the second half of 2015, most of them poorly 
qualified, changes this picture substantially.
The number of “regularly employed,” meaning 
those subject to mandatory social insurance 
contributions, even increased significantly from 
its low point of slightly more than 26 million in 
2005 to 32.1 million in September 2017 (cf. Figure 
1). Inequality, which had been steadily increasing 
since the 1990s, has been on the decline since 
2006 and poverty rates have decreased, too. For 
instance, the GINI coefficient fell from 32.8 (2006) 
to 30.1 (2011) and has dropped further since, and 
the poverty rate fell from 9.1 to 7.8 between 2007 
and 2013 (e.g., OECD 2015: 56).75 The claim that 
the reform increased “German inequality quite 
dramatically” (Blyth 2015: 269) is wholly unsub-
stantiated.
Total employment is also at a record high of around 
44.5 million people. With an employment rate of 
76 per cent, in Europe, Germany is now second 
only to Sweden, and quite unlike its conserva-
tive homologues, France and Italy (Eichhorst and 
Tobsch 2014: 6-7). It was this high employment 
rate which then also helped fuel domestic demand 
during the crisis when export demand collapsed. 
Full-time, non-temporary employment is still the 
dominant form in the German labour market, 
specifically for 40 percent of working-age individ-
uals and for 60 percent of those in gainful employ-
ment (Eichhorst and Tobsch 2014: 10). The overall 
job growth, however, came at the cost of a signifi-
cant increase in non-standard employment. Yet, if 
we want to bemoan this development, we should 
bear in mind how high structural unemploy-
ment had been previously. We also should take 
into account that “non-standard jobs contribute 
to better labour market access and additional job 
creation, which generates additional income from 
work. Flexible types of contracts also contribute 
to wage moderation in collective agreements and 
to overall competitiveness” (vgl. Klinger, Rothe et 
al. 2013; Eichhorst and Tobsch 2014: 4). Moreover, 
for many, particularly mothers, part-time employ-
ment is the preferred form of employment, and 
does not lead to an accumulation of social risks 
(Böhnke, Zeh et al. 2015). 
75  See for instance, World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=DE or (OECD 2015).
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With these more flexible forms of employment 
the Agenda 2010 managed to reduce the inac-
tivity rate, which was their biggest achievement 
(Klinger, Rothe et al. 2013). Inactivity, wide-
spread in the 1990s, “is no longer a problem of 
the German labour market” (Hassel 2014: 68). 
While the overall flexibility of the labour market 
has clearly increased, average job tenure has not 
only remained stable but also even increased, 
from 10.3 to 11.5 years between 2000 and 2011 
(Eichhorst and Tobsch 2014: 13) - mainly due 
to the fact that the Agenda 2010 and subsequent 
reforms rendered many routes to early retirement 
much less attractive, but also because in 2007, 
another deeply unpopular reform measure raised 
the retirement age to 67. It is important to note, 
however, that high employment, low inactivity 
etc. were as much due to a favourable economic 
climate (weak euro, eastern enlargement of the 
EU, and low interest rates) as to the flexibility of 
the labour market promoted by the reforms.
At the same time, the rapidly increasing low-wage 
sector (see Rhein 2013) is the more worrying 
development for many, but even here opin-
ions vary. Some emphasise that “the liberaliza-
tion of non-standard contracts has contributed 
to the expansion of overall labour market inclu-
sion and job growth in Germany and that at least 
some forms of non-standard work provide step-
ping stones into permanent regular jobs. Atypical 
contracts do not necessarily undermine the domi-
nance of standard employment relationships and 
job quality in this primary segment but rather 
form a supplementary part of employment in 
sectors that depend on more flexible and maybe 
cheaper forms of labour” (Eichhorst and Tobsch 
2014: 2). Not surprisingly, the reforms also created 
the need for some re-regulation, and the introduc-
tion in 2014 of a binding wage floor (minimum 
wage) for many labour market sectors is one 
of these re-regulating measures. Interventions 
like these moved the German political economy 
further away from one of its formerly sacred prin-
ciples - that of Tarifautonomie or autonomy of 
the social partners in wage bargaining. Germany 
became less corporatist.
There is no doubt that the welfare reforms created 
real “losers” - in fact, they were designed to do 
precisely that, but those were, contrary to the 
expectations of many, rather the labour market 
insiders. Some categories of households benefit 
substantially from higher transfers (Koch, Kupka 
et al. 2009: 249-50) and overall spending on social 
assistance significantly increased after the reform: 
“Hartz IV - widely considered the harshest of the 
recent reforms - actually provided a boost for an 
estimated one-third of those who were previ-
ously in the lowest tier of the old social assis-
tance system,” particularly single mothers (Palier 
and Thelen 2010: 138).76 Whereas these former 
‘outsiders’ benefited, insiders also lost out consid-
erably. Against all conclusions of “dualization,” 
the reform “clearly and most drastically cut the 
benefits for well-insured labour market insiders” 
(Beramendi, Häusermann et al. 2015: 41).
Not surprisingly, the reforms were highly contro-
versial, and this is reflected in the conflicting 
assessments of these reforms still found in the 
literature today. Whatever might be the final 
assessment of the reforms, given the substantial 
pathologies of Germany’s prior “welfare without 
work” model even critics of the Agenda 2010 can 
hardly deny the urgent need for reform in the early 
2000s. Labour market performance since then 
also tends to discredit some of the initially very 
critical assessments of the Agenda: higher flexi-
bility apparently did contribute to the employment 
growth that reformers had wished for, and so far 
without undermining the core of regular employ-
ment. It therefore appears rather questionable to 
76  Combining unemployment insurance and Germany’s 
social assistance scheme involved a huge cost shifting game 
between the municipalities, which were responsible for social 
assistance, and the social insurance schemes (Hassel and 
Schiller 2010). The process conformed to the pattern described 
in Chapter 6 above: the political incentive to substitute social 
insurance contributions for taxes. Municipalities had an 
incentive to declare as many recipients of social assistance as 
“employable” as possible. In some instances, comatose patients 
miraculously turned into active “jobseekers.” Whereas the 
federal government had anticipated less than 3.5 million em-
ployable recipients of ALG II/Hartz IV, in the end it was more 
than 5 million. The welfare state “retrenchment measure,” the 
Agenda 2010, increased social assistance spending dramati-
cally to 25 billion euros —11 billion more than anticipated.
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accuse the Agenda 2010 of having strengthened 
“dualization” (Th elen 2014) without at the same 
time referring to the disheartening and unaccept-
able exclusion of a very high number of long-term 
unemployed under the status quo ante. To put it 
more specifi cally: a prior “dualization” between 
those in and those not in employment has been 
substituted by today’s “dualization” between those 
in stable and those in marginal employment, and 
it seems strange to assess the one without alluding 
to the other (or to describe only the latter as “dual-
ization”). Moreover, most labour market indica-
tors prove the higher employment dynamics today 
as compared to pre-reform times.
In an evaluation of the reforms from a political 
point of view, both critics and proponents would 
probably concur that the labour market aft er 
the Agenda 2010 reforms is in a situation that is 
“fundamentally diff erent from the situation in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s” (Eichhorst and Tobsch 
2014). According to established performance 
criteria such as employment and unemployment, 
youth unemployment, female labour market 
participation, and average retirement age, it can be 
stated that Germany today is no longer “adjusting 
badly” (Manow and Seils 1999). Again, this overall 
assessment would not only have to make reference 
to the domestic reforms, but also be put into the 
context of the new monetary environment, which 
became much more favourable for the German 
political economy aft er 2005 (see below).
Figure 1: Employment and Unemployment rate, 
2005-2017, in thousands
Source: OECD (https://data.oecd.org)
However, the return of growth, the turnaround of 
the German economy, and the substantial reduc-
tion in the number of unemployed and inactive 
persons came too late for the red/green govern-
ment. In 2005, Schröder was forced to call new 
elections aft er having lost the large state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, which had been tradition-
ally Social Democratic. With this state now in 
the hands of the oppositional Christian Demo-
crats, a two-thirds majority of the opposition 
in the Bundesrat, Germany’s second chamber, 
became a likely scenario. With such a majority, 
the CDU/CSU-FDP opposition would have been 
able to block any government initiative (according 
to Article 77, Section 4 of the Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany, i.e., the German 
constitution).77 Schröder decided that attack was 
the best form of defence. In the early federal elec-
tions of 2005, the share of the vote of the red/green 
coalition suff ered. However, the opposition, which 
in the meantime had decided to rally around an 
even more radical reform platform than what the 
Agenda had brought, also lost vote shares (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1 Bundestag elections, overview of results, 
1994-2013, in per cent
1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013
SPD (Social Demo-
crats) 36.4




35.1 38.5 35.2 33.8
41.5
FDP (Liberals) 6.9 6.2 7.4 9.8 14.6 4.8
Grüne (Green) 7.3 6.7 8.6 8.1 10.7 8.4
PDS/die Linke (ex-
Communists) 4.4
5.1 4.0 8.7 11.9
8.6
Turnout 79.0 82.2 79.1 77.7 70.8 71.5
Numbers indicate the share of valid votes.
Source: www.bundeswahlleiter.de (Federal Returning Offi  ce).
While voters apparently punished the Social 
Democrats for their reform agenda, they showed 
little enthusiasm for the CDU’s attempt to posi-
77  Parliament can only override a two-thirds majority 
veto of the second chamber by finding/securing a two-thirds 
majority itself, which is a completely unrealistic prospect. 
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tion itself as even more “de-regulative” than the 
Schröder government. As a consequence, the 
race was extremely close, and neither a centre-
right (CDU/CSU/FDP) nor a centre-left (SPD and 
Greens) coalition gained a majority of seats. The 
upshot was that a Grand Coalition then ruled from 
2005 to 2009. The Christian Democrats, however, 
had learned their lesson: in 2009, Chancellor 
Angela Merkel moved the Christian Democrats’ 
program back to the centre. Given that in 2009 the 
genuine “left-wing”, orthodox anti-reform posi-
tion was occupied by Die Linke, a party which had 
easily surpassed the German legal five-percent 
threshold in the 2005 election thanks to the lack of 
popularity of the Agenda 2010 in the traditionalist 
left milieu, the Social Democrats were crushed 
from two sides. There was little room left in the 
political centre for a Social Democracy that under 
Schröder had once claimed - in imitation of Blair’s 
New Labour - to represent the New Centre (Die 
neue Mitte) after Merkel ultimately decided to 
abandon her short flirt with a neoliberal agenda.
In hindsight, the SPD’s electoral disaster was 
predictable, partly because a Social Democratic 
minister of labour had not only been responsible 
for important labour market reforms between 
2002 and 2005, but also for another hugely unpop-
ular measure: the decision in 2007 to increase the 
retirement age to 67. However, the onset of the 
global financial crisis in 2009 also played into the 
hands of the CDU chancellor, since German voters 
are known to become more conservative in times 
of economic crisis (Anderson and Ward 1996).
3. German Wage Bargaining 
within the Euro Area
In order to put the Agenda 2010 reforms into a 
broader economic context, we need to examine 
them in relation to the changed monetary incen-
tive structure in the euro area. With respect to the 
nexus between monetary policy and industrial 
relations, it is important to note that relatively high 
interest rates and their recessive consequences had 
not been perceived as the sole cause of Germany’s 
economic troubles in the early 2000s. High interest 
rates were interpreted as responses (of an inde-
pendent central bank) to inflationary tendencies, 
possibly provoked by exaggerated wage increases. 
It appeared that poor economic performance 
pointed instead to the lack of competitiveness of 
German firms and products as the root cause of all 
the country’s economic troubles.
Having been “socialized” with the implicit supply-
side logic of Modell Deutschland in the post-
Bretton Woods world where the Bundesbank’s 
independence and its hard currency policy ruled 
supreme (Scharpf 1987; Hall and Franzese 1998; 
Franzese 1999), the relevant German actors, both 
in the political and economic spheres, believed 
that interest rates were not too high, but wages 
and welfare benefits were. Subsequently, monetary 
policy did not have to be adjusted, but German 
wage costs did. Adjusting monetary policy was 
considered a taboo, at any rate, given the indepen-
dence of the European Central Bank, which had 
been modelled on the Bundesbank (James 2012).
Initially, the immediate post-euro recession thus 
seemed to present German unions, employers, 
and politicians with a familiar challenge. The well-
established interplay between wage bargaining 
and monetary policy could not be continued 
under the new circumstances of the euro, given 
that the ECB would not and could not target its 
monetary policy exclusively on pilot agreements 
between German employers and unions – as the 
Bundesbank had done in the past. However, in the 
high interest rate environment of the early 2000s, 
German social partners felt that the circumstances 
they found themselves in were, if not comfort-
able, then at least familiar (Hall and Franzese 
1998). What has been succinctly labelled Germa-
ny’s “supply-side corporatism” (Wolfgang Streeck) 
kicked in: Germany experienced wage moderation 
and productive company-level pacts concluded by 
the social partners, productivity-enhancing ratio-
nalization and, in part, relocation of firms, and 
finally the welfare reforms enacted by a Social 
Democratic government. It is worth highlighting 
that this latter aspect of the adjustment process, 
namely the profound welfare reform enacted by 
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the red/green coalition, was a rather new element, 
something from which the CDU under Helmut 
Kohl had largely shied away. Th us it signifi ed a 
major deviation from the course of earlier politics 
and also from the established approaches of social 
policy.
By creating space for the emergence of a large 
low-wage sector, the labour market and welfare 
reforms themselves subsequently exerted pres-
sure on the unions and thereby further contrib-
uted to the wage restraint of the social partners. 
Of course, the boom in Europe’s periphery and 
the ensuing signifi cant increase in labour unit 
costs there helped restore the cost competitive-
ness of German industry as well - while the cost 
pressures stemming from eastern enlargement 
also helped keep German wages under control. 
Th e new, much poorer members of the Euro-
pean Union provided Germany with new product 
markets, but in particular with a supply of cheap 
production factors. Business relocation to the East 
or the threat of it helped German fi rms to keep 
their wage costs under control, as did the import 
of cheap labour under the EU Posting of Workers 
Directive.
Th e monetary parameters for the German model 
changed profoundly again when the banking 
crisis eventually translated into a sovereign debt 
crisis for some of euro area member states. Th e 
subsequent expansionary policy of the Euro-
pean Central Bank, the low interest rate environ-
ment, the (from a German perspective) under-
valued euro, the massive repatriation of capital 
from the periphery to the centre: taken together, 
all this boosted German investment and produc-
tion substantially (Wolf 2014: 63). Germany’s 
recent record-high trade surplus (see Figure 2) 
is therefore to some extent the result of the euro 
crisis, not its cause, which also means that it 
cannot be explained by only referring to superior 
economic performance.78 Just as everything that 
was wrong with Modell Deutschland in the early 
2000s could not be blamed on the new currency, 
it is also impossible to explain today’s spectac-
ular economic revival of the German economy by 
exclusively citing the inherent strengths of Modell 
Deutschland.
Figure 2 German Exports and Imports as a 
percentage of GDP, 1980–2013
One component of this situation is undoubt-
edly that German euro area partners can no 
longer devaluate their currency in order to rebal-
ance their current accounts vis-à-vis Germany 
- rendering strategies of wage moderation by 
German employers and unions now even more 
eff ective than they had been under the fl exible 
or fi xed, but adjustable exchange rates of the past 
(Höpner and Lutter 2014). Painful and unpop-
ular “internal devaluation” is the only option left  
to Germany’s euro partners (De Grauwe 2013; 
De Grauwe 2014; Iversen and Soskice 2018: 12). 
While countries like France or Italy had hoped 
78  To the extent that the German current account surplus 
has to be explained by interest rates that were too low and 
a euro that was undervalued, at least from a German per-
spective, both of which were the result of the ECB’s rather 
accommodating monetary policy, the European critique of 
Germany’s current account imbalances appear contradictory. 
The fact that a euro that is “too weak” for German industry is 
still “too strong” for the French or Italian exposed sectors has 
more to do with the low external value of the US dollar, the 
yen, and the British pound due to the massive quantitative eas-
ing programs of their banks. 
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that the EMU would replace the Bundesbank’s de 
facto monetary hegemony within the EMS with 
a more lenient European monetary policy, at the 
same time, the common currency exposed their 
economies to full, unfettered competition from 
German industry and foreclosed the devaluation 
option in response to infl ationary wage settle-
ments at home. 
Yet, it is important to emphasize that this very 
situation had been an anticipated, intended, 
and welcome consequence of monetary union. 
Italian and French government representatives 
hoped that the disciplinary eff ects of the common 
currency would help them keep wage infl ation 
under control, given that national monetary and 
political authorities in the past had tended to give 
in too quickly to unions’ aggressive wage demands 
(see De Grauwe 2012). Th ese self-binding eff ects 
of the currency union were quite obvious from 
the beginning, as, for instance, Daniel Gros and 
Niels Th ygesen had already remarked in 1998 in 
what was to become one of the classic textbook on 
monetary union: “In sum, labour market fl exibility 
is always useful and if EMU forces labour market 
reforms that are needed anyway, the economy 
of EU can only gain” (Gros and Th ygesen 1998: 
288). Bemoaning the euro’s de-regulatory eff ect 
on southern European industrial relations seems 
therefore to be rather a case of “dynamic incon-
sistency.”
Th e absence of a devaluation instrument within 
the euro area certainly made German (Nordic) 
wage restraint more eff ective. Wage constraint, 
“combined with heavy investment in training … 
propelled northern Europe - Germany in partic-
ular - to a hegemonic trade position within 
Europe” (Iversen and Soskice 2018: 12). Th is has 
contributed to an erosion of the industrial base 
in the euro area periphery, the converse being the 
slight reversal of the long-term decline of employ-
ment in manufacturing in Germany. German 
industrial production increased by 8.7 per cent 
from 2010 to 2014, whereas in Italy and Spain, it 
declined over the same period by 7.7 and 7.2 per 
cent, respectively. Th e manufacturing sector in 
2013 accounted for 22 per cent of German GDP 
and 10 per cent of French GDP, and for 28 and 
22 per cent of total employment in Germany and 
France, respectively.
Generally, since the introduction of the common 
currency, the labour markets in the centre and 
in the periphery developed in a counter-cyclical 
fashion. German unemployment was high when 
it was low in the rest of the euro area and started 
to decline when it rose in the south—one of the 
many asymmetries indicating that the euro area 
is anything but an Optimal Currency Area (see 
Figure 3).
Figure 3 Standardised unemployment rates in 
euro area member countries, 2000-2013
As we have seen, during the fi rst years of the euro 
area the monetary environment for German unions 
and employers’ associations was not completely 
unfamiliar. Th e traditional German model could 
work reasonably under the ECB’s high interest rate 
regime (that is, high for sluggish Germany). What 
about the period aft er 2005 though, when the 
ECB’s interest rates became too low and accord-
ingly the euro too weak for the booming German 
economy? If the German export-led growth 
model presupposes wage moderation, but the ECB 
cannot substitute the Bundesbank’s disciplinary 
monetary policy, how do unions and employers 
secure a moderate development of wages? Th e 
answer to these questions can be divided into 
several components. First, it is possible that the 
erosion of the German wage bargaining system 
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(Streeck 2009), i.e., its increasing devolution to 
the company level, actually explains its continuing 
capacity to deliver wage moderation. Second, 
the disciplining effect of the Agenda 2010 labour 
market reforms is also worth mentioning. Further, 
the moderating effect of eastern enlargement and 
of the currency union itself, and finally the disci-
plinary consequences of crisis-induced immigra-
tion should also be acknowledged. Let me briefly 
elaborate on these points.
Ironically, the more limited coverage of wage 
negotiations, due to the erosion of member-
ship both of the unions and the employers’ asso-
ciations, could turn out to be an explanation for 
the continuing capacity of the German political 
economy to moderate wages. Since the 1990s, 
German collective wage agreements have been 
largely substituted with company-level agree-
ments or what are known as firm-level “produc-
tivity pacts” (Rehder 2003). They replace employ-
ment guarantees by employers with workers’ 
consent to rationalization, partial relocations, 
increased labour flexibility, and so on. If we are 
looking for an explanation for how the German 
economy continued to deliver wage moderation 
during times when the familiar strategic interac-
tion between social partners and the central bank 
had ceased to function, it is important to empha-
size the fact that the “control of labour costs in the 
German industrial relations system shifted over 
time from the dominance of coordinated wage 
setting institutions to competitiveness-driven 
plant level adjustment” (Hancké 2002; Hassel 
2014: 26; Hassel 2017 (forthcoming)). The erosion 
of Germany’s wage coordination system would 
then not be an indication of a fundamental change 
of Modell Deutschland(Streeck 2009), but a neces-
sary precondition for the model to function as it 
had previously, albeit under profoundly different 
circumstances.
This insight helps us to explain a second, prima 
facie puzzling aspect of Germany’s economic 
recovery after 2004. Whereas the poor labour 
market dynamic in the 1990s was due to partic-
ularly weak job growth in the (low-skill, low-
productivity) service sector, the recent strong 
increase in the employment rate (Germany’s job 
miracle) and the corresponding low degree of 
inactivity were to a large extent due to the striking 
expansion of the low-wage labour market segment, 
primarily in services. This labour market dynamic 
had previously been hindered by union wage coor-
dination, restrictive employment protection rules, 
and the high “replacement rates” implicit in the 
generous regulations of the unemployment insur-
ance scheme, which were tailored to insider inter-
ests (Rueda 2005; Rueda 2006). Once the Agenda 
2010 reforms removed these protective features 
removed, low union density and low productivity 
in the service sector combined to bring about 
unforeseen job growth in the third sector, keeping 
the costs of living down and thereby supporting 
wage moderation in manufacturing, too.
The result was a sectoral dualization of the German 
political economy - that is, the maintenance of 
the traditional German model in manufacturing 
and simultaneously the “deregulation” of the 
service sector - which many observers, including 
the author, (cf. Manow and Seils 1999) for many 
years considered quite unlikely, if not outright 
impossible. The “frozen landscape” that Esping-
Andersen described when analysing the conserva-
tive political economies of continental Europe in 
the 1990s (Esping-Andersen 1999) has given way 
to a political economy with employment rates very 
similar to the high Scandinavian levels. Given that 
Germany’s Bismarckian welfare state is still based 
on employment and payroll taxes, today’s quasi 
full employment scenario also helps to control the 
welfare state costs.
Further, the wage discipline of German workers in 
the 2000s is certainly also due to monetary union 
itself, since regional economic integration, admit-
tedly evolved over many decades, substantially 
intensified under the EMU and further increased 
with European enlargement in 2004. Both events 
lend momentum to the establishment of a new 
economic region that integrates new member 
states from Central and Eastern Europe with the 
German economy, but also increases integration 
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with the Baltic and Benelux states. German trade 
“with the new member states of the EU increased 
from 2 percent to more than 7 percent of GDP 
between 1994 and 2006. During that period, 
intra-firm trade represented about 21.6 percent 
of imports from Eastern Europe” (Hassel 2014: 
63). Some observers even maintain that the new 
ways of “organising production by slicing up the 
value chain has been more important for Germa-
ny’s lower unit labour costs than German workers’ 
wage restraint. According to estimates, German 
off-shoring to Eastern Europe boosted not only 
the productivity of its subsidiaries in Eastern 
Europe by almost threefold compared to local 
companies, but it also increased the productivity 
of the parent companies in Germany by more than 
20%” (Marin 2010). 
Wage development within this emerging, larger 
economic region could be taken into account by 
the ECB’s monetary policy. To the extent that the 
ECB did take German wages into account, while 
“Germany’s neighbours effectively targeted [these 
German wages] to hold down their own wages … 
the northern European countries could pursue the 
export-led growth strategies to which they had 
long been accustomed with considerable success” 
(Hall 2012: 358-359). This pattern was consider-
ably strengthened in the first decade of the euro. 
Now that (relatively) high growth and low unem-
ployment have returned to Germany, we should 
not expect that unit labour costs will increase as 
steeply as they did during the boom in southern 
Europe. They will increase, but it seems safe to 
predict that they will remain largely in line with 
productivity and international competitiveness. 
We can therefore assume that the German wage 
setting regime is still able to deliver wage modera-
tion quite effectively, since functional equivalents 
to the monetary signals of the Bundesbank and 
the traditional system of pattern wage bargaining 
seem to have been put in place: competitive firm-
level pacts, the relocation and regional economic 
integration of firms, the liberalization of the 
service sector, the price pressure of international 
markets, etc. With the anticipated inflation firmly 
anchored around two per cent or lower, German 
unions do not need strong monetary signals to 
figure out which wage hikes are likely to harm 
the international competitiveness of industries, 
sectors, or companies.
Finally, the crisis itself appears to contribute to 
German wage restraint: while the labour inflow 
from Europe’s periphery in the wake of the crisis 
is insufficient to bring relief to southern labour 
markets, it is apparently enough to ensure that 
labour supply meets Germany’s increased labour 
demand. In 2013, Germany welcomed around 
400,000 new immigrants, a number only surpassed 
by the US - and in 2015 more than a million 
migrants arrived, with similarly high numbers in 
2016.79
In sum, even if the ECB were to pursue a much 
more accommodating monetary policy, this would 
be unlikely to result in German wage inflation 
to the extent that the boom in southern Europe 
did after 2000. It is more likely that the strength 
of German industry would be reinforced under a 
lax monetary policy (due to what would then be a 
weak external value of the euro). This points to the 
systematic differences in wage setting regimes in 
the coordinated “hard currency” north of the euro 
area as compared to the largely uncoordinated 
“soft currency” south (Hancké 2013; Höpner and 
Lutter 2014; Iversen and Soskice 2018), which 
have been at the heart of the crisis. I will now 
analyse these differences.
4. One Currency, Two 
Political Economies
The fact that in pre-crisis times German unit 
labour costs remained stagnant or even decreased 
(see Figure 4), whereas in most other countries 
79  In this respect, a parallel between the early 1950s and 
the 2010s can also be observed/identified: a steady inflow of 
qualified workers enabled Germany to combine full employ-
ment with low inflation. However, the massive inflow of 
refugees in 2015 (estimated at 1.3 million) is quite another 
issue. This will translate into a huge quasi-Keynesian push for 
domestic demand - and integration into the labour market of 
these mainly poorly skilled people will take an extremely long 
time.
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of the euro area they increased, was something 
that had initially been interpreted as a welcome 
economic convergence, given that wage levels in 
the south were way below the German level at fi rst 
(Illing, Jauch et al. 2012). In retrospect, Germa-
ny’s European neighbours have severely criticized 
the country’s economic and political adjustments 
to the slump of the early 2000s as a strategy of 
unfair labour cost dumping. Th e adjustments are 
not considered a solution to the problem but are 
accused of being a cause of the widening competi-
tiveness gap between the centre and the periphery 
in the currency zone.
Figure 4: Unit labour costs, 2000-2013 (index 
with 2005 = 100; source: ECB)
From a “northern” perspective, in turn, Italian, 
Spanish, or French labour had simply become 
too expensive, a trend concealed for some time 
by massive capital infl ows (Hall 2014). Unable 
to moderate wages, fragmented and militant 
unions in these countries successfully pushed for 
wage settlements signifi cantly above productivity 
growth plus infl ation, thereby steadily under-
mining their industry’s competitiveness. Because 
of their incapacity to correct for this through 
(nominal) currency depreciations within the euro 
area, countries in the periphery are now forced to 
pursue a painful process of real depreciation.
Whether German wages are “too low” or southern 
wages “too high” is a debate in which it is not 
necessary to take sides (in fact, both assessments 
are accurate and tautologically have to be accu-
rate if the comparison is restricted to the euro area 
only). With very diff erent degrees of export depen-
dency, German employers (and policy-makers) 
have to be much more sensitive about German 
wages than, say, French or Italian employers and 
policy-makers (Scharpf 2017). However, what is 
more central to my argument is the fact that the 
discussion about defl ation in the south or refl a-
tion in the north points to profound diff erences 
in the two political economies, particularly with 
respect to their diff erent abilities to deliver wage 
moderation. In fact, these diff erences explain why 
countries such as France and Italy pushed for 
a single European currency in the fi rst place - it 
was intended to represent the ultimate credible 
commitment to break with the infl ationary cycles 
inherent to their political economies.80
Before the euro, the “typical situation in the high-
infl ation countries usually involved powerful (or, 
at the very least, highly militant) labour unions that 
managed to extract high wages from employers, 
both in the public and in the private sector (high 
wages are defi ned here as wages that grow faster 
than labour productivity). Since employers passed 
on these wage increases through higher prices (or 
rising budgets), higher wages led into the next 
infl ationary cycle, where they would be raised 
again to refl ect higher infl ation, and so on, ad infi -
nitum” (Hancké 2013: 16). High infl ation rates 
then regularly triggered devaluations to regain 
price competitiveness. Yet these devaluations 
could only provide temporary relief. A weaker 
currency translates into increased costs of living 
through higher prices for imported goods, and 
unions, both strong and militant ones, are then 
eager to compensate for the decrease in workers’ 
real wages with higher (nominal) wages, which, in 
turn, initiates the next round of infl ationary wage-
price dynamics (Carlin and Soskice 1990, Chapter 
12; De Grauwe 2013). Th e competitive advantage 
of each devaluation quickly dissipated in the next 
infl ationary wage-price spiral.
80  It is therefore not true that the founders of the EMU 
were insufficiently aware of the profound differences between 
the political economies of the EMU members (see Hall 2014). 
They were simply overoptimistic about how smoothly the 
anticipated adjustment process would take place.
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It was the desire to break out of this inflationary 
cycle and to credibly commit to a low inflation 
equilibrium, with the anticipated consequences 
for domestic wage bargaining regimes, that moti-
vated countries such as Italy and France to pursue 
the single currency strategy, since the EMS, 
already described by Stanley Fisher as an “arrange-
ment by France and Italy to accept German lead-
ership, imposing constraints on their domestic 
monetary and fiscal policies” (quoted in James 
2012: 208), had failed to fully deliver low infla-
tion and exchange rate stability (cf. Eichengreen 
2007: 283).81 Instead, France and Italy were forced 
to devaluate the Franc and the Lira several times, 
something which - apart from the fact that depre-
ciations provided only temporal economic relief 
- was perceived as damaging national prestige.82 
The view that periodic devaluations were (and are) 
an essential precondition for the functioning of 
the soft currency political economies in Europe’s 
south does not seem to be fully accurate, therefore 
(Scharpf 2011). It was precisely the intention to 
overcome these recurrent episodes that motivated 
key Italian and French actors to opt for a common 
currency. It is unsurprising then that these actors 
have not proven to be particularly eager to regain 
the devaluation option, but are more interested in 
expanding their fiscal leeway (Iversen, Soskice et 
al., 2016).
What the relevant political actors in the south did 
not anticipate, however, was that the much stricter 
constraint, the “irrevocable” commitment to a 
81  That the effects of the EMU for/on domestic wage bar-
gaining regimes were not only anticipated, but also intended, 
is indicated, for instance, by the view of monetary economist 
Niels Thygesen, member of the Delors Committee. Monetary 
union, he stated, would be “a way of ‘reducing the scope for the 
kind of lax and divergent monetary policies’ that characterized 
Europe in the 1970s” (James 2012: 7).
82  Of course, it is important to emphasize that devalua-
tions were not always due to wage growth differentials, but 
sometimes also reflected domestic imperatives of Germany’s 
monetary policy. One example of this was the increased inter-
est rates with which the Bundesbank wanted to cool down 
an overheating economy in the wake of Germany’s post-
unification boom. Also, the status of the deutschmark as a 
reserve currency sometimes forced the French or the Italians 
to devalue vis-à-vis the deutschmark during periods when the 
US dollar was weak.
common currency, would still not be sufficient to 
constrain domestic wage bargaining - at least not 
instantly. This commitment would only become 
binding at a later point and then with much more 
harmful consequences, namely, only after the 
southern economies had gone through a spectac-
ular boom period. This then made the necessary 
real devaluation, particularly the wage decreases, 
much more painful than before, both economi-
cally and politically.
The initial surge in the south was indeed just the 
complement of the later crisis: with little capacity 
for wage moderation, with higher wages and 
therefore higher inflation, the southern euro 
area benefited from very low, partly negative real 
interest rates in the first five years of the mone-
tary union. As wages then increased at a consis-
tently higher rate than wages in the north (Höpner 
and Lutter 2014), southern industry quickly lost 
its cost competitiveness.83 This translated into 
growing current account deficits, which could 
only be sustained by massive capital inflows. Once 
these stopped in the wake of the Lehman bank-
ruptcy and capital even started to flow in the 
reverse direction, the crisis fully and dramatically 
materialised.
With respect to wage bargaining, the southern 
high-inflation equilibrium and the German 
low-inflation equilibrium seem to be opposites 
(Iversen, Soskice et al. 2016; Iversen and Soskice 
2018). In this context, Bob Hancké speaks of the 
“two Europes”, “one with orderly wage-determi-
nation systems, where low wage and price infla-
83  In fact, every year since the introduction of the euro, 
unit labour costs have increased more dramatically in Italy and 
France than in Germany (Höpner and Lutter 2014). The lack 
of wage moderation is partly due to unions’ strategies, partly 
due to highly inflexible labour markets: “productivity growth 
was correspondingly weak …. The most important reason for 
the relatively inflexible labour markets of southern Europe 
was legislation, which made it extremely difficult to lay-off 
long-term workers” (Wolf 2014: 63). But it “really did not make 
sense for countries whose industries were competing with 
those of China to allow their labour costs to rise faster than in 
countries like Germany, whose industries were complemen-
tary to those of China” (Wolf 2014: 293-294). The role of wage 
inflation in the public sector in Italy is well described in (Di 
Carlo 2018).
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tion targets were internalised by the trade unions 
by means of inter-sectoral wage coordination, 
and another, where wages rose faster relative to 
productivity, competitiveness collapsed, and trade 
balances deteriorated sharply” (Hancké 2013: 13; 
Hassel 2014; Iversen and Soskice 2018).84 The 
challenge, therefore, is not to explain why the 
euro area is not an optimal currency area, but 
why it is almost the exact opposite, why the single 
currency binds together two rather different types 
of political economies—a hard currency, export-
led growth model, on the one hand, with a soft 
currency, i.e., inflation-prone, consumption-based 
growth model, on the other (Iversen, Soskice et al. 
2016). One key motive for currency union was a 
geopolitical consideration: committing unified 
Germany irreversibly to the European project. In 
addition, the currency union represented a quid 
pro quo of low inflation and low interest rates for 
the south and therefore a boost of credit-based 
growth there, in exchange for abandoning the 
option of devaluating in order to level out the wage 
restraint and productivity growth in the northern 
export industry (Iversen, Soskice et al. 2016). Apart 
from these two decisive factors, EMU came about 
not despite the profound differences between the 
northern and the southern political economy, but 
because of them: as a commitment of the south to 
the “German” low inflation equilibrium in order 
to break with the inflationary tendencies inherent 
in the southern model.
This explanation of the euro crisis and its specific 
dynamic starts with a focus on national wage 
bargaining systems. It is also in line with several 
other recent explanations for the crisis (Hancké 
2013; Hassel 2014; Höpner and Lutter 2014; 
84  This bifurcation into two groups of countries had 
already occurred in the 1970s under the European Monetary 
System: “The first group, made up of Germany, the Benelux 
countries, and Denmark, had succeeded in limiting inflation 
to the mid to high single digits and in keeping their exchange 
rates stable …. In fact, this was a deutschmark-based arrange-
ment, since Germany was the lowest-inflation country and 
accounted for more than two-thirds of the collective GDP of 
this group. The second set of countries - France, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom, and Ireland - had more difficulty restraining 
inflation and were therefore unable to keep their currencies 
within the margins of the Snake” (Eichengreen 2007: 283).
Iversen, Soskice et al. 2016; Iversen and Soskice 
2018).85 Differences between the continental and 
the southern wage bargaining regimes can explain 
both the political motives behind the strong push 
for a common currency in the 1990s - as a means 
of breaking the domestic inflationary cycles in the 
soft currency countries (mainly Italy and France) 
and as the ultimate proof of reunified Germany’s 
commitment to Europe - and what were then 
divergent dynamics of the two political economies 
under the euro, which finally culminated in the 
dramatic crisis of 2008/2009 and the subsequent 
recession and sovereign debt crisis. Somehow 
ironically, or tragically, therefore, the export of 
the German low-inflation regime to the European 
level, triggered the real divergence between the 
north and the south of the currency zone (Palier, 
Rovny et al. 2018), and it rather reinforced than 
weakened central traits of the German political 
economy, in particular its strong export depen-
dence.
85  This contradicts Martin Wolf ’s diagnosis, however: the 
euro crisis is not (or at least no longer) a “financial crisis with 
fiscal consequences” (Wolf 2014: 302), but has since turned 
into a competitiveness crisis with fiscal consequences. My 
position also diverges from Scharpf ’s analysis, in which he 
emphasizes the fiscal problem of euro member states running 
a public debt in a “foreign” currency. With Draghi’s “whatever 
it takes” guarantee the ECB has, in fact, become lender of last 
resort. Further, with historically low interest rates, debt service 
is cheaper than ever before. However, (the lack of) private 
competitiveness remains a problem and, with sluggish growth, 
these states then also inevitably have a fiscal problem.
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for the representation of public employers (TdL86 
for Germany, and ARAN87 for Italy), national 
courts of auditors (Corte Dei Conti) and academic/
policy experts close to the field of interest.
In preview, the main argument of this paper is 
the following: while Germany pursued public 
sector wage restraint throughout the period 
1994-2007, during the years 2002-2006, Italian 
public employers deliberately pursued a policy of 
public sector wage inflation for strategic political 
purposes. After the crisis, wage restraint in Italy 
was the result of unilaterally implemented wage 
cuts and freezes in the public sector. In Germany, 
wages are, instead, prevented from rocketing 
- notwithstanding favourable material condi-
tions - by the peculiar structure of public sector 
wage-setting, which brings together rich and poor 
Länder (and municipalities) into a structured deci-
sional process which produces a low wage equi-
librium. In both the TVöD and TV-L contracts, 
wage increases have to be set as a lowest common 
denominator to take into consideration the ability 
of the poor Länder (in TV-L) and municipalities 
(TVöD) to pay. Italy, in contrast, experienced a 
pro-cyclical pattern of public sector wage inflation 
and restraint. During the good times of the Euro, 
public sector wages increased beyond macroeco-
nomic fundamentals, driven by the political moti-
vations of the “Southern bloc” (composed of the 
parties such as Alleanza Nazionale and Unione 
Di Centro) inside the Berlusconi-led centre-right 
coalition. The pattern of wage inflation had started 
to be reversed before the crisis occurred, when 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa was finance minister, 
under the centre-left coalition led by Romano 
Prodi in 2006-2007. Eventually, however, when 
the crisis unfolded, wage restraint was unilater-
ally imposed by the finance minister Giulio Trem-
onti in 2009 and was then continued by the subse-
86   TdL (Tarifgemeinschaft deutscher Länder) is the associa-
tion of finance ministers of the German Laender in charge of 
negotiating public sector wage contracts.
87   ARAN (Agenzia per la Rappresentanza Negoziale delle 
Pubbliche Amministrazioni) is the Italian independent agency 
in charge of representing the government during negotiations 
with trade unions.
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Setting the Scene
The chance to write this brief contribution stems 
from the invitation that I received to attend the 
Villa Vigoni conference. The general topic of the 
conference revolves around discrepancies in the 
German and Italian responses to the multiple 
crises affecting Europe.
Specifically, the subject matter of this paper 
pertains to the domain of public sector employ-
ment relations and wage policies in the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The aim 
is to look at the political and institutional determi-
nants of public sector wage policies in Germany 
and Italy over the period 1991-2015. In so doing, 
I ask the following interrelated questions: What 
were the political and institutional determinants 
of Germany and Italy’s divergent public sector 
wage trajectories before the crisis? And, while Italy 
underwent severe post-crisis austerity measures 
which led to public sector wage deflation, why 
have public sector wages not risen consistently in 
Germany notwithstanding the budget surplus and 
low unemployment?
The empirical basis of the argument developed 
here is provided by research pursued in the context 
of my doctoral project at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for the Study of Societies, in Cologne. Besides 
the analysis of macroeconomic data and primary 
institutional sources, the essay draws on exten-
sive fieldwork carried out in both countries. I have 
conducted interviews (24 in Germany and 17 in 
Italy) with key policy-makers in the top echelons of 
the Finance ministries, trade unions, associations 
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CPE research interested in studying public sector 
wage-setting should, instead, look at the institu-
tional constellation shaping processes of public 
sector wage-setting proper and stop understanding 
the working of the public sector solely as a func-
tion of export-sector interests. This constellation, I 
posit, is composed of three key elements; first, the 
structure of the public administration determines 
the distribution of administrative competencies 
among the layers of the public administration – 
and therefore the distribution of personnel costs; 
second, the structure of the taxation system deter-
mines the ability to pay of sovereign employers 
located at the different levels of the public admin-
istration; and, third, the characteristics of public 
sector employment relations determine legal rights 
and the structure and modes of interest represen-
tation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as 
follows; Section 1 engages with the problem of 
public sector wage divergence in the EMU; Section 
2 provides a summary of the German case study, 
while Section 3 deals with the Italian one. Due to 
space constraints, I will skip a thorough review of 
the literature88 and provide only stylised accounts 
of the case studies.
1. The Problem of Divergent 
Public Sector Wage-setting 
in the EMU
Joining the EMU entails losses of national sover-
eignty vis-à-vis the policy tools available for the 
macroeconomic stabilisation of the economy (De 
Grauwe 2016). Of the four standard policy tools 
available for the control of the economy (Scharpf 
1991), monetary policy is delegated to a suprana-
tional independent central bank; fiscal policy is 
de jure constrained by national and supranational 
Fiscal Compacts, while exchange rates are relin-
quished. In this scenario, wage policies remain the 
most important pillar of macroeconomic policy-
making for domestic social partners in the EMU.
88   For a more detailed discussion on public sector wage 
setting in the German context, see Di Carlo (2018) and Keller 
(2011).
quent governments. Overall, Italy had seven years 
of wage freezes which substantially contributed to 
deflate its economy pro-cyclically.
In sum, discrepancies in public sector wage-setting 
in the two countries can be attributed to different 
institutional structures for the determination of 
public sector pay and interest representation. A 
system of soft fiscal constraints in Italy allows for 
the political willingness of sovereign employers to 
pay inflationary wages in good times. In Germany, 
instead, a system of hard fiscal constraints for sub-
national governments precludes the pursuit of a 
policy of wage inflation. In the former country, the 
structure of public sector wage-setting leads to the 
politicisation of wage determination processes. In 
the latter, wage policy choices are constrained ex 
ante by the fiscal constitution of the state.
The implications of this argument for comparative 
political economy (CPE) are manifold. Contrary 
to what is usually believed (Hancké 2013; Höpner 
and Lutter 2014; Johnston 2016; Johnston and 
Hancke 2009; Johnston, Hancke, and Pant 2014), 
wage restraint in the German public sector is 
not due to effective/defective inter-sectoral wage 
co-ordination imposed by the export sector upon 
sheltered sector wage-setters (Di Carlo 2018). 
Nor was or is it pursued to protect export price 
competitiveness in the interests of an “hege-
monic social coalition” between employers and 
skilled labour in the export industries (Baccaro 
and Benassi 2016; Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; 
Hassel 2014). Public sector wage-setting is, first 
and foremost, a public finance problem. It involves 
state actors located at different levels of the public 
administration, representing heterogenous insti-
tutional interests (very diverse from those of the 
German export industry). Furthermore, public 
sector wage policies do not come uncontested. 
Studying the politics of fiscal policy teaches us that 
significant conflicts can emerge inside the sover-
eign employers bloc: for example, between finance 
ministers with diverse vested interests across 
different state levels (as in Germany) or between 
politicians (who make promises) and the finance 
ministers of their governing coalition (who have 
to pay for them).
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Starting from the Golden Rule:
WP= 1,9% + Δ avg. LP
Where:
WP = wage policy implemented
ECB inflation target = 1,9%
Δ Avg. LP = % change (yoy) in total labour 
productivity in the economy
Sovereign employers can then adopt three alter-
native types of wage policies:
i. Policy of wage inflation > Golden Rule
ii. Policy of wage restraint < Golden Rule
iii. Policy of the Golden Rule = Golden Rule
Ideally, in order to avoid a rise of macroeconomic 
imbalances, trajectories of nominal wages would 
have had to develop in line with national produc-
tivity rates and the supranational price target. 
Reality has proven different from theory. Panel 
a in Figure 1 shows the divergent trajectories of 
nominal wages in the public sectors of the EMU 
participants during the good times of the Euro. 
Three clusters can be observed. At the two oppo-
site extremes, we find Germany (alone) pursuing 
a policy of remarkable public sector wage restraint 
and the so-called GIIPS91 countries experiencing 
substantial public sector wage inflation. The core 
countries of the EMU, interestingly, have had 
wage developments almost perfectly in line with 
the Golden Rule.
Not surprisingly, public sector wage developments 
have mirrored quite faithfully the trajectory of real 
exchange rates (REER) (Figure 2) since the launch 
of the single currency. The connection between 
public sector wage inflation/restraint, REER 
appreciations/depreciations and current account 
imbalances is evident. Research has, in fact, shown 
that current account imbalances in the EMU had 
their root cause primarily in sheltered sector wage 
inflation (Baccaro and Tober 2017; Hancké 2013; 
Johnston, Hancke, and Pant 2014), of which the 
public sector constitutes the bulk.
On average, public sector employment in the 
91   Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
While private sector wage policies are often 
beyond the remit of governmental authorities 
(e.g., Tarifautonomie in Germany), public sector 
wage policies are of particular interest, given 
that their implementation necessarily coincides 
with the fiscal stance of the sovereign employers 
in charge of earmarking fiscal resources for wage 
contracts. Thus, looking at public sector wage 
trajectories is a fundamental way of looking at the 
fiscal trajectories of governments. Public sector 
wage-setting matters in the EMU, both with regard 
to the co-ordination of the fiscal policies of euro 
Member States, but also, and especially so, for the 
impact that wage inflation can have on macroeco-
nomic imbalances via divergent unit labour costs 
(ULC) and price inflation89 (Baccaro and Tober 
2017; Hancké 2013; Johnston, Hancke, and Pant 
2014).
From the perspective of the EMU’s macroeco-
nomic regime - an economic system rooted in 
price stability - relatively stable ULC inflation is 
required in order to avoid structural divergence of 
Members’ price inflation in the medium to long 
run. The trade imbalances to which this diver-
gence leads can, in fact, no longer be absorbed 
through adjustable exchange rates (Carlin and 
Soskice 2014, Ch. 12).
In this context, the European Commission had 
adopted what is understood as the Golden Rule of 
Wage Bargaining90 as the formal policy guideline 
for national social partners: wage-setting is to be 
based upon the European Central Bank’s (ECB) 
inflation target plus average productivity in the 
economy. Given the absence of pan-European 
wage co-ordination, this was meant to engineer a 
virtuous interaction between national wage poli-
cies and the supranational monetary policy and, at 
the same time, avoid inflation differentials and the 
rise of macroeconomic imbalances in the mone-
tary union. In an abstract world, three types of 
wage policies are thus available to national public 
sector wage-setters.
89   See Höpner and Lutter (2014) for a review of the em-
pirical literature.
90   For a more detailed description, see Collignon (2009).
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had undergone wage infl ation in the good times 
of the single currency all experienced post-crisis 
restraint, as part of the harsh austerity measures 
which followed. Arguably, public sector wage-
setting is the fi rst and most accessible policy 
domain from which governments glean resources 
in hard times. Germany, in contrast, did not 
perform the eagerly awaited symmetric adjust-
ment (Bibow 2012) through an expansionary 
public sector wage policy. It continued along 
the trajectory of moderate public sector wage 
increases inaugurated in the aft ermath of re-unifi -
cation (Di Carlo 2018; Keller 2016; 2014).
Th us, overall, the wage trajectories in the Italian 
and German public sectors develop asymmetri-
cally in both good times (panel a) and hard times 
(panel b). In the fi rst decade of the EMU, Italy 
experienced public sector wage infl ation, while 
Germany pursued wage restraint. In hard times, 
Germany continued its pattern of moderate public 
sector wage increases (despite slightly expanding 
public sector employment in some sectors such 
as education and care), while Italy underwent 
remarkable wage restraint.
Figure 2: Real Eff ective Exchange Rates (REER) 
of EMU members (2000-2013), based upon unit 
labour costs (ULCs), weighted against 14 EU 
trading partners. Quarterly data (.1=1st quarter)
Source: Bruegel Datasets, REER for 178 countries, a new data-
base (Latest update: June 6,2017).
EMU Core = Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Nether-
lands.
EMU Periphery = Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal.
EMU accounts for more than 15 per cent of total 
employment. Th e sovereign employers are the 
single biggest, political and economic, employers 
in every advanced economy. Since public wages 
are paid out of taxpayers’ money, wage policy in 
the public sector cannot but be a subset of fi scal 
policy. With regards to the latter, studies by the 
European Central Bank (Holm-Hadulla et al. 
2010, 4) also fi nd that “government wage expen-
diture is subject to a pro-cyclical bias in most 
euro area countries and at the euro area aggregate 
level”. A pro-cyclical policy of wage infl ation in 
the public sector can thus lead to losses of REER 
competitiveness, underpin excessive imports, 
and contribute to an overall expansionary - pro-
cyclical - fi scal stance in the economy. Vice versa, 
in hard times, public sector wages are hardly hit by 
the fi scal authorities.
Figure 1: Indexes* of hourly wages in the public 
sectors of EMU countries (1999-2015).
Source: EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, 
September 2017 release.
*Indexes are discounted by labour productivity in the total 
economy. In (a), 1999=100. In (b), 2009=100.
EMU Core = Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Th e Neth-
erlands.
EMU Periphery = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
Th is is particularly evident when observing devel-
opments in public sector wages in the aft ermath 
of the crisis. Panel b in Figure 1 shows the poli-
cies of public sector wage restraint pursued in the 
GIIPS countries aft er 2009. Th e countries which 
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2. The Political Economy of 
Public Sector Wage Restraint 
in Germany: die öffentlichen 
Kassen sind immer leer
2.1  The 1990s: blühende 
Landschaften hit the EMU fiscal 
constraints
With regard to public sector wage-setting in 
Germany, it needs to be distinguished between 
public employees and civil servants (Beamten). 
Collective bargaining regulates wage-setting for 
the former. Unilateral legislation by the Govern-
ment sets employment and pay conditions for the 
latter. Given the structure of the German public 
administration, three levels of employment exist: 
the Federation (Bund), the states (Länder), and the 
municipalities (Gemeinden). Public employers at 
each level are responsible for their employees and 
can choose whether to employ personnel as civil 
servants or as public employees. At the federal 
level, the sovereign employers are represented in 
negotiations by the ministry of the interior, flanked 
by the finance minister. At the Länder level, the 
regional finance ministers are grouped together in 
the so-called Tarifgemeinschaft deutscher Länder 
(TdL). At the municipal level, municipalities are 
grouped into a state level association Kommunaler 
Arbeitgeberverband (KAV). The 16 associations 
from each Land are then represented together 
by the Vereinigung der kommunalen Arbeitge-
berverbände (VKA). Overall, until 2002, the three 
employers corresponding to the three public 
administration levels negotiated jointly with the 
trade unions under the leadership of the federal 
minister of the interior (a practice termed Tarifge-
meinschaft).
Given that the German Constitution (Grundg-
esetz) attributes most of the competencies to the 
sub-national governments, the Länder and the 
municipalities are the entities which bear the costs 
for administrative personnel disproportionately. 
While for the Länder expenditure for personnel 
Notwithstanding the relevance of public sector 
wage policies for the smooth functioning of the 
single currency, very little research is available on 
the topic. The public sector has been neglected 
both by industrial relations scholars and the 
comparative political economists – not to mention 
scholars of European affairs.
In industrial relations, a set of works exists that 
studies the structures of public sector employ-
ment relations and patterns of institutional change 
(Bach and Bordogna 2016; 2013; L Bordogna, 
Dell’Aringa, and Della Rocca 1999; Keller 2016; 
2011; Keller and Seifert 2015). These studies 
are highly informative, but remain mostly at a 
descriptive level. In CPE, the public sector has 
always been treated as a satellite of the export 
sector’s interests.92 The perspective adopted in 
these studies was always that of inter-sectoral wage 
co-ordination between the exposed sectors and 
the sheltered ones. Surprisingly enough, no atten-
tion was ever paid to the structure of the public 
administration, the role of the state as a sovereign 
employer (Hyman 2008; Traxler 1999), the char-
acteristics of public sector employment relations 
or the fiscal constitution of the state. The study of 
public sector wage bargaining remains a neglected 
and misunderstood aspect in the discipline. The 
status quo in the literature is not satisfying and a 
clear-cut understanding of the political and insti-
tutional determinants of public sector wage setting 
in missing in both industrial relations and CPE.
92   Di Carlo (2018) provides a thorough literature review of 
this literature in the context of European CPE. It also provides 
an empirical falsification of the thesis according to which wage 
restraint in the German public sector is the result of export-
sector-led pattern bargaining.
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esterno. In the 1990s, public sector wage restraint 
occurred out of concerns for fiscal deficits by the 
federal finance minister Theo Waigel. The consoli-
dation measures implemented in 1996 are effec-
tively summarised by the IMF fiscal consolidation 
dataset:
“Fiscal consolidation in 1997 was 
primarily motivated by deficit reduction 
and meeting the Maastricht deficit criteria 
… To shore up the public finances, the 
authorities adopted in late 1996 substantial 
discretionary fiscal measures as part of 
the budget for 1997, which were heavily 
weighted on spending cuts … With these 
measures, the authorities expected that the 
general government deficit would decline 
to 2% of GDP in 1997, safely under the 
Maastricht reference value. Spending cuts 
in the 1997 budget amounted to 1% of 
GDP and were based on wage restraint and 
retrenchments, spending limits imposed at 
the federal and state level, reducing sick 
pay coverage and restricting spa visits, and 
tightening eligibility for unemployment 
benefits.”
2.2  The Early 2000s: The Länder 
Offensive
In the early 2000s, the drivers for restraint were 
different. Wage restraint was the result of a process 
of institutional change which overhauled the old 
Tarifgemeinschaft. The process was driven and 
wanted by the finance ministers of the Länder. At 
the core of Länder finance ministers’ preoccupa-
tions was the concern about keeping the personnel 
cost of their state administrations under control. 
They also started a controversy with the unions, 
in 2003, on extending working hours (Dribbusch 
2006). For them, keeping costs down is of dispro-
portionate importance given their cost struc-
tures and, especially, given the impossibility of 
freely manipulating their marginal tax revenues. 
To achieve this end, they opted to free themselves 
from the (expensive) leadership of the federal 
amount to around 40-45 per cent of their total 
expenditure, the municipalities spend 25 per cent 
of the budget on personnel, while the federal level 
spends only around 9-10 per cent (Destatis data).
Given this cost structure, personnel costs (a stock) 
(and hence wage increases (a flow)) constitute a 
major concern for the finance ministers of the 
Länder and municipalities. Most importantly, the 
states and municipalities act as tax collectors for 
the federation, with whom they share tax revenues 
according to vertical and horizontal fiscal equal-
isation grants which are enacted via pre-deter-
mined formulae. Given the taxation structure, the 
Länder and municipalities simply cannot readily 
manipulate their marginal tax revenues. The only 
way that the Länder have to increase their tax 
revenues is through changes in legislation via the 
Bundesrat, which would require the consensus of 
all the Länder. The result of this joint-decision 
trap (Scharpf 2005) is that the fiscal structure in 
which lower levels of government are embedded 
puts enormous pressure on the expenditure side 
– of which the personnel costs are among the 
most significant items – leaving not much choice 
other than to keep the personnel expenditure in 
check - disproportionately so for the Länder. This 
tense situation worsened after the absorption of 
the poor new Länder into the fiscal equalisation 
system in 1995.
In fact, wage restraint in the German public sector 
started both before (and in relation to) the EMU, 
and as a consequence of the fiscal costs of reuni-
fication. The blühende Landschaften promised by 
Helmut Kohl to his fellow Germans, inevitably 
came to clash with the fiscal constraints set in 
the Maastricht Treaty and the following Stability 
Growth Pact (forcefully insisted upon by the 
German finance minister Theo Weigel). Public 
sector wage restraint first emerged in 1994 via a 
wage freeze for civil servants unilaterally imposed 
by the government, together with a moderate 
wage settlement collectively negotiated for public 
employees. It was then pushed through decisively 
via a Spaarpaket before the fiscal year of 1997 - 
in order to comply with the Maastricht vincolo 
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there is increasing difficulty in recruiting public 
employees (especially teachers and nurses). Public 
opinion also appears to be in favour of expanding 
public employment. Yet, one can barely notice an 
upward trajectory of wage increases. Why?
To be sure, increases in public employment in 
the categories mentioned are indeed visible. Yet, I 
argue that public wages are structurally prevented 
from increasing in Germany because of the unique 
public sector wage-setting regime.
With regards to the TV-L contract, TdL negotiators 
are forced to take into consideration the ability of 
the finance ministers from the poor Länder to pay. 
The poor states greatly value the benefits of collec-
tive bargaining coordinated through the TdL, 
especially in order to avoid direct wage competi-
tion with the richer Länder and to avoid setting 
up costly bargaining units to handle negotiations 
and internecine conflict. Moreover, they still have 
to make sure that the rich Länder, with a higher 
ability to pay, do not push up wage settlements 
driving them into bankruptcy. In the internal poli-
tics of TdL, it does not take much to convince the 
finance ministers of the rich states to hide behind 
the poor ones: they have, so to speak, an interest 
in being outvoted. Personnel costs are, on average, 
higher in the books of the old Länder, when 
compared to the new ones, which underwent a 
massive re-structuring after re-unification. Setting 
wages calibrated as a lowest common denomi-
nator decreases their fiscal opportunity costs - i.e., 
frees fiscal resources can be spent on other items 
(or hoarded as budget surpluses, which the finance 
ministers of accountable states seem to value 
considerably). At the same time, richer Länder 
can blame the restraint on the poor finances of 
the others. TdL itself has an organisational interest 
in keeping the 15 state finance ministers together 
(Hesse is not in the TdL). The rich states would 
most probably have to pay higher wages than they 
currently pay (without upward competition) and 
would see their transaction costs in negotiations 
increase. The poor Länder would find themselves 
in a fully competitive federal system, in which they 
would be net losers. The system is granted some 
level in public sector wage negotiations. Also, they 
wanted to separate themselves from the (trouble-
some) municipal level in which public employees 
potentially have the highest disruptive power 
to affect negotiating dynamics thanks to their 
strength in basic community services (e.g., in local 
transport and waste disposal).
Negotiations to reform the system started after the 
signature of the 2002 collective/national contract 
and were concluded in 2005 with the creation 
of the Tarifvertrag für den Öffentlichen Dienst 
(TVöD) contract which regulates public employees 
at federal and municipal level. Wage restraint 
emerged as a combination of extended working 
hours, a rationalisation of special bonuses and a 
moderate lump-sum compensation of €300 per 
year in the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. The unions 
exchanged restraint for participation in reforming 
the old bargaining structure.
TdL did not want to be part of TVöD, and, after 
very tense negotiations and strike actions, 
throughout 2006, they reached an agreement with 
the unions on the creation of the new Tarifvertrag 
für den Öffentlichen Dienst der Länder (TV-L). 
The agreement envisaged lump sums of various 
amounts depending on the pay grades, to be 
paid out to employees in July 2006, January 2007 
and September 2007, a rationalisation of special 
bonuses and the extension of working hours.
As a parallel development, the reform of the 
fiscal federalism system in 2006 has restored to 
the Länder the competence to legislate on the 
employment and wage conditions of their own 
civil servants. This has introduced an element 
of competitive federalism and created an hori-
zontal diversification of wage conditions across 
the states, with Berlin and Bavaria located at the 
opposite extremes of the continuum (DGB 2016).
2.3 Public Sector Wage-setting in 
the Age of Prosperity
Germany is living through times of budget 
surpluses and almost full employment. Also, 
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bargaining rights in conjunction with civil servant 
status gave birth to a regime of “double guarantee”, 
or, as scholars have put it, “pluralism without 
markets” (Lorenzo Bordogna 1994; Giugni 1992). 
During the 1980s, this public sector wage-setting 
regime led to uncontrolled wage inflation and 
politically-tolerated, leapfrogging dynamics in 
a context of union fragmentation and recurring 
disputes (Cella 1991).
The public sector wage-setting regime of the 
first republic consisted of a highly fragmented 
system in which smaller trade unions (sindacati 
autonomi), independent of the peak level confed-
erations, the CGIL, CISL and UIL, had established 
a dense network of clientelistic relations with 
political referents in parliament (Ricciardi 2013, 
120-27). This network led to what was termed 
“wage jungle” (giungla retributiva) (Gorrieri 1973) 
to indicate the practice of setting public sector 
wages regardless of any economic or administra-
tive logic. Wage-setting in the public sector simply 
responded to the political logic of (re-) producing 
consent. Political actors in parliament were thus 
able to pass specific laws (leggine settoriali)93 
hiding them from the scrutiny of public opinion, 
delivering favourable provisions (income and 
non-income related) to their affiliated sub-groups 
of workers in the public sector (Talamo 2009b).
Major reforms of the system of public sector pay 
determination were passed in 1992-1993 with 
the ambition to make the process “apolitical” 
and to contain public expenditure. The public 
law status of public employees was abolished and 
the employment relationship was “privatised” 
(privatizzazione del pubblico impiego). Collective 
bargaining became the legal method94 to regulate 
terms and conditions of employment. The reform 
of the summer of 1993 introduced a two-tier 
wage-bargaining system in which the main pillar 
93   This practice was unveiled also by a Parliamentary 
Commission (Commissione Coppo) in 1977 and later de-
nounced in the famous “Report on the fundamental problems 
of the State” by Professor Massimo Severo Giannini in 1979.
94   Approximately 80% of public employees were subjected 
to the reform. Core functions of the state were not privatized, 
such as judges, police, the army, etc.
flexibility for diversification and competition via 
the possibility for the states of hiring civil servants 
and thus can unilaterally decree wage settlements.
With regard to the TVöD contract, a similar logic 
applies, although without the cleavage rich vs 
poor states. This is because poor municipalities 
are widespread also in West Germany. Substantial 
wage increases are prevented from the necessity 
to avoid bankruptcy of poor municipalities and/
or a likely increase of transfers from the Federal 
level. Negotiators in the VKA, together with the 
federal finance and interior ministers, are aware 
of the necessity to avoid costly settlements which 
risk endangering the finances of lower levels.
Thus, in the German system, key explanatory 
factors for public sector wage restraint are the 
structure of the public sector wage-setting regime, 
the direct accountability of Länder finance minis-
ters and their isolation from political influence.
3. The Political Economy of 
Public Sector Wage Inflation 
and Restraint in Italy: We 
will Find the Money, if we 
Like
3.1  The 1990s: Depoliticisation 
of Public Sector Collective 
Bargaining?
Until the end of the 1960s, pay and employment 
relations in Italy were unilaterally set by the sover-
eign employer through laws or administrative 
acts. In this system, public employees enjoyed the 
employment status of civil servants, which guar-
anteed employment security and seniority careers 
(Rusciano 1978). Over time, collective bargaining 
rights were granted and, during the 1970s, the 
practice spread throughout the branches of the 
public sector, until the 1983 Legge Quadro intro-
duced collective bargaining as a primary mode 
of pay determination – although contracts still 
needed to be transformed into administrative acts 
to come into effect. The introduction of collective-
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wage negotiations for political purposes. However, 
the creation of ARAN could not circumvent the 
political nature of public sector wage-setting in 
which the fiscal costs for the determination of 
wage increases had to be earmarked in budget 
laws. The way in which Italy reformed its system 
did not shelter the finance ministers from party 
politics. ARAN would negotiate with the trade 
unions on how to distribute resources, while the 
quantum of the fiscal resources to be earmarked 
before the government’s mandate remained fully 
in the hands of the government.
During the 1990s, the trade unions acted respon-
sibly in the determination of the public sector 
pay. In a context of weak political parties, the 
unions played a major role in tripartite consulta-
tion for the reform of collective bargaining and, 
above all, the production of public sector wage 
restraint. The unions exchanged wage restraint 
with political influence on the determination of 
legislation related to the re-structuring of public 
sector employment relations (Talamo 2009a, 4-5). 
Unions also shared in the objective of complying 
with the external constraints imposed on public 
finances by the accession phase to the EMU in 
199995 (Hancké and Rhodes 2005).
3.2  The Early 2000s: The Return 
of (Political) Incomes Policies
The scenario for public sector wage-setting 
changed substantially with the advent of the 
centre-right coalition (2001-2006) led by Silvio 
Berlusconi. Although, formally speaking, the 
institutions for public sector collective bargaining 
were not changed during the years of inflation 
(mostly 2002-2006), the function of pay determi-
nation was re-oriented towards a logic of political 
consent. This was made possible by the incon-
sistencies of the structure created in 1993, which 
made room for the return of the politicisation of 
public sector wage determination.
95   Confirmed in interviews with heads of public sector 
branches of CGIL, CISL, but also confirmed in interviews with 
decision makers in the top echelon of ARAN. Interviews car-
ried out in winter 2017/2018.
consisted of nationally agreed and uniform wage 
increases negotiated between the newly-created 
independent agency (Agenzia per la Rappresen-
tanza Negoziale delle pubbliche amminstrazioni - 
ARAN) and the trade unions. The second pillar 
regarded wage increases at the decentralised level 
to be negotiated by individual administrations and 
the workplace personnel representation bodies in 
a context of “organised decentralisation” (Lorenzo 
Bordogna 2012; L Bordogna, Dell’Aringa, and 
Della Rocca 1999).
The wage contracts were to last for a two-year 
duration (biennio contrattuale) and the wage 
increases were to be decided according to three 
criteria. First, wage increases at national level were 
to be calculated according to the rate of “expected 
inflation” (Tasso di Inflazione Programmata, 
TIP) for the subsequent two-year contract. This 
rate would have to be negotiated in a concerted 
manner between the government, employers and 
the unions during two sessions (one in the spring 
and one in the autumn) throughout the preceding 
year. Second, in the event of a discrepancy between 
the expected and the actual inflation, the subse-
quent two-year contract would have to incorpo-
rate resources ex post on order to compensate 
for lost purchasing power. This provision would 
be calculated upon the basis of the difference 
between the expected rate of inflation and the 
actual rate. To these criteria for centrally deter-
mined wage increases, local administrations could 
add resources to the central contracts according to 
productivity increases. These additional resources 
would have to be paid in part by resources granted 
from the central level and in part by the finances 
of the local administrations.
The creation of the independent agency, ARAN, 
as the monopolistic representative of all public 
administrations in national level negotiations 
had the purpose of insulating wage bargaining 
from the incursions of party politics. The tech-
nical body, in a principal-agent relationship with 
the government, was meant to prevent the distor-
tions of the previous model. After the Mani pulite 
scandal(s) in the 1990s, the political establishment 
came to be held inadequate to continue handling 
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Fini, its leader, had been appointed deputy prime 
minister, Berlusconi saw, as the driving force of 
the coalition, a special alliance with Umberto 
Bossi, Northern League’s leader, and Giulio Trem-
onti, the appointed finance minister acting as the 
guarantor between the two leaders. This special 
relationship came to be known as the “Northern 
axis” (Diamanti and Lello 2005, 22-23). Proof 
of the close ties between Berlusconi and Bossi 
was the recurring practice of dining together at 
Berlusconi’s villa in Arcore every Monday evening 
to discuss the interests of the Northern middle 
classes, small- and medium-sized enterprises, and 
freelance professionals.
As representatives of the South - and the centre 
- the coalition included the post-fascist Alleanza 
Nazionale (AN) and the post-Christian-Demo-
cratic Unione di Centro (UDC). These parties 
were rooted in the Southern areas of the country 
which were characterised by high levels of unem-
ployment and in which public sector employ-
ment (and wage inflation therein) has historically 
played a key role as a socio-economic stabiliser 
in the local economies (Cassese 1977; Santoro 
2014). The remaining forces of the coalition, AN 
and UDC, thus came to constitute the “Southern 
bloc” - inspired by the values of the Social Right 
(destra sociale), representing the lower classes of 
the South and employees in the public admin-
istration. As the leader of UDC put it to me, the 
Southern bloc “represented all those people which 
were not taken care of by the Arcore tablemates” 
(interview with the then leader of the UCD. Rome, 
9 February 2018). AN and UDC strongly, and 
vocally, supported public works and infrastruc-
ture building in the South, as well as resources 
for public employment, with a special eye on the 
Lazio region where most of the central adminis-
trations are based and where AN has historically 
been strongly rooted.
The bargaining cycles which led to public sector 
wage inflation in Italy are the two-year contracts 
of 2002-2004 and 2004-2006. On both occa-
sions, the direct mobilisation of political capital 
by Gianfranco Fini, the deputy prime minister 
According to the legal structure, the government 
would decide the fiscal resources to be earmarked 
in the budget law which preceded the beginning of 
the two-year contract. These resources, inserted in 
the budget law, were decided ex ante by the sover-
eign employer and would be publicly known to 
all actors. Since resources are already earmarked 
before the beginning of negotiations between 
ARAN and the unions - and unions know the exact 
amount already granted - this becomes the “point 
of non-return” in the bargaining cycle. Instead of 
serving as a ceiling for wage setting, the determi-
nation of the quantum by the government makes 
room for political contestation. The unions, in fact, 
contest the amount of available resources, oppose 
the beginning of negotiations with ARAN, and 
exploit the already-agreed upon number in order 
to increase the resources required by lobbying the 
government.
The capability of the unions to obtain greater 
resources depends on the willingness of the 
government to reach a compromise with them. The 
centre-right government was not united behind 
a policy of public sector wage inflation. In fact, 
the House of Freedoms (La Casa delle Libertà), 
as the coalition was named, was not united at all. 
It consisted of four very heterogeneous parties 
geographically and sociologically rooted in 
different parts of the country (Diamanti 2003). 
After the end of the first republic, the centre-right 
had been formed in 1994 (and reformed in 2001) 
by Berlusconi’s capacity to bring together, into a 
unique political space, parties with strongholds in 
different parts of the country.
In the North, Berlusconi had secured a pact with 
the Lega Nord (Northern League) centred on the 
middle classes’ quest for a neo-liberal agenda 
comprising tax cuts, fiscal federalism, a clamp-
down on immigration, and reduced state inter-
vention. After the disastrous experience of the 
mid-1990s, the House of Freedoms campaigned 
together again and won the elections in 2001, 
opening a new era for the centre-right. Although 
Alleanza Nazionale (AN) was the second polit-
ical force in the coalition (12%), and Gianfranco 
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3.3  Public Sector Wage-setting 
in the Age of Sovereign Debt 
Crises: The Show must not Go on
The pattern of public sector wage inflation in 
Italy started to be reversed in the 2006-2008 wage 
bargaining cycle. This occurred under the pres-
sure exercised by the finance minister Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa in the centre-left coalition in 
government. The finance minister strongly wished 
to enforce a wage freeze during the negotiations 
for the renewal of the 2006-2008 public sector 
contracts. This was meant to compensate for the 
wage excesses of the previous two bargaining 
cycles (2002-2004 and 2004-2006) which had 
occurred under the centre-right coalition in 
government. Wage freezes were only avoided at 
the very last minute thanks to the political media-
tion of the Prime Minister Romano Prodi during 
private negotiations with the heads of the public 
sector branches of the trade unions confedera-
tions (Interviews conducted with the then leaders 
of the public sector branch of CGIL (in Bologna, 
20 November 2017) and of CISL (in Rome, 5 
February 2018)). However, much less money was 
earmarked for public contracts and the result was 
a harsh conflict between the finance minister and 
the prime minister.
Measures for wage restraint were introduced unilat-
erally in 2008 (2009 budget law) written by Giulio 
Tremonti, before Italy came under pressure from 
the financial markets in summer 2011. Restraint 
was then strengthened by various governments 
(political and technocratic) in 2010 and 2011 and 
eventually extended in 2013 until, in spring 2015, 
a verdict of the Constitutional Court has declared 
the multi-year wage freeze pursued unilaterally by 
various governments since 2010 to be unconsti-
tutional. The judgment forced the government to 
restart collective bargaining with the trade unions 
for the years ahead without, however, imposing 
compensation for lost purchasing power, which 
would have severely endangered the weak state 
of public finances. Legislation passed in 2008 had 
imposed a wage ceiling on the wage increases, 
and leader of AN and the Southern bloc, was of 
fundamental importance for increasing fiscal 
resources previously granted through budget laws. 
With regard to public sector wage policy, Fini has 
been repeatedly capable of imposing the inter-
ests of the Southern bloc on the whole coalition, 
especially against the will of the finance minister 
Tremonti. AN and UDC, in coalition with the 
trade union confederation CISL (the most repre-
sentative union in the public sector), have always 
been open with respect to their interest in repre-
senting the vast constituency of public employees 
for whom they forcefully obtained the increase in 
the resources available for public sector contracts.
Politically, allowing for public sector wage infla-
tion served two inter-twined purposes. For Berlus-
coni’s Forza Italia, conceding inflationary wage 
increases in the public sector had the purpose of 
dividing the unions (the CISL from the irksome 
CGIL) during their open contestation regarding 
the government’s reformist agenda. Berlusconi 
acted behind the scenes to support the political 
mediation of the deputy prime minister with the 
trade unions. For the Southern bloc of the coali-
tion, Fini’s political mediation came to serve their 
electoral interests perfectly. In courting their core 
constituency, the public employees, AN’s leader 
Fini repeatedly proved himself capable of over-
coming the opposition of the other coalition 
partner, the Northern League, which was opposed 
to generous public sector increases. Notwith-
standing this opposition, Fini managed to exploit 
public sector wage increases in favour of political 
consent by successfully mobilising political capital 
to increase resources for public wages in subse-
quent budget laws. There has been, in this sense, a 
clear political willingness on the part of the Italian 
sovereign employers to grant inflationary wages 
for reasons other than the mere adjustment of the 
personnel expenditure to macroeconomic devel-
opments.
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tragedies. For Italy to survive in a hard currency 
regime with Germany at its core, a re-structuring 
of its public sector wage-setting regime should be 
a priority so as to avoid de-stabilising wage/fiscal 
expansion and subsequent austerity measures. 
Cyclical developments in wage-setting are also 
likely to have a strong impact on the morale of 
public employees and the quality and efficiency of 
the public administration.
I wish to conclude with an important clarification. 
There is no pretension here to praise Germany and 
belittle Italy; nor should the reader see this paper 
as support for the austerity measures pursued as 
nemesis in the public sectors of the GIIPS. Rather, 
it is the opposite reasoning that motivates my 
inquiry: from the perspective of the EMU macro-
economic governance, both trajectories of marked 
restraint and inflation are equally deplorable.
Indeed, the core countries of the EMU have been 
able to produce stable public sector wage trajecto-
ries both before and after the crisis (Figure 1). This 
has contributed to stabilise their REERs (Figure 2). 
Hence, a more balanced approach to public sector 
wage policies exists, and not just in abstract terms. 
Future research could take off from this observa-
tion and ask what the institutional determinants 
of balanced wage growth in public sectors are. 
Looking at these countries’ public sector wage-
setting regimes should teach us something about 
how to design a set of institutional changes aimed 
at avoiding the problem of structural divergence 
when the good times return.
declaring unlawful every wage agreement that 
went beyond the established ceiling. A decree law 
of May 2010 unilaterally cancelled wage rounds 
for 2010-2012. This freeze was then extended via 
administrative decision for the years 2013 and 
2014 (Lorenzo Bordogna and Pedersini 2013).
Conclusions
Public sector wage-setting is an extremely inter-
esting field in which to observe the discrepancies 
in policy-making between Germany and Italy. 
The relevance of public sector wage-setting in the 
political economy of European integration stems 
from two factors. Public sector wage policy coin-
cides necessarily with fiscal policy. Given the enor-
mous size of the public sector in advanced econo-
mies, divergent public sector wage trajectories can 
underpin discrepancies in the fiscal co-ordination 
of the EMU participants. Secondly, public sector 
wage-setting can produce negative spillovers for 
REER competitiveness, and underpin trade imbal-
ances.
In Germany, the observable pattern of marked 
wage restraint started in the mid-1990s out of 
fiscal concerns by the federal finance minister. It 
was then driven by fiscal concerns of the Länder 
finance ministers, in the 2000s. As we observe the 
German public sector wage-setting regime today, 
after the reforms of the early 2000s, it emerges 
that Länder finance ministers are institutionally 
sheltered from political incursions and are locally 
accountable. Given the structure of its fiscal feder-
alism and of the employers’ interest representa-
tion, Germany is institutionally entrapped into a 
low-wage-increase equilibrium, which impedes 
a more inflationary stance in public sector wage-
setting.
In Italy, the observable pattern of public sector 
wage inflation of the early 2000s can, first and 
foremost, be attributed to the political willing-
ness of sovereign employers to tolerate inflation 
for strategic political advantages. Patterns of wage 
inflation in good times, followed by austerity and 
cuts in hard ones, resemble hubris and nemesis 
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“Ten times Trump asked [Ms Merkel] if he could 
negotiate a trade deal with Germany. Every 
time she replied, ‘You can’t do a trade deal with 
Germany, only the EU.”96
I. Introduction: Going 
Beyond the North-South 
Problems inside the Euro 
Zone
The financial crisis—the Eurozone crisis in partic-
ular—initiated an important debate over the 
distributive implications of the EMU.  Aside from 
questioning the wisdom of the austerity policies 
imposed by the Troika—the European Commis-
sion (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—many 
people began to focus on what they perceived 
to be the structural problems of the EMU.  The 
EMU, it was argued, structurally advantaged the 
Northern European economies at the expense of 
the weaker Southern European economies.  The 
single currency rewarded the Northern Euro-
pean member states with a weak currency (much 
weaker counterfactually than in the absence of the 
EMU), while it punished the Southern European 
member states by robbing them of the policy tool 
they long relied upon to boost their competitive-
ness—i.e. currency devaluation (Hall 2012, Streeck 
2015).  The Euro thereby improved the terms of 
trade for the Northern European member states. 
96  This is the report of the meeting between the Chancellor 




As a consequence, the German economy boomed 
after the crisis, while the citizens of Greece, Italy 
and Spain suffered from austerity policies (Blyth 
2012).  This debate fed a morality play that 
portrayed the Greeks, Italians and Spaniards as 
the morally inferior lazy brethren of Northern 
Europeans.  It appeared as if European solidarity 
was giving way to an ugly family feud over who 
owes what to whom. 
The aim of this paper is to extend the discussion 
beyond Europe and the EMU.  The consequences 
of the EMU go well beyond the Euro-zone borders. 
Not only did the Euro improve the terms of intra-
EMU trade for the Euro-zone North; it also 
improved their competitiveness outside Europe. 
The first meeting between Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and the President Donald Trump focused 
attention on the importance of Germany’s rela-
tively advantageous trade terms.  Trump bitterly 
complained about Germany—the largest economy 
in Europe.  Trump took aim at the German trade 
surplus, and demanded a bi-lateral agreement to 
rectify the “unfair” trade imbalance between the 
two countries.   While European elites shrugged 
off Trump’s comments as the ramblings of an 
uncouth novice who did not understand how the 
EU worked, the reality was actually the other way 
around.  It was European—and German—elites 
who had been too slow to realize that they could 
no longer free-ride on the Americans.  Trump’s 
statements about trade imbalances and NATO 
funding actually reflect an inconvenient truth for 
Europeans: the Marshall Plan era is over. Europe 
and the US can no longer count on the presence of 
a common enemy to unite them.  
Germany is an exporting powerhouse.   It is the 
third largest exporter in the world after China 
and the US. Germany exports almost as much as 
the US does. The volume of German exports is 
close to twice as large as that of Japan, the fourth 
largest exporter.  Germany, however, stands out 
for its trade surplus.  For an economy of its size, 
it imports relatively little.  In fact, as Baccaro 
and Pontusson (2016) note, Germany relies on 
foreign—rather than domestic—demand to stim-
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ulate its economy.  When a large wealthy economy 
relies on foreign demand to propel its economy, 
other countries must pay the price in trade defi-
cits.  Even within the EU, criticisms of this beggar 
thy neighbor policy emerged (Varoufakis 2017). 
Outside the EU, the same criticisms have led to 
serious geo-political tensions between the US and 
Europe. 
 This short paper argues that the dramatic rise in 
German exports would not have happened without 
the Euro, and that the EU has served as a cover to 
shield Germany from any bi-lateral trade disputes 
that might have emerged.  Consequently, the 
German growth model has exacerbated geo-polit-
ical problems between two sides of the Atlantic. 
This paper uses Japan as a counter-factual case to 
highlight the importance of the special advantages 
that Germany enjoys thanks both to the EMU and 
the EU.
II. Similar Pasts and 
Similar Challenges, but 
Charting New Paths
Germany and Japan provide us with a pair of 
similar cases—two economies that are alike in 
many ways except one had the protection of the 
EU and EMU while the other did not.  This paper 
takes advantage of the initial similarities and 
divergences following the creation of the EMU. 
This particular combination of similarities and 
divergences makes Germany and Japan an ideal 
pair of comparative cases to explore the effects of 
the EMU.  First, let me talk about their initial simi-
larities before moving on to the discussion of their 
more recent divergent paths.  
During the postwar period, Germany and Japan 
emerged as competitive economies that possessed 
distinctive characteristics.  Their models of capi-
talism inspired a whole generation of compara-
tive studies of economic/ production regimes in 
the 1980s and 1990s.97  Wolfgang Streeck’s work 
on the German production regime and Masahiko 
97  The Varieties of Capitalism literature in many ways synthe-
sized and built upon their contributions.  See footnote 3.
Aoki’s work on the Japan firm provide pioneering 
examples of this scholarship.98  Indeed, Germany 
and Japan became the real life models that helped 
the conceptualization of Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) in the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature.99  They both shared similar character-
istics: neither was a neo-corporatist system, but 
both had developed organizational capacities to 
coordinate economic activities.  Firms cooperated 
with one another, and employers did the same 
with their employees in their joint effort to inno-
vate and navigate the ups and downs of business 
cycles.  In both countries, banks and closely-knit 
corporate ownership patterns stood out.
Their economic success stories of the 1970s 
and 1980s notwithstanding, the 1990s brought 
daunting challenges to both countries.  The 
German economy suffered after the re-unifica-
tion and unemployment rates soared.  This was 
the period when Germany was nicknamed “the 
sick man of Europe.”  Japan fared no better.  After 
the burst of the so-called Bubble Economy in the 
early 1990s, Japan plunged into a long period 
of economic stagnation. Furthermore, the two 
countries also began to experience demographic 
problems.  Their models of welfare capitalism 
assumed households with male-breadwinners. 
Their employment practices and welfare states 
had developed with traditional gendered divisions 
of labor in mind, whereby men were expected to 
become breadwinners and women were expected 
to become unpaid carers for their families (Daly 
2011; Lister 1994; Leitner 2003; Sainsbury 1994). 
Comparatively strong employment regulation in 
Germany and Japan protected male breadwinners’ 
jobs, and their welfare states mostly addressed the 
needs of male breadwinners.  The other side of the 
coin was sex-discriminating employment prac-
98  Aoki (1983), Cole (1971, 1989), Dore (1973), Patrick (1976), 
Streeck (1984,1992) represent some of the most influential 
contributions that initiated firm-level comparative analyses of 
advanced industrial countries. 
99  For instance, when Estévez-Abe et al (2001) distinguish CMEs 
that rely on firm-specific skills and industry-specific skills, this 
distinction heavily relies on the Japanese (firm-specific) and 
German (industry-specific) cases.
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tices and underdeveloped services for working 
mothers—i.e. scarcity of work-family reconcili-
ation policies (Estévez-Abe 2005, 2006).  As a 
result, maternal employment rates in these coun-
tries remained lower than the OECD average. 
Given the fact that among the OECD countries 
fertility rates are higher where female labor force 
participation rates are high, it is not surprising 
that fertility rates plunged in Germany and Japan. 
It is no coincidence that they are the most “aged” 
OECD countries.
 The economic fortunes of the two countries began 
to diverge in the 2000s and the pace of divergence 
accelerated after the financial crisis in 2008.  While 
Germany recovered from its economic stagnation 
in the 1990s, Japan did not.  In Germany, as the 
economy recovered and unemployment rate went 
down in the latter half of the 2000s, labor shortages 
became the new problem.  Demographic aging 
means the shrinking of younger cohorts, and it 
directly affects the number of young male workers 
who are available in the labor market.  There are 
two potential solutions: (i) to increase the activity 
rate of the native population; and or (ii) to increase 
immigration.  Germany did both in the latter half 
of the 2000s.  The Hartz Reforms and the pension 
reform removed work disincentives and pushed 
up male employment rates.  Germany also began 
to promote female employment and immigration 
of skilled foreigners (Blome 2016: Constant and 
Bienvenue 2011; Hien 2013; Morgan 2013; Wiliarty 
2010).  Japan, in contrast, just stagnated.  In spite 
of its shrinking workforce, Japan did not feel the 
labor market crunch as early as Germany because 
of its prolonged recession.  This long recession 
motivated many women to enter the labor market, 
which in turn further depressed wages.  What the 
Japanese initially referred to as “the lost decade” 
of the 1990s, eventually became the “lost decades.” 
Japan could not export its way out of the economic 
recession as Germany had done, as its currency 
kept on strengthening against the dollar.  Japan 
thus tried to boost domestic demand.  This effort 
yielded a national public deficit of 237% of the 
GDP compared to 79% in Germany.  Germany, in 
contrast, turned to foreign demand and overtook 
Japan as an exporting superpower. Furthermore, 
as demand for skilled labor increased, Germany 
increasingly recruited women and foreigners.  In 
Japan, such changes are only occurring now—
with a delay of ten years (Estévez-Abe and Naldini 
2016).
III. Why Did Their Economic 
Fates Diverge?
Why did the trajectories of Germany and Japan 
come to diverge so much? Proponents of the Vari-
eties of Capitalism might attribute the German 
economic success to its CME.  By the same token, 
they might argue that Japan’s relative decline is 
due to Japan not really being a CME any longer.100 
This explanation is too shallow.  Baccaro and 
Pontusson (2016) are right to claim that a dichoto-
mous taxonomy that omits so many countries does 
not provide the best model tool to understand the 
challenges facing super- aging mature economies. 
Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) pay greater atten-
tion to how mature countries manage “demand-
side” factors in their effort to promote economic 
growth.101 They argue that Germany explicitly 
chose to seek out foreign demand while neglecting 
to expand its own domestic demand.  They point 
out how the German employers and unions made 
a pact to reduce wages when they joined the EMU 
in order to preserve their competitiveness in an 
effort to capture foreign markets. 
I agree with the importance of examining the 
demand management particularly in the context 
100  Iversen and Soskice dropped Japan from their list of 
CME as they shifted their analysis to the causal link between 
CMEs and proportional representation systems (see Cusack, 
Iversen and Soskice 2007).  Others have continue to look at 
Japan as a form of highly organized capitalism (Estévez-Abe 
2008; Streeck and Yamamura eds. 2005).
101  Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) criticize the VOC as be-
ing too “supply-side” in their justification of their demand-side 
approach.  However, Michael Piore (2016) is correct to point 
out, in his commentary on Baccaro and Pontusson (2016), 
that the “macro” versus “micro” distinction might be more 
appropriate to describe how Baccaro and Pontusson situate 
themselves vis-à-vis the VOC rather than the contrast between 
“demand-side” and “supply-side.”  
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of demographic aging.  That said, Baccaro and 
Pontusson (2016) fail to pay attention to the 
specific advantages that Germany enjoyed under 
the umbrella of the EMU and the EU.  As Baccaro 
and Pontusoon (2016) claim, Germany initially 
moderated its wage growth in its attempt to seize 
greater market shares in the new single market 
initially. But  it would not have been able to capture 
so much of foreign demand had it not been for the 
EMU/EU framework.
The EMU—in combination with other advan-
tages the EU provides—helped create extremely 
favorable conditions for German exporters.  First, 
Germany benefited handsomely from the new 
single currency, which, because it reflects the 
macro-economic performance of all Euro-zone 
countries, including some quite dysfunctional 
ones, will always appreciate less than the Deutsch-
Mark would have done.   Second, the EU harmo-
nized all key product regulations across the EU 
member states removing any trade barriers.  Third, 
the EU shielded Germany from any possibility of 
having to engage in unfavorable bi-lateral negotia-
tions, whether with any specific EU member-state 
or powerful non-EU trading partner such as the 
US.  Four, the Schengen Agreement expanded the 
potential labor pool for Germany. 
The first two conditions de facto turned the Euro-
zone into a big domestic market for German 
exporters as they no longer faced any currency 
risk in trading within the Euro-zone.  Because 
the monetary union also took away less competi-
tive countries’ capacity to devalue, more competi-
tive countries were better-positioned to reap the 
benefit of the bigger single market. Germany was 
such a country—and a huge one by European 
standards.  Germany enjoyed a scale of merit due 
to the size of its own domestic market, and now 
could enjoy an even bigger scale of merit thanks to 
the expanded de facto domestic market.  Further-
more, Germany also had easy access to the markets 
in those EU member states outside the Euro-zone 
such as the UK.  Given that the national currencies 
of non-Euro-zone member states tended to appre-
ciate more, Germany again stood to gain from 
favorable terms of trade.   In 2006, the combined 
economy of the EU28 was the largest in the world 
accounting for 30% of global GDP (Eurostat 
2018).  Ten years later, it fell to 25% and became 
the second largest after the US, but these numbers 
underscore the importance of the advantage that 
Germany gains from easy access to this market. 
Furthermore, the third and fourth conditions 
removed potential bottlenecks for Germany’s 
export-oriented strategy for growth.  The EU 
shielded Germany from any trade sanctions. 
Indeed, if any sanctions were to be threatened, 
they would have to target the whole of the EU.   No 
less importantly, Germany enjoyed access to a vast 
labor pool within the Schengen area. If Germany 
had not enjoyed the aforementioned four condi-
tions, it would have struggled to manage its aging 
society and would have suffered similar economic 
problems to those facing Japan.   
IV. Exposure to Currency 
Risk, Euro and the Distorted 
Geo-Politics of Trade: 
Germany Gains and Japan 
Loses
Let us now contrast Japan to Germany.  Japan 
faced a completely different, significantly more 
volatile exchange rate environment.  The first 
currency shock came in 1985, when the Finance 
Ministers from the G5 countries met in the Plaza 
Hotel in New York City and agreed to inter-
vene in the currency market to raise the value 
of the Japanese yen.  The so-called Plaza Accord 
was an action orchestrated by the US to correct 
Japan’s allegedly unfair currency advantage, which 
allowed it to enjoy a large trade surplus with the 
US.  Figure 1 shows the dramatic currency fluc-
tuations against the dollar that Japan has expe-
rienced over the past forty years.  Immediately 
after the Plaza Accord, the value of the US dollar 
nearly halved against the yen within a matter of 
months.  This was the first of three drastic waves 
of currency appreciation that Japan was to expe-
rience: the second one in 1994/5, and then again 
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in the late 2000s.   Japan’s off -shoring of produc-
tive facilities abroad had started in earnest in the 
mid-1990s increasing the relative share of foreign 
production of Japanese manufacturers.  Given the 
fact that the US is its major export market, drastic 
currency appreciation meant losing price compet-
itiveness in the US as well as suff ering the earning 
losses as the earnings were calculated in the Japa-
nese yen.   Th e harsh currency environment made 
it indispensable for Japan to boost its domestic 
market.   While private companies struggled to 
adjust their business models to the new currency 
environment, the public sector tried to compen-
sate for the shortfall in demand due to recession 
and demographic aging.  In the aft ermath of the 
fi nancial crisis, another wave of currency appre-
ciation negatively aff ected Japanese exports in an 
already weak global market. In contrast, Germany 
enjoyed its biggest ever trade surplus—roughly 
9% of its GDP in the post-crisis years.
Figure 1. Shift s in the Value of the US Dollar in 
Japanese Yen (1975-2018) 
Both Germany and Japan faced diff erent but simi-
larly dramatic economic shocks in the 1990s and 
in the 2000s.   However, the structural advantage 
provided by the Euro made it much easier for 
Germany to deal with its problems aft er 2000.  As 
mentioned earlier, Germany faced the shock of the 
German re-unifi cation, which sent its economy 
into a prolonged economic downturn.  Germa-
ny’s high levels of unemployment rates continued 
throughout the 1990s.  Th e uptake in the exports 
occurred before the labor market and welfare 
reforms in the early and mid-2000s—the Hartz 
Reforms and the Pension Reform—and grew 
larger aft erwards.   Germany’s current account 
surplus grew more or less steadily aft er joining 
the EMU (Figure 2).  In addition to the increase 
in Germany’s within the Euro-zone trade volume, 
Germany also gained a lot from non-Eurozone 
member states such as the UK.  Again, Figure 3 
shows how British trade defi cit with Germany 
grew aft er Germany joined the EMU.   When the 
Euro-crisis and the austerity policies in a number 
of largest member states suppressed the demand 
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for German products, Germany turned to other 
export markets including China and the US.  Figure 
4 shows how German (as well as the overall Euro-
pean) trade surplus with the US rapidly increased 
as a combination of weak domestic demand in EU 
member states and reliance on foreign demand as 
the US economy recovered from the crisis. 
Figure 2. Germany’s Current Account Surplus
Source: Romano 2018, p.8.
Figure 3. British Trade Defi cit in Goods and 
Services with Germany (in British pounds)
Source: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/
balanceofpayments/timeseries/lgmi/pb
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perform relative to Germany in the 2000s.102  A 
further blow to Japan was the third dramatic wave 
of currency appreciation, which came right aft er 
the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
Japanese export perfor-
mance worsened and wage 
levels in manufacturing 
began to drop as shown in 
Figure 5.
Figure 5. Hourly Wages in Manufacturing 
(2010=100)
Source: OECD Statistics
As Figure 6 indicates, the drop in labor share 
was much bigger in Japan than in Germany.  As 
in Germany, labor market deregulation led to a 
dualization of the labor market.  However, unlike 
102  OECD (2018), Multifactor productivity (indicator). doi: 
10.1787/a40c5025-en (Accessed on 22 June 2018)
Figure 4. US Trade Defi cit in Goods with 
Germany and Other Selected Trade Partners (in 
US dollars)
Source: Th e US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Data. https://
www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html
Japan, in turn, faced two 
major fi nancial shocks in 
the 1990s—the fi rst was 
the burst of its own spec-
ulative bubble in the early 
1990s and the second was 
the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997, which hit hard 
Japanese major banks 
since they were big lenders 
in many of the coun-
tries aff ected by the crisis. 
Unlike Germany, whose 
recovery was aided by the 
Euro, Japan was penal-
ized by extremely unfavorable exchange rates. 
In the years immediately following the burst 
of the so-called bubble economy, Japan experi-
enced another drastic currency appreciation in 
1994/1995. Th e Japanese growth rate of multifactor 
productivity was higher than that of Germany 
throughout the 1990s, but Japan began to under-
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Germany, Japan had no access to an expanded 
Euro-denominated quasi-domestic market.  In a 
shrinking market with strong currency, corpo-
rations maintained their profi ts by paying their 
workers less.  In the absence of the advantages of 
Euro, the strong yen led Japanese manufacturers 
to off -shore most of their production, and the 
number of workers employed in manufacturing 
decreased more in Japan than in Germany and 
Italy.  Th e new demand composition in Japan’s 
aging society added low wage service sector jobs 
to the economy instead.  Schwellnus et al. 2017 
calculate that most of the decline in labor’s share 
of the economy in Japan can be attributed to the 
reduction of labor share in service jobs, while in 
Germany the decline originated in its manufac-
turing sector.   If the Euro did not exist, Germany 
with its strong national currency would have off -
shored its production to a much greater degree. 
Revenue from investments in Eurozone countries 
would have suff ered from currency volatility—
earnings going down every time the Deutsche 
Mark appreciates. 
Figure 6. Changes in Gross and Net Labor Shares 
in OECD Countries, 1995-2014
Source: Schwellnus et al. 2017.
V. Geo-Political 
Implications of Too Much 
Surplus
Germany’s trade surplus aff ected the geopolit-
ical relationship between the EU and the United 
States.  Geopolitically, both Germany and Japan 
are similar.  Partly for historical reasons, they both 
underspend on their own defense budgets and 
rely on others—the US or the NATO—to provide 
security.   Germany benefi tted greatly from the 
EU, which not only foreclosed any possibility of 
bi-lateral trade negotiations between a member 
state and a non-EU country, but made it diffi  cult 
to link trade and security issues.  Th is meant that 
Germany could continue to amass trade surplus 
against the US, but the US could not raise issues 
about Germany’s meager defense budget. Th e situ-
ation in Japan was very diff erent. 
Th roughout the 1980s and the 1990s, Japan’s 
large trade surpluses with the United States led to 
multiple rounds of bi-lateral negotiations between 
the two countries (Schoppa 1997).  Th e Plaza 
Accord must be seen as the US’s reaction against 
Japan’s trade surplus.  In the US-Japan bi-lateral 
negotiations, security 
and trade issues were 
linked, and the negotia-
tions prompted Japan 
to agree to various 
concessions.  Japan 
“self-imposed” an unof-
fi cial export quota to 
the US; built factories 
in the US; paid for the 
cost of the US military 
bases in Japan; coor-
dinated its monetary 
policy with the US; and 
procured overpriced military weapons from the 
US. Furthermore, the US demanded that Japan 
adopt expansionary monetary and fi scal policies 
to boost its own domestic demand (and to buy 
more US goods); and Japan obliged by means of a 
low interest rate policy and greater public invest-
ments.  Th e monetary expansion right aft er the 
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Plaza Accord led to the rise of a speculative bubble 
in Japan, which fed the Bubble Economy of the 
1980s.  Unconstrained by anything like the Maas-
tricht Treaty and helped by its abundant domestic 
savings, the Japanese government continued its 
fi scal expansion.
Figure 7.  Growth Accounting
Source: Sánchez and Yurdagul (2017)
Th e US Government has been complaining about 
Germany’s excessive reliance on foreign demand 
(i.e. exports).  However, as Merkel explained to 
Trump, no bi-lateral negotiations are possible, 
because foreign trade is an EU competence. 
Th e inability of the largest European economy 
to work out bi-lateral solutions has now led the 
Trump Administration to raise the specter of 
tariff s against the whole of the EU.  One could 
argue that the whole of the EU is now paying the 
price for German trade surpluses.  Furthermore, 
the inability of the US to link security and trade 
issues in dealing with the EU trade partners seems 
to be eroding the very foundation of the NATO. 
Again, the history of the Japan-US trade confl icts 
and the negotiations can tell us what counter-
factually would have happened to Germany in 
the absence of the EU and the Euro.  Like Japan, 
Germany probably would have had to build more 
factories in the US as a way of cultivating polit-
ical capital in the US (Japanese big manufactures 
cleverly invested in “swing states” for Presidential 
elections) and to buy more “made in US” military 
weaponry. 
Conclusion 
When domestic demand starts to contract due 
to demographic aging, it is very diffi  cult for the 
government to fi ns a quick solution.  It can either 
export more or boost domestic demand.  Th is 
short paper has argued that Germany enjoyed 
special advantages. In the absence of the EU 
and the monetary union, Germany would have 
suff ered the long stagnation of Japan. Baccaro 
and Pontusson (2016) argue that it was the polit-
ical coalition in Germany that led Germany to 
rely heavily on foreign demand in lieu of any 
attempt to boost domestic demand.  Th ey contrast 
Germany to the UK and Sweden as examples of 
countries that have adopted more lax consumer 
loans and mortgage lending to boost domestic 
demand for diff erent reasons.  Although it is not 
mentioned in their piece, it is important to note 
that these were both countries outside the mone-
tary union and hence could not enjoy the bene-
fi ts Germany enjoyed.  Th e Netherlands, which 
is a smaller country, which thrived within the 
monetary union, exports a lot and does not resort 
to fi nancial policies to boost domestic demand. 
Given its small population size, they are the third 
largest exporter of agricultural goods in the world. 
Unlike the Netherlands, Denmark, another 
member state that stayed out of the currency 
union, also relies on domestic demand stimula-
tion by extremely accommodating mortgage poli-
cies.  Japan, too, shift ed to expansive monetary 
policy in the 1980s in its attempt to stimulate 
domestic demand.  Once the speculative bubble 
burst in Japan, the prolonged banking crisis in 
the 1990s that continued into the early 2000s, 
prevented Japanese banks from doing the same. 
In the absence of the past banking crisis, Japan 
most likely would have pursued a similar policy to 
stimulate domestic demand.  
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IDEATIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ITALIAN AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS DURING THE CRISIS
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European integration reviewed. For the past three 
years, Europe has been mesmerised by the Euro 
crisis, namely the struggle to resolve the debt 
problems facing Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain (the GIIPS. In its early stage, econo-
mists were already warning that the Eurozone did 
not constitute an “optimal currency area” and that 
it would have been subject to asymmetric supply 
and demand shocks. However, other kinds of 
evaluations prevailed. The Euro arose as a Franco-
German political project: Germany accepted to 
give up its monetary sovereignty in exchange for 
a French agreement on its re-unification, whereas 
France aimed to tame the power of the Bundes-
bank by establishing a European central bank (Hall 
2012, 356). The other Member States had interests 
in joining the monetary union, too. The Northern 
countries could benefit from the fixed internal 
exchange rate – which prevented their Southern 
competitors from competitive devaluation – and 
from a low external exchange rate. The Southern 
countries, in turn, would have enjoyed lowered 
interest rates to finance their public spending, 
and the possibility of imposing some wage disci-
pline; however, in exchange for this, they had to 
give up the instrument of competitive devalua-
tions, which represented one of the pillars of their 
growth model (Ibid., pp. 358-60).
Political and immediate economic interests, 
however, under-determine the reasons why the 
single currency was made possible. In order to 
grasp them fully, we should also account for 
ideational factors. At the European level, the rise 
of the monetarist paradigm in the 1980s, caused 
by the unsuitability of Keynesian policies to deal 
with stagflation, played a key role (McNamara 
1999). Monetarist views shaped the institutions of 
the EMU: a rule-based monetary-policy targeted 
on inflation in the hands of an independent 
central bank, and a fiscal policy in the hands of 
the Member States. Furthermore, monetarist ideas 
entailed that supply-side and structural reforms 
would constitute the one-size-fits-all formula to 
secure competitiveness in the whole Eurozone 
(Hall 2012, 356-57).
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In this contribution, based upon secondary liter-
ature, I will review the ideational approaches to 
the Euro crisis of the Italian and of the German 
governments. In Section 2, I will show how 
ideational factors contributed to the making of 
the Eurozone. In Sections 3 and 4, I account for 
the role of ideas during the Euro crisis respectively 
in Italy and Germany. In Section 5, I conclude by 
comparing the role, the content and the function 
of these ideas in the two countries.
2. Ideational factors in the 
making of the Euro
The roots of the Euro crisis are to be sought in the 
asymmetrical design that has characterised the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its 
inception (Hall 2012, 2014)where do the roots of 
the crisis lie, how can the response to the crisis 
be explained, and what are its implications for 
European integration? It explores how prevailing 
economic doctrines con-ditioned the institutional 
shape of the single currency and locates the roots of 
the crisis in an institutional asymmetry grounded 
in national varieties of capit-alism, which saw 
political economies organised to operate export-
led growth models joined to others accustomed 
to demand-led growth. The response to the crisis 
is reviewed and explained in terms of limitations 
in European insti-tutions, divergent economic 
doctrines and the boundaries of European solidar-
ity. Proposed solutions to the crisis based on defla-
tion or reflation are assessed from a varieties of 
capitalism perspective and the implications for 
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Ideas played a crucial role in the making of the 
Euro even at national level. In Italy, the position 
of the Italian government during the integration 
process was shaped by the interplay of economic 
ideas and foreign policy beliefs. Economic and 
foreign policy ideas were, on occasion, conso-
nant in fostering the integration process, as in the 
case of the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1990-1992; other times, the policy imperative 
of remaining at the heart of European integration 
prevailed over more sceptical economic consid-
erations, as in the last phase of the EMU in 1999 
(Quaglia 2004).
In Germany, the position of the government on 
the EMU was characterised by a tension between 
ordoliberalism, represented by Hans Tietmeyer 
and by the Bundesbank, and Europeanism, 
embodied by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and by 
his vision of a “community of stability” (Dyson 
1998, 39). To be sure, Kohl’s vision was not antag-
onistic to ordoliberalism; on the contrary, being 
“based on strict fiscal discipline and economic 
convergence” (Ibid., p. 40), it overlapped it. The 
ordoliberal features of Kohl’s vision stemmed 
both from his convictions and from the need to 
secure the support of the Bundesbank and of the 
finance ministry. However, Kohl’s position was 
also motivated by his intimate Europeanism and 
by his commitment for a Western and European 
Germany (Ibid., p. 39). During the negotiations, 
Kohl’s Europeanism offered historical and political 
legitimation to the EMU (Ibid., p. 61), whereas the 
ordoliberal ideas represented powerful ideational 
resources. First, they offered the theoretical basis 
from which the German proposals were derived; 
second, they limited the win-set of acceptable 
outcomes for the German government, therefore 
strengthening its position in the negotiations.
It is worth noting that, outside of the core exec-
utive, the ordoliberal camp was split into two, 
respectively against and in favour of the EMU. 
The manifesto entitled Die währungspolitischen 
Beschlüsse von Maastricht: Eine Gefahrfür Europa 
(“The Monetary Policy Decision of Maastricht: 
A Threat for Europe”), signed in June 1992 by 62 
economists (including the distinguished ordolib-
eral economist Herbert Giersch) and published 
on the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, concisely 
represented the former faction: it claimed that 
the political economies of the European states 
were still too different for the establishment of 
a common currency. In turn, the Ordnungspoli-
tisches Plädoyer by Olaf Sievert (1993), Giersch’s 
student, represented the pro-EMU faction of 
the ordoliberal camp. In his article, published in 
September 1992 in the same newspaper, Sievert 
claimed that the monetary discipline of the EMU 
would have secured the ordoliberal principles of 
stability of monetary policy, and of responsibility. 
This division within the ordoliberal camp was to 
re-emerge during the Euro crisis.
For the first years, the EMU seemed to work 
smoothly: the Northern countries were institu-
tionally well-equipped for the architecture of the 
monetary union, and started developing huge 
surpluses. In the meanwhile, the Southern econo-
mies, despite having lost the possibility of compet-
itive devaluation, benefited from low interest rates 
and from the flows of money deriving from their 
Northern partners’ surpluses (Hall 2012, 360). But, 
as always happens, the honeymoon was destined 
to end: the Euro crisis made the structural flaws 
of the Eurozone evident, and called for its reform.
3. Italy: From Berlusconi’s 
Opportunism to Monti’s 
Pragmatic Europeanism
When the crisis broke out in autumn 2008, Italy 
was not immediately hit: this allowed Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi to downplay the impact 
of the crisis, and focus on domestic issues (Jones 
2017, 2). At this stage, he claimed that the crisis 
was a problem of other European states, not Italy’s. 
The situation worsened in Summer 2011, as diffi-
culties in the negotiation of the second Greek bail-
out programme and a second round of the stress 
test of the European Banking Association raised 
concerns about the stability of the Eurozone: inves-
tors started losing confidence in the Italian bond 
market, and the early counter-measures adopted 
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by Berlusconi during the summer did not calm the 
markets. Since the difficulties in re-financing the 
Italian debt threatened the stability of the whole 
Eurozone, the ECB started to buy Italian bonds 
and urged the government, in exchange, to adopt 
measures (such as a reform of the pension system) 
to secure debt sustainability on the long term.
Berlusconi’s leadership proved to be inadequate 
to deal with the crisis. His parliamentary majority 
was divided, as the Lega Nord refused to accept 
any measure involving pensions, and he came into 
conflict with his powerful Minister of Finance, 
Giulio Tremonti. The internal divisions both 
within the executive and its parliamentary majority 
led to ineffective and tardy measures. Berlusconi 
lost credibility in Europe (as testified by Angela 
Merkel’s and Nicolas Sarkozy’s chuckles after a 
question about Berlusconi during a press confer-
ence) and in the markets (rating agency Standard 
& Poor’s lowered the rank of Italian bonds from 
A+ to A). Eventually, he decided to resign, and 
President Giorgio Napolitano appointed Mario 
Monti as the new Prime Minister in November 
2011 (see Schmidt and Gualmini 2013).
The case of the Fiscal Compact (FC), accurately 
described by Moschella (2017), shows the role of 
ideational factors in Monti’s government. From a 
mere economic perspective, the decision of the 
government to adhere to the FC was puzzling, as it 
clearly penalised Italy, and offered no guarantees of 
success (pp. 208-10). Furthermore, despite being 
popularly remembered as a zealot of austerity, 
Monti and his ministers constantly asserted that 
fiscal discipline did not represent the best way to 
address Italy’s long-term problems, and that they 
would have prioritised growth-oriented measures, 
instead. Instead, the government abided to the 
austerity rules because it feared adverse market 
reactions: the perception of Italy’s vulnerability 
“nurtured a ‘there is no alternative’ mind-set that 
dominated the policy-makers’ thinking and led 
them not to even conceive of the possibility of 
looking for alternative courses of action” (p. 217).
Along with the fear of punishment, three other 
mechanisms determined the stance of the govern-
ment: institutional constraints, a pro-European 
attitude, and a large domestic win-set. The institu-
tional constraints worked in two ways. On the one 
hand, the incomplete architecture of the EMU did 
not provide any automatic insurance for countries 
hit by the crisis, thus amplifying the influence of 
market pressures: the government felt obliged to 
adhere to the FC, if it wanted to obtain a Euro-
pean insurance against the crisis. On the other, the 
FC was in line with the framework set by previous 
fiscal rules (for instance, the Stability and Growth 
Pact), and opposing the FC would have not put/
called into question the overall framework. The 
pro-European attitude of the government led it 
not only to defend the national interest, but also 
to safeguard the European integration process: 
the signature of the FC was a demonstration of 
the Italian commitment to the European project. 
Finally, the parties in the Parliament broadly 
supported the FC, in line with their Europeanist 
attitude – even if in a reactive, rather than proac-
tive, way. This prevented the government from 
evaluating the opportunity of not signing the 
Treaty (pp. 218-21).
4. Germany: between 
pragmatic Europeanism and 
ordoliberalism
Unlike Italy, the crisis hit Germany from the begin-
ning. As mentioned above, the EMU architecture 
enabled Northern economies to pile up important 
surpluses. In investing this money, the German 
banking sector let down its conservative, risk-
averse reputation and became embroiled in the 
financial bubble (Dyson 2010, p. 400): important 
commercial banks (the most famous case was the 
IKB) and the state-owned Landesbanken needed to 
be bailed-out by the government. However, when 
the financial crisis turned into the sovereign-debt 
crisis that menaced the Eurozone, Germany was 
out of danger, and, unlike the Southern econo-
mies, did not face an immediate threat. Its imme-
diate interests were, on the one hand, to secure 
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the Eurozone (not least because of the exposure of 
its banks in the Southern countries), and, on the 
other, to shift away the costs of rescuing the Euro-
zone. The fact that the immediate consequences 
of the crisis were much heavier for the Southern 
countries than for their Northern counterparts 
increased Germany’s power during the negotia-
tions (see Schimmelfennig 2015).
There has been a huge debate on the impact of 
ideas on Germany’s behaviour during the Euro 
crisis. Some claim that the German government 
strictly adhered to the principles of the ordolib-
eral ideology, whereas, according to others, it was 
driven by self-interest and pragmatism (Hien 
and Joerges 2017, collected several contribu-
tions on this topic). Ordoliberalism and pragma-
tism should not be considered as being mutually 
excluding: within the German government, we 
could find both more pragmatist (such as Chan-
cellor Merkel) and more ordoliberal (such as 
the director of Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, or 
Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble) leaders. 
The German position seems therefore to have been 
shaped by a tension between ordoliberalism and 
pragmatism. The ordoliberalism of the German 
executive, however, was not a strict version of the 
theory, but a more superficial, crude adaptation of 
it (see Hien and Joerges 2018; and Wyplosz 2017).
The German political discourse during the crisis 
was dominated by ordoliberal concepts: stability, 
responsibility, and competitiveness. The more 
ordoliberal leaders stressed the Haftungsprinzip 
(principle of responsibility): the rescue of the 
Eurozone should not have entailed a mutuali-
sation of the sovereign debt, and the Member 
States should have remained responsible for their 
own public finances. In turn, the more pragmatic 
leaders justified, upon the basis of the stability 
principle, those policies that diverged from the 
ordoliberal orthodoxy, such as the bail-out pack-
ages for indebted countries, or the establishment 
of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
Ordoliberal ideas played, therefore, a double 
role. On the one hand, together with the imme-
diate interests derived from its status of Northern, 
export-led political economy, they shaped the 
German strategy for the reform of the Eurozone. 
The interplay between stability, responsibility and 
competitiveness resulted in an approach charac-
terised by intergovernmentalism and market disci-
pline. Intergovernmentalism was seen as the best 
guarantee to prevent any mutualisation of the debt; 
market discipline, in turn, was seen as the driving 
force for the reforms, necessary to overcome the 
lack of competitiveness that afflicted the Southern 
economies, and this constituted, according to the 
ordoliberal (and German) account, the real cause 
of the Euro crisis (see Matthijs and McNamara 
2015).
On the other, ordoliberal ideas represented a 
constraint to the German executive (see Jamet, 
Mussler, and De Corte 2011, 64). Even the prag-
matist leaders had to pay lip-service and to justify 
their policies through ordoliberal principles: this 
is what Chancellor Merkel did in 2011 in Freiburg, 
the birthplace of ordoliberalism, when she 
defended her European strategy, and what Klaus 
Regling, the chief of the ESM, did in 2017 in the 
same city, when he claimed the consistency of the 
ESM with the principles of Ordnungspolitik. More-
over, beyond the German executive, the remarks 
of many influential ordoliberal economists (such 
as Hans-Werner Sinn), highly critical towards the 
European strategy of Merkel’s governments, posed 
a further constraint on the government. Eventu-
ally, some of these economists took part in the 
foundation of the Euro-sceptic party Alternative 
für Deutschland. Once again, the ordoliberal camp 
was split into two(see, also, Jacoby 2014).
5. Conclusions
During the Euro crisis, in both Italy and Germany, 
we could witness the resurfacing of the ideational 
dynamics that had characterised the previous 
stage of the monetary integration. In Italy, the 
committed Europeanism of the Monti govern-
ment led Italy to accept the German-inspired 
reforms of the Eurozone, although they penalised 
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it as a demand-led political economy. In Germany, 
the tension between a pragmatist Europeanism 
and ordoliberalism – that already characterised 
Kohl’s chancellorship – shaped the European 
strategy of the government. In the aftermath of 
the crisis, however, these ideas showed their weak-
nesses. On the one hand, the last elections in Italy 
(2018) are the perfect representation of the end 
of the so-called “permissive consensus”: by now, 
it has become very hard – if not impossible – for 
a government to justify its choice only relying on 
Europeanism. On the other, the fact that the Euro-
zone is still considered to be in danger despite the 
reforms undertaken during the crisis shows all the 
limits of the German approach.
Italian and German ideas during the crisis were 
substantively different. Italian Europeanism 
translated into a preference for a supranational 
approach, while the stress on the need to foster 
growth (that characterised even the Monti govern-
ment, despite its commitment to fiscal discipline) 
reflected a preference on market-correcting poli-
cies. In turn, the German commitment to ordo-
liberal principles translated into an intergovern-
mental, market-discipline-oriented approach, 
suited to secure responsibility and competitive-
ness. It is worth noting that the German approach 
is consistent with the monetarist founding of the 
EMU and with a certain national egoism, whereas 
the Italian one requires a high solidarity among 
European countries, which, to date, does not exist. 
In this sense, borrowing the Varieties-of-Capi-
talism jargon, we could speak of a “comparative 
advantage” of German ideas over the Italian ones.
Finally, the ideational attitudes of the govern-
ments had different effects in Italy and in 
Germany. In Italy, Berlusconi’s opportunistic lead-
ership prevented the government from setting up 
an effective and timely strategy against the crisis. 
The Europeanist attitude of the Italian parliament 
during Monti’s government, in turn, widened the 
win-set of acceptable reforms: while this secured 
the participation of the Italian government in 
the reform process, it also diminished its nego-
tiating power in the bargaining (on the relation 
between bargaining power and size of the win-set, 
see Putnam 1988, p. 440). In Germany, quite 
the opposite happened: not only did ordoliberal 
ideas provide a set of principles to articulate the 
reform of the Eurozone, but they also dramatically 
restricted the win-set, thus improving the govern-
ment’s bargaining power.
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In 2011, a Greek minister wrote in a newspaper 
about the Troika that “we are dealing here with 
idiots and Protestants, hence there is no solu-
tion” (cited in Makrides, 2015, p. 373). Looking at 
the split between the crisis and non-crisis coun-
tries, it seems, at first glance, that the crisis coun-
tries are all Catholic or Orthodox, while the non-
crisis countries overwhelmingly share a Protes-
tant background. The cultural and ethical rooting 
of German ordoliberalism and the reliance of 
German politicians on the concept helps German 
politicians to approach the crisis as a morality tale 
of Northern saints and Southern sinners (Hien 
2017). Do we witness a new Thirty Years’ War 
in Europe? Not quite; the ideational and cultural 
split between Catholic/Orthodox and Protes-
tant countries also overlaps with the material 
interest-based fault lines between creditor- and 
debtor-countries or the institutional differences 
between those countries that generate economic 
demand primarily through exports or those that 
do so through internal demand. So far, the Euro-
pean crisis has been analysed through the lenses 
of the Variety of Capitalism concept, the growth 
model framework, or ideational accounts. These 
three accounts have generally been applied in 
isolation from one another. There has been little 
room for cross-fertilisation, arguably, due to the 
different points of epistemological departure that 
emphasise either institutional rational efficiency, 
the material driving forces, or the constructivist 
motives for the political economies during the 
crisis. This paper adopts the concept of cultural 
political economy, modifies it, and applies it to the 
North-South conflict. 
Cultural political economy integrates institu-
tional, material and ideational viewpoints, and 
adopts a decisive neo-Weberian historical evolu-
tionary perspective to show how they have 
co-evolved and re-enforced one another since the 
1950s, creating the discrepancies and irritations 
that we witness today between the Northern and 
Southern Member States. The contribution exem-
plifies the cultural political economy approach to 
the crisis with the German-Italian discrepancies 
that have been growing slowly since the 1950s, but 
have accelerated during the past 30 years. While in 
the 1950s and 1960s both economies started from 
similar premises, they are worlds apart today.
While cultural political economy has been 
promoted for a decade and a half, this approach, 
to date, has not come centre-stage in the Euro-
pean discussion on the crisis. The paper argues 
that this is due to the fact that, while, in essence, 
these approaches are on the right track towards 
a more encompassing post-disciplinary under-
standing, they have not left their foundational 
basis in rational-efficiency-centred institution-
alism or in material Marxism. The paper proposes 
a new starting-point for cultural political economy 
anchored in a Weberian framework that is onto-
logical and epistemological better suited to inte-
grate institutional, material and ideational expla-
nations and set them in an evolutionary context 
over time.
After an introduction to the concept of cultural 
political economy (Section 1), the paper lays out 
the socio-economic points of divergence between 
the Catholic and the Protestant thought as they 
developed from the 1930s onwards in Germany 
and Italy (Section 2). It also explores how much 
of this socio-economic thought found its way into 
the institutional reform of both countries in the 
1950s and 1960s, and traces the evolution of the 
two doctrines and the institutions which they 
informed to the present day (Section 3).
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1. The Dominant Approaches 
within Political Economy to 
the Crisis
The “Varieties of Capitalism” approach has domi-
nated comparative political economy for almost 
20 years (Hall and Soskice 2001). Putting the firm, 
business networks, and their interaction with the 
(welfare) state at the centre of the analysis, “Vari-
eties of Capitalism” scholars argue that market 
economies cluster into co-ordinated and liberal 
market economies. Co-ordinated market econo-
mies rely on diversified quality production. They 
orient their production towards market niches 
where quality and customisation are important. 
A state-run vocational-training system ensures 
the supply of skilled labour, and high employment 
protection creates incentives to invest in specific 
skills. The system is co-ordinated through strong 
employer and employee organisations. In the orig-
inal account of the Varieties of Capitalism and in 
most of the follow-up literature, Italy and Germany 
are classified as co-ordinated market economies.
During the 2000s, the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach reigned supreme. The introductory 
chapter of Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism 
book has been cited according to google scholar 
11,522 times. Chapters such as Estevez-Abe et al. 
(2001) on social protection and the formation of 
skills have led to paradigmatic changes in entire 
sub-fields of political-economy (e.g., welfare state 
studies). However, the theory has been seriously 
challenged through the shockwaves that the finan-
cial crisis sent through the European co-ordi-
nated market economies (Hall 2014; Johnston 
and Regan 2015). The crisis drastically showcased 
a strong “variety within the variety” of European 
co-ordinated market economies between North, 
South, and Central and Eastern Europe (Höppner 
and Lutter 2017; Armingeon, Guthmann and 
Weisstanner 2015; Perez and Matsaganis 2018). 
Accounts started to re-classify countries, and Italy 
is now presented as a “mixed-model”. The euro is 
the bête noire for researchers who emphasise the 
“within variety” of European political economies. 
The political economies of the countries that have 
adopted the euro are simply too heterogeneous to 
be subsumed under a single currency.
Authors such as Wolfgang Streeck, Lucio Baccaro, 
Johannes Lindvall and Stefan Svallfors had already 
criticised the “Varieties of Capitalism” scholarship 
before the crisis for not accounting for the far-
reaching processes of neo-liberalisation that all of 
these national economies have undergone since 
the 1990s. The decline in union density and corpo-
ratist arrangements, as well as wage dispersion and 
the dualisation of the labour markets, eroded the 
equilibrium that the co-ordinated market econo-
mies had found before the 1980s (Streeck 2009; 
Baccaro and Howell 2011; Lindvall and Rothstein 
2006; Lindvall 2006; Svallfors 2016; Svallfors and 
Tyllström 2018). The different ways in which these 
liberalisations were executed contributed to signif-
icant shifts in the configuration of GDP growth 
in both Germany and Italy. This is the gist of the 
growth model perspective. It emphasises that, in 
the 1990s, Germany turned from a growth model 
that was equilibrated between domestic demand 
and exports, to an export-led economy. The share 
of exports in German GDP growth doubled in the 
1990s and 2000s (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016, 
189). To support the export competitiveness of 
the price-sensitive German manufacturing goods, 
domestic demand (household consumption) was 
suppressed through wage depression. Unions in 
the manufacturing sector agreed to wage restraints 
and the rest of the labour market was de-regulated 
(Baccaro and Benassi 2017; Hassel 2017).
For the proponents of the Growth model perspec-
tive and the scholars of the preceding liberalisa-
tion, the German model runs at the expense of 
the Southern political economies of the Eurozone, 
which are geared towards demand-led growth. 
The proposed and enforced solutions of Germany 
to the Euro-crisis also have to be seen in this light. 
The interests of the German export coalition are 
the underlying motives of the austerity policies 
that the German government made the pre-condi-
tion for loans and rescue packages. These austerity 
measures risk being counter-productive because 
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they stifle domestic demand, which has tradition-
ally been the key driver of growth in Southern 
European economies. In the literature on the 
European crisis, this features as a cleavage dividing 
Northern and Southern Europe between importer 
versus exporter states. The cleavage sometimes 
also appears as a cleavage between debtor versus 
creditor states (Dyson 2014).
A third explanatory framework for the Euro-
crisis is based upon ideas. The ideational turn in 
comparative political economy has demonstrated 
the power of economic ideas in politics (Berman 
1998, 2006; Blyth 2003; Carstensen and Schmidt 
2016). During the euro crisis, idiosyncratic 
national economic ideologies such as German 
ordoliberalism and French dirigisme experienced 
an unexpected explosion of public and schol-
arly interest because they link expert ideas with a 
common national tradition of how the economy 
should be run (Economist 2015; Financial Times 
2014; Blyth 2013; Scharpf 2016; Hien and Joerges 
2017; 2018; Needergard and Snaith 2015; Amable 
2017). In particular, the clash between French 
economic ideas and their German counterparts 
has been blamed for the prolonged stalemate 
between the countries on what is the right crisis 
policy (Brunnermeier, James and Landau 2016).
The “Varieties of Capitalism”, the growth model 
perspective, and the ideational accounts exist 
largely independently from one another. The 
reason for this can be found in the different epis-
temological points of departure. The “Varieties 
of Capitalism” model is anchored in a rational-
efficiency-oriented institutionalism. The growth 
model perspective relies ultimately on an interest 
coalition between segments of capital and labour 
in the export sector. And the ideational approaches 
rely on the power of ideologies to serve as blue-
prints for socio-economic actions and institu-
tion-building. A severe downside to all three is 
that they do not incorporate an explicit histor-
ical evolutionary perspective. Moreover, they are 
largely apolitical, since they leave electoral consid-
erations and the anchoring of different economic 
strategies in the population by the wayside.
Arguably, a fourth explanatory strand for the 
euro crisis also exists, one which, to date, has 
lived in the shadow of the three other approaches. 
Here, historical evolutionary pathways are at the 
centre of attention, allowing for a more integra-
tive epistemic perspective than the other three 
approaches: economic historians have devel-
oped a notion that has so far not been picked up 
much in the mainstream of political economy: the 
idea of different economic cultures (Abelshauser 
2003; Abelshauser, Gilgen and Leutzsch 2013). 
It brings a historical-evolutionary perspective 
that tracks the embeddedness of socio-economic 
actors in national cultures, traditions, and preva-
lent economic ideas within a nation-state (Dyson 
2017). Here, the crucial role of “meaning making” 
to reduce complexity in the economy is brought 
out. The concept of cultural political economy 
or economic cultures highlights the importance 
and instrumental use of shared imaginaries for 
contemporary economic actors (Jessop 2010; 
Jessop and Sum 2017; Best and Paterson 2015; 
Esch and De Jong 2017). While the economic 
cultures notion of the Bielefeld historians around 
Abelshauser is based upon the rational efficiency 
accounts of Douglass North, the notion of cultural 
political economy advanced by Ngai-Ling Sum 
and Bob Jessop is rooted in Marx and Gramsci. 
Jessop and Sum’s cultural political economy prom-
ises a “dialectic of discursivity and materiality” 
(Jessop 2004, 164) but the initial vow to “produce 
a Marxist-inflected ‘cultural political economy’” 
(Jessop and Sum 2001: 92) makes this difficult. 
Like the cultural economy concept of the Biele-
feld historians, Sum and Jessop want to present 
an integrative account, but both approaches still 
emphasise material and institutional conditions 
over ideational factors. Ideas are regarded as tools 
to solve collective-action problems in the tradition 
of North, or as fig leaves to manipulate and veil the 
true material conditions to establish hegemony in 
a Gramscian sense (Jessop and Sum 2001: 94-95) 
making one wonder where the culture in these two 
cultural political economy approaches actually 
resides. It is certainly understandable that scholars 
that have worked within the Marxist paradigm for 
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most of their careers will not give it up even when 
trying to stretch its boundaries towards a “post-
disciplinary” (Jessop and Sum 2001: 89) perspec-
tive. But it is fair to ask them why the “anti-
cultural” (Smith 2001: 6) theorist par excellence, 
Karl Marx, is chosen as the starting-point for the 
formulation of this post-disciplinary approach. 
Might not Max Weber, for whom culture had been 
the starting-point of any socio-economic analysis, 
be more fruitful as a point of departure?
Culture, in Weber’s work, is the “most funda-
mental category” (Swedberg and Agevall 2005:56) 
and “culture is a finite segment on which human 
beings confer meaning and significance” (Weber 
1904: 81). “Weber emphasizes to study capitalism 
not only as an economic phenomenon but also as 
a cultural phenomenon” (Swedberg and Agevall 
2005: 57). Moreover, for Weber, social science was 
about “Verstehen”, about finding out about the 
“subjective meanings”. Social science should not 
emulate the positivism of the physical sciences but 
should instead be a “Geisteswissenschaft”, literally, 
a “science of the spirit”. Therefore, social analysis 
and, especially, the study of political economy, 
should be a “science which is concerned with the 
subjective meaning of action”, in which “explana-
tion requires a grasp of the complex of meaning” 
(Weber 1968: 9). Hence, Weber’s sociology is 
about the analysis of meaning-making and shared 
imaginaries which speak very much to the core 
concept of shared imaginaries and meaning-
making that not only Sum and Jessop but also the 
Bielefeld School put centre-stage in their accounts. 
Insightful in this respect is a quick look at the 
subtitle of Weber’s opus “Economy and Society”, 
which reads: “An Outline of Interpretative Soci-
ology”. There is also an emerging trend towards 
neo-weberian approaches to the EU in general 
(Ferrera 2017, 2018). But these are only perceived 
as manipulating themes in the existing cultural 
political economy approaches due to their rooting 
in Marxist materialism. Hence, it is not surprising 
that the ideational components of Jessop and Sum’s 
analysis have been heavily criticised for an ad hoc 
evoking of cultural themes when their explanatory 
toolkit is exhausted (Staricco 2015). Weber would 
offer a much more solid fundament to arrive at 
an “organic synthesis” of the “soft” and “hard” 
(Sum and Jessop 2013: 23; Staricco 2015: 9) parts 
of cultural political economy without subscribing 
fully to total constructivism or total materialism.
For the rest of social science, culture as an explan-
atory variable is (often not without foundation) 
accused of being a residual category that gets 
evoked when all other explanations fail (Staricco 
2017). However, the strength of a cultural polit-
ical economy that is based upon Weber, is that it 
can integrate the trichotomy between material, 
ideational and institutional accounts that currently 
divides the study of political economy and the euro 
crisis. As in Weber’s famous switchmen metaphor, 
it is not interests, ideas or institutions that deter-
mine action, but all three together. When they all 
point into the same direction, they form a self-
reinforcing compound, an amalgam, that is very 
hard to overcome or to break up. This is exactly 
the case in the Eurozone crisis, and the following 
will show how ideas, interests and institutions 
re-inforced themselves in an evolutionary process 
over time, and came to determine today’s position 
of crisis and non-crisis countries.
2. Catholic and Protestants 
Reactions in Socio-economic 
Concepts to the Crisis of 
1930.
Language and religion are two major carriers of 
culture. This paper focuses on religion, and traces 
how the different socio-economic doctrines of 
religious institutions left their imprint on post-
WWII ideologies and institutions. Our story 
starts with the world economic crisis of the 1930s, 
which re-formed the dominant strands of socio-
economic thought in Europe. The ordoliberal 
project as it evolved in Germany from the late 
1920s onwards is the reaction of Protestant social 
thought to the upheavals of Weimar that cumu-
lated in the World Economic Crisis of 1929.
Walter Eucken, the founding father of the Ordo-
liberal School, had already commented, in the 
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1930s, that the loosening ties to the churches had 
facilitated the people turning to secular-isms in 
the Weimar period and that “religion had increas-
ingly lost the power to provide individuals’ lives, 
and thus also their economic activity, a context of 
meaning” (Eucken 1932). Numerous “explicitly 
normative-anthropological deliberations” of the 
ordoliberals were derived from Protestantism, and 
“the strong affinity of a liberal ethos [was] largely 
influenced by Protestantism” (Jähnichen 2010: 11, 
13).
The “deep Protestant grammar” (Manow 2001) of 
ordoliberalism was no accident. All the key figures 
of the first ordoliberal generation were Protes-
tants. Eucken wrote in a 1942 letter to Alexander 
Rüstow: “I could neither live nor work if I did 
not believe that God exists.” (Lenel 1991, 12) The 
ordoliberal project that developed in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s in the Freiburg circles was there-
fore a genuinely Protestant attempt to design an 
economic order. The project was meant as an anti-
dote to the social-Catholic, the Keynesian-welfare-
state, and the neoclassical Austrian-Anglo-Saxon 
approaches. The key figure was the Protestant theo-
logian Dietrich Bonhoeffer/Bonhöffer. Between 
1938 and 1944, he brought Protestant theologians 
(Otto Dibelius, Constantin von Dietze), Protes-
tant economists (Walter Eucken, Leonard Miksch, 
Adolf Lampe), Protestant jurists (Franz Böhm, 
Hans Großmann-Doerth), and Protestant histo-
rians (Gerhard Ritter) together in the Bonhoeffer 
Kreis and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Erwin von 
Beckerath, the two most important ordoliberal 
circles in Freiburg (Goldschmidt 1997).
The Freiburger Denkschrift, which originated from 
these circles and was to be the blueprint for post-
war re-construction, laid out the first coherent 
Protestant economic and social ethics. Its under-
lying values clearly differentiate ordoliberalism 
from nineteenth century laissez faire liberalism, 
and the post-Keynesian Anglo-Saxon neoliber-
alism, which has become the dominant ideational 
paradigm since the late 1970s. Although self-
interest induces people to give their best, it can 
also bring them to manipulate competition to 
their own benefit. Just as in Protestantism, ordo-
liberalism considers people to be “neither angels 
nor devils” (Dietze 1947, 26), but rather “justi-
fied and sinners at the same time; that is why it 
is decisive to place them within an order that 
disciplines the peccator” (Reuter 2010: 3). In 
his work, Eucken seeks a compromise between 
“a Calvinist theocracy with its near identity of 
church and state and the Lutheran two-kingdoms 
doctrine with its separation of the spiritual and 
secular spheres” (Petersen 2008, 23). His concepts 
mirror Bonhoeffer’s “authoritative-paternalistic 
[...] thinking” that “trusts an order and authority 
based on law and responsibility more than indi-
vidual freedom” (Falcke 2011, 382). Ordoliberal-
ism’s notion of society is not paternalistic, even 
though the state’s capability to provide order is so 
important to it. The state is supposed to hold back 
and limit itself to setting the underlying condi-
tions for the social order. Ordoliberals reject social 
transfer payments as false incentives. Uncondi-
tional transfers for reasons of solidarity would, in 
the end, result in the “total catastrophe for state 
and society” and make citizens “slaves of the state” 
(Röpke 1949, 257). Instead, the state should limit 
itself to ensuring equal opportunity and creating 
the conditions for helping people to help them-
selves. This is what sets ordoliberal ideology apart 
from the Keynesian and Beveridgean welfare-state 
concept that aims at equality in society, on the one 
hand, and social-Catholic welfare concepts that 
emphasise a male-breadwinner-centred corpo-
ratist-transfer-heavy welfare state, on the other.
Eucken saw social policy as something that would, 
in the long run, kill all individual self-responsi-
bility. He emphasised that it would “foster collec-
tivization, create coercion and dependency that 
would diminish self-responsibility and endanger 
the unfolding of the powers which strive in the 
individual human being for fulfillment” (Eucken 
1949, 113). Müller-Armack, who later became 
State Secretary in the Ministry of the Economy, 
opined, as early as 1947, that, in any case, “the 
social policy results […] have been quite poor” 
(Müller-Armack 1947, 130). Kaufmann notes 
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that, for Ludwig Erhard, later to become Minister 
of the Economy and the single most prominent 
Christian Democratic exponent of ordoliberalism, 
“economic policy was the best social policy”. (cited 
in Kaufmann 2003, 131).
Due to their Protestant religiosity, the ordolib-
erals searched for a political home in the Chris-
tian Democratic Party (not in the Liberal Party). 
Franz Böhm was Minister in Hessen and became 
member of the Federal Parliament, Ludwig Erhard 
was Minister and became later Chancellor and 
Alfred Müller-Armack State Secretary. However, 
these Protestant ordoliberals faced a mighty oppo-
nent within the Christian Democratic party: the 
social Catholic faction. At the same time as the 
ordoliberals, and also as a reaction to the crisis of 
the late 1920s, the social Catholics had developed 
socio-economic ideas that ran, in most points, 
exactly the opposite from the Protestant ordolib-
erals. Their ideology was based largely upon the 
social Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, which, like 
the Ordo Manifesto (1936), had been issued as a 
response to the world economic crisis which began 
in 1929.The prime target of criticism in Quadra-
gesimo Anno is the current “economic dictator-
ship” (Quadragesimo Anno, 109) brought about by 
a rampant system of free competition which had 
led to the “virtual degradation of the majesty of 
the state” (Quadragesimo Anno, 109). According 
to Quadragesimo Anno, “the free market has 
destroyed itself ” (Quadragesimo Anno, 109).
The Encyclical stresses that its socioeconomic 
concept is neither neo-liberal nor socialist, but 
marks a distinct, Catholic third way. In contrast 
to socialism, private property remains central, 
but, unlike neo-liberal conceptions, any private 
property has to be subject to the increase of the 
common good. Quadragesimo Anno is of the view 
that “the right order of economic life cannot be 
left to a free competition of forces” (Quadragesimo 
Anno, 87). The judgment is harsh: “free competi-
tion […] clearly cannot direct economic life” as 
“it cannot curb and rule itself ” (Quadragesimo 
Anno, 88). Unrestricted free market competi-
tion would be directed by the “evil individualistic 
spirit” (Quadragesimo Anno, 88) spread by “the 
errors of individualist economic teaching” stem-
ming from a “poisoned spring” (Quadragesimo 
Anno, 88). Instead, the papal letter puts forward 
that economic life must again be “subject to and 
governed by a true and effective directing prin-
ciple” (Quadragesimo Anno, 88).
Quadragesimo Anno marks a new step in Cath-
olic social thinking. Catholic social thinking is 
now no longer limited to social welfare insti-
tutions (as it still was in Rerum Novarum) that 
engage in repair work after capitalism has brought 
social dislocation and hardship by destroying the 
old social order. Instead, its plea for corporatism 
makes a step towards actively shaping capitalism. 
This is new and novel thinking, different from 
the Vogelsangian pleas to go back to a medieval 
estate-based social order, even though it embodies 
these ideals to a certain extent. The difference is 
that it fuses them with a decisive Christian Demo-
cratic plea to democratise the capitalist system 
by arguing for the centrality of associations. The 
Encyclical promotes a specific type of neo-corpo-
ratism in which the state only intervenes as a 
last resort (Invernizzi-Accetti 2019). Christian 
Socialism emphasises the importance of collec-
tive organisation for the common good (Quadrag-
esimo Anno, 85). Employers and employees should 
be organised in mutual associations depending 
on the sector of activity. These mutual associa-
tions should grant a stable and smooth running 
of the economy, which would avoid strikes, on 
the one hand, and wage deprivation, on the other. 
The Encyclical notes that “both workers and 
employers with united strength and counsel can 
overcome the difficulties and obstacles and let a 
wise provision on the part of the public authority 
aid them”. (Quadragesimo Anno, 73). Wages 
should be negotiated fairly in bi-partite negotia-
tions, and only in cases of stalemate or dissatisfac-
tion should the state intervene. Workers should be 
protected by ample worker-protection legislation 
that would regulate maximum work hours as well 
as women in work and child labour. Co-determi-
nation should reduce industrial conflict and give 
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kept secret because of widespread scepticism in 
both camps towards collaboration. The Catho-
lics were later reported to have rejected both the 
term and the concept of a social market economy, 
since it contained too much ordoliberal Protestant 
thinking. Both churches were still very far from 
their (cautious) ecumenical moves of the 1970s, 
despite having joined forces in a single party (the 
CDU) for the first time in German history.
The ordoliberals joined the Christian Democratic 
party for electoral considerations. With German 
partition, the denominational balance had shifted 
to roughly 50 per cent Catholics and 50 per cent 
Protestants in West-Germany. Since Protes-
tants not only voted Christian Democrat but also 
Liberal and Social Democrat (but almost all Cath-
olics voted Christian Democrat), they needed the 
Catholics to form an electoral coalition to get at 
least some of their points through. However, given 
the differences in socio-economic ideology, Social 
Catholics worked in, the early years of the republic, 
as an effective counterweight to ordoliberal ideas. 
On the other hand, ordoliberalism also balanced 
social Catholicism towards a moderate position 
away from its hardcore corporatist standpoints of 
the 1930s. Such a moderation effect did not exist in 
Italy. Here, the mono-confessionalism pampered 
through the softer version of fascist totalitari-
anism led to a less clear-cut break with the past 
and a general easier embracing of corporatist and 
Social Catholic (even Christian Socialist) ideas (a 
good example here is Amintore Fanfani).
In contrast to the West-German Christian Demo-
cratic CDU, the Italian Democrazia Cristiana 
(DC) was all Catholic. The DC’s founding father 
Alcide De Gasperi is portrayed by historiography 
as a pragmatic realist politician (Cau 2009, 431), 
a governor interested in organising with little or 
no stake in ideology or doctrine. De Gasperi was 
partly keen on presenting himself in this way. 
He said, in preparation of the Christian Demo-
cratic Congress in 1949, “He [Giuseppe Dosetti] 
had been getting ready for this congress for many 
months … in thoughtful analysis … Unfortu-
nately, I have not had so much time, as I have had 
the employed a say in the administration of the 
firm. In general, “the riches that economic-social 
developments constantly increase ought to be so 
distributed among individual persons and classes 
that the common advantage of all, which Leo XIII 
had praised, will be safeguarded”. (Quadragesimo 
Anno, 75). The prime aim of the economy is to 
increase the aggregate wealth, instead of individual 
riches. This shared wealth should be generated not 
only through the payment of a “just wage” and the 
regulation of working hours and conditions, but 
also through a system of re-distribution. There-
fore, “we must strive that at least in the future the 
abundant fruits of production will accrue equi-
tably to those who are rich and will be distrib-
uted in ample sufficiency among the workers”. 
(Quadragesimo Anno, 61). With its emphasis on 
corporatist organisation of socio-economic rela-
tions and the transfer-heavy male-breadwinner 
model, the Encyclical reads like an anti-manifesto 
to Protestant ordoliberal claims.
Thus, ordoliberalism distinguished itself clearly 
from Catholic social ethics, and this is largely 
due to the different (Hien 2012) conceptions of 
the human being that Catholics and Protestants 
loaded into Social Catholicism and ordoliber-
alism. Catholicism assumes that individuals are 
not equipped with the same intellectual, moral, 
and physical capabilities. For this reason, ensuring 
fair and equal starting-conditions and opportuni-
ties (level playing-field), as ordoliberals do, would 
not suffice for Catholic social ethics; instead, 
society must also guarantee a certain amount of 
re-distribution (Quadragesimo Anno, 75).
The mutual distrust between both camps was 
tangible up into the 1960s. In 1963, the leading 
figures of German Catholic social teaching (von 
Nell-Breuning, Gundlach) and ordoliberalism 
(Röpke and Rüstow) met secretly in a hotel in 
Augsburg to discuss whether the social Catho-
lics could be won over for the term “social market 
economy” that the ordoliberal Alfred Müller-
Armack had coined. One of the participants 
later commented that this was an extremely deli-
cate meeting (Emunds 2010: 1-2). It had to be 
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oration with the Communist Party in the 1970s, 
and was subsequently kidnapped and murdered 
by the Brigate Rosse. Amintore Fanfani became 
prime minister in the 1960s and overhauled the 
economy in a corporative fashion. Like every 
strong ideological group, the Dossetians had a 
central journal, the Cronache Sociali. Its contribu-
tions were inspired and impressed by the labour 
victory in Britain, and by Keynes’ and Beveridges’ 
political economic ideas of re-organisation. The 
first programmatic party manifesto of the DC 
developed during a series of clandestine meet-
ings that rotated around the homes of several of 
its founding members during 1942 and the first 
months of 1943 also bore a strong imprint of 
the Catholic left. Copies were secretly diffused 
throughout Italy during the German occupation. 
The manifesto is signed with one of De Gaspa-
ri’s pseudonyms, but was the result of extensive 
collaboration of the wings or factions (correnti) of 
the whole party [the DC] (Masala 2004, 106). The 
programme incorporated a detailed plan for the 
future institutional framework of the new Italian 
state, and also featured prescriptions for industrial 
relations and a detailed social policy agenda.
The programme tried to walk the typical Chris-
tian Democratic line between calls for the 
nationalisation of key industries and the impor-
tance of private entrepreneurship. However, 
the programme had a strong Christian Socialist 
leaning inspired through the Encyclical Quadragn-
esimo Anno. Moreover, the existence of the largest 
communist party outside of the Soviet Union in 
Italy created a stronger drift of party competition 
towards left-wing socio-economic issues (Ferrera 
1984, 1986). Fighting fire with fire, the Christian 
Democrats had to propose strong social ideas 
to curb the influence of the Communist party 
(PCI). The most remarkable prescription of the 
programme is for the establishment of two parlia-
mentary chambers, of which one would be elected 
while the other would serve as a forum for corpo-
ratist-interest representation (Manow 2015). This 
“assembly of the organized interests” (DC 1943, 
1) should be “founded foremost on the elected 
to deal with practical tasks and constructive expe-
riences” (cited in Cau 2009, 432). Newer historio-
graphic research shakes this picture, pointing to 
the early formative experience of De Gasperi and 
his training as a Catholic sociologist and Catholic 
militant in Vienna (Pombeni and Nobili Schiera 
2009). In his early writings, De Gasperi empha-
sised the centrality of the Catholic corporatism 
of the Quadragesimo Anno and its connection to 
the personalist concepts of Emmanuel Mounier 
and Heinrich Pesch. The independence of organ-
isations was “a natural consequence of personal 
freedom” since they were “natural organs of civil 
society” (Cau 2009, 441). While De Gasperi and 
Konrad Adenauer were similar regarding the 
compromisability of ideological positions for their 
political ambitions, the Italian Catholic left was 
arguably much more to the left than its German 
counterpart.
To the left of De Gasperi stood the “profes-
sorini” (young professors) or “dossetians”, who 
were recruited from a circle of young university 
researchers around Dossetti – a professor and 
social philosopher at the Catholic University of 
Milan. Two other central figures in his faction 
were Giorgio La Pira, who later became mayor 
of Florence, and Giuseppe Lazzati, who became 
rector of the Catholic University of Milan (Masala 
2004, 101). Dossetti’s social thinking drew heavily 
on personalism inspired by the French Emmanuel 
Mounier’s or Jacques Maritain’s philosophy of 
Christian Democracy (Müller 86). Like Pesch’s 
and Oswald von Nell-Breuning’s personalism in 
Germany, the emphasis was more on the view 
that “the human personality unfolds through 
organic belonging to the successive communities” 
(La Pira cited in Acanfors 2007, 312). In contrast 
to De Gasperi’s insistence on interclassism and 
mediation, which bears relics of the conservative 
Austrian Catholic Vogelsangian thought, it aimed 
at getting rid of classes all together.
Dossetti’s followers had a long-lasting influence 
on Italian Christian Democracy and Italian post-
war institutions. His student Aldo Moro engi-
neered the compromesso storico, the first collab-
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a leftist reformer for whom, in the words of the 
leader of the Catholic union wing of the party in 
1952, “the battle of the DC has to be fought, […], 
on the territory of social justice, on the recogni-
tion of the new rights of the new status of work” 
(Gronchi cited in Vecchio 1978, 182). Gronchi and 
his union wing pressed for comprehensive social 
policy programme and the integration of the lower 
classes as “resistance to Bolshevism, in doctrine 
as well as in the social political regime, does not 
compensate for blocking the working classes in 
their aspirations for more justice” (Gronchi cited 
in Vecchio, 181). These thoughts were not mere 
lip service. Under the leadership of Fanfani, the 
party’s left wing, with its connections to farm 
leagues and Catholic unions, gained consider-
able strength within the party. Fanfani wanted to 
compensate for the organisational agony of the DC 
under De Gasperi. As a contemporary fellow party 
member observed, they were convinced that “if 
the absolute majority had not been reached in the 
country, it was partly the fault of the DC, due to its 
organizational insufficiencies, the scarce compre-
hensive penetration of the various social classes, 
[…], its complicated and tired apparatus” (Boiardi 
cited in Galli 1978, 161). Fanfani foresaw for the 
DC a much more active role in the penetration of 
society than under De Gasperi. Fanfani’s view was 
that the party should not only be a transmission 
belt and interlocutor between state and society, 
but that it should also actively influence and model 
both institutions. Fanfani was convinced that the 
party had to liberate itself from the Vatican and 
from Confindustria (the Italian employers asso-
ciation). His vision was of a modern mass party 
firmly anchored on the territory and all-encom-
passing in its aspirations to the electorate.
Fanfani started with the countryside by ordering 
Paolo Bononi to build up a dense network of rural 
savings banks and peasant leagues, the so-called 
Coldiretti. They not only gave out loans to farmers 
but also became a strong interest group or faction 
within the DC (Ginsborg 1990, 171). In order to 
anchor in the urban areas, Fanfani promoted the 
expansion of a huge network of Christian Demo-
representatives of the organized professions”. 
(DC 1943, 1) This represented an almost word for 
word incorporation of the provisions of the social 
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno into the Christian 
Democratic program. The concept was one of a 
“liberal Christian idea of a free organic collabo-
ration of all means of production” (DC 1943, 2). 
In line with the provisions of Quadragesimo Anno, 
the State should be confined to a role of “vigi-
lance” (DC 1943, 2) that guarantees the func-
tioning of the neo-corporatist model. Regarding 
the issue of social security, the program spelled 
out that “social insurance should be extended, 
simplified, its organization decentralized and its 
management put into the hands of the people that 
it concerned“(DC 1943, 2) reflecting the subsid-
iarity clauses of Quadragesimo Anno. In Germany, 
such corporatist positions can only be found in 
the Ahlen programme or manifesto of the CDU, 
an internal concession to the left-Catholic party 
wing on the part of Adneauer in the 1940s, which 
was quickly quashed and replaced by the Protes-
tant liberal conservative Düsseldorfer Leitsätze 
in 1949. Another difference between Italian and 
German social Catholicism was that the DC could 
count on the backing of a strong Catholic union 
movement (“Gronchians” headed by Giovanni 
Gronchi, the influential union leader), while, in 
Germany, the Catholic unions were subsumed 
under the roof of the Deutscher Gewerkschafts-
bund and pulled into the orbit of the Social Demo-
crats (Schroeder 1992).
3. The Impact of Catholic 
and Protestant Doctrines on 
Politics and Institutional 
Set-up of both Economies
Under De Gasperi the Catholic left remained 
contained and the socio-economic policy was 
dominated by the liberal linea Einaudi, but, once 
De Gasperi resigned, the Christian Socialist Amin-
tore Fanfani became the leading figure of the party. 
Corporatism started to be re-instated wholesale. 
Fanfani, a student and follower of Dossetti, was 
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The party also had to simultaneously distance itself 
from the liberal employer’s association, Confin-
dustria, in order to increase its financial autonomy 
(Galli 1978, 72). The prime means for this were 
the creation of the Ministry of State Holdings 
(Ministro delle partecipazioni statali), which was 
approved by parliament after prolonged and fierce 
debate on 22 December 1956. One year later, on 
11 January 1957, the law on fossils (legge idro-
carburi) followed, which gave the state company 
ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) a monopoly 
on research and exploitation in this sector. The 
strategy to curb the power of business over the 
party, and society in general, was completed by 
the withdrawal of all IRI (Instituto per la Ricon-
struzione Italiana – a large state holding) compa-
nies from Confindustria only a year later on 1 
January 1958. Galli notes that, from this point on, 
“the party that used to be the prince of the indus-
trial complex controlled progressively the means 
of production, which are the source of true power” 
(Galli 1978, 180). ENI, a huge oil and gas company 
founded in 1953, is exemplary of this process. The 
Christian Democrat Enrico Mattei “a man of few 
principles and great entrepreneurial skill” (Gins-
borg) became its restless president. Starting with 
the state petrol company AGIP, Mattei built up an 
industrial empire in the state sector that, within 
a few years, encompassed business sectors as 
diverse as petrochemicals, motorway construc-
tion, synthetic rubber production, contract engi-
neering, construction and nuclear research (Gins-
borg 1990, 164-165). Despite the rampant clien-
telism and often corrupt practices within ENI, it 
contributed – together with IRI, the second large 
state holding – as a key driver of Italy’s post-war 
economic miracle. The flipside of this success 
was that it tightened the state’s, and therefore 
the party’s, grip on society and created a class of 
politico-economic Christian Democratic barons 
of whom it became increasingly hard to judge 
whether their motivations were fuelled by left 
Catholic ideology or pure rent-seeking for them-
selves and their party fraction (corrente).
Fanfani had intended to build a party with elec-
cratic circoli (social organisations), which usually 
consisted of a venue with an alcohol licence in the 
centre of the town or neighbourhood in which 
Catholic workers could gather. At the end of the 
1950s, these ACLI (Associazioni Cristiane dei 
Lavoratori Italiani) circoli boasted over one million 
members. Many of them still exist to this day, even 
though the DC is long gone. In order to acquire 
more members, Fanfani initiated large-scale 
membership subscription campaigns that were 
held in festival-like atmospheres in which prizes 
were handed out for inscription. These yearly 
canvassing campaigns increased the membership 
of the DC from 1,341,000 in 1955 to 1,377,286 in 
1956, and boosted it to 1,400,179 in 1958. This 
went hand in hand with a shift of the socioeco-
nomic background of the DC members in favour 
of working-class members. Between 1955 and 
1959, the proportion of members coming from 
the working and lower middle classes increased 
from 52.2 per cent to 56.7 per cent (Galli 1978, 
178). The figures added up in the following way: 
the presence of workers increased from 19 per 
cent to 21 per cent, while landless farm labourers 
accounted for 6.8 per cent, as opposed to 6 per cent. 
This saw the share of working-class members rise 
from one quarter to 28 per cent (Galli 1978, 178). 
Though these figures do not display a substantial 
increase on their own, they do when one takes the 
family dimension of Italian society into account. 
Galli notes that “the DC of Fanfani started to gain 
control over the electorate independent from the 
institutions of the bourgeoisie” (Galli 1978, 178).
Fanfani was a fervent exponent of the Catholic 
left, but, at the same time, he had sympathised 
with fascism and had held some minor offices 
during fascism. His interpretation of Catholic 
Socialism sometimes blurred the lines to fascist 
corporatist organisation of society. By contrast, 
German Catholicism was pulled in a liberal direc-
tion by the ordoliberals and Protestants after 
World War Two, and therefore away from stronger 
corporative thinking. The new corporatist strategy 
entailed that the DC tightened its grip over the 
existing state entities and even created new ones. 
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contributed immensely to Adenauer’s landslide 
victory in the next election. 1957 was not only the 
year of Adenauer’s big pension reform but was, at 
the same time, also the “Conceptual final stroke of 
the social market economy” (Schulz cited in Conze 
2009, 169). As a compensation, an “interconfes-
sional compromise” (Manow 2001), the core ordo-
liberal projects of an independent federal central 
bank (Bundesbank) and the Cartel Law, which led 
to the formation of an independent Cartel Agency, 
were finally enacted. 1957 was also the endpoint of 
another often unnoticed struggle between ordo-
liberal Protestants and Social Catholics: the intro-
duction of a corporatist interest mediation insti-
tution (Bundeswirtschaftsrat). It was to guarantee 
a democratisation of the economy by establishing 
a second forum for interest representation from 
capital and labour next to parliament as foreseen 
in Quadragesimo Anno. This idea was pushed by 
the unions and social Catholics, but was heavily 
opposed by the ordoliberals. Ludwig Erhard (ordo-
liberal, Protestant, Minister of the Economy and 
later Chancellor) could not fully erase the plans, 
but he managed to postpone and transform them. 
Seven years later and seven legislative proposals 
later, the result was the establishing of an expert 
committee that is still of central importance in 
German economic affairs today. It is dubbed the 
Council of the Five Sages of the Economy (fünf 
Wirtschaftsweise) and has - ever since its estab-
lishment - been a hotbed of ordoliberal economic 
expertise that counsels the federal government 
on matters of political economy. Hence, the 
re-instalment of German socio-economic insti-
tutions in the 1950s and 1960s was heavily influ-
enced by social Catholic ideas but it did not lead 
to a wholesale influence of Catholic corporatism 
ideology due to the counterweight of the ordolib-
eral faction within the CDU. On the other hand, 
central elements of the German socio-economic 
system never had any ordoliberal imprint. The 
anti-ordoliberal huge welfare state and the large 
amount of co-ordination within Germany’s organ-
ised capitalism which was further re-inforced 
during the Keynesian episodes under the Social 
toral ties that were independent of the Vatican, 
the allies and Confindustria. He wanted to do this 
with a strong left corporatist program. But, owing 
to Italy’s regional disparities, this played out in 
different ways in different parts of the country. 
While the North saw the construction of a strong 
Christian Democratic subculture based upon 
a Christian Democratic worldview, the South 
witnessed the establishing of a gigantic clientelist 
party machine. The party was Catholic-Christian 
Democratic in the North and clientelist-corrupt in 
the South. In the same way, some of the large state 
holdings became synonymous with the rampant 
favouritism and clientelism of the DC. The special 
blend of corporatism that Fanfani had elabo-
rated in his 1948 book Economia (Fanfani 1948) 
was too vulnerable to corruption and clientelism. 
The transformation of the DC under Fanfani into 
a corporatist party was, especially in the South, 
coupled with a drifting towards a clientelist party.
In the Italian case, the initial social Catholic moti-
vations for a specific and distinctive model of 
corporatist capitalism were, after the 1960s, grad-
ually replaced by vote- and rent-seeking interests. 
However, ideology and interests re-enforced one 
another in the Italian model for spoils distribu-
tion and contributed both to its stability and to the 
difficulties to reform it right up to the present day 
and the Eurocrisis.
In Germany, too, the Christian Democratic left 
also left its mark on the early set-up of institutions, 
but, due to the balancing effect between ordoliberal 
Protestants and social Catholics, the outcome was 
much less corporatist than in Italy. Social Catho-
lics in Germany also had the upper hand but only 
as long as their subculture and political connec-
tions remained strong. The re-instalment of the 
German Bismarckian welfare state was a key social 
Catholic project. The pension reform of 1957 was 
an enormous popular success. The ordoliberals 
fought it where they could but were defeated. A 
public opinion survey from the Allensbach Insti-
tute found that Germans ranked it as the “Most 
popular event in the eight year long history of the 
Federal Republic”. (Conze 2009, 169). The reform 
A CULTURAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN CRISIS
Josef Hien91
the eve of re-unification (Pollack and Pickel 2003). 
West Germany, until re-unification, experienced 
only a slight drop in church affiliation (though 
church attendance dropped remarkably). In 1987, 
42.9 per cent were Catholic, while Protestants 
became a minority for the first time with a drop 
to 41.6 per cent. The number of unaffiliated had 
risen from 3.6 per cent in 1950 to 11.4 per cent in 
1987 (FOWID 2011). Through the strong decrease 
in church affiliation in the East, re-unification 
boosted the “non-members of a statuary religious 
corporation”, as the census of 2011 put it, to 33 per 
cent in the same year. Catholic Church member-
ship sank to 31 per cent of the population and 
Protestant church membership to 30.8 per cent.
Social Catholicism had already lost much of its 
political clout in the Christian Democratic Party 
in the 1980s when the Christian Democratic 
Employees’ Association (Sozialausschüsse) lost 
both members and influence. Angela Merkel, 
the East German daughter of a Protestant Priest, 
became the symbol of the (neo-) Protestantisation 
of the German Christian Democrats, a party that 
had, for most of its post-WWII history, been more 
Catholic than Protestant in its programme, its 
membership and its electorate. Norbert Blüm, the 
last prominent “heart-Jesus-Marxist” (Herz-Jesu-
Marxist), ended his last term as welfare minister 
in 1998 and was hissed at the party congress at 
Leipzig in 2003 for his critique of the new neolib-
eral party programme (Zeit 2003). The Protestant 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble became the 
equivalent of a re-strengthened ordoliberalist. 
This enabled a series of welfare reforms in the 
1990s, and later the famous Agenda 2010, which 
was hammered out by the Red/Green coalition 
under Chancellor Schröder, but was espoused and 
passed with the votes of the Christian Democratic 
Party. Chancellor Merkel stated the following when 
assuming office in 2005: “I want to thank Chan-
cellor Schröder personally for bravely opening a 
door with the Agenda 2010” (Merkel, 2005). This 
was the “homework” that Germany demanded 
from the crisis countries in exchange for fiscal soli-
darity. Due to the mono-confessional situation of 
Democratic regimes of the 1970s and only came 
to an end with the stagflation crisis in the late 
1970s (Scharpf 1991). However, after the stagfla-
tion crisis, Germany slowly began to embark on a 
reform trajectory inspired by ordoliberal Protes-
tant ideology. This process, which picked up speed 
but met much resistance from a still strong social 
Catholic wing within the CDU, was accelerated 
with German re-unification.
Re-unification brought huge economic problems. 
During the 1990s, Germany underwent the trans-
formation from being regarded as the strong man 
to being regarded as the sick one. This was the 
chance for an ordoliberal comeback. The neolib-
eral reform agenda, with its emphasis on deep 
welfare cuts, privatisation, equal starting condi-
tions, the individualisation of social risks and 
equality of opportunity, came against the back-
drop of skyrocketing unemployment, debt, and 
sluggish economic growth. This made it ever the 
more politically attractive. Reunification also 
opened an enormous practical laboratory for neo-
liberal politics. Approximately 14,600 formerly 
state-owned companies with 4 million employees 
together with 2.4 billion hectares of land and a 
huge public housing stock were to be privatised 
according to the “principles of the social market 
economy” (§2 Treuhandgesetz). However, these 
“principles of the social market economy” were 
now interpreted as being more liberal than ever 
before. In addition, re-unification altered the elec-
toral map of Germany. With the addition of the 
Eastern states, 16 million citizens from a Protes-
tant cultural background joined the German elec-
torate and decreased the importance of the Cath-
olic vote for the Christian Democratic Party (Hien 
2013).
After German partition, West Germany (FDR) 
became 45.8 per cent Catholic and 50.6 per cent 
Protestant. In East Germany (GDR), the 1950 
census showed 85 per cent Protestants and 10 
percent Catholics. Through a strong policy of 
de-Christianisation, the GDR brought these 
figures down to 25 per cent Protestants, 5 per cent 
Catholics and 70 per cent unaffiliated in 1989 on 
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Italy, a similar reform process and trajectory never 
happened, and this is the key to understanding the 
sharp divergence in the positions of the two econ-
omies. Even after the implosion of the DC in the 
early 1990s under the impact of heavy corruption 
scandals, the Catholic Church has not ceased to 
be an influential variable in Italian politics. Some 
even argue that, without the DC as interlocutor, it 
has become even stronger. It is very hard to reform 
the Italian political economy from the outside, as 
most Northern Protestant countries in the Euro-
zone demand, because it is anchored so strongly in 
the cultural background of the country. A cultural 
background that is composed of ideas, interests 
and institutions that have, over the past 60 years, 
formed a very dense amalgam. Social Catholic 
ideas are loaded with interests since the clien-
telist ties of vote aggregation in Southern Italy not 
only survived the dissolution of the DC but were 
inherited and incorporated by Silvio Berlusconi’s 
“descent” into politics (discesa in campo).
4.  Conclusion
The Euro crisis has now been dragging on for almost 
a decade. The fixing and emergency measures 
have not led to an easing of European relations, 
but have infuriated the European public, putting 
Northern populations against Southern ones. A 
look at the tabloids suffices. The powerful German 
tabloid Bild headlines read: “This is how the Greek 
Cheated us”, “Why do we Pay for Greek Luxury 
Pensions” and “Go Sell your Islands, you Bank-
rupt Greeks” (Bild 2010c; Bild 2010a; Bild 2010b). 
The approach of cultural political economy to the 
European crisis taken here suggests that there are 
no “quick fixes” to be expected through structural 
reforms. Instead, it has shown how political econ-
omies like the German and Italian ones evolved 
over almost a century, and that institutions, ideas 
and interests interacted in setting their pathways 
providing a highly durable complex of relations 
that are hard to break up, especially from the 
outside.
A CULTURAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN CRISIS
Josef Hien93
ments have now also been acknowledged by 
the celebrities of the Varities of Capitalism 
approach.
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Just when Germany’s mortgage debt started to 
decline seriously in the year 2000, the Italian 
one began to rise steeply and similar trends can 
be observed in house prices. At the same time, 
German export surpluses began to grow to 
unprecedented levels, while mortgage- and wage-
repressed domestic demand left the housing and 
construction sector starving. Not surprisingly, 
we find a negative cross-sectional association 
between the importance of exports and construc-
tion in OECD countries from the 1980s onwards.
As we argue in the discussion, construction- and 
export-driven economies require systematically 
different macroeconomic conditions. Construc-
tion, for instance, thrives with low interest rates, 
higher inflation, and relies almost exclusively 
on wage-driven domestic demand. Conversely, 
exports require stable inflation and, if possible, 
undervalued real exchange rates. For Germany, 
exports became cheaper due to its wage repres-
sion. One the one hand, the inclusion of structur-
ally heterogeneous economies in one monetary 
union could therefore be seen as problematical, as 
macroeconomic policies cannot address contra-
dictory demands. On the other hand, it could also 
be an insurance-mechanism, as construction cycle 
downturns are no longer as correlated between 
countries as they were previously.
1. Construction: A Neglected 
Core Component of Advanced 
Capitalist Economies
In the shadow of economic sectors as predom-
inant as manufacturing, finance, and various 
services-sector branches, contemporary Political 
Economy has neglected core components of capi-
talist economies. Among those sectors left behind, 
the construction sector stands out not only with 
regard to its contribution to GDP, but also with 
regard to its contribution to employment (espe-
cially for low- and medium-skilled workers). It, 
moreover, contributes largely to the formation of 
the physical capital stock of modern economies, 
even if its added-value contribution varies signifi-
cantly across OECD economies.
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Introduction
In both public debates about the economic hetero-
geneity of Southern and Northern European econ-
omies - and especially the Italian and German ones 
- as well as in Comparative Political Economy, the 
construction sector and housing construction in 
particular are rarely debated topics. This contrasts 
with their overall economic importance and the 
important cross-country differences in housing 
construction. Our contribution argues in favour 
of taking this “forgotten sector” seriously in Polit-
ical Economy, in which manufacturing or finance, 
as of late, have been the predominant focus. 
However, lessons learned in these sectors have 
hardly been transferred to construction, with its 
different sectoral logics.
We therefore show how Germany and Italy - and 
Southern Europe more generally - have moved 
along different housing and construction trajec-
tories over the last decades. Italy became a high-
homeownership country with initially low mort-
gage debt, while Germany remained a country of 
tenants with initially high mortgage-debt levels and 
a declining trend since then. Germany maintained 
a large private rental market, whereas stronger 
historical rent legislation eroded the Italian rental 
market (Voigtländer 2009). Most notably, the 
end of the post-war construction cycle led to an 
a-synchronisation of construction cycles in both 
countries. Germany was uniquely booming after 
re-unification just as Italy’s construction boom 
was about to take off, leaving Italy with surplus 
housing and Germany with housing shortages 
today.
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dwelling) product demands for mostly individual 
solutions in the form of made-to-order produc-
tion. This reduces repeatability, mass-standardisa-
tion, and thus continuous productivity increases 
within the sector. Moreover, the multitude of 
sites on which firms have to operate as well as the 
number of trades that are involved both within a 
firm as well as across construction projects create 
complex, industry-specific co-ordination prob-
lems. Furthermore, due to the close bond between 
producer and buyer, the mostly regional nature 
of the construction market, and the necessity to 
form consortia and small companies which act 
as suppliers to these trades limit competition 
and customer diversification severely. Last, high 
capital requirements and the longevity of produc-
tion processes create a high sensitivity to changes 
in the monetary, financial, and regulatory envi-
ronment.
Consequently, the different sectoral logic also 
promotes different macroeconomic repercussions. 
For reasons of space, we will focus only on two 
macroeconomic policy aspects of construction 
activity. First, the construction sector serves as a 
kind of natural buffer to macroeconomic shocks. 
Due to its dominant role as an investment goods 
industry in conjunction with a higher general level 
of volatility in investment compared to general 
demand, the construction sector faces additional 
vulnerability to changes in the general economic 
climate. Thus, the severity that booms and slumps 
have on construction activity goes hand-in-hand 
with a higher likelihood of adverse effects on the 
industry during these business-cycle events.
In contrast to manufacturing, a loss of demand in 
the construction sector usually represents a severe 
short-term threat to the regional business models 
of firms. On the one hand, although production 
lasts, on average, over a longer period of time, 
the dependence on long-term finance represents 
a threat to payment and fulfilment of contractual 
obligations both on the side of customers as well 
as on that of the construction firms itself. Hence, 
construction firms cannot simply “wait and see” 
during crises, but are under constant threat of 
insolvency despite full order books. On the other 
When we speak of construction, we distinguish it 
from the debates on housing and especially housing 
finance which have gained overwhelming atten-
tion since the dawn of the global financial crisis in 
2007/08 (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008b). These 
debates usually discuss aspects of wider financiali-
sation, such as the effects of financial (de-) regula-
tion, product developments in the financial sector 
for the purpose of insurance, hedging, and specu-
lation, as well as general macroeconomic steering 
actions to create GDP growth in a globalising 
economy through capital attraction (Schwartz 
2009, Fuller 2018). However, very few studies are 
actually interested in the real economy output 
of activities in the housing sector, which should 
accompany the rise of housing finance (Malpezzi 
and Maclennan 2001).
We want to stress the fundamental role of 
construction for any governmental gross fixed 
capital formation. Since governments in advanced 
capitalist economies usually do not own factory 
productions, they spend their investment neces-
sarily not on machine goods,103 but largely on the 
production of infrastructure and (social) housing. 
They are thus the principal clients of the construc-
tion sector. The sector refers to all parts of an 
economy that are concerned with the construc-
tion, maintenance, and utilisation of buildings 
and other structures (i.e., dwellings and infra-
structure), and the adjustment and change of 
building stock through construction activity. The 
stock of dwellings matters not only with regard 
to its absolute number, but also with regard to 
the level and development, that is, the cumulated 
(building) assets as well as the residential capital 
stock (Rußig, Deutsch, and Spillner 1996, 12f., 
Fleming 1988, Gornig and Michelsen 2017).104
Yet, compared to other sectors, the construction 
sector shows certain industry-specific qualities. 
One of these is that the nature of the (building/
103 With the noticeable exception of car pools and military 
equipment.
104 The construction sector resembles not so much a singu-
lar industry (in the narrow understanding), but rather a com-
plex sub-system of the economy due to its deep interlinkages 
with other sectors such as manufacturing for the production of 
pre-manufactured steel or concrete parts.
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tate a national strategy of export-orientation, it has 
to curtail both the inflationary effects of construc-
tion activities as well as the overall size and contri-
bution of the sector itself. On the other hand, due 
to its role for the active domestic macroeconomic 
management, one can attribute the promotion of 
construction activity to the domestic consump-
tion-led growth model (Baccaro and Pontusson 
2016). Since national housing and ownership 
patterns vary significantly across OECD countries 
for historical reasons (Kohl 2017), a government 
is unable to change the general role of construc-
tion activity in the short term. For instance, a 
government that encourages property ownership 
relies on the availability and the provision of new 
housing stock to make this model work.
Given the difference in the underlying monetary 
conditions as well as the importance that govern-
ments attribute to construction, there is an overall, 
distinguishable effect on the macroeconomic 
performance of an economy and, thus, poten-
tially on the development of macroeconomic 
imbalances. For the discussion about European 
macroeconomic imbalances, this means that the 
construction sector is at the core of the origins of 
the North-South divide.
2. Diverging Housing and 
Construction Trajectories in 
Southern Europe and Germany
The differences in housing and construction 
between Southern and Northern Europe are not 
of recent origin. Traditionally, Southern Euro-
pean housing and construction regimes have 
been characterised as distinct from Northern 
European countries, and, even internationally, 
have been exceptional along a variety of dimen-
sions (Castles and Ferrera 1996). First of all, all 
Southern European countries have developed into 
high-homeownership countries, comparable only 
to the completely privatised housing regimes of 
Eastern Europe and largely surpassing even the 
traditional Anglo-Saxon high-homeownership 
countries (Stephens, Lux, and Sunega 2015). In 
hand, a reduction in employment – which is some-
thing necessary during times of reduced order 
numbers – is difficult to accomplish as a construc-
tion firm needs to retain various trades and skills 
in order to maintain its operational capacities. 
This retention of excess labour capacities in this 
“populated” sector prevents the immediate severe 
increase of overall unemployment in an economy.
Only in the case of a lasting recession and further 
reduced order numbers will small construction 
and specialised supply-trade firms face bank-
ruptcy and thus ramp up unemployment overall. 
Hence, the delay of unemployment due to the 
necessity to retain intra-firm skills makes the 
sector a buffer for macroeconomic shocks and a 
bearer of significant adjustment costs of business-
cycle downturns in general.
Second, the construction sector is a core playing-
field for governments wanting to engage in macro-
economic management, because a government’s 
capacity to steer economic activity through invest-
ment depends on its access to the sector. For one, 
it is the easiest way to increase overall economic 
activity. An activist government can use the sector 
(in so far as labour capacity is available econ-
omy-wide) to enlarge positive employment and 
growth. However, a government willing to enforce 
construction activity has to provide conducive 
macroeconomic and monetary conditions (e.g., 
lower capital costs and increased capital avail-
ability in the domestic economy to be spent on 
housing and infrastructure). Yet, in so doing, it 
faces negative consequences for the overall export 
competitiveness which profits from quite different 
conditions such as a comparably lower inflation 
rate and unit labour cost developments (that result 
in an effective real exchange-rate under-valuation 
with regard to trading partners). Hence, construc-
tion companies benefit from the opposite mone-
tary conditions than export-oriented manufac-
turing firms.
This, in turn, has consequences for the national 
growth strategies and the development of national 
housing regimes. If a government wishes to facili-
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had already taken place and Italy had become a 
country of homeowners.
A second dimension is the kind of homeown-
ership which has mostly grown in the form 
of condominium or apartment ownership in 
Southern European coun-
tries. Legal arrangements of 
privately owning parts of a 
building on the same plot of 
land were absent in German 
Civil Code between 1901 and 
1951. Aft er being legally intro-
duced, owner-occupied fl ats 
remained a very exceptional 
form of tenure until the late 
1970s (Kohl 2017, Chapter 4). 
Even nowadays, fl ats that are 
available for purchase under 
condominium ownership law 
are still a minority in German 
cities, albeit a growing one. 
Much to the contrary, coun-
tries following the French Civil Code have either 
always known a sort of condominium ownership 
or introduced an updated form of it much earlier 
in the twentieth century. In Italy in the 1930s, still 
under Mussolini’s policies in favour of an owner-
ship society (Bortolotti 1978), most of the new 
constructions were apartment buildings with fl ats 
in condominium ownership (Di Feliciantonio and 
Aalbers 2018). Th is mostly urban phenomenon 
makes Southern European countries’ housing 
stock appear as an exception among OECD coun-
tries (Hoekstra 2005) and creates crucial diff er-
ences in how the urban fabric works. German 
major cities, for instance, are populated by majori-
ties of (private) tenants, whereas Italian cities have 
long since moved to homeowner majorities. Given 
tenure and house-price related voting patterns 
(Ansell 2014), this can be a crucial political diff er-
ence as well.
A third dimension of a South-Northern diver-
gence is in the sector of new constructions. While 
all countries saw a similar post-war re-construc-
tion boom which peaked in the 1970s, the subse-
the German-Italian comparison, the homeowner-
ship gap amounts to 30 plus percentage points, as 
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Homeownership rates in Germany and 
Southern Europe
Source: (Kohl 2017)
Th e fl ipside of these diff erences in tenure is, of 
course, that the rental stock is much larger in 
Germany than in Southern Europe. One reason 
behind these diverging developments is that the 
regulation of private rental relations was histori-
cally much more intense in Southern Europe than 
in the North (Weber 2017, Kholodilin 2018). 
All countries started rent regulation and tenant 
protection during the two World Wars. Yet, 
Southern European countries were both slower 
in de-regulating aft er the wars and more likely to 
re-introduce hard rent freezes when rent infl ation 
risked endangering the social peace. One poten-
tial cause for these social policies via consumption 
price stops was the lack of functioning and eff ec-
tive wage co-ordination in the South (Höpner and 
Lutter 2018). A direct consequence of strong rent 
regulation, however, was the increasing conver-
sion of private rental units into owner-occupied 
ones and a fl ight of landlords from this market 
segment. When Italy started its de-regulation of 
rent prices again in the 1980s, large conversions 
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A fi nal divergence was in house price and mort-
gage developments, as presented in Figure 3. 
While Southern European countries witnessed 
continuously rising real house prices over the last 
fi ve decades, Germany’s house prices stagnated 
until the crisis of 2007, only to take off  in 2010 
when house prices started to decline again in all 
Southern countries. Th e German house prices, in 
relation to 1990, have even overtaken the Italian 
development again in recent years. House prices 
are, of course, closely related to mortgage indebt-
edness. Traditionally, Southern European econo-
mies were characterised by family-owned forms 
of housing fi nance. Rather than relying on bank 
credit, ex-ante savings and within-family credit 
were supposed to fi ll the gap left  by a still under-
developed social system (Schwartz and Seabrooke 
2008a, Blackwell and Kohl 2018). Although 
elements of this system might still persist, the 
recent mortgage-debt growth in Southern Euro-
pean countries reveals a changing picture, as 
Figure 3 shows. Germany has had a higher mort-
gage debt per GDP until the late 1990s. But with 
the end of the re-unifi cation boom, all Southern 
European economies overtook Germany in terms 
of institutionalised mortgage 
debt. Th is was driven by 
house price increases, but 
also by banks relying more 
on external (foreign) capital 
and new securitisation tech-
niques.106
106 Spain being a prime case for the latter development (van 
Gunten and Navot 2016).
quent trajectories were diff erent from each other. 
Germany had an exceptional construction boom 
aft er re-unifi cation, which set it apart from all 
other countries. Scandinavian countries at that 
time had just experienced a house price bust and 
major recession, and Southern European coun-
tries were just about to start one of their most 
extensive construction booms in the mid-1990s. 
As a result, the building cycles, usually correlated 
with the general business cycle, became asyn-
chronous among countries that began the Euro-
pean Monetary Union, as Figure 2 shows. Italy’s 
housing boom was still the most conservative 
one among Southern European countries; hardly 
going beyond the 5 units built per 1,000 inhabit-
ants. A potential source of distortion here could be 
that a certain number of informal housing units 
were not counted in the construction statistics, 
due to informal housing being part of the belated 
urbanisation process in Southern Europe (Allen 
2004). But in all Southern European countries, the 
construction sector made up large shares of the 
GDP and was booming at a time when Germany’s 
was in a deep recession.
Figure 2: Construction cycles105
Source: National construction statistics; (Bolt et al. 2018)
105 Numbers use housing completions. If not available, 
housing starts or permits were deflated by the first lag times 
0.95 of permits issued. The displayed deflated Greek permit-
based numbers still reflect speculative exaggeration before the 
crisis 2007 and need to be interpreted accordingly.
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prices (and outstanding mortgage debt) remain 
surprisingly sticky. In Germany, by contrast, the 
construction sector has been 
running at full capacity and 
still not producing suffi  cient 
(aff ordable) urban housing 
to fi ll the run-up shortages or 
to drive down urban prices 
(Voigtländer et al. 2017).
3. Discussion: What are the 
implications of different 
housing/construction regimes 
for the broader political 
economy in Europe?
If it was not the construction sector that most 
employees and domestic credit was allocated to in 
Germany, where did the factor input go? Germany, 
much more than other Northern European count-
ries, developed into an export-driven economy 
(Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). While tenden-
cies of export-orientation or currency under-va-
luation can be traced back to the post-war period 
(or even earlier) in the German case (Höpner 
2018, Scharpf 2018), it was not until the last three 
decades that Germany produced persistently high 
and even growing exports surpluses. Th is occurred 
at the same time that its construction sector and 
mortgage debt declined, while Southern Europe 
produced a mortgage-driven construction boom. 
Not surprisingly, OECD countries display a nega-
tive cross-sectional association between the 
importance of their export and their construction 
sectors in the economy, with Germany and Sout-
Figure 3: House prices and mortgage debt per 
GDP
Note: House prices (above fi gure) and mortgage debt per GDP 
fi gures (below fi gure).
Source: (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2017, Knoll, Schul-
arick, and Steger 2015, Amaral 2018).
Th e only point of convergence in the countries’ 
housing systems has been the decline of social 
rental housing (Harloe 1995). It amounted tradi-
tionally to up to a third of Germany’s housing 
stock, but never more than 10 per cent in the case 
of Southern European countries. In recent years, 
this public housing segment has been generally in 
retrenchment mode, reported to be about 4 per 
cent in Germany in 2012 (Bundestag 2012).107
One consequence of these diverging construction 
trends is that housing markets in the North and 
South are currently facing very diff erent prob-
lems. In Southern Europe, the overcapacity of the 
construction industry has led to a construction-
driven prolonged recession, to an oversupply of 
housing and high vacancy rates, as well as prob-
lems of mortgage delinquency and foreclosures 
(Cano Fuentes et al. 2013, Gentili and Hoekstra 
2018). Given the oversupply of housing, however, 
107 Even if non-profit housing organisations and co-opera-
tives still make up more than 10 per cent of Germany’s private 
rental sector.
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tion or export-dominated regimes are in place, 
they tend to produce their own stabilisers.
In international perspective, the two different 
trajectories of economies can even help stabilise 
each other, as when export economies simultane-
ously export their surplus capital to lend it to the 
domestically consuming construction economies 
(Fuller 2018). Having countries with asynchro-
nous construction cycles in a monetary union, 
however, can also be a blessing in disguise, because 
it could act as a risk-sharing mechanism.108 When 
construction is down in one economy, it could be 
compensated for by an upturn in another one.109 
The risks of a construction-cycle and hence busi-
ness-cycle downturn could thus become uncor-
related and work as a sort of insurance, with one 
economy absorbing the capacities and demand of 
the other. Yet, the extent of the insurance-mech-
anism might be limited, as the regional character 
of construction reduces the easy transferability of 
workers, firms, and building traditions from one 
country into another.
This rosier insurance mechanism could also be 
thwarted by the inability to adjust the macroeco-
nomic steering of inflation and interest rates to 
nationally different construction markets. This 
meant in particular that the common European 
interest rate in the early 2000s was too restrictive 
for the German construction sector, where house-
hold debt was decreasing and construction output 
down (Scharpf 2018). Conversely, Southern Euro-
pean economies faced house-price, construction, 
as well as mortgage booms, and thus the risk of an 
overheated economy followed by an even deeper 
recession. Therefore, the current struggles within 
the Eurozone can also be interpreted through the 
lens of structurally different economies: some of 
them relying on debt-financed domestic demand 
with large construction sectors, and others relying 
on wage- and credit-restraint domestic demand in 
favour of a growing export sector.
108 See Schelkle for a related argument (Schelkle 2017).
109 One can compare this to times when urban construc-
tion cycles had not been synchronised in national economies 
and provided for regional balancing.
hern Europe choosing alternative strategies along 
this negative association.
The fact that countries usually do not have both 
- a thriving export and a booming construction 
sector - has to do with the different macroeco-
nomic environments that the two sectors require 
in order to prosper. The construction sector works 
best in times of higher inflation and lower interest 
rates. Construction and particularly the purchase 
of houses requires cheaply available capital, and 
higher inflation makes the burden of mortgage 
indebtedness less onerous. It also motivates people 
to switch from financial to the intangible asset of 
housing. The mostly manufacturing export sector 
in the economy, by contrast, requires low inflation 
through higher interest rates in order to have reli-
able exchange rates, i.e., expectable prices both of 
goods imported and of goods sold abroad. Finally, 
on the demand side, the construction sector 
almost exclusively relies on domestic demand, 
whereas the export sector, by definition, is much 
less in need of domestic demand. Much to the 
contrary, it emphasises wage restraint to guarantee 
the competitiveness of goods exported abroad. 
Therefore, one can understand the worry of the 
Bundesbank in 2017 when discussing the poten-
tial negative macroeconomic consequences of an 
ongoing house-price boom in Germany (Bundes-
bank 2017).
Whatever initiated the divergence along different 
construction/export trajectories in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the different functional requirements 
of dominant sectors in conjunction with social 
blocs defending their interests acted as rein-
forcing mechanism to keep countries on the track 
(Baccaro and Pontusson 2018). A comparative 
look at party manifestos (Kohl and Spielau 2018), 
for instance, reveals that OECD countries with a 
large construction share in the economy, are asso-
ciated with all manifestos that are more likely to 
defend infrastructure and housing investments, 
independently of party cleavages. In countries 
with large export sectors, by contrast, party mani-
festos are rather associated with the defence of free 
trade across party families. Thus, once construc-
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Introduction
The banking crisis of the late 2000s not only had 
a long-lasting impact on the European Union, its 
economy, and many of its citizens, it also changed 
the political discourse to a certain extent. Refer-
ences to the billions mobilised overnight to rescue 
struggling banks have become defining parts of 
many political debates surrounding financing 
welfare spending, rescuing bankrupt firms, and 
reducing taxes. Why could states raise money for 
bank rescues but not for pensioners or workers? 
There is some truth in this argument: confronted 
with great turmoil on financial markets, liquid-
ity and solvency problems of major parts of the 
banking sector, in addition to an alarmed public, 
many European countries intervened in markets 
and saved a number of struggling banks with 
taxpayers’ money. Governments injected capital 
into failing banks, they bought non-performing 
loans (NPLs), facilitated take-overs, or guaranteed 
banks’ assets. This was necessary due to the high 
importance of banks for the rest of the economy. 
They were often “too-big-to-fail” (Krugman, 
2010), meaning that a single bank was so im-
portant for the functioning of an economy that a 
country could not afford to let it go bankrupt. In 
other cases, governments feared public panic and 
the breakdown of their banking sector simply due 
to a loss of confidence if they let one bank fail – a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. As soon as banks can no 
longer fulfil their role as financiers of businesses, 
an economic crisis is almost inevitable. Hence, 
most major economies bailed out their banks (and 
investors) instead of letting them go bankrupt, 
even though bad investment decisions and unrea-
sonably high exposures to risks had led to such 
scenarios. States simply had no alternative but to 
save banks.
Governments vowed never to let their econo-
mies be held hostage by struggling banks again. 
This resulted in increased regulation at interna-
tional (such as Basel III) as well as at European 
level, more stringent supervision especially for 
the most important banks (e.g., the European 
Single Supervisory Mechanism - SSM), and other 
common rules for banks across Europe, especially 
with regard to their resolution in the case of fail-
ures. This common approach towards regulation 
became necessary as the recent crisis had revealed 
major contagion risks across countries (Fecht, 
Grüner, & Hartmann, 2012). In Europe, this con-
tagion across national banking sectors was accom-
panied by interdependencies in a monetary union 
through public debts that rose as a result of the 
banking and economic crises. The new rules im-
plemented in Europe in recent years are supposed 
to avoid banking crises through regulation and su-
pervision as well as through market discipline by 
making the bankruptcy of a bank a credible threat 
for investors. This paper focuses on the newly 
introduced European resolution framework for 
failing banks that contributes to the latter.
In theory, investors are supposed to bear the full 
risk of their investment and supervise it accord-
ingly; any prospect of government intervention 
in times of crisis distorts such incentives. It is a 
straightforward assumption of economic theory 
that investors would choose their preferred risk 
class by maximising their utility in a trade-off 
between security and returns. Some investors 
might very well be risk-seeking in return for high 
premia and allow a firm to behave hazardously, 
while many others might prefer to contain risks 
and control the respective firm more stringently. 
In a perfect world, all actors are aware of these risks 
and should either be ready to face the consequenc-
es or hedge against losses. The prospect of state 
intervention in times of crisis changes this pattern 
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rules and used taxpayers’ money to save banks 
through recapitalisation or at least to facilitate 
their liquidation. This was highly criticised by 
German politicians, because it probably reduced 
the credibility of the new resolution regime. I will 
argue that Italy had little choice but to evade the 
new rules to some extent since they were imple-
mented prematurely for countries that were at an 
earlier stage of the crisis than Germany or other 
northern European countries.
The following section will be dedicated to sketch-
ing the new EU approach towards re-structuring 
struggling banks. Afterwards, I will describe the 
banking crises in Germany and Italy, the respec-
tive government responses, and the effects that the 
new rules had on the crisis responses. I will con-
clude with a comparison of the two cases and an 
argument on how the premature introduction of a 
strict and stringent resolution regime has damaged 
the very purpose for which it was intended.
The EU’s Pledge to Let 
Investors Pay First
The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD – European Union, 2014a) and the EU 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM –European 
Union, 2014b) are supposed to rule out state aid 
for struggling banks and to ensure orderly resolu-
tion if they fail. While the BRRD is an EU-wide 
measure to harmonise regulation and resolution, 
the SRM is a feature of the banking union that 
especially includes the countries of the Eurozone 
and their banks, which are supervised by the ECB. 
The introduction of such regulation is a political 
signal for all those who criticised costly govern-
ment interventions during the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2007 to 2009 (GFC) and who fear future 
cross-border bail-outs in the case of bank failures 
due to contagion risks across closely interlinked 
economies. But it is also a measure to get incen-
tives for investors straight and reduce excessive 
risk-taking. Shareholders and bondholders are 
supposed to be the first ones to bear the losses of a 
struggling bank through so called bail-in mecha-
and, consequentially, may lead to riskier behav-
iour of firms because their investors do not see the 
need to control them as stringently; in fact, they 
may even push them into risky business since they 
know that there is a certain amount of government 
insurance that limits their risk. Due to the system-
ic importance of banks for all major economies, 
their investors can usually count on bail-outs by 
the respective government. Eventually, this leads 
to both potential economic crises through the in-
efficiently risky behaviour of banks and high costs 
for taxpayers for direct bank rescues.
To address this problem, the new European resolu-
tion regime was put in place once most states had 
saved their banks. Future investors should face 
an undistorted risk of loss, leading to lower costs 
for taxpayers and better market control of banks. 
However, parts of the EU had not overcome the 
crisis at this point and the new regime bound their 
hands to address threats to investors and whole 
economies that were still formed under the old 
regime. Italy is a prime example of this. I contrast 
Italy’s long-lasting banking crisis and the effects of 
introducing new rules during the ongoing crisis 
with Germany, whose banking crisis ended early 
after heavy state intervention.
In the following, I will argue that, while both were 
affected by the same crisis, the cases of Germany 
and Italy reveal major differences in their banking 
sectors prior to, during, and in reaction to the 
crisis. Germany intervened much faster and with 
much more power than Italy when the crisis hit in 
the period from 2007 to 2009. Italy’s banks were 
not greatly affected by the international turmoil, 
partially due to better supervision and more sta-
bility-oriented regulators. The Italian crisis un-
folded more slowly following the economic down-
turn and never reached a peak like the German 
one, but lasted much longer. Timing was key here 
because the new European resolution regime was 
introduced after the German crisis had been re-
solved, but before the Italian banks ran into deep 
trouble. This bound Italy’s hands in addressing its 
banking problems in the same way in which the 
Germans had. Italy partially circumvented the 
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and more efficient so that triggering it is a real 
threat.
The resolution fund is an instrument of last resort 
that is supposed to cover the costs of bank resolu-
tion if the liability cascade is not enough to cover 
them. Only if investors already covered losses of at 
least 8 per cent of the bank’s balance-sheet total, 
does a bank qualify for aid from the resolution 
fund, which serves as a backstop against state in-
tervention that would have to pay for resolution 
costs not covered by investor liability (European 
Union, 2014b). It is financed through contribu-
tions from banks themselves so that, in theory, 
taxpayers do not have to bear any of the costs.
Even though credibility and coherence are key 
for changing the incentives for investors, the 
new resolution framework entails exceptions and 
loopholes. Not only do the usual exceptions for 
German savings banks and similar small financial 
firms tend to make the new framework incoher-
ent, but also the definitions on when a bank must 
be resolved or when it can be saved using state aid 
in order to avoid significant negative consequenc-
es for the rest of the economy remain unclear. An 
important loophole in this regard is precautionary 
recapitalisation (see Article 16 SRM Regulation/
Article 32 BRRD), which has already been used 
in Italy to circumvent resolution rules. In the case 
of precautionary recapitalisation, a government 
can provide state aid to a struggling bank if it is 
solvent and systemically important for a country’s 
economy (see Hellwig, 2017) for a detailed analy-
sis of precautionary recapitalisation). These rules 
were meant for extraordinary cases, but they were 
already used on the first serious occasion when 
Italian banks ran into trouble.
Given that the new mechanisms had already been 
circumvented when they were tested for the first 
time, it seems questionable whether they can gain 
enough credibility to change the incentives for 
investors as described above. If BRRD and SRM 
are regarded as sham standards, they will not have 
much impact. It seems questionable whether gov-
ernments would be able to resist demands to use 
exceptions from the new rules when banks in their 
countries fail.
nisms that result in financing the bank’s resolution 
or recapitalisation through investor liability before 
any other stakeholder have to step in.
Key to achieving a change in future investor in-
centives is the credibility of such a scheme. Inves-
tors will adjust their behaviour only to a limited 
extent if they can expect bail-ins to remain an ex-
ception and bail-outs – the standard intervention 
during the GFC – to prevail as a standard reaction 
to bank failures. In particular, the SRM was sup-
posed to be a solution that credibly regulates the 
resolution of a failing bank – including investor 
liability – complementing the new Single Super-
visory Mechanism that was supposed to prevent 
Europe-wide systemic banking crises in the first 
place. A potential result of such a credible resolu-
tion regime is a virtuous circle in which market 
forces require banks to act more prudently, which 
results in fewer banking crises and renders the 
new resolution regimes almost unnecessary.
In the event of a crisis that threatens a bank’s exist-
ence, the new resolution mechanism is organised 
around two pillars: a liability cascade for bank in-
vestors (the bail-in mentioned before), diverging 
from usual insolvency regulation, and a resolution 
fund for the case that recapitalisation through the 
bail-in is not enough to cover the costs of a po-
tential failure. These pillars come into effect when 
a normal insolvency of a financial firm would 
endanger financial stability. The liability cascade 
means that, after own funds are used up for re-
capitalisation measures, junior and even senior 
bondholders must write off their investments 
or convert them into shares to recapitalise the 
firm, following a pre-determined pattern. While 
seeming like a straightforward consequence of 
“bad” investments, losses for senior investors have 
rarely occurred in the past, which probably played 
a role when investment decisions were made. 
This corresponds to the too-big-to-fail argument 
mentioned before. Letting a bank fail based upon 
normal procedures, even if it is not too-big-to-fail, 
would probably take much time and destroy trust 
in the financial system if the state did not step in 
and smoothen the failure. Pre-determined rule-
based recapitalisation can make this process faster 
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helped the bank both directly and indirectly with 
more than 7bn € (Handelsblatt, 2008).
State banks also faced tremendous losses from un-
reasonably high exposure to failing US markets; 
other state banks, states, and the federal gov-
ernment stepped in and bailed them out. For 
example, WestLB, the state bank of North Rhine-
Westphalia, was recapitalised through guarantees 
covering risks of about 5bn € based on the book 
values of assets whose fair values were obviously 
much lower; this was regarded as illegal direct 
state aid by the EU Commission, which neverthe-
less subsequently proceeded to allow it (German 
Ministry of Finance, 2013). Later, a bad bank took 
over most toxic loans and the remaining parts 
of WestLB were liquidated. For many other state 
banks, it is evident that they behaved hazardously 
when investing in American asset-backed securi-
ties, often encouraged and poorly supervised by 
politicians who represented the respective states 
on the banks’ boards Hallerberg and Markgraf 
(2018) provide an examination of political in-
fluence on German state banks before the crisis 
which resulted in bad supervision and risky be-
haviour; Traut (2017) examines the way in which 
three state banks (Sachsen LB, HSH Nordbank, 
and BayernLB) came to be in crisis and finds major 
shortcomings in risk management and reactions 
to warnings as well as outright moral hazard. This 
hints at highly distorted incentives prior to the 
crisis and insufficient supervision from German 
government entities that resulted in great inter-
ventions and high costs for taxpayers.
The list could be extended much further: names 
like Hypo Real Estate or Commerzbank are still 
strongly associated with the crisis, and obligations 
from bank rescues have not yet disappeared yet. 
This becomes clearer when looking at indicators 
for the aggregated involvement of government en-
tities in supporting the financial sector through 
several agencies and state-owned firms. Figures 
1.1-1.3 show how much Germany invested into 
saving its banks by becoming a shareholder of 
banks or their asset management companies (bad 
banks), taking over debt from struggling banks 
I will come back to this problem after outlining 
the banking crisis developments in Germany and 
Italy, which have led to state aid in recent years 
and how they differ.
The German Response to the 
Crisis: Quick, Costly, 
Successful
The German federal government and several 
state governments as well as government agencies 
heavily intervened in the banking markets in the 
period of turmoil between 2007 and 2009. Both 
private banks and state banks (especially Landes-
banken, state-level banks that were mostly owned 
by the respective federal state and the semi-public 
Sparkassen) ran into major trouble during the fi-
nancial crisis in the US – partially because of their 
investments in risky assets, and partially because 
of a loss in confidence in the banking market fol-
lowing the failure of major international banks. 
The crisis responses included the outright nation-
alisation of banks, relief from bad loans through 
special asset management corporations (bad 
banks), state-guarantees, and the facilitation of 
take-overs or liquidation. Some examples might 
be helpful to illustrate the mismanagement of 
German banks prior to the crisis and how much 
the German government intervened:
IKB, a bank specialised in lending to medium-size 
enterprises, was the first German bank that faced 
great difficulties in the GFC and had to be saved by 
public entities in the 2007–2008 period. It suffered 
dangerous losses from large investments in the in-
famous US asset-backed securities market  1that 
brought the bank to the brink of failure, which it 
was feared would initiate a chain reaction of fail-
ures that would bring the German economy to its 
knees. The state-owned bank KfW (which already 
held a share of the bank prior to the crisis) and 
the federal government intervened and bailed out 
IKB with direct capital injections and guarantees 
for outstanding debts. Eventually, the government 
1 US mortgages to dubious borrowers were bundled and sold 
all over the world under the assumption that losses from some 
mortgages would be outweighed by profits from others – they 
were not.
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pervision might work better and risk and return 
are actually connected (European Commission, 
2014). Given the German experience and the state 
of its economy, a new resolution regime seems like 
an adequate measure to foster financial stability.
Figure 1: Assets (e.g., equity in banks), liabili-
ties, and contingent liabilities (e.g., guarantees) 
resulting from supporting financial institutions 
in Germany and Italy (Eurostat, 2018).
(often correlated with becoming a shareholder, 
which explains the similar curves in Figures 1.1 
and 1.2), or giving out guarantees for bank debts, 
which are contingent liabilities (Figure 1.3). 
German involvement in rescue operations started 
quickly in 2007 and stopped growing in 2009 
when the international financial markets were sta-
bilised. Since then, new state intervention has not 
been required.
The sheer size of the rescue packages needed 
during the GFC reveals the immense problems 
in the German banking sector. These problems 
certainly required a reaction by regulators and 
changes in the regulatory framework. Especially 
in the cases of the failures of banks with poten-
tial systemic importance such as Commerzbank or 
Hypo Real Estate, state aid was unavoidable, which 
included compensation for the shareholders and 
the non-participation of the bondholders in the 
rescue operations. This was mostly due to lack of 
rules that facilitated investor liability. Those who 
made giant profits from risky bank investments in 
the past were bailed out and only suffered minor 
losses (Reiermann & Reuter, 2009). Simply to 
avoid future hazardous behaviour on the part of 
banks, it was important to set up a framework in 
which every bank can fail and which makes actual 
holders of stocks and bonds responsible for con-
trolling the bank’s activities and bearing the con-
sequences if they fail to do so.
A credible bank resolution framework was proba-
bly among the most important consequences of the 
crisis. As soon as banks can be treated almost like 
normal firms that can go bankrupt if they make 
bad investments, more disciplined behaviour and 
more supervision by investors will follow. Fur-
thermore, the quick crisis resolution in Germany 
and the following economic boom as well as the 
general structure of German investors (usually, 
normal citizens do not invest substantial amounts 
of their life savings into bank bonds or shares) re-
sulted in a truly fresh start for investment in banks, 
as investors could adjust their expectations and 
investment behaviour to the new environment. A 
new framework could be introduced in which su-
BANKING CRISIS INTERVENTIONS IN GERMANY AND ITALY: THE UNPLEASANT CASE OF THE NEW EUROPEAN BANK RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
Frederik Traut
113
balance sheet – a measure to reduce capital re-
quirements – was much harder in Italy than, for 
example, in Germany. Italian regulators were also 
well-informed about potential risks to bank assets, 
because they collected much more data than inter-
national standards would have required (OECD, 
2009). Regulators basically prevented Italian 
banks from holding assets that later turned out to 
be toxic. Second, Hallerberg and Markgraf (2018) 
show that especially (semi-) state banks in Italy 
were relatively well-managed and were efficiently 
supervised before the GFC. This stands in stark 
contrast to the management and supervision of, 
for example, German state banks.
The problems for Italian banks came later, when 
many other countries had already consolidated 
their financial sectors or were in the process of 
doing so. As we can also see in Figure 1, Italy 
eventually intervened to support its banks when 
the economic crisis – the second phase of the 
GFC in Europe – became an unbearable burden 
for some banks. This economic crisis was partial-
ly caused by funding and liquidity problems for 
banks, which resulted in tightened credit condi-
tions for firms which relied on financing from 
banks (OECD, 2009); however, as a trade-depend-
ent economy, Italy was also highly affected by the 
world-wide economic downturn. Furthermore, 
larger Italian banks suffered from exposure to 
Eastern European markets, which suffered great 
economic turmoil as international credit condi-
tions tightened (Di Quirico, 2010). Support for 
domestic banks became necessary in the course 
of this economic crisis whenever more bank loans 
to local businesses became non-performing and 
the credit-crunch – the unavailability of credit for 
businesses – worsened.
It is important to stress again that the Italian crisis 
was fundamentally different to that of other coun-
tries: while banks and bursting bubbles brought 
the world economy to the brink of chaos, Italian 
bank troubles were rather the result of these 
worldwide problems. The Italian economic down-
turn and its banking crisis went hand in hand, 
while the GFC preceded the worldwide economic 
problems. Italian banks had to reduce credit as a 
Italy: a Hidden Banking 
Crisis
The Italian crisis experience was quite different 
from the German one. As already indicated by 
the numbers on government involvement in the 
financial sector in Figure 1, Italy did not inter-
vene heavily in the markets early on. While the 
displayed numbers show almost no support for 
banks, it is important to recognise that the govern-
ment did indeed give out a guarantee for insured 
deposits to avoid a bank run in case the depositors 
lost trust. Furthermore, guarantees for some types 
of bank liabilities were announced and banks were 
partially shielded from losses from non-financial 
sector lending. The Italian government had also 
prepared instruments to recapitalise struggling 
banks (OECD, 2009). However, these measures 
were much less specific than the German ones, 
since German banks actually failed in the period 
2007 to 2009 due to high exposure to toxic assets, 
while Italian banks were much less exposed to 
turmoil on international markets. As the OECD 
stated, ”[t]he Italian financial system managed 
to cope with the ‘first round’ of the crisis better 
than most of its European peers […]” (OECD, 
2009, p. 37) and mostly suffered due to spill-over 
effects that reduced confidence in banks and in-
creased funding costs. The measures taken by the 
Italian government mostly aimed at reducing such 
burdens for Italian banks.
The Italian banking sector was apparently kept in 
rather good shape by regulators prior to the GFC. 
Two examples illustrate this: first, the general reg-
ulatory attitude towards the risk-taking of banks 
was relatively strict in Italy (Laeven & Levine, 
2009). Especially regarding the factors that were 
among the determinants of the GFC, Italian regu-
lators were exceptionally prudent. Regulators for 
different types of financial firms collaborated and 
closed loopholes that banks could have used to 
avoid regulation. 2 Shifting loans outside a bank’s 
2 Such efficient collaboration between regulators was an excep-
tion in major economies. See Barth, Caprio & Levine (2012) 
for a detailed discussion on how regulators in industrial 
countries had the powers and resources to efficiently supervise 
banks prior to the GFC, but did not use them and failed to co-
operate efficiently.
BANKING CRISIS INTERVENTIONS IN GERMANY AND ITALY: THE UNPLEASANT CASE OF THE NEW EUROPEAN BANK RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
Frederik Traut
114
case of Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), 4 which 
enjoyed precautionary recapitalisation. MPS had 
failed to collect enough money from private in-
vestors to meet the requirements of the EU-wide 
bank stress test, which is supposed to ensure ad-
equate capitalisation of major banks. The bank, 
just like the two smaller banks, requested precau-
tionary recapitalisation to solve this problem. In 
mid-2017, it was found that MPS as the country’s 
fourth-largest bank was important enough and at 
the same time generally solvent so that recapitali-
sation was feasible under the loopholes in the new 
resolution rules. After shareholders and junior 
bondholders contributed 4.3bn € to its rescue, the 
Italian state contributed more than 5bn € to the 
bank’s capital in exchange for shares (European 
Commission, 2017b). Again, senior bondholders 
did not participate in the bail-in prior to the gov-
ernment bail-out. It is not very far-fetched to say 
that this state intervention again recalls German 
reactions to its own banking crisis; this time, it 
looks quite similar to the rescues of IKB or Com-
merzbank.
Estimates show that the two Italian regions mostly 
affected by the bank turmoil, the Veneto and 
Tuscany, saw a substantial decline in business 
lending of 6 per cent and 3 per cent respectively in 
2016, while similar regions do not show such pat-
terns (Zingales, 2017). Rome could only choose 
between great turmoil on financial markets as a 
result of non-interventionist resolution of strug-
gling banks (leading to a credit-crunch which 
already induced the economic crisis that had 
caused these troubles) or finding loopholes to in-
tervene in the banking crisis to resolve the problem 
smoothly. Discretionary intervention would have 
been a viable choice in 2007, but now the Italian 
government faced a different regulatory environ-
ment.
4 MPS had also faced major difficulties before and had already 
been a burden for financial stability for years. For example, it 
managed to circumvent regulators in some cases and lost hun-
dreds of millions in the GFC due to risky transactions. It also 
had to be supported by the state in 2012 when it failed to raise 
enough capital to meet stricter European capital requirements 
(Thompson, 2013).
result of financial market turmoil and a lack of 
liquidity in the period 2007 to 2009. The highly 
leveraged Italian corporate sector could not cope 
with the resulting credit-crunch and the general 
economic downturn. 3 As a result, it now accounts 
for 80 per cent of Italian banks’ non-performing 
loans (NPLs), reflecting a long-lasting recession as 
well as a reluctance on the part of banks to write 
off NPLs (Jassaud & Kang, 2015).
The economic crisis in Italy eventually lasted 
much longer than the recessions in other Euro 
countries, with the resulting NPL problems pro-
ducing a slow-motion banking crisis. Shortly after 
the SRM regulation took effect in January 2016, 
Italian banks ran into trouble when their funding 
and liquidity positions eroded in the course of 
the ongoing NPL crisis. The smaller banks Banca 
Popolare di Vincenza and Veneto Banca tried to 
prevent liquidation through loopholes in the 
banking resolution directive, but their limited size 
prevented this. They were eventually sold in 2017 
under Italian insolvency law, including substantial 
state guarantees on the liquidation mass (Europe-
an Commission, 2017a). The common resolution 
regime was not used in this case; an important 
feature of the liquidation of the two Italian banks 
was that senior bonds were protected from losses 
as well as small savers’ junior bonds – partially 
financed by the Italian state (Humblot, 2017). 
Hence, the promise that taxpayers would not pay 
for bank failures was not kept. The liquidation of 
a failing bank using state guarantees and other in-
struments of state aid to facilitate liquidation very 
much recalls the German reaction to the failure of 
SachsenLB – a German state bank that failed in the 
early days of the GFC in 2007 due to unreasonably 
high exposure to risky US assets.
Much more important, however, is probably the 
3 Germany strongly supported its industry in replacing 
international demand by domestic public spending. While 
these efforts were successful, they were also classic Keynesian 
measures and had little to do with Germany’s celebrated model 
of Ordnungspolitik– a concept that relies on rules and rejects 
discretionary intervention in markets. Perhaps, one could say 
that Italy behaved in a more “German” way than Germany 
during the crisis.
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The future of the Italian banking system remains 
uncertain. Italy’s quantity of NPLs is still the 
highest in Europe in absolute numbers (The Econ-
omist, 2017). The government in Rome seems to 
lack the power and resources to solve the NPL 
problem in due time; the new all-populist govern-
ment will probably make it even more difficult 
to convince investors to relieve banks of NPLs at 
reasonable prices. For the foreseeable future, Eu-
ropean regulation and political constraints (in-
cluding the reluctance of northern countries to 
enter risk-sharing schemes) make it unlikely that 
the NPL crisis can be resolved without harming 
Italy’s economy or investors – among them, many 
normal citizens saving for their retirement.
Bail-in, Bail-out, and 
How Double-Standards Hurt 
Everyone
Both data and anecdotal evidence on government 
intervention during recent banking crises as well 
as on banking supervision show major differences 
between Germany and Italy. Italy did relatively 
well in terms of banking supervision and regula-
tion prior to the crisis. Nevertheless, a long-last-
ing economic downturn brought its banks into 
serious trouble. This economic downturn was a 
result of the global financial crisis of the period 
2007 to 2009 and resulted in huge amounts of 
non-performing loans on bank books. In contrast, 
Germany’s banks were much more exposed to the 
initial financial crisis and partially caused it. This 
required early and severe government interven-
tion by government entities. Figures 1.1-1.3 show 
that the magnitude of these interventions ex-
ceeded Italian state aid for its banks by far. When 
Italy’s banks needed state aid, the German crisis 
had already been resolved and its government had 
started working on preventing such events in the 
future.
A consequence of Germany’s early intervention 
was that its banks’ balance sheets were relatively 
clean when the financial crisis turned into a Eu-
ropean economic crisis. This stands in contrast 
to the Italian experience where bank balance 
The ownership structure of bonds and the poten-
tial losers of non-intervention eventually made 
this a non-choice. Italian households are tradi-
tionally among the most important buyers of 
bank bonds for investment purposes, exposing 
the most vulnerable economic players to great 
economic pain in the event of resolution. This is 
partially due to an under-developed pension fund 
sector (which would then pool savers’ money) 
and tax incentives that favour bonds over deposits 
(Grasso, Linciano, Pierantoni & Siciliano, 2010). 
Banks obviously had an interest in selling bonds 
that secured their own funding and Italians were 
willing to buy them. Italian households’ bond 
ownership was 200 million € in 2017 – four times 
higher than that of German households (Barbera, 
2017). Letting senior bondholders participate in 
recapitalisations would have meant expropriat-
ing citizens who had invested into allegedly safe 
assets. Their long-running investments were sup-
posed to pay for their pensions or other big plans 
and could not simply be sold to investors at a low 
price to get out of the business after the rules were 
changed externally. Hence, Rome basically had no 
choice but to circumvent the new rules.
Despite its own interventions in similar cases, 
the German government heavily opposed any 
state aid by the Italian government under the new 
resolution framework. German politicians and 
government officials condemned all government 
efforts to cushion the Italian banking crisis and to 
protect senior bondholders. It was argued that the 
new resolution framework was circumvented on 
the first occasion and that the European authori-
ties should not have allowed state guarantees to 
facilitate the liquidation of the two smaller banks, 
nor the precautionary recapitalisation for MPS. 
A conservative German MEP was quoted in the 
Financial Times a few days prior to the eventual 
MPS decision with the statement: “the promise 
that the taxpayer will not stand in to rescue failing 
banks any more is broken for good” (Brundsen, 
2017). The same article spoke of “outrage among 
German politicians” that rules introduced after 
the GFC had been undermined.
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vestment patterns can emerge; Germany was ap-
parently at such a stage after heavily intervening in 
the markets. Italy did not intervene in its markets 
so much, and suffered a slowly evolving crisis 
based upon an economic crisis. Consequently, 
Italy was not ready for the new rules when they 
were introduced, and investors could not react ap-
propriately.
One could very well accuse the Italian govern-
ments of recent years of doing too little against the 
economic crisis that then resulted in the Italian 
banking crisis; they certainly also failed to work 
on the NPL problem (Zingales, 2017). Especially 
during the major downturn of the world-econo-
my in the period 2008-10, Berlusconi’s right-wing 
government reacted much more timidly com-
pared to Britain’s centre-left government or Ger-
many’s centrist grand coalition. Italy rather stuck 
to the general European rules of non-intervention, 
while its peers conducted classic Keynesianism. 
Neoliberal Britain, as well as Germany with its 
tradition of Ordnungspolitik, faced great trouble 
during the GFC and did not stick to their princi-
ples. In contrast, traditionally interventionist Italy 
acted in a restrained way and adhered more to 
the principles of prudence and order, at least with 
regard to banking supervision, and did not have to 
intervene. The Italian government clearly did not 
conduct “rogue policies” or moral hazard that led 
to failing banks prior to the crisis, nor did finan-
cial firms in general. Instead, it was the economic 
environment that caused problems on the Italian 
banking market.
It is not without irony that Italy adhered to north-
ern European principles for too long. This does 
not mean that it was intelligent to do so, nor does 
it mean that the Italian economy was in exception-
ally good shape prior to the crisis, of course.
The introduction of the European resolution 
regime had two purposes: the economic one was 
to change the future incentives of banks and their 
investors in order to reduce the risk of banking 
crises; the political one was to show voters that no 
more tax money would be used for bank rescues. 
Premature implementation prior to all the af-
fected banking markets being cleaned up prob-
sheets turned sour over the years, resulting in a 
slow-motion banking crisis. This Italian banking 
crisis overlaps with the introduction of EU rules 
to address the reasons for the last financial crisis, 
including a new resolution regime that was sup-
posed to prevent government interventions with 
taxpayer money to save banks. In Germany, these 
rules were introduced in a more or less stable en-
vironment and it seems reasonable to assume that 
market participants could change their behaviour 
accordingly. This would be in line with the goals 
of introducing the new resolution regime: reduc-
ing incentives for moral hazard by banks and their 
investors, and making them liable for their mis-
takes.
Thus, the outrage of German politicians about 
state aid for Italian banks in 2017 is understand-
able from their point of view: it hurts the credibil-
ity of the newly introduced resolution regime that 
was supposed to prevent interventions like the one 
conducted by Germany in the GFC. As argued 
before, credibility is key to change the future be-
haviour of banks and investors as well as to make 
resolution feasible at all. It is perfectly reasonable 
for a German government that just cleaned up 
its banking sector to want to change the rules as 
long as no new problems have emerged that might 
require new intervention.
It is problematical, however, to impose such rules 
on Italy for the same reason. As argued before, the 
Italian banking crisis evolved from an economic 
crisis and hit much later. In contrast to Germany 
in the period 2007 to 2009, Rome’s hands to 
resolve its own crisis on the banking market from 
2016 onwards were bound by the new regulatory 
regime introduced in 2014-16. The Italian gov-
ernment could not react to a crisis of its banks as 
Berlin had done. Yet, the Italian economic crisis 
had been caused by the worldwide economic 
downturn and resultant market turmoil from the 
GFC; one can very well say that these crises belong 
together and cannot be regarded separately.
The timing aspect is key to understand the flaws of 
the new system and the need to circumvent them. 
One cannot change incentives retrospectively. The 
new rules can only work when they are introduced 
in a relatively stable environment in which new in-
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ably mainly served the political purpose, but this 
happened at the cost of the economic one. Since 
current regulation cannot change past incentives, 
solutions had to be found to deal with the impact 
of the new rules on old investors. This corrupt-
ed the credibility of the system, thereby certainly 
harming the economic purpose of these rules for 
the foreseeable future as well as probably harming 
the political signal in general.
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sets of interests in the two countries, but it can 
also be ascribed to different economic cultures (or 
ideas) concerning macroeconomic governance 
in the euro area and the completion of Economic 
and Monetary Union. It is, however, important to 
point out that both Germany and Italy were inter-
nally divided (i.e., had different domestic prefer-
ences) on some of the issues at stake.
2. The Negotiations on the 
Construction of the Banking 
Union
The main purpose of the Banking Union was to 
break the dangerous link (the so-called “doom 
loop”) between the high and rising sovereign 
debt in the euro area peripheral Member States 
and domestic banks, which had come to hold an 
increasing amount of this debt (Veron 2012). At 
the same time, the Banking Union was an attempt 
to address the increasing fragmentation of finan-
cial markets in the EU, which was a consequence 
of the crisis. Banks reduced their cross-border 
activities, and the cost of money (e.g., the interest 
rate paid on bank loans) also varied considerably 
across the Member States of the euro area. In turn, 
this disrupted the conduct of the single mone-
tary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
(Howarth and Quaglia 2016).
In June 2012, the President of the European 
Council, the President of the Eurogroup, the Pres-
ident of the Commission, and the President of the 
ECB, prepared an interim report entitled “Towards 
a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union” (Van 
Rompuy 2012), the above-cited “Four Presidents’ 
Report” or Van Rompuy Report. The report, which 
was discussed at the European Council and Euro-
group meetings in late June, proposed what later 
became known as the Banking Union. However, 
the most pressing issues discussed at the Council 
meetings concerned the possibility of using the 
ESM directly to re-capitalise ailing Spanish banks, 
rather than doing so indirectly, that is to say, via 
a loan to the Spanish government, which would 
have weakened the already fragile fiscal position 
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The establishment of a Banking Union repre-
sented a major development in European 
economic governance and European integration 
history more generally. The Banking Union was 
the main response of the European Union (EU) 
- to be precise, the euro area - to the sovereign 
crisis in the euro area periphery and the ensuing 
fragmentation of the financial markets in the euro 
area (Donnelly 2014; De Rynck 2015; Epstein and 
Rhodes 2016; Glöcker et al. 2016; Howarth and 
Quaglia 2016a,b; Nielsen and Smeets 2017; Scha-
effer 2016; Schimmelfennig 2016; Skuodis 2017). 
The Banking Union, as initially proposed by the 
so-called “Four Presidents’ Report” (Van Rompuy 
2012), was supposed to break the “vicious circle” 
between ailing banks and fiscally-weak sovereigns, 
elevating the “responsibility for supervision to 
the European level”, and providing for “common 
mechanisms to resolve banks and guarantee 
customer deposits”. Moreover, the European Stabi-
lity Mechanism (ESM) was to “act as the fiscal 
backstop to the resolution and deposit guarantee 
authority”. Hence, the Banking Union was to be 
based upon four pillars: single banking supervi-
sion, single banking resolution, common deposit 
guarantee scheme, and common fiscal backstop.
This paper compares the approaches of Germany 
and Italy to the Banking Union by focusing on 
their preferences concerning each of the four main 
components of the Banking Union. It is argued 
that German and Italian policy-makers had 
different views concerning the construction of the 
Banking Union, its purposes and its institutional 
design. These dissimilar visions for the Banking 
Union had partly to do with different underlying 
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cant” banks would continue to be under the direct 
supervision of the national competent authorities, 
albeit according to increasingly harmonised rules 
and practices. Moreover, the ECB was permitted 
to step in, by taking direct supervisory respon-
sibilities, if and when necessary (Howarth and 
Quaglia 2016b).
The regulation on the SRM was proposed by 
the Commission in July 2013. Most of the nego-
tiations concerned the scope of the SRM, the 
decision-making process in the Single Resolu-
tion Board (SRB), and the establishment of the 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF). The Commission, 
supported by French, Spanish and Italian policy-
makers, proposed that the SRM should cover all 
euro area banks and that the Commission should 
be given the final power to decide whether to 
place a bank in resolution and determine the 
application of resolution tools (Financial Times, 
10 July 2013). These policy-makers were also in 
favour of a timely setting up of a large SFR. For 
example, Treasury Minister Fabrizio Saccomanni 
(2013) sent a letter to the other EU finance minis-
ters stressing that, in order “to break the nexus” 
and “reduce the risk of contagion”, the system 
had to rely on “common financial resources”. By 
contrast, German policy-makers argued that the 
SRB should be given the power to decide on reso-
lution, and insisted on the setting up of a small 
SRF through an intergovernmental agreement 
(Financial Times, 8 November 2013). The ECB, 
the Commission and the European Parliament 
(EP), mainly challenged the German position. The 
ECB (2013) issued a 32-page opinion that the SRB 
should be, from the very start, a single “strong and 
independent” body. In order to move the negoti-
ations forward, the Eurogroup and Ecofin (2013) 
issued a statement that made it clear that the SRM 
should be “fiscally neutral over the medium term 
so that taxpayers will be protected”.
In March 2014, an agreement was reached in the 
Council of Ministers on the establishment of the 
SRM. As advocated by German policy-makers, 
the Commission’s proposal was modified: the SRB 
would be responsible for the planning and reso-
of Spain. Spanish and Italian policy-makers were 
the main supporters of direct re-capitalisation by 
the ESM (Financial Times, 29 June 2012). Reluc-
tantly, German policy-makers agreed to it, but 
posed, as a condition, the supranationalisation of 
banking supervision by transferring it to the ECB 
(The Economist, 29 June 2012). Consequently, 
the Member States asked the Commission to put 
forward legislative proposals for the establishment 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) (Euro 
summit 2012). Subsequently, German policy-
makers reneged on their commitment to allow 
the ESM directly to recapitalise banks (Financial 
Times, 18 October 2012).
Two legislative proposals concerning the establish-
ment of the SSM were prepared by the Commis-
sion in close collaboration with the ECB (Nielsen 
and Smeets 2017; Glocker et al. 2016) and were 
officially put forward in September 2012. During 
the negotiations on the SSM, the most controver-
sial issues concerned the distribution of super-
visory power between the ECB and the compe-
tent national authorities. The Commission’s 
proposal, which was also supported by France, 
Italy and Spain, envisaged the direct supervision 
of all euro area banks in the SSM by the ECB. 
The ECB (2012) issued an opinion, supporting 
the proposal and calling for a Single Resolu-
tion Mechanism (SRM) to complement the SSM. 
However, German policy-makers opposed the 
transfer of supervisory competences for the coun-
try’s regional public savings banks and co-opera-
tives to the ECB (Financial Times, 12 December 
2012). The institutional design of the SSM eventu-
ally agreed by the Member States in the European 
Council (2012) involved a compromise that took 
the German preferences into account. Thus, the 
ECB was to be “responsible for the overall effec-
tive functioning of the SSM” and the “oversight of 
the euro area banks”. This supervision, however, 
was to be “differentiated” and the ECB would 
carry it out in “close co-operation with national 
supervisory authorities”. Direct ECB supervision 
was to cover only the so-called “significant banks”, 
while thousands of smaller, so-called “less signifi-
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opposition, the proposal for the EDIRA was 
removed from the final Commission document 
“A Roadmap Towards Banking Union” (2012). 
German policy-makers and German banks feared 
that they would probably become net contributors 
to an EDIS - bailing out depositors in other euro 
area Member States (Donnelly 2014; Howarth 
and Quaglia 2016a; Schimmelfennig 2016; Schild 
2017). German banking associations and indi-
vidual banks also feared that an EDIS would 
impinge upon their sectoral institutional protec-
tion schemes (Handelsblatt, 7 November 2012). 
By contrast, policy-makers in France and in the 
euro area periphery regarded the EDIS as the final 
pillar of the Banking Union, necessary to sever 
the “doom loop” between banks and sovereigns 
(Reuters, 11 September 2015).
The issue came back on the policy agenda in June 
2015, when the “Five Presidents’ Report” on the 
future of the euro called for an EDIS (Juncker 
2015). In the autumn of 2015, the Commis-
sion proposed the EDIS as “the third pillar of 
the Banking Union” (Commission 2015). The 
Commission proposal would, as a first step, 
involve the establishment of a mandatory “rein-
surance”’ scheme that would “contribute under 
certain conditions when national deposit guar-
antee schemes are called upon”, and thus, in effect, 
act as a backstop to national deposit guarantee 
schemes. The proposal was supported by French, 
Italian and Spanish policy-makers. By contrast, 
the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble 
strongly criticised the proposal: his concern was 
that “German taxpayers” would have to “foot the 
bill” (Financial Times, 10 September 2015). In 
order to make progress on the EDIS and overcome 
German opposition, the Commission proposed 
that savings and co-operative banks be exempted 
from having to contribute to the EDIS (Reuters, 2 
November 2015).
In June 2017, the Governor of the Bank of Italy, 
Ignazio Visco, and Treasury Minister Pier Carlo 
Padoan renewed their calls for a common deposit 
guarantee scheme (Bloomberg, 23 June 2017). 
Nonetheless, given the impasse reached in the 
lution of cross-border banks and those directly 
supervised by the ECB, while national resolu-
tion authorities would be responsible for all other 
banks, except if or when a bank required access 
to the SRF. However, it would be possible for the 
SRB to decide to exercise its powers directly with 
regard to other banks. Under German insistence, 
the SRF, financed by bank levies raised at national 
level, was to be set up through an intergovern-
mental agreement (Schild 2017). It would initially 
consist of national compartments that would be 
gradually merged over a period of eight years. 
German policy-makers - joined by the Austrian, 
Dutch and Finns - insisted that the funds of the 
ESM - as a backstop of the SRF - could not be used 
to cover legacy problems, which was to be revealed 
by a comprehensive assessment of euro area banks 
by the ECB (Howarth and Quaglia 2016a), as elab-
orated below. The SRM regulation was adopted in 
conjunction with the Bank Recovery and Resolu-
tion Directive (BRRD), which harmonised reso-
lution instruments and powers in the EU. The 
BRRD and the SRM regulation introduced a new 
instrument in bank resolution, the bail-in, which 
substantially reduced the need for public funding 
to bail out banks (Nielsen and Smeets 2017). The 
German-led coalition insisted on an earlier entry 
into force of the bail-in than the originally envis-
aged date in 2018. Other policy-makers, especially 
from Italy (Visco 2016), resisted this, but to no 
avail. The start date for the entry into force of the 
bail in was eventually moved forward to 2016 (The 
Economist, 14 December 2013).
The other missing pillar of the Banking Union, 
beside the common backstop, was what later 
came to be known as the European Deposit Insur-
ance Scheme (EDIS) (see Gros and Schoenmaker 
2014). In June 2012, the interim Van Rompuy 
(2012) report mentioned the need to set it up. 
Subsequently, the Commission prepared a draft 
proposing a new agency, the European Deposit 
Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA), 
which would oversee a new European Deposit 
Guarantee and Resolution Fund (Financial Times, 
13 September 2012). However, due to German 
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3. Economic Interests and 
Ideas Concerning Banking 
Union in Germany and Italy
The construction of the Banking Union was 
characterised by the need to reconcile different 
national sets of interests and ideas concerning 
macroeconomic governance. At the risk of over-
simplifying, the main line of division was between 
the Northern (German-led) coalition and the 
Southern coalition, with France in-between, but 
overall closer to the Southern coalition.
Germany policy-makers, like the policy-makers 
from Austria, Finland and The Netherlands, 
shared similar interests: they had sound fiscal 
positions; they had mostly healthy banks; and they 
were likely to be net contributors to any mecha-
nism for financial support in the Banking Union. 
However, the German approach was also shaped 
by the ordo-liberal economic paradigm. The 
German authorities were particularly concerned 
about “moral hazard” - that is to say, not to provide 
incentives for any “risky” behaviour of sovereigns 
and banks – or for “legacies problems” derived 
from past “supervisory forbearance” (Schild 2017; 
Schaeffer 2016).
The argument of moral hazard featured promi-
nently in the German debate (2014). Even though 
the term, as such, was not regularly used by most 
German policy-makers, Finance Minister Wolf-
gang Schäuble used it both to justify the transfer of 
supervisory power over banks receiving aid from 
the ESM (New York Times, 18 November 2011) 
and to oppose the creation of the Common (DGS) 
(Financial Times, 8 December 2015). More gener-
ally, the fear of moral hazard was implicit in talk of 
fiscal transfers. Moral hazard was of great concern 
for policy-makers in some countries, notably 
Germany, that were less likely to need finan-
cial support in the Banking Union because their 
banking systems were in sufficiently rude health 
and/or because these governments had a suffi-
ciently strong fiscal position that would enable 
them to withstand real and potential bank losses. 
negotiations on the EDIS, due to strong opposi-
tion from Germany, the Commission discarded 
its earlier proposals for fully-fledged EDIS in the 
autumn of 2017 (Howarth and Quaglia 2018). 
Trying to establish some common ground between 
the positions of the two coalitions, the President of 
the ECB Mario Draghi argued before the EP that 
the “EDIS remains a fundamental pillar of Banking 
Union”, although “risk reduction and risk sharing 
should go in parallel”, thus “there cannot be an 
EDIS if the level of unpaid bank loans [mostly in 
the euro area periphery] is not reduced” (Reuters, 
20 November 2017).
Overall, the Banking Union was established in 
timely fashion between 2012 and 2014. However, 
it was incomplete and hence asymmetric in three 
main respects. First, a rather “complex” compro-
mise was reached concerning the resolution 
process in the SRB, and Member State govern-
ments retained an important say on the use of the 
resolution funds in the SRM. Second, a common 
deposit guarantee scheme was not set up. Third, 
no common fiscal backstop was established. 
Most of the intergovernmental negotiations basi-
cally boiled down to distributional conflicts on 
two dimensions: the centralisation of decision-
making, and the allocation of costs via risk-sharing 
(Schild 2017). The discussions pitted the countries 
expected to make net contributions to common 
rescue funds - either from taxpayers or from 
banks - against those that expected to be the prin-
cipal recipients. Thus, compromises were sought 
during the negotiations. The institutional design 
eventually agreed for the Banking Union was 
closer to the preferences of the German led-coali-
tion as far as risk-sharing was concerned, whereas 
Germany had to make concessions concerning the 
transfer of decision-making to the EU/euro-area 
level (Skuodis 2017). The result was an incomplete 
and asymmetric Banking Union, which was rather 
different from the one initially envisaged: out of 
the four pillars initially proposed, only one and a 
half were set in place (supervision and resolution, 
respectively).
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the euro area, which was at risk of losing Member 
States and even falling apart following the sover-
eign debt crisis. Indeed, the prospect of a euro 
area collapse was worrisome for all its members, 
Germany included. Hence, German policy-
makers were willing to proceed - albeit with some 
reluctance - with the Banking Union.
Yet, countries were not “unitary actors” in the nego-
tiations on the Banking Union because they often 
had different (even competing) domestic political 
economy preferences that had to be reconciled 
(Moravcsik 1993: 30-1). In other words, different 
domestic economic interest groups were likely to 
be affected in different ways by the Banking Union; 
they therefore lobbied domestically as well as at 
the EU level in order to pursue their preferences. 
This was particularly the case in Germany, where 
the national position was pulled in different direc-
tions by the representative associations of each of 
the three pillars of the German banking system. 
The big commercial banks wanted the Banking 
Union and wanted it to apply both to all banks 
in Germany and the euro area, while the domes-
tically-focused co-operative and savings banks 
did not want Banking Union to apply to them. 
Domestic divisions weakened German reluctance 
to Banking Union, contributing to Germany’s 
negotiating position as a “constrained veto player”.
Italian policy-makers, like policy-makers from 
Spain and other countries in the euro area 
periphery, shared similar interests concerning the 
Banking Union: they had weak fiscal positions; 
they had several ailing banks; and they were at risk 
of contagion from the crisis (Howarth and Quaglia 
2016a). Moreover, domestic banks in these coun-
tries held considerable amounts of national 
government bonds, creating a “doom loop” bank-
sovereigns (Veron 2012). Policy-makers in Italy 
were keen to secure financial support mechanisms 
for ailing banks and sovereigns. In return, they 
were willing to accept the supra-nationalisation 
of banking supervision. Moral hazard was less of 
a concern for policy-makers in countries such as 
Italy, that would be more likely to need access to 
external financial support in the Banking Union 
There were several moral hazards that preoccupied 
the German government: for bank shareholders, 
bondholders, and depositors; for the banks them-
selves; and for governments. Thus, policy-makers 
in Germany sought to establish clear limits to their 
financial assistance to ailing banks and govern-
ments in countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis. 
They were also keen to minimise the elements of 
the Banking Union that could result in fiscal trans-
fers from fiscally and financially stable Member 
States to ailing Member States. Thus, Germany 
was keen to supra-nationalise banking supervi-
sion for systemic banks – an important quali-
fication for Germany, given the three-pillared 
configuration of its national banking system - 
but opposed mechanisms for financial support to 
ailing banks and their sovereigns (Howarth and 
Quaglia 2016b). German concerns about moral 
hazard help to account for the limited scope of the 
SRM agreed upon, the delay to an agreement on a 
Common DGS, and the limited amount of ESM 
funds made available and the strict condition-
ality attached to their use. A core element of the 
German political discourse on the Banking Union 
was that (German) taxpayers should be protected 
against all future public bail-outs of banks (Schild 
2015).
Germany was the largest economy in the euro area, 
and had a sizeable current account surplus and a 
sound fiscal position. Consequently, Germany 
had a strong bargaining position resulting from 
asymmetric interdependence (Schild 2017). It was 
the pivotal country, the “win set” of which deter-
mined what was acceptable (or not) in the negotia-
tions on the Banking Union. This explains why the 
compromise solutions were generally within the 
win-set of Germany on several (but not all) issues, 
and why the institutional design of the Banking 
Union had a German “imprint”. German policy-
makers enjoyed a “constrained veto power” in the 
construction of Banking Union (Bulmer 2016; 
Bulmer and Patterson 2013) because German and 
French banks were heavily exposed (i.e., they had 
invested substantially) in the EU/euro periphery. 
Moreover, Germany had a stake in the survival of 
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was incomplete and asymmetric, whereby full 
monetary union was not coupled with full 
economic union (Dyson, 2000; Hodson 2009; 
Verdun, 1996). Fiscal Union was notably missing 
and had deliberately been left out, principally 
(but not exclusively), because of the opposition 
of German policy-makers, and despite the half-
hearted calls of French and Italian policy-makers 
for a gouvernemente economique in the euro area 
(Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Moreover, there 
was some debate as to whether the ECB should 
be responsible (or not) for banking supervision in 
the euro area. Partly (but not exclusively) due to 
opposition of German policy-makers, the super-
vision of banks was left at national level (Dyson 
and Featherstone, 1999). Thus, the Banking Union 
can be seen as a crisis-driven attempt to address 
several important issues that were sidestepped or 
papered over during the EMU negotiations which 
led to the Maastricht Treaty.
After the (partial) establishment of the Banking 
Union, the debate on the completion/reform of 
EMU re-gained momentum. In October 2015, the 
President of the European Commission, in close 
co-operation with the President of the Council, 
the President of the Eurogroup, the President 
of the European Central Bank, and the Presi-
dent of the European Parliament, produced what 
became known as the “Five Presidents’ Report” on 
“Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
Union”. This report built on “Towards a Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union” (the so-called 
“Four Presidents’ Report”) of June/December 
2012, the Commission’s “Blueprint for a Deep 
and Genuine EMU” of November 2012, and the 
Analytical Note “Preparing for Next Steps on 
Better Economic Governance in the Euro Area” of 
February 2015. The Five Presidents’ report stated 
the objectives of a “genuine Economic Union”, a 
“Financial Union”, a “Fiscal Union”, and a “Political 
Union”, arguing that these four Unions depended 
on each other and should therefore be developed 
in parallel and with the participation of all euro 
area Member States.
because their banking system was in poorer health 
and/or their domestic fiscal position was weaker.
For Italian policy-makers, the over-riding impor-
tance of EU-level support mechanisms was to 
bolster international financial confidence in the 
Italian banking system. They also advocated the 
mutualisation of risks. Thus, the SRF and the 
common fiscal backstop of the ESM were a priority 
for the Italian government. In the final stage of 
the negotiations in December 2013, the Italian 
finance minister, Saccomanni (2013), called for a 
“common backstop” to “provide contribution to 
the cost of resolution without conditionality”.
In the negotiations on the Banking Union, the 
Member States had an asymmetric distribution 
of bargaining power determined by the size of the 
national economy and the banking system, the 
relative stability of the national banking system 
and the state of the public finances. Italy and other 
euro area periphery countries were mostly deman-
deurs: they were directly hit by the crisis and 
needed German political and financial support 
for the Banking Union to go ahead. Hence, they 
had relatively limited bargaining power. Coun-
tries that were not directly hit by the sovereign 
debt crisis and were relatively less exposed to it - 
first and foremost, Germany, which was also - by a 
significant margin - the largest economy in the EU 
with the second largest banking sector after the 
UK - were better positioned to resist the requests 
of the “demandeurs” and impose their design for 
the Banking Union. The asymmetric distribution 
of bargaining power during the Banking Union 
negotiations, which were skewed in favour of 
Germany, accounts for the prioritisation of some 
components of the Banking Union rather than 
others.
4. Banking Union and the 
Completion of EMU
The Banking Union was presented as contributing 
to the completion of EMU. Indeed, the institu-
tional design of EMU agreed by the Maastricht 
Treaty and eventually set up from 1999 onwards 
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In December 2017, the European Commission 
presented a package of initiatives that included, 
amongst others: a proposal to bring the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) into the EU 
legal framework, transforming it into a Euro-
pean Monetary Fund; and a Communication on 
establishing a European Minister of Economy and 
Finance minister. Negotiations on these reform 
proposals have barely started and are expected to 
last for some time. However, we can expect that 
the different interests and ideas that character-
ised the German and Italian approaches to the 
Banking Union and to EMU more generally will 
play out in the negotiations of these pieces of legis-
lation as well. The additional complication is that 
the recently elected Italian government is likely to 
adopt a more Eurosceptic stance compared to that 
of previous Italian governments.
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ATTITUDES TOWARD GENDER 





Germany and Italy were long known for their fa-
milialist and male-breadwinner-oriented models 
of welfare capitalism. Social security and labour 
markets developed based on traditional gendered 
divisions of labor, where men are expected to 
become breadwinners and women are expected 
to become unpaid carers. Work-family reconcili-
ation policies such as care services were absent, 
or, if they existed, reinforced traditional gender 
roles by supporting long leaves and part-time 
work for mothers. As a consequence, women’s and 
mothers’ employment rates have been low in both 
countries. Yet, in recent years the labour market 
participation of mothers increasingly shows di-
verging trends. While maternal employment rates 
in Germany jumped to 70 percent in 2014, only 
56 percent of Italian mothers participated in the 
labour market in the same year. 
This piece draws on institutional and cultural 
factors to describe and explain recent trends in 
maternal employment in Germany and Italy. 
While a large body of research focuses on the 
impact of public policies and labour market char-
acteristics, more recent research takes into account 
cultural factors such as ideas and norms about 
mothers’ employment and childcare. In countries 
where “ideals of care” emphasize the importance 
of maternal care for small children, maternal em-
ployment rates may be lower because mothers’ 
labour market participation may be perceived as 
in conflict with the ideal of “good motherhood” 
(Kremer 2007, Boeckmann et al. 2015). Since the 
traditional male-breadwinner model shaped both 
public policies and people’s attitudes in Germany 
and Italy for a long time, these recent changes in 
German mothers’ employment are surprising. 
What happened to the care ideals in both coun-
tries and what impact do they still have on public 
policies and on maternal employment?
Based on this research I argue that childcare 
norms and attitudes towards gender equality not 
only shape maternal employment, but are also 
related to changes of public work-family policies. 
Thus, where attitudes and the cultural context 
changes, mothers’ employment-friendly policies 
become more likely and this will be reflected in 
increasing maternal employment rates. I use at-
titudinal data from the European Values Study 
(EVS) to examine country-level differences in cul-
tural norms regarding the gender division of work 
and beliefs that children and family life suffer 
when a mother works for pay. To analyze policies, 
I examine maternity and parental leaves as well as 
publicly funded childcare for 0-3 years old chil-
dren.
Maternal employment, work-
family policies and cultural 
norms
Due to their unequal access to positions and eco-
nomic resources, men and women are affected dif-
ferently by the economic context. Several studies 
on gender inequalities in the labour market show 
that women in general spend less hours in paid 
work and are less likely to have highly remunerated 
positions than men (Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 
Pettit and Hook 2009, Dieckhoff et al. 2015). This 
is especially the case when women have children. 
Childless women and men, but also fathers, have 
higher employment rates and work longer hours 
than mothers (Boeckmann et al. 2015). Yet, cross-
country differences in maternal employment rates 
point to the importance of country-specific con-
textual factors that shape women’s decisions about 
employment as well as employers’ understanding 
and treatment of mothers in the workforce. For in-
stance, the Varieties of Capitalism literature claims 
that the way the market economy works influ-
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Wrohlich 2018, Budig et al. 2012, Korpi et al. 2013, 
Nieuwenhuis 2014). Others claim that certain 
aspects of work-family policies such as lengthy 
parental leaves and part-time employment have 
adverse labour market consequences for women 
(e.g. Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006; Pettit and 
Hook 2009). This literature has provided evidence 
of large cross-national variation in the design of 
work-family policies – not only between Anglo-
Saxon, Scandinavian and Conservative welfare 
states, but also within these groups. For example, 
the Conservative welfare states Germany, France 
and Italy strongly differ in their family policy ap-
proaches. While the French model of comprehen-
sive childcare support comes close to the Nordic 
welfare states, Italy is characterized by very low 
public support of working mothers. Germany 
only recently reformed some of the work-family 
reconciliation policies, but is at the same time 
characterized by regulations such as the income 
splitting that continue to support the male bread-
winner model. 
International comparisons have also highlighted 
the role of normative beliefs in shaping maternal 
employment. In fact, some argue that the deci-
sions of mothers do not simply respond to the 
policy context, implying that other factors than 
economic gains play a role for a mother’s decision 
to take up employment and to what extent (Pfau-
Effinger 2004, Kremer 2007). Rather, the cultural 
support of mothers’ employment is also decisive. 
In a mothers’ employment supportive cultural 
setting, maternal employment is more likely to in-
crease than in a context with a lack of support for 
working mothers (Budig et al. 2012). 
Normative beliefs towards childcare and maternal 
employment not only shape mothers’ employment 
decision-making processes, but are also mirrored 
in policy design. For example, generous work-
family policies that enable mothers to take a long 
leave from the labour market reflect conservative 
understandings of the gender division of work 
(Budig et al. 2012). At the same time, work-fam-
ily policies may change people’s attitudes towards 
maternal employment in the long run (Ziefle and 
ences the degree of sex segregation in a country. 
A country’s production system emphasizes either 
specific or general skills. Since general skills are 
more easily portable on the labour market than 
specific skills, countries with an emphasis on 
specific skills (Coordinated Market Economies, 
CME) provide more generous employment secu-
rity provisions and social protection to safeguard 
people who lose a job during e.g. a recession (Hall 
and Soskice). Moreover, because employers have 
invested in worker training they are interested in 
committing employees to their workplaces. By an-
ticipating women’s discontinuous work and lower 
working hours due to care responsibilities, em-
ployers often practice statistical discrimination. 
As a consequence, women are often excluded from 
many sectors of employment in these economies 
(Estevez-Abé 2006, Mandel and Shalev 2009). 
Social protection schemes designed to protect the 
male model of full-time continuous employment 
reinforce the effect (“institutional complemen-
tarities”). In addition, generous family policies 
may exacerbate employer’s reluctance to invest in 
women’s specific skills’ training and to hire them. 
Long maternity and parental leaves, in particular, 
worsen women’s chances, because firms would 
have to find a replacement for someone with spe-
cific skills (Estevez-Abé 2005, 2006). 
The comparative feminist welfare state schol-
arship has long pointed to the extent of a male-
breadwinner orientation of social policies, where a 
strong male breadwinner welfare state undermines 
women’s and mothers’ employment (Lewis 1992, 
Sainsbury 1996). While some focused on the role 
of classic social policies such as unemployment 
protection and pension schemes for fostering the 
male full-time continuous breadwinner model, a 
prominent body of research claims that maternal 
employment is shaped by work-family reconcili-
ation policies designed to alleviate gender-based 
labor market inequalities. All in all, this literature 
is inconsistent in their conclusions (Brady et al. 
2018). Some argue that generous work-family pol-
icies encourage female and maternal employment 
and reduce motherhood penalties (Müller and 




Graph 1: Employment of mothers aged 25-54 
years in European welfare states, 2005 and 2014 
Note: Mothers with at least one child under 14 years old.
Source: OECD Family Database
One of the main differences between working 
mothers in Germany and Italy is related to the 
number of hours worked. Part-time work in 
Germany is widespread, and mothers, in par-
ticular of very small children, usually work few 
hours (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017). In contrast, 
(quality) part-time work is often not available to 
Italian mothers. Therefore, the barriers to take up 
employment while children are small are high. It 
should be noted, though, that the recent increase 
of maternal employment rates in Germany is 
related to a rise in (near) full-time employment.1 
Compared to 23 percent in the mid-2000s, more 
than 30 percent of German mothers worked full-
time in 2013 (OECD Family Database). At the 
same time, the share of German mothers who 
worked part-time remained at about 40 percent 
during the years. In Italy, the relationship between 
motherhood status and working hours is inverse: 
more mothers work full-time (35 percent) than 
part-time (21 percent) and this has not changed 
over time.
1  The OECD defines full-time/part-time work as more/less than 
30 hours per week.
Gangl 2015). To understand change it is therefore 
essential to analyze developments of normative 
beliefs and public policies over time. In 
recent decades, many rich democracies 
have reformed work-family reconcilia-
tion policies, yet maternal employment 
continues to differ across countries. 
Differences in the (changes to the) cul-
tural context may explain the discrep-
ancies. When policy-makers consider 
work-family policy reforms they take 
into account the electorate’s norma-
tive beliefs. When their beliefs change, 
policy change becomes more likely 
(Blome 2017). Together with changed 
cultural expectations regarding mater-
nal employment, these reformed poli-
cies may then shape mothers’ decisions 
about employment as well as employers’ treatment 
of mothers in the workforce.
Mothers’ employment rates: 
Large differences in Europe, 
sharp increase in Germany, 
continuing low levels in 
Italy
Maternal employment is on the rise throughout 
Europe. At the same time, the employment level 
differs considerably between European welfare 
states (Graph 1). In 2014, more mothers are in em-
ployment than in 2005 in all countries except for 
Greece, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. Still, the 
average growth is moderate (about 4 percentage 
points). Germany stands out for a considerable in-
crease of maternal employment from 63 percent 
to 70,3 percent, while in Italy only 56 percent of 
mothers are in employment in 2014 compared to 
54 percent in 2005. 




For example, the joint taxation splitting system 
and the free co-insurance of non-employed 
spouses incentivizes mothers to opt out of the 
labor market or to reduce labor market participa-
tion. While Germany made substantial changes in 
the work-family policies between 2000 and 2008, 
policy developments in Italy have been discon-
tinuous and fragmentary (Blome 2017). The fol-
lowing paragraphs describe (1) the developments 
in maternity and parental leave schemes and (2) 
childcare provision for children under three years 
of age.
In Germany, mothers are entitled to paid maternity 
leave 6 weeks before and 8 weeks after birth. After 
maternity leave, parents may be on parental leave. 
After its first adoption in 1986 parental leave reg-
ulation changed several times in Germany. Since 
1992 parents have a right to return to their previ-
ous employer until the child is 3 years old. The last 
substantial reform took place in 2006, when the 
maximum duration of paid parental leave for all 
parents was increased to 14 months including two 
“use-it-or-lose-it” fathers’ months and the previ-
ously flat-rate sum changed to an income-related 
measure of 67% of previous net income with a cap 
of €1,800. A further reform in 2011 abolished the 
entitlement of social assistance beneficiaries to 
the flat-rate basic parental leave allowance of €300 
and reduced the replacement rate to maximum 
65% for parents who earn more than €1,200. In 
2015, parental leave was flexibilized by giving 
parents the possibility to share more months (up 
to 32 paid leave months). It can be classified as a 
generous parental leave scheme that offers some 
incentives for fathers to participate in care work 
and thus enable couples a more gender equal divi-
sion of work.
In Italy, mothers are entitled to a comparatively 
long maternity leave of five months at 80% of pre-
vious earnings. Paid parental leave was created in 
1994 and offered up to six months per parent at 
30% of earnings for a child under six. The 2000 
parental leave reform gave fathers the right to 
claim the benefit independently of the mother. 
Parents are entitled to a total of 10 paid parental 
During the economic crisis, women in both 
Germany and Italy had been protected by the 
persistence of sectoral and occupational segrega-
tion by gender in their countries. Most employ-
ment losses happened in the manufacturing and 
construction sectors as well as in selected finan-
cial branches which are dominated by men (Eu-
ropean Commission 2012). At the same time, em-
ployment growth in the services sector – which is 
where many women work – is often accompanied 
by a rise in temporary work and related to more 
precarious employment conditions (reference). 
In Italy, most of the increase in women’s employ-
ment took place in lower ranked job positions, 
and lower educated women experienced less job 
losses than highly educated women (Gálvez-Mu-
ñoz et al. 2014). Furthermore, older workers (49 
years and older) appear to have been able to keep 
jobs at the expense of younger women (and men). 
As women tend to have children once their labour 
market prospects are more secure, they are older 
when they become mothers. Since older workers 
are more likely to keep their jobs, this might partly 
explain the stability in maternal employment rates 
in Italy and the rise in Germany. 
As shown, part-time work is one of the maternal 
employment facilitating factors in Germany. It is 
related to other institutional differences between 
Germany and Italy. The following section con-
centrates on the – arguably – two most important 
public work-family reconciliation policies: mater-




Expansion in Germany, 
stagnation in Italy 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Germany and Italy 
stood paradigmatically for welfare states in which 
the lack of day care and other policies supporting 
mothers’ employment led to a strong gender divi-
sion of labor. The support of the male-breadwin-
ner model was more comprehensive in Germany: 




es in coverage rates (Naldini and Jurado 2013, 
Naldini and Saraceno 2008). During the crisis 
years the small expansion came to a halt in 2008 
(13 percent).
In sum, the German family policy model became 
much more supportive of the dual-earner model, 
while in Italy, maternal employment is not sup-
ported by public policies and childcare remains 
the responsibility of mothers. The most impor-
tant reforms happened after the Millennium in 
Germany.
Attitudes towards gender 
equality, maternal 
employment and childcare
More recent research on the determining factors of 
maternal employment argues to take into account 
the cultural context of maternal employment. At-
titudes toward gender equality and toward proper 
childcare shape both individuals’ decisions to 
return to or to look for employment and employ-
ers’ willingness to employ mothers. At the same 
time, the population’s beliefs are reflected in 
work-family policy design and their reforms. The 
following paragraphs will assess the normative 
beliefs of Italians and Germans towards gender 
equality, childcare and maternal employment. 
Budig et al. (2012) argue that motherhood-based 
employment differences are less likely in countries 
where gender ideologies support both men’s and 
women’s contribution to the household income, 
while dominant ideals of care that emphasize 
mothers’ care for children may be associated with 
higher employment differences. 
The following analyses are based on three waves 
of the European Values Study. A battery of ques-
tions is asked to assess people’s attitudes towards 
gender equality, the gender division of work and 
childcare. By way of factor analysis two indica-
tors were identified that represent (1) attitudes 
towards gender equality and (2) attitudes towards 
childcare and maternal employment. The graphs 
show the deviations from the mean over all years. 
leave months, but each of them may only claim 6 
months at most. If one parent (usually the mother) 
uses 6 months and the other (often the father) uses 
at least 4 months, the leave period may be extend-
ed by one month. In addition, fathers are entitled 
to two days paternity leave. The low replacement 
rate and the short overall duration of parental 
leave makes the Italian parental leave scheme par-
simonious with little incentives for a more gender 
equal division of work.
Children older than three are well covered by 
public provision of childcare in both Germany 
and Italy. However, parents of children aged 
between 0 and 3 years faced care supply shortages. 
There is a gap between the end of paid parental 
leave and the start of ample childcare. In the be-
ginning of the 1990s, only 3 percent of children of 
that age group had a publicly subsidized childcare 
place in Western Germany (40 percent in Eastern 
Germany) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004). Fur-
thermore, opening hours in Germany were only 
short. Often, children did not stay until lunch-
time. Only 6 percent of 0-3 years old children 
had access to publicly provided childcare in Italy 
in 1994 (Centro nazionale di documentazione e 
analisi per l’infanzia e l’adolescenza 2002). Thus, 
in both countries mothers were the primary care-
taker for the very young children.
In 2004 and 2008 two reforms pushed the pro-
vision of childcare places for children younger 
than three years in Germany. The 2004 reform 
required municipalities to provide enough places 
for children below three to meet demand, or as a 
minimum to make places available for children 
with parents in employment/training. The 2008 
reform introduced the right to a childcare place 
for children over one year of age. Since 2013, every 
child between the age of one and six has had the 
legal right to a place in a daycare centre or with a 
qualified childminder. The ratio of the number of 
places available per 100 children of that age group 
rose from 14 percent in 2006 to 33 percent in 
2017 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017). In Italy, by 
contrast, medium-range reforms and much fewer 
financial resources led to only marginal increas-




Graph 3: Attitudes towards childcare
Note: Values are based on a factor analysis. The factor loads on the 
following questions: (1) A working mother can establish just as warm 
and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does 
not work, (2) A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother 
works, (3) A job is alright but what most women really want is a 
home and children.
Source: European Values Study 1990, 1999, 2008.
The picture also holds when we look at specific 
groups in society (Graph 5). In both countries, 
women have more progressive attitudes towards 
childcare and maternal employment than men. 
Yet, Italian women are much less supportive of 
maternal employment than German women. In 
addition, people with low incomes have more tra-
ditional attitudes in both countries – again with a 
big difference between Germany and Italy. People 
with a high income have more progressive views 
in Germany, while they are not different to the 
mean in Italy.
The higher the value the more progressive are atti-
tudes towards gender equality and towards child-
care and maternal employment.
Italians have had more progressive attitudes 
towards gender equality than Germans (Graph 
2). Yet, the change in Germany between 1990 
and 2008 is remarkable. In 2008, the likelihood 
to support gender equality is higher in Germany 
than in Italy.  
Graph 2: Attitudes towards gender equality
Note: Values are based on a factor analysis. The factor loads on the 
following questions: (1) Both the  husband and wife should contribute 
to household income, (2) Having a job is the  best way for a  woman 
to be an independent person, (3) Being a housewife is just as fulfilling 
as working for pay, (4) A working mother can establish just as warm 
and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does 
not work.
Source: European Values Study 1990, 1999, 2008.
A significant change in Germany is also noted for 
attitudes toward childcare. In 2008, more Germans 
were positive toward maternal employment than 
in 1999 and even more compared to 1990. Italians, 
by contrast, continued to be opposed to maternal 
employment despite a small change between 1999 
and 2008 (Graph 3). 




cies likely build the context for the low maternal 
employment rates in Italy and the increase in 
mothers’ labour force participation in Germany. 
Despite the overall developments, the data also 
show some degree of polarization in attitudes in 
both countries. Certain groups of the electorate 
(e.g. women, people with high incomes) drive the 
change of attitudes towards more progressive at-
titudes in Germany while others (e.g. men, people 
with low incomes) tend to support the traditional 
male-breadwinner model. The situation is similar 
in Italy, even though attitudes polarize the popula-
tion to a lesser extent. 
Conclusion
Maternal employment increasingly differs 
between Germany and Italy. This article aimed at 
showing how institutional and cultural develop-
ments build a context for maternal employment. 
More precisely, it shows how policy effects are 
influenced and conditioned by cultural contexts. 
By examining the evolution of attitudes towards 
gender roles, maternal employment and child-
care I show how the cultural context changed in 
Germany and enabled a series of work-family 
policy reforms. Both factors then contributed to 
the increase of maternal employment. At the same 
time, attitudes did not change to a similar extent 
in Italy. As a result, only small-scale changes hap-
pened to work-family policies. This likely contrib-
uted to the persistent low maternal employment 
rates. 
Several questions are left for further research. 
In this paper I have looked at the relationship 
between maternal employment, cultural factors 
and public policies on the macro level. Analyses 
on the individual level may explore further the 
role attitudes and policies play for an individual’s 
or couple’s decision (when) to return to employ-
ment after a baby was born. A pertinent ques-
tion is why attitudes changed so dramatically in 
Germany, but less so in Italy. Religion, seculariza-
tion and unification arguably play a role, but given 
the diverging attitudes of societal groups obvious-
Graph 5: Attitudes towards childcare by social 
groups
Note: Values are based on a factor analysis. The factor loads on the 
following questions: (1) A working mother can establish just as warm 
and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does 
not work, (2) A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother 
works, (3) A job is alright but what most women really want is a 
home and children.
Source: European Values Study 1990, 1999, 2008.
The comparison of Germany and Italy shows in-
creasing cultural differences. While Germans have 
had traditional attitudes towards gender equality 
and maternal employment for a long time, this 
changed around the Millennium. Even though 
Italians had slightly more progressive attitudes 
toward gender equality than Germans in the be-
ginning of the 1990s, this reversed in the 2000s. 
Especially regarding opinions on childcare and 
maternal employment, Italians seem to contin-
ue to favor a more male-breadwinner-oriented 
family model (see Lomazzi 2017). The fact that 
attitudes in Germany changed before the turn of 
the millennium while policy reforms happened 
after implies that policy-makers reacted to the 
changed cultural context and re-designed policies. 
In Italy, by contrast, attitudes hardly changed, and 
policy-makers might not have deemed it neces-
sary to reform policies (see Blome 2017 for a more 
detailed account of the policy reforms). Both the 
cultural context and the respective (adapted) poli-




ly these factors are not the whole story. Last, future 
research should attend to the question of unequal 
policy responsiveness, i.e. whether and under 
which political conditions policy-makers respond 
to certain groups of the electorate – e.g. women 
and the highly educated in the case of work-family 
policies – more than to others. 




tional Segregation by Sex in Advanced Indus-
trial Societies.” World Politics 59(1): 142–75.
Gálvez-Muñoz, Lina, Paula Rodríguez-Modroño, 
and Tindara Addabbo. 2014. The impact of 
austerity on women’s work in Italy and Spain. 
Available at: www.aiel.it
Hall, Peter A, and David W. Soskice 2001. Varieties 
of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
ISTAT. 2013. Rapporto Annuale: La Situazione del 
Paese, Rome, Istat. Available at: www.istat.it.
Korpi, Walter, Tommy Ferrarini and Stefan 
Englund. 2013. “Women’s Opportunities 
Under Different Family Policy Constellations: 
Gender, Class, and Inequality Tradeoffs in 
Western Countries Re-Examined.” Social Poli-
tics 20: 1-40.
Kremer, Monique. 2007. How Welfare States Care. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Lomazzi, Vera. 2017. “Gender role attitudes in 
Italy: 1988–2008. A path-dependency story 
of traditionalism.” European Societies 19(4): 
370-395.
Mandel, Hadas and Moshe Semyonov. 2005. 
“Family Policies, Wage Structures, and Gender 
Gaps: Sources of Earnings Inequality in 20 
Countries.” American Sociological Review 70: 
949-967.
Mandel, Hadas and Moshe Semyonov. 2006. “A 
Welfare State Paradox: State Interventions and 
Women’s Employment Opportunities in 22 
Countries.” American Journal of Sociology 111: 
1910-1949.
Müller, Kai-Uwe and Katharina Wrohlich. 2018. 
Does Subsidized Care for Toddlers Increase 
Maternal Labor Supply?: Evidence from a 
Large-Scale Expansion of Early Childcare. 




Blome, Agnes. 2017. The Politics of Work-family 
Policies in Germany and Italy. Abingdon/New 
York: Routledge.
Blome, Agnes. 2018. „Von Kinder, Küche, Kirche 
zu Kinder, Karriere, KiTa? Geschlechterrollen, 
Familienpolitik und Religion im Wandel der 
Zeit“, Sozialer Fortschritt 67, special issue 
„Ökonomisierung und Konfession. Was 
bleibt?“, edited by Josef Hien and Wolfgang 
Schroeder, pp. 453-475.
Boeckmann, Irene, Joya Misra, and Michelle J. 
Budig. 2015. “Cultural and Institutional Factors 
Shaping Mothers’ Employment and Working 
Hours in Postindustrial Countries.” Social 
Forces 93: 1301-1333.
Budig, Michelle J., Joya Misra, and Irene Boeck-
mann. 2012. “The Motherhood Penalty in 
Cross-National Perspective: The Importance of 
Work-Family Policies and Cultural Attitudes.” 
Social Politics 19: 163-193.
Centro nazionale di documentazione e analisi per 
l’infanzia e l’adolescenza. 2002. I servizi educa-
tivi per la prima infanzia. In Quaderni no. 21. 
Firenze: Istituto degli Innocenti.
Dieckhoff, Martina, Vanessa Gash and Nadia 
Steiber. 2015. “Measuring the Effect of Insti-
tutional Change on Gender Inequality in the 
Labour Market.” Research in Social Stratifica-
tion and Mobility 39: 59-75.
European Commission. 2012. The Impact of the 
Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and 
Men and on Gender Equality Policies. Luxem-
bourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union.
Estevez-Abe, Margarita. 2005. “Gender Bias in 
Skills and Social Policies: The Varieties of Capi-
talism Perspective on Sex Segregation.” Social 
Politics 12(2): 180–215.
Estevez-Abe, Margarita. 2006. “Gendering the 
Varieties of Capitalism – a Study of Occupa-




Naldini, Manuela and Chiara Saraceno. 2008. “Not 
totally frozen, but far from structural reforms.” 
Social Policy & Administration 42(7): 733-748.
Naldini, Manuela and Teresa Jurado. 2013. “Family 
and welfare state reorientation in Spain and 
inertia in Italy from a European perspective” 
Population Review 52(1): 43–61.
Nieuwenhuis, Rense. 2014. Family policy outcomes: 
Combining institutional and demographic 
explanations of women’s employment and earn-
ings inequality in OECD countries, 1975-2005 
(SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 2438617). Social 
Science Research Network, Rochester, NY.
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2004. Kindertagesbe-
treuung in Deutschland. Einrichtungen, Plätze, 
Personal und Kosten 1990 bis 2002. Wiesbaden
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2017. Statistiken der 
Kinder- und Jugendhilfe. Kinder und tätige 
Personen in Tageseinrichtungen am 01.03. 
eines Jahres. Wiesbaden.
Ziefle, Andrea and Markus Gangl. 2015. “Do 
Women Respond to Changes in Family Policy? 
A Quasi-Experimental Study of the Dura-
tion of Mothers’ Employment Interruptions 
in Germany.” European Sociological Review 30: 
562-581.
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT, ATTITUDES TOWARD GENDER EQUALITY AND WORK-FAMILY POLICIES. GERMAN-ITALIAN 
DISCREPANCIES?
Agnes Blome






ITALY AND GERMANY DURING THE CRISIS: SUPPORT FOR THE EU AND RECIPROCAL VIEWS
Alessandro Pellegata
countries facing severe economic and financial 
difficulties. As Grabbe (2012) pointed out, the 
sovereign debt crisis is more than the breakdown 
of both a currency and a political project, as it is 
also causing a loss of trust between EU Member 
States.
By taking Germany and Italy as illustrative exam-
ples of this “Core-Periphery” divide, this article 
aims to investigate the evolution of public support 
for the EU in these two countries, both before 
and after the Euro crisis, and its relation with the 
mutual perceptions of both countries as expressed 
by public opinion and the political élites. We postu-
late that, given the leading role played by Germany 
within the EU institution and the different narra-
tives fuelled in the core and peripheral Member 
States, Italian citizens and representatives tend to 
blame Germany both for the Euro crisis and for 
the bad Italian economic situation. Therefore, we 
expect to find a significant association between the 
orientations of Italians towards the EU and their 
view of Germany. Empirical analyses have been 
conducted using cross-sectional survey data at 
both the mass and élite levels taken from multiple 
sources. The findings obtained confirm our expec-
tations.
Political Commonalities but 
Long-lasting Stereotypes
Germany and Italy share numerous historical 
commonalities, such as a late nation-building 
process which occurred only in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, and the experience of 
authoritarian regimes during the two world wars. 
Germany and Italy are both founding members 
of the EU and, since the end of WWII have been 
characterised by a pronounced Europeanism by 
both their political élites and citizens. Moreover, 
both countries have undergone major political 
changes after the end of the Cold War: the re-unifi-
cation of West and East Germany following the 
tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the 
collapse of the traditional party system in Italy, 
following the Mani Pulite corruption scandal(s) 
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Mutual trust among citizens of different EU 
Member States is a cornerstone for the estab-
lishment of a sense of European identity and 
the strengthening of the EU integration process 
(Hooghe and Verhaegen 2017). However, the 
current multifaceted crisis that the EU is expe-
riencing and some side effects of the integration 
process have not only exacerbated public opposi-
tion to the EU, but are also eroding the stock of 
mutual trust among the citizens of the different 
Member States that was accumulated after the end 
of the Second World War. In particular, the recent 
Eurozone crisis has increased the tension between 
core countries of Northern Europe, with strong 
macro-economic performances, and countries of 
the Southern periphery, struggling with excessive 
deficits and increasing public debt. Two competing 
narratives about who is to blame for the crisis are 
at play. The core countries’ narrative is about feck-
less Greeks and Italians and the inability of their 
national institutions to adopt structural reforms to 
keep their public debt under control and thereby 
render the Euro sustainable. The narrative running 
in peripheral Member States blame the Northern 
countries, Germany in primis, for their austerity 
measures and their lack of solidarity towards 
110  This article has been presented at the workshop “Re-
sponses of European Economic Cultures to Europe’s Crisis 
Politics: The Example of German-Italian Discrepancies” held 
in Villa Vigoni, Menaggio (IT) on 25 – 27 June 2018. The 
present contribution is mostly taken by Olmastroni, Francesco 
and Alessandro Pellegata (2018) “Members Apart: A Mass-
Elite Comparison of Mutual Perceptions and Support for the 
European Union in Germany and Italy”, Contemporary Italian 
Politics 10 (1): 56-75. This study received the financial support 
of the project “Reconciling Economic and Social Europe: The 
Role of Values, Ideas and Politics (REScEU)”, funded by an 
Advanced Grant of the European Research Council (Grant no. 
340534, P.I: Maurizio Ferrera).
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In Germany, the debate over the Euro crisis has 
been framed as a conflict between “Northern 
saints” and “Southern sinners” (Matthijs and 
McNamara 2015). Hard work, prudent savings, 
moderate consumption, wage restraint, and 
fiscal stability – primarily in Germany, but also 
in Austria, Finland and The Netherlands – were 
seen as northern virtues and were juxtaposed to 
the southern vices of low competitiveness, meagre 
savings, disproportionate consumption, inflated 
wages, and fiscal profligacy which characterised 
the offensive acronym of “PIIGS” (the countries of 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). There-
fore, Germany supports a markedly “discipli-
narian” approach, deeply rooted in the ordoliberal 
doctrine (Bulmer 2014; Meiers 2015), according 
to which the burdens of fiscal adjustment should 
fall exclusively on national governments and 
taxpayers.
In contrast, a large part of the Italian media and of 
the political élite, even among mainstream polit-
ical parties, blame the excessive rigour and lack 
of solidarity of the EU institutions and northern 
governments, Germany in primis, and advance the 
notion of debt pooling in the form of Eurobonds 
or fiscal equalisation schemes. They oppose the 
conditionality regime and austerity measures, and 
call for more flexibility in the application of rules, 
the mobilisation of EU resources for investment 
and growth, and, most importantly, the “mutu-
alisation” of risks (Ferrera 2017). The REScEU 
(Reconciling Economic and Social Europe: Values, 
Ideas and Politics) Mass Survey provides evidence 
in support of the difference between the Germans’ 
and the Italians’ approval of financial bailouts, and 
their views about who is to blame for the recent 
Eurozone crisis (Ferrera and Pellegata 2017).
Previous research has shown a positive relation 
between support for the EU and macroeconomic 
performance (Anderson 1998; Anderson and 
Kaltenhaler 1996). Considering that the economic 
crisis, fiscal austerity measures and the condi-
tionality regime have produced clear and tangible 
losses in the Euro periphery, we expect to find a 
sharper decrease in public support for the EU in 
in the 1990s. Italian-German relations are intense 
and co-operative at the cultural, economic and 
societal level, as well as in daily political life. In 
2015, Italy ranked third among EU countries for 
the total value of German imports, and Germany 
is the biggest source of Italian imports and the first 
destination for Italian exports (Diedrichs 2010; 
Dinger 2013).
However, Germany and Italy have been also char-
acterised by longstanding stereotypes and preju-
dices. Germans express a high self-esteem and 
consideration of their leading role in Europe, 
and, while they admire Italy for its lifestyle, they 
consider its institutions to be inefficient and 
corrupt. On the other hand, Italians appreciate 
German efficiency and the hardworking ethic of its 
people but, at the same time, criticise their exces-
sive rigour and their harsh and uncompassionate 
nature. (Pew Research Center 2012, 2013; Frie-
drich Ebert Stiftung 2016). Gian Enrico Rusconi 
(2008), one of the most important scholars of 
Italian-German relations, argues that, since the 
end of the Cold War, several political events have 
represented sources of tension in Italian-German 
bilateral relations and have contributed to exacer-
bating the divergent views that the two countries 
have of each other.
Core versus Periphery: 
Germany-Italy Relations in 
Times of Crisis
With the outbreak of the Euro crisis, the EU and 
the integration process, which, for many years, 
had represented the common denominator of 
German-Italian bilateral relationships, have 
become the most challenging source of tension 
between these two countries. A new sharp dividing 
line over the issue of fiscal stability and, ultimately, 
cross-national solidarity has polarised German 
and Italian publics, their media and their political 
élites. Thus, two opposing narratives about who 
is to blame for the crisis and the initiatives that 
should be taken to manage its detrimental conse-
quences are in play.
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Figure 1. Public Mood towards the EU in 
Germany and Italy
Notes: Mood in the two countries has been estimated through 
the dyad ratio algorithm (WCalc soft ware, Stimson 1999).
Source: Eurobarometer 1973-2016.
Th e green line in the graph plotted in Figure 1 
represents our estimate of the public mood of 
Italians towards the EU, while the red line indi-
cates that of the Germans towards the EU. Th is 
indicator should be interpreted as the annual 
share of citizens who express “pro-EU” stances. 
Th e average level of public mood towards the EU 
is quite high in both Germany (65.7%) and Italy 
(70.0%), confi rming the marked Europeanism 
that has characterised the two countries from the 
beginning of the EU project. However, the two 
countries show diff erent patterns of variation over 
time. Th e public mood of the Germans towards 
the EU remained high and fairly constant during 
the 1970s and the 1980s. It decreased during the 
1990s, aft er the re-unifi cation process and the 
decision to abandon the Deutschmark, but subse-
quently increased again to remain high even 
in recent years. As expected, the Italian mood, 
in contrast, relentlessly decreased from 1993, 
following the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, 
and fell below the threshold of 50 per cent aft er 
the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. While, in 
2016, two Germans out of three expressed posi-
tive orientations towards the EU, only 37 per cent 
of Italians supported the integration process.
Italy than in Germany caused by the onset of the 
Eurozone crisis. However, we push our expecta-
tions a step forward by postu-
lating an association between 
support for the EU and the Ital-
ians’ view of Germany. Th e narra-
tives of both the media and the 
Italian political élite scapegoat 
EU institutions and their policy 
initiatives for the stagnant Italian 
economy and its excessive public 
debt. Given the strong relations 
that have occurred historically 
between Germany and Italy, and 
the leadership that the former 
plays within the EU institu-
tions (Paterson 2011; Kundnani 
2015), Italian citizens and its political élite tend 
to identify the EU behaviour with that of the role 
of Germany. Th us, we expect to fi nd evidence in 
support of a decline in the level of trust of Ital-
ians vis-à-vis Germans relating to their decreasing 
support for the EU.
Assessing the Relation 
between Support for the EU 
and Mutual Feeling
A vast amount of the literature has argued that, 
from the early 1990s, the EU and the integration 
process started to be politicised in domestic poli-
tics, and became increasingly disputed aft er the 
onset of the fi nancial crisis (Hooghe and Marks 
2009; Hutter, Grande and Kriesi 2016). In order 
to estimate the preferences of the Germans and 
the Italians for the EU, we have built a measure 
of public mood based upon several EU-related 
issues. Th is measure stems from the concept of 
policy mood developed by Stimson (1999), which 
is an aggregate and longitudinal estimation of the 
opinions of citizens on one or more controver-
sial policy issues. More precisely, we have aggre-
gated the frequency distributions of responses 
to survey questions related to general attitudes 
towards the EU gathered from Eurobarometer 
series conducted between 1973 and 2016.
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Figure 2. Germany-Italy mutual feelings. Mass 
(upper panel) and elite (lower panel) level
Th en, to test our conjecture that the orientations 
of Italians towards the EU and their views about 
Germany are related, we have investigated empiri-
cally which individual-level factors are associated 
with the view of Germany expressed by Italian citi-
zens and their political representatives. Unfortu-
nately, as already observed, data on the reciprocal 
views of Germans and Italians do not system-
atically cover a long period. As a result, we have 
selected two partially diff erent questions in order 
to operationalise Italian views of Germany in the 
last ten years taken from the Transatlantic Trends 
Survey and the LAPS-PRIN PEI survey.111 Th e fi rst 
survey question asked respondents to evaluate 
their feelings towards Germany, its institutions, 
and people using either a 100-point or 10-point 
111  For Transatlantic Trends Survey, see http://www.gmfus.
org/initiatives/transatlantic-trends-%E2%80%93-public-opini-
on, and for LAPS PRIN_PEI data, see the Special issue “Italian 
Foreign Policy: To Take Arms against a Sea of Troubles?” of 
the Italian Political Science Review.
Unfortunately, we could not rely on a yearly esti-
mate of the reciprocal views of the Germans and 
the Italians to allow us to make a 
longitudinal description of their 
evolution. However, a number 
of recent surveys provide us 
with data that depict alarming 
signals regarding the mutual feel-
ings of the Germans and Ital-
ians. Th e Friedrich Ebert Foun-
dation (2016) shows impor-
tant diff erences in the opinions 
of the Germans and the Italians 
regarding the role of Germany 
within EU institutions. While 68 
per cent of the Italian respond-
ents agreed with the statement 
that Germany should contribute 
more to the EU budget since it 
receives more advantages than 
other Member States, 66 per cent 
of Germans took the opposite 
position. Furthermore, while an 
impressive 81 per cent of Italian 
respondents believe that Germany 
is abusing its power within the EU 
at the expense of other EU Member States, only 
19 per cent of their German counterparts agree on 
this position (see Figure 2). Few available data at 
the élite level confi rm this discrepancy. A recent 
élite survey conducted by REScEU between 2017 
and 2018 among the national representatives of 
seven EU Member States, including Germany and 
Italy, asked the respondents to evaluate Germa-
ny’s political and diplomatic behaviour during the 
Euro crisis on a scale ranging from 0 (a self-inter-
ested hegemon) to 10 (a solidaristic leader). As the 
lower panel of Figure 2 indicates, the average value 
of German MPs is 5.7, while the average score 
among Italian MPs is 3.5.
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As expected, the lower the level of support for the 
EU expressed by Italian citizens and their polit-
ical élite, the lower their feeling towards Germany. 
This result is consistent, including a control for 
the impact of ideology, which is never signifi-
cantly related to Italians’ views of Germany. Not 
surprisingly, the negative association between 
the perceived threat of the economic recession 
for Italy/Europe and feeling towards Germany is 
significant only after the onset of the economic 
crisis. In contrast, the perceived cultural threat 
posed by immigration is never significantly asso-
ciated to the dependent variable. Finally, the nega-
tive evaluation of the influence exerted by Germany 
within the EU expressed by Italian public opinion 
and its élite is strongly associated with the negative 
feeling of Italians towards the former.
Note: -: negative and significant regression coefficient; n.s.: not 
significant regression coefficient.
Source: Transatlantic Trends Survey (2006; 2008; 2012); 
LAPS, PRIN-PEI (2016).
“thermometer” scale, with 100 (or 10) meaning a 
very warm, favourable feeling, 0 meaning a very 
cold, unfavourable feeling, and 50 (or 5) meaning 
not particularly warm nor cold. For the sake of 
consistency, we re-scaled the original values in 
order to obtain a 10-point scale. This survey item 
was available in 2006, 2008 and 2016. In 2012, 
we selected an item which presented a different 
wording. This item asked respondents whether 
they had a favourable or unfavourable opinion 
of Germany. We have recoded the original Likert 
scale, which included four response catego-
ries into a dummy variable: “tend not to favour” 
(0) and “tend to favour” (1). The main explana-
tory variables included in the regression models 
refer to individual perceptions of the economic 
and migration crises, the role of Germany and its 
leadership during and after the crisis, and their 
opinion of the EU and their country’s membership 
of the Eurozone.112 The results are controlled for 
the inclusion the ideological orientations, gender, 
age, and education of the respondents.113 Table 1 
summarises the main findings obtained in regres-
sion analyses.114
Table 1. Main Regression Results
112  Detailed information on the exact wording of different 
questions and their sources is provided in Olmastroni and Pel-
legata (2018) and its Online Appendix.
113  Because of the very low number of observations and in 
order to maximise the number of cases for each predictor, we 
have decided to omit controls from the regression models for 
political élites.
114 For a detailed presentation and discussion of all the 




2006 2008 2012 2016
Negative attitudes towards the EU - - - -
Economic downturn is a threat to Europe/Italy n.s. n.s. n.s. -
Immigration is a threat to Europe/Italy n.s. n.s.
Negative evaluation of Germany’s influence in Europe - -
Italian national MPs
View of Germany
2006 2008 2012 2016
Negative attitudes towards the EU - - - -
Economic downturn is a threat to Europe/Italy n.s. n.s.
Immigration is a threat to Europe/Italy n.s. n.s.
Negative evaluation of Germany’s influence in Europe -
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Conclusions
The empirical results that emerge from this study 
undoubtedly represent a serious challenge to 
the integration process. The multiple crises that 
Europe is recently experiencing and the policy 
initiatives implemented by the EU to address them 
have detrimental effects not only on support for 
the EU and its institutions, but also on the labori-
ously accumulated capital of respect and mutual 
trust among both the national governments and 
the citizens of the different Member States. In 
particular, Italian citizens and their political élite 
are likely to assimilate the EU and its behaviour 
with Germany’s “hegemonic” role within the EU 
institutions.
However, recent public opinion surveys also show 
that the EU is re-gaining confidence in the eyes 
of the citizens, and, more interestingly, that there 
is a broad support, even in core countries such as 
Germany, for policy initiatives aimed at strength-
ening pan-EU solidarity (Ferrera and Pellegata 
2017; PEW Research Center 2017). Many Euro-
pean citizens still believe in the EU, provided that 
the EU changes its course, carrying on solidarity-
enhancing measures to re-assure voters worried 
about the negative consequences of the integra-
tion process and the recent crises. Our results 
suggest that European leaders should follow this 
strategy with due diligence to avoid new losses of 
intra-European cohesion and the consequential 
damage to the stability, security and development 
of the EU community.
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Bornschier 2010, 2010a, 2015): from focusing on 
religion, this dimension was reshaped to refer to 
a new fundamental conflict between universalistic 
(cosmopolitan) and traditionalist-communitarian 
(nationalistic) values.
The established mainstream parties have not 
been able or are not ready to represent the rising 
demands linked to this structural conflict in 
society, and have also converged on the economic 
dimension of party competition, which has tradi-
tionally been their home turf. Accordingly, the 
representative function of established parties has 
been weakening: they have become increasingly 
remote from their constituencies, and their mobi-
lising capacity has continued to decline (see Mair 
2013). In particular, the fact that the mobilisation 
potentials created by the new fundamental conflict 
were largely neglected by the mainstream parties 
created a tension between the political represent-
atives (“the élites”) and the voters (“the people”). 
This made room for the rise of new challengers 
within the party system. Mair (2002: 88) has already 
pointed to the link between, on the one hand, the 
weakening of party democracy, as we knew it and, 
on the other, the rise of such new challengers. The 
new challengers not only articulate the new struc-
tural conflicts, but they also denounce the estab-
lished parties for their incapacity to represent 
the voters’ concerns. They pursue a double logic 
(Rooduijn et al. 2016: 34): on the one hand, they 
express the substantive concerns and the demo-
cratic dissatisfaction of the voters in question, 
while, on the other, they contribute to their voters’ 
discontent by their populist rhetoric which claims 
that the established élites are betraying the people 
and that the sovereignty of the people ought to be 
restored.
As a result of the long-term trends, the dominant 
competition between the mainstream parties of the 
centre-left (Social Democrats) and the centre-right 
(Conservatives, Liberals and Christian-Demo-
crats) on the economic dimension of the political 
space has been supplemented by the competition 
between the New Left (Greens) and the New Right 
(radical populist challengers – AfD in Germany) 
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1. Introduction: The General 
Background of the Recent 
Rise of New Challenger 
Parties
There are two sets of factors that determine the 
vote for new challenger parties from the radical 
left and the radical right in Western Europe. On 
the one hand, there are the structural transforma-
tions of society which create new societal conflicts, 
and which are at the origin of a set of new demands 
to be represented in the political system. On the 
other hand, there are the political dynamics, espe-
cially those within the party system, which create 
the supply-side conditions for the representation 
of these demands within the political system.
The long-term trends in the development of the 
cleavage structure constitute the starting-point for 
any discussion of the determinants of the vote for 
challenger parties. As has been argued by various 
authors, north-western Europe has been charac-
terised by the rise of a “new” cultural divide that 
has emerged since the 1970s as the result of succes-
sive waves of mobilisation of new social conflicts 
by, first, the new social movements and the New 
Left (new radical left parties and Green parties) 
and then by the radical right. The cultural issues 
politicised by the two waves – issues related, above 
all, to cultural liberalism, immigration and Euro-
pean integration – transformed the meaning of the 
cultural dimension of the two-dimensional space 
of party competition in north-western Europe 
(see Kitschelt 1994, 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012; 
Hooghe et al. 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2017; 
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lasting authoritarian regimes and strong commu-
nist parties, i.e., a strong “old” left) and with the 
fact that they had been emigration countries until 
more recently. By contrast, southern Europe was 
particularly hard hit by the Great Recession – the 
financial crisis and eurozone crisis in the after-
math of the fall of Lehman Brothers in the autumn 
of 2008. These countries experienced a double 
crisis – an economic and a political crisis - which 
provided a unique opportunity for new chal-
lengers to articulate classic left-wing economic 
grievances and the widespread political dissat-
isfaction (see Hutter et al. 2018). The latter had 
both international and domestic origins. Inter-
nationally, the management of the eurocrisis led 
to interventions in national politics by suprana-
tional actors (the “Troika”) and northern Euro-
pean “creditor” countries, and ended up pitting 
them against the southern European “debtor” 
countries. Domestic factors added to the resulting 
political discontent in southern Europe: struc-
tural problems, policy errors and misconcep-
tions predated the euro crisis and left the southern 
European countries particularly ill-prepared to 
respond to the economic crisis. An overall sense 
of frustration with the political élites captivated a 
large share of the population and was translated 
into a wave of protest that swept across southern 
Europe (Kriesi et al. 2018). Moreover, as a result of 
the double crisis, southern Europe saw the rise of 
challengers from the radical left (such as Podemos 
in Spain, Syriza in Greece) or of purely populist 
challengers from “neither left nor right” such as 
the M5S in Italy.
Figure 1 gives an idea of the key political back-
ground conditions for the rise of these challengers 
– democratic dissatisfaction, which distinguishes 
north-western European countries from southern 
European countries. As the figure shows, the 
Great Recession led to a decline in democratic 
satisfaction in southern Europe, but not in north-
western Europe. While democratic satisfaction 
in Germany never reached the very high levels of 
Sweden, it was not affected by the Great Reces-
sion and, if anything, increased until the refugee 
on the cultural dimension. While Germany saw 
the rise of a strong Green party, which emerged 
from the massive new social movements and 
experienced its breakthrough in the federal elec-
tions in 1983, the New Right only developed belat-
edly, primarily due to its national-socialist legacy. 
Ultimately, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
broke through in the context of the Great Reces-
sion. At its origin, the AfD opposed the repeated 
bailouts of Europe’s crisis-ridden debtor coun-
tries. But rather rapidly, it muted into a typical 
populist radical right party, focusing on immigra-
tion issues and joining the ranks of the New Right 
that had already been established in other north-
western European countries for more than thirty 
years. Even though it had just been founded only 
seven months before, and even though it had not 
yet developed the typical profile of a radical popu-
list right party, the AfD obtained 4.7 per cent of 
the votes cast and only barely missed the five per 
cent threshold to enter the Bundestag in the 2013 
federal elections. Subsequently, the party gained 
electoral ground in European and state-wide elec-
tions, both in West and East Germany. As argued 
by Bremer and Schulte-Cloos (2018), it probably 
benefited from the fact that it was initially not as 
closely associated with outright radical right posi-
tions as its predecessors from the New Right. For 
the outcome of the 2017 elections, it is important 
to keep in mind that Germany does not belong 
to the countries that were most heavily hit by the 
economic crisis. However, we should also keep in 
mind that, during the euro crisis, Germany became 
the most important representative of the “creditor” 
countries, and, as such, experienced the accentua-
tion of domestic conflict over rescue measures for 
the “debtor” countries and institutional reforms 
of the Eurozone. Moreover, Germany is certainly 
one of the countries that has been most concerned 
by the refugee crisis, which first hit Europe in the 
summer of 2015.
Importantly, the impact of the two waves of mobi-
lisation had been more limited in southern Europe 
– for reasons that have to do with the political 
legacy of southern European countries (long-
THE POLITICAL SPACE IN ITALY AND GERMANY DURING THE CRISIS: ITALIAN AND GERMAN POPULISM COMPARED
Hanspeter Kriesi150
the punishment of the SPD was more a sign of 
general wear. Th e SPD had suff ered most in the 
fi rst crisis-election in 2009, when it lost roughly a 
third of its share of the vote, a loss from which it 
never recovered. In addition to the general trends 
described above, the lack of a distinctive profi le, 
a series of candidates for Chancellor (Steinmeier, 
Steinbrück and Schulz) who lacked any charis-
matic appeal, and the predicament of having to 
serve as a minority partner in a coalition domi-
nated by Angela Merkel may go a long way to 
explain the decline of the SPD. Th e Liberals and, 
above all, the AfD were the benefi ciaries of the 
punishment of the incumbents in the 2017 elec-
tions, while the radical and the New Left  (Linke 
and Greens) stagnated.
Th e Italian elections resulted in the punishment of 
the governing PD (Partito Democratico - Demo-
cratic Party), the Italian equivalent of the SPD, 
and of the main centre-right party in opposition 
(Berlusconi’s re-baptised Forza Italia, formerly 
Popolo della Libertà), as well as in the rise of the 
populists from both the radical right (Lega – the 
League, formerly Lega Nord) and the “neither left  
nor right” (Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) - Five Star 
Movement). Th e PD lost roughly a fourth of its 
previous vote share (down from 25.4 to 18.7 per 
cent), Forza Italia more than a third (down from 
21.6 to 14 per cent). Berlusconi’s party had already 
lost more than 40 per cent of its vote share in the 
previous 2013 elections (down from 37.4 to 21.6 
per cent). Th e PD’s loss was partly due to a split: 
the anti-Renziani who split and campaigned 
under the name of “Liberi e Uguali” (Free and 
Equal) obtained 3.4 per cent. Together, the popu-
lists (M5S and Lega) won half of the vote (50.1 per 
cent in the Chamber vote), and a clear majority 
of the seats in both chambers. Note that, in the 
Italian case, the results of individual parties do 
not tell us as much as in Germany, because the 
parties form pre-electoral coalitions. As a result 
of these coalitions, there were actually three main 
electoral forces – the centre-right (“centrodestra”), 
the centre-left  (“centrosinistra”) and the M5S. 
Interestingly, among the three components of 
crisis broke. Only during the refugee crisis did it 
start to decline. By contrast, the level of satisfac-
tion in Italy reached German levels only briefl y 
in the mid-2000s, but then declined to very low 
levels in the course of the euro crisis. As is illus-
trated by the case of Spain, the decline in demo-
cratic dissatisfaction during the euro crisis was 
not an Italian speciality, but occurred throughout 
southern Europe. However, given that the level of 
satisfaction was already much lower in Italy before 
the crisis than in Spain, the decline of satisfaction 
was less precipitous in Italy than it was in Spain 
during the euro crisis.
Figure 1: Th e development of satisfaction with 
democracy in four European countries
2. The Outcome of the German 
2017 Elections and the 
Italian 2018 Elections
Against this background, let us now consider the 
outcome of the German 2017 elections and the 
Italian 2018 elections. In Germany, both incum-
bents lost about one fi ft h of their respective share 
of the vote. In absolute terms, the CDU-CSU 
was, however, punished more heavily, because its 
previous vote share had been far larger (41.5 per 
cent) than that of the SPD (25.7 per cent). Argu-
ably, the CDU-CSU was, above all, punished for 
Angela Merkel’s welcoming asylum policy, while 
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ular and is, however, not fully represented in Figure 
2. Th e reason for this is the above-mentioned 
inclusion of the Lega in the centre-right. Between 
2013 and 2018, a shift  in the relative power of the 
components of the centre-right occurred in Italy, 
with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia losing its polar posi-
tion to the Lega. Back in 2013, the Lega still had to 
recover from a major scandal in its own ranks that 
dates back to the spring of 2012. By 2018, however, 
its new leader, Matteo Salvini, had succeeded in 
re-positioning the former regionalist party as a 
classic radical populist right party that now mobi-
lised across the entire country, above all on issues 
of immigration and Euroscepticism.
Figure 2: Th e outcome of the four most recent 
German and Italian elections
However, the Lega still kept its stronghold in 
northern Italy and met with great scepticism in 
the South. In order to appreciate the outcome of 
the Italian 2018 elections correctly, it is actually 
very important to take into account the regional 
diff erences in the electoral outcome. Figure 3 
compares a typical northern district – Lombardia 
3, which includes the cities of Brescia, Bergamo 
and Treviglio, with a central district – Toscana – 
and a southern district – Sicilia 2, which includes 
Messina, Catania, Ragusa and Syracusa. In 
Lombardy, the centre-right largely dominated, 
in Sicily, M5S took almost half of the vote, while 
the centre-right we not only fi nd Forza Italia, but 
also the Lega and “Fratelli d’Italia”, an extremely 
nationalistic off shoot of the old Alleanza Nazio-
nale created in 2014. In other words, the Italian 
centre-right includes the radical right populists, 
which would still be unthinkable in Germany. On 
the other side, the centre-left  includes, in addition 
to the PD, the remnants of the Radical Party (Più 
Europa), and some other minor components, but 
no new populist challengers.
In order to compare the Italian electoral develop-
ment with the German one, I propose to compare 
the combination of the CDU-CSU and the FDP 
with the Italian centrodestra, the SPD with the 
centrosinistra, and the combination of die Linke 
and Grüne with the M5S. Figure 2 presents the 
development of these camps over 
the last four elections. In addition 
to the development of these camps, 
the fi gure also presents the develop-
ment of the AfD for Germany and 
the Lega separately. Looking at the 
two countries from this perspec-
tive, it becomes quite clear that 
what distinguishes the two coun-
tries is not so much the rise of the 
radical populist right, which rose 
to a similar extent in both coun-
tries in the most recent elections. 
What really distinguishes the two 
countries is the rise of M5S and 
the spectacular decline of both the 
centre-left  and the traditional centre-right. While 
the combined radical and New Left  in Germany 
stagnated throughout the 2000s, its functional 
equivalent in Italy – M5S – proved to be a spec-
tacular success. Coming from nowhere it obtained 
a fourth of the vote (25.6 per cent) in 2013, and 
rose to a third (32.7 per cent) in 2018. Without 
any doubt, it benefi ted from the political dissatis-
faction of the Italians, which reached new heights 
aft er the experience with the Monti government of 
technocrats (2011-2012) that was supported by all 
the mainstream parties. Th e decline of the tradi-
tional centre-right has been particularly spectac-
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3. The Structure of the 
Party Systems in Germany and 
in Italy
Th e return of the FDP to the German Bundestag 
did not change much in the structure of the party 
system, but the establishment of the AfD did. As 
is shown in Figure 4, the German party system is 
structured by an economic and a cultural dimen-
sion which is closely correlated, and appears to be 
multi-polar as well. However, this multi-polarity 
is more apparent than real: with the exception of 
the AfD, which occupies a similar position as the 
radical populist right parties in north-western 
Europe, all the parties are located in the upper left -
hand corner of the space, relatively close to the 
pro-welfare pole of the economic dimension (with 
the exception of the FDP) and 
relatively close to cultural liber-
alism. It is the contrast between 
the New Right and the rest of 
the parties which serves as the 
crucial structuring device in the 
German party system today. We 
should, however, keep in mind 
that the AfD still has a somewhat 
limited electoral weight, which 
means that it contributes only to 
a limited extent to the polarisa-
tion of the German party system. 
Compared to the position of 
the New Right, the diff erences 
between the remaining parties 
appear of minor importance.
in Tuscany the three camps of the current Italian 
party system were of much more equal strength. 
If we add the AfD to the centre-right to make it 
comparable to the Italian centre-right, the similar-
ities between the electoral outcome in Germany 
and Lombardy are striking, as is also shown in 
Figure 3. Table 1 is added to clarify that the simi-
larity between the two is more apparent than real, 
because the power relations within the centre-
right are actually very diff erent in Germany and 
Lombardy: while the mainstream CDU-CSU 
dominates the centre-right in Germany, it is 
the Lega that dominates it in Lombardy (and in 
Tuscany, too).
Figure 3: Regional diff erences in the Italian 
electoral outcome 2018, and German electoral 
outcome 2017
Table 1: Northern Italy vs Germany, outcome of 
last national elections
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Th e rather unstructured confi guration refl ects the 
unique role played by Silvio Berlusconi, the leader 
of Forza Italia in Italian politics. Th e 
election of 2008 roughly coincides 
with the apex of Berlusconi’s personal 
dominance over Italian politics. Th e 
rather unusual confi guration of the 
political space at the time is likely to 
be related to the peculiarities of this 
unique period, during which polit-
ical competition revolved more on 
the personality of individual leaders 
than on a programme or manifesto. 
Th e Berlusconi-factor, in turn, also 
had an important impact on the 2013 
electoral campaign. While, in 2008, 
political competition tended to be 
one-dimensional, in 2013, it became 
two- dimensional. As shown in 
Figure 4, the economic and cultural 
dimensions only play a marginal role 
in the structuring of political compe-
tition in 2013. What really struc-
tures the political space, instead, are 
political issues, and, in particular, the 
issue of political renewal. On the one 
hand, we fi nd the PD and M5S (and 
Mario Monti’s Scelta Civica) pleading 
in favour of political renewal. On 
the other hand, the PdL represents 
the opposite pole with Berlusconi 
becoming an issue himself, as the 
main exponent of a political class that 
the challengers asked to be replaced.
Th e crucial role of the political crisis in the 2013 
Italian elections is confi rmed by an analysis of the 
determinants of the vote for M5S in the elections. 
Th is analysis is based upon the ESS6, which went 
into the fi eld in Italy aft er these elections. While 
voters for parties on the radical left  and the radical 
right typically make their choice based upon a 
combination of substantive concerns (economic 
concerns such as re-distribution for the radical left  
voters and cultural concerns such as opposition 
to immigration for the radical right voters) and 
Figure 4: Political spaces in Germany and Italy 
a) Germany
b) Italy
For Italy, we do not have the data for the 2018 elec-
tions yet, which is why Figure 4 presents the struc-
ture of the Italian party system before the initial rise 
of M5S (2008) and aft er its successive rise (2013)
(see Karremans et al. 2018). Before the crisis and 
before the rise of M5S, the Italian political space 
was structured mostly around a bipolar opposi-
tion between the centrosinistra (PD, IdV) and the 
centrodestra (PdL + Lega), with issues of welfare, 
democratic renewal and cultural liberalism on one 
side, opposed to issues of security on the other. 
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coalition or a CDU-CSU minority government 
remained as the only option. Although the leader 
of the SPD had originally excluded a remake of the 
grand coalition between the CDU-CSU and the 
SPD, aft er the intervention of the President, the 
SPD’s leadership reluctantly decided to enter coali-
tion negotiations nevertheless. Th ese negotiations 
dragged on until February and were eventually 
concluded with a coalition contract that still had 
to be approved by the two parties. In the case of the 
SPD, this meant consulting its 460,000 members, 
part of whom heavily contested the renewal of 
a grand coalition. Aft er a four month stalemate, 
the SPD membership eventually approved the 
contract on 4 March 2018 by a two-thirds majority. 
Th e old and new chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, has paid a high price for the 
new coalition government. Although 
even more weakened in the elections 
than the CDU-CSU, the SPD obtained 
important concessions in the coali-
tion negotiations and sees its posi-
tion strengthened in the future grand 
coalition. Aft er the installation of the 
grand coalition, there is the prospect 
of a sustained period of a stable, albeit 
weak, government.
In Italy, the confi guration in Parlia-
ment resulting from the 2018 election 
made government formation equally 
diffi  cult. No feasible combination of 
parties seemed to have the number of 
seats necessary to form a government. Th e centre-
right, which claimed to have won the elections, fell 
clearly short of the necessary majority, as did M5S, 
which also claimed to have won the elections. A 
coalition between M5S and the centre-left , which 
was attempted by M5S was vetoed by the Renziani 
in the PD. Aft er a protracted period of negotia-
tions that lasted almost three months and a fi nal 
stretch of extremely tense negotiations between 
the prospective coalition partners and the Italian 
President Sergio Mattarella, the originally rather 
unlikely combination of the two populist parties 
– the Lega and the M5S – succeeded in forming 
of democratic discontent, the voters for M5S did 
not distinguish themselves from the mainstream 
voters with respect to any substantive preferences. 
Instead, the key determinant for the M5S vote 
was general dissatisfaction with the way democ-
racy worked in Italy. Th is is illustrated by Figure 
5, which presents the average marginal eff ects 
(estimated with logit models based upon ESS6 
data) for some key substantive preferences and for 
two measures of democratic discontent (general 
political dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction with 
government responsiveness).
Figure 5: Eff ects of cultural/economic prefer-
ences and democratic dissatisfaction on vote for 
M5S (2013)
4. The consequences of these 
election outcomes
From these election results, we can observe a 
weakening of the government in both countries. 
Th e German elections resulted in a confi guration 
in parliament which made coalition formation 
diffi  cult and led to the Federal Republic’s longest 
period without a government since World War 
II. A fi rst attempt to form a so-called “Jamaica” 
coalition composed of the CDU-CSU, the Liberals 
(FDP) and the Greens spectacularly failed in 
late November 2017. Aft er this failure, a grand 
THE POLITICAL SPACE IN ITALY AND GERMANY DURING THE CRISIS: ITALIAN AND GERMAN POPULISM COMPARED
Hanspeter Kriesi155
seen how they will react to the economic policies, 
once the new government attempts to implement 
them.
5. Conclusion
After the last elections, Germany is once more 
governed from the centre, while Italy – a first in 
Western Europe – is governed by a coalition of 
populist parties. The German grand coalition 
is not so grand after all. It is based upon a tight 
absolute majority of 53 per cent of the vote. For 
the time being, the challengers from both left and 
right are marginalised in Germany, and the ques-
tion is how they will react to their powerlessness. 
They might get another chance in the not too 
distant future. The fact that the German govern-
ment rests on a rather small popular base suggests 
that the electoral situation in Germany is far from 
stable. The major conflict between the nationalist-
conservative forces defending the nation-state 
and its citizens and the forward-looking forces 
promoting cultural liberalism, European inte-
gration, and openness to immigrants is far from 
settled in Germany.
In Italy, the new populist coalition is articulating 
both, the conflict between cosmopolitan and 
nationalist-conservative forces, and the economic 
conflict between the rich and the poor, which is 
also a regional conflict between the North and the 
South. In both of these conflicts, the two compo-
nents of the governing coalition tend to defend 
opposing interests: while the Lega defends the 
nationalistic position, especially with regard to 
immigration, the M5S is more multi-culturally 
oriented, and, while the M5S defends the poor 
Southerners, the Lega defends the Northerners 
who are unwilling to pay for the South. How the 
two coalition partners intend to square the circle 
remains to be seen, but it is clear that the Italian 
electoral situation is also far from stable.
a government. This government promises to 
be weak as well, given its internal contradic-
tions. Thus, the combination of the substantive 
economic demands of the two coalition partners 
promises to be explosive: while the Lega intends to 
implement the centre-right’s key electoral promise 
of a flat tax for both individuals and corporations, 
which will reduce government revenue consider-
ably, the M5S intends to implement a very costly 
social security project, the so-called reddito di 
cittadinanza (a sort of minimum income for 
the unemployed). Moreover, the Lega plans to 
tighten immigration legislation in a heavy-handed 
manner, whereas the M5S has been supported by 
many former voters from the left, who are rather 
opposed to such measures.
The latent Euroscepticism of both of these parties, 
but especially of the Lega, will make for difficult 
relations with Italy’s European partners. Already, 
the new cabinet is seeking to re-negotiate the 
rules for the distribution of refugees as well as the 
rules for economic deficits in the EU. The new 
Italian government is likely to re-inforce German 
prudence which has already been putting the brake 
on the great plans for Europe of the new French 
President Emmanuel Macron. But given that Italy 
is one of the founding members of the EU, the 
sanctioning capacity of the EU, with regard to the 
difficulties which are likely to be created by the new 
Italian government, is likely to be rather limited. 
By contrast, the markets are likely to impose more 
strict constraints on this government, as was illus-
trated during the final phase of the government 
formation: the markets reacted sharply when the 
leaders of the two populist parties submitted a 
list of prospective ministers to the President of 
Italy which included a finance minister who was 
an explicit opponent of Italy’s membership in the 
Eurozone: the two-year yield on Italian govern-
ment bonds jumped from 0.27 to 2.72 per cent 
over three trading days at the height of the negoti-
ations between the President and the two populist 
leaders. When the latter backed down and were 
prepared to compromise, the markets calmed 
down to some extent, although it remains to be 
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECOVERY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE
Manos Matsaganis
In the short run, growth is driven by a combina-
tion of consumption, investment, and exports. In 
the longer run, growth depends on rising produc-
tivity (and more jobs created than destroyed). In 
turn, rising productivity depends once again on 
more (and more productive) investment.
On this count, the evidence gives plenty of cause 
for concern. As explained elsewhere116, in the 
context of harsh, externally imposed austerity, 
national governments (and firms) have found it 
expedient to cut investment by more than they cut 
consumption spending.
This was true in all countries: gross fixed capital 
formation in the EU was cut back by 13.4% in 
2008-2013, while over the same period final 
consumption expenditure held constant (-0.1%). 
In Southern Europe, where consumption fell 
quite significantly during the crisis, investment 
collapsed spectacularly: comparing 2008 and 
2013, the cumulative decline was 25.5% in Italy, 
35.0% and 36.5% in Spain and Portugal respecti-
vely, and a massive 61.3% in Greece.
In 2013-2017, investment bounced back in Europe, 
registering an increase of 14.4%, while consump-
tion rose by half as much (7.1%) in the same 
period. By doing so, pre-crisis levels of gross fixed 
capital formation were almost fully restored (-1.0% 
in 2008-2017 in the EU28). During the recovery, 
investment also fared better than consumption in 
the four South European member states, but that 
was not nearly enough to make up for the losses 
of the previous period. By the end of 2017, gross 
fixed capital formation in Italy was 20.5% lower 
than it had been in 2008, 21.4% in Spain, 23.9% in 
Portugal, and as much as 59.1% lower in Greece 
(Table 1).
116  See Perez S.A. & Matsaganis M. (2018) The political 
economy of austerity in Southern Europe. New Political Eco-
nomy 23 (2) 192-207.
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Has Southern Europe recovered from the Great 
Recession and the Eurozone crisis?
The question is simple, but the answer is complex – 
and differs from the point of view of the economy, 
the social situation, and politics. A laconic assess-
ment, valid as of September 2018, would have to 
be ‘partly’, ‘not much’, ‘not at all’ respectively. For a 
slightly fuller one, read on.
1. The economy
In 2017, GDP in the EU grew faster than expected, 
by 2.4%. This may look rather modest, but repre-
sented, as DG-ECFIN pointed out, “the highest 
growth rate in 10 years”. Furthermore, for the first 
time since the onset of the crisis, in 2017 growth 
was positive in all EU member states.
In 2013-2017, Southern Europe returned to posi-
tive rates of growth. The economy grew by a cumu-
lative 11.5% in Spain, and 7.2% in Portugal. Italy 
(3.4%) and Greece (1.6%) did less well. Over the 
same period, the European economy as a whole 
(EU28) expanded by 8.7%.
Nevertheless, Southern European economies have 
not yet regained the ground they lost during the 
Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis. By the 
end of 2017, only in Spain had GDP surpassed its 
2008 level (by a mere 1.6%). In Portugal, it was 
1.2% lower. In Italy, the shortfall was 4.4%. In 
Greece, the size of the economy was 25.1% smaller 
than it was pre-crisis115.
Why is it that the recovery has been so slow and 
uneven in Southern Europe?
115  See Eurostat “GDP and main components (output, 
expenditure and income) [nama_10_gdp]”, NA_ITEM: Gross 
domestic product at market prices, UNIT: Chain linked volu-
mes, index 2010=100. Last update: 04/09/2018. Extracted on: 
05/09/2018.
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In terms of export performance, the fortunes of 
South European economies began to diverge 
considerably during the crisis. The fall 
in domestic demand presented all firms 
in all countries with a strong incentive to 
switch to export markets. However, the 
degree to which they actually succeeded 
in doing so differed greatly between 
countries. In the EU as a whole, exports 
grew by 9.1% in 2008-2013. In Portugal 
and Spain, a strong export performance 
(+16.4% and +10.2% respectively) 
cushioned the effects of the crisis on 
employment and earnings. In contrast, 
exports decreased in Italy (-0.7%) and, 
especially, in Greece (-12.2%) over the 
same period, contributing to the recession instead 
of mitigating its impact.
More recently, exports increased significantly 
throughout Europe (+20.7% in the EU28 in 
2013-2017). This was also the case in the four 
South European member states, although again 
at varying degrees: in 2013-2017, exports grew by 
24.7% in Portugal, by 19.5% in Spain, by 16.5% in 
Greece, and by 15.8% in Italy.
Overall, relative to the EU as a whole, exports grew 
faster in Portugal, and just as fast in Spain. On the 
contrary, in Italy, and especially Greece, exports 
failed to provide the necessary stimulus. Compa-
ring the latest figures with pre-crisis, in 2017 
exports were 45.2% higher than they had been in 
in 2008 in Portugal, and 31.7% in Spain (same as 
the EU28 average). Over the same period, exports 
grew by only 14.9% in Italy, while they barely grew 
at all in Greece (+2.2%)118.
Summing up, in terms of a range of economic indi-
cators (economic growth, resumption of invest-
ment, increases in labour productivity, and export 
performance), Spain and Portugal did signifi-
cantly better than Italy during the recovery, while 
Greece fell further behind.
118 See Eurostat “GDP and main components (output, ex-
penditure and income) [nama_10_gdp]”, NA_ITEM: Exports 
of goods and services, UNIT: Chain linked volumes, index 
2010=100. Last update: 05/09/2018. Extracted on: 05/09/2018.
Table 1: Consumption and investment (2008-
2017)
Note: The figures are cumulative rates of change in the end 
of a period relative to the start of the period, as a percentage of 
the latter.
Source: Eurostat “GDP and main components (output, 
expenditure and income) [nama_10_gdp]”, NA_ITEM: Final 
consumption expenditure / Gross fixed capital formation, 
UNIT: Chain linked volumes, index 2010=100. Last update: 
04/09/2018. Extracted on: 05/09/2018.
vvvReal labour productivity per hour worked 
improved throughout Europe during the crisis 
(+5.1% in the EU28 in 2008-2013). This implies 
that the jobs destroyed were less productive than 
those saved or created anew. This was even more 
the case in Spain (+10.0%) and Portugal (+6.7%). 
However, labour productivity barely increased in 
Italy (+1.1% in 2008-2013), and actually fell in 
Greece during the crisis (-8.4%).
As the economy picked up, creating more jobs 
(including some less productive ones), advances 
in labour productivity were slower (+3.7% in 
the EU28 in 2013-2017). Nevertheless, with the 
exception of Spain (+2.8%), real labour produc-
tivity per hour worked declined in Portugal and 
Greece (-0.9% and -0.6% respectively), and stag-
nated in Italy (0.0% in 2013-2017)117. In view of 
that, except in Spain, there was little evidence of a 
shift to a higher-productivity growth model (and, 
in the case of Greece, clear signs of a retreat to an 
even lower-productivity growth model).
117 See Eurostat “Labour productivity and unit labour 
costs [nama_10_lp_ulc]”, NA_ITEM: Real labour producti-
vity per hour worked, UNIT: Index 2010=100. Last update: 
05/09/2018. Extracted on: 05/09/2018.
Final consumption expenditure 2008-2013 2013-2017 2008-2017
EU28 -0.1 7.1 7.0
Greece -24.3 -0.4 -24.6
Spain -9.3 8.8 -1.3
Italy -5.7 3.6 -2.3
Portugal -9.4 7.3 -2.8
Gross fixed capital formation 2008-2013 2013-2017 2008-2017
EU28 -13.4 14.4 -1.0
Greece -61.3 5.7 -59.1
Spain -35.0 21.1 -21.4
Italy -25.5 6.7 -20.5
Portugal -36.5 19.9 -23.9
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in the recovery).
Moreover, fewer of the jobs that have been created 
since the trough of the recession are full-time 
than used to be the case pre-crisis. Even though 
the share of part-time in total employment is still 
lower in the four South European economies than 
in the EU as a whole, it went up in all four at a 
faster rate than average between 2008 and 2013. 
Th ereaft er, it continued to rise in Italy and Greece, 
though it has fallen back in Spain and, especially, 
Portugal. In 2017, the share of part-time in total 
employment was 4.4 percentage points higher 
than in 2008 in Italy, 4.3 in Greece, 3.3 in Spain, 
while it was practically constant (+0.1 pp.) in 
Portugal. In the EU as a whole, the share of part-
time in total employment rose by 1.9 percentage 
points in 2008-2017120.
Figure 1: Net job creation (2007-2018)
Notes: Th e blue bars show the diff erence in numbers of 
workers in employment at the trough of the recession, rela-
tive to the pre-crisis peak. Th e red bars show the diff erence in 
numbers of workers in employment at the latest quarter for 
which data are available, relative to the trough of the reces-
sion. Both diff erences are normalised as a percentage of the 
number of workers in employment in 2008q3. Pre-crisis peak 
was 2007q3 in Spain, 2008q2 in Italy and Portugal, 2008q3 
in Greece and EU28. Th e trough of the recession was 2013q1 
in the EU28 and all South European countries except Greece 
(2013q4). Th e latest quarter for which data are available is 
2018q2 in Spain and Portugal, and 2018q1 everywhere else.
Source: Eurostat “Employment by sex, age and citizenship 
(1 000) [lfsq_egan]”, SEX: Total, AGE: From 15 to 64 years, 
CITIZEN: Total, UNIT: Th ousand. Last update: 04/09/2018. 
Extracted on: 05/09/2018.
120 See Eurostat “Part-time employment as percentage of 
the total employment, by sex and age (%) [lfsa_eppga]”, SEX: 
Total, AGE: From 15 to 64 years. Last update: 03/08/2018. 
Extracted on: 05/09/2018.
2. The social situation
Th e rise in unemployment was the most characte-
ristic feature of the Great Recession and the Euro-
zone crisis. Th ere is no doubt that the unemploy-
ment rate is on the decrease in Europe, including 
in its Southern periphery. Nevertheless, because of 
recent changes in labour supply (demography and 
migration), there has been less net job creation 
than might be thought from inspection of changes 
in the unemployment rate alone.
In fact, focusing on the total number of workers 
in jobs makes it clear that fewer jobs have been 
created during the recovery in Southern Europe 
than were lost during the crisis (Figure 1).
Specifi cally, in the EU as a whole, there were 13.43 
million more workers in 2018q1 than there had 
been in 2013q1. By comparison, there were 12.25 
million fewer workers in 2013q1 than 
there had been in 2008q3. In view of 
that, the ratio between net job creation 
in the recovery and net job destruction 
in the crisis for the European economy 
as a whole is 1.10 (i.e. 10% more jobs 
have been created in the recent period 
than were lost in the previous period)119.
Repeating the exercise for the South 
European economies (and taking into 
account diff erences in the timing of 
peak and trough, and the latest data 
available) shows that none of the four 
has yet created as many jobs in the recovery as 
were lost during the crisis.
Portugal, with a ratio of 0.74, implying that 26% 
fewer jobs have been recently created than were 
previously lost, comes closest. Th e corresponding 
ratio in Spain is 0.61. In Italy, it is only 0.50 (i.e. 
only half the jobs lost have been recently created). 
In Greece, the ratio of net job creation to net job 
destruction is a disappointing 0.20 (i.e. for every 
fi ve jobs lost in the crisis, only one has been created 
119 Note that job creation and job destruction take place 
simultaneously at all times in all economies. The difference 
between the two is ‘net job creation’ (or, when it is negative, 
‘net job destruction’). Note also that the terms ‘net job creation’ 
and ‘net job destruction’ are used a bit loosely in the text. Since 
it is possible for a worker to hold more than one job at the 
same time, changes in the number of workers in employment 
(as reported in the text) need not be identical to changes in the 
number of jobs.
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Summing up, in terms of a range of social indi-
cators (net job creation, real wage growth, and 
income inequality), all four South European 
economies lost ground relative to the EU as a 
whole. Portugal did better in terms of net job crea-
tion and income inequality (though not as regards 
real wage growth), followed by Spain in terms 
of real wage growth and, partly, net job creation 
(though not as regards income inequality). Italy 
did less well, and Greece did worst.
3. Politics
This is not the right place (nor, for that matter, 
the right author) for a discussion of recent poli-
tical developments in Southern Europe. However, 
it is to see that one common aspect is the rise of 
new political actors in the context of great poli-
tical instability. Again, Portugal stands out, with 
a socialist minority government enjoying the 
external support of the two left parties in parlia-
ment since October 2015. In Spain, two new 
parties, the leftist Podemos and the centrist Ciuda-
danos are challenging the primacy of the socia-
list PSOE and conservative PP, in the context of a 
constitutional crisis provoked by the ‘declaration 
of independence’ of Catalonia. In Italy, the March 
2018 general election brought to power a “souvra-
nist” coalition of the populist Five Star Movement 
and the anti-immigration Lega. In Greece, a coali-
tion of the radical left and the nationalist right is 
in power since January 2015. In all four count-
ries, the political parties that introduced austerity 
policies, usually reluctantly, lost ground and were 
evicted from power.
Popular sentiments towards the EU partly reflect 
that reaction. In October 2008, the share of Euro-
barometer respondents who ‘tended to trust the 
EU’ was 41% in Italy, 50% in Portugal, 55% in 
Spain, and 58% in Greece (relative to 47% across 
the EU as a whole). Within less than five years 
(in May 2013), trust in the EU had collapsed: it 
had fallen to 25% in Italy, 24% in Portugal, 17% 
in Spain, and 19% in Greece (31% in the EU as a 
whole). By May 2017, trust in the EU had bounced 
back, especially in Portugal (54%), and Spain 
Wage growth remained sluggish. In hourly terms, 
taking into account the growth in part-time work, 
between 2013 and 2016 there was virtually zero 
growth in real wages in Southern Europe except for 
Spain (1.7%). In the EU as a whole, real compen-
sation of employees per hour worked increased 
by 3.3%. In 2008-2016, real hourly wages fell by 
0.7% in Italy, 1.2% in Spain, 4.4% in Portugal, and 
16.1% in Greece. In the EU as a whole, they rose 
by 4.2%121.
Poor performance in terms of net job creation 
and sluggish wage growth contributed to rising 
inequality (except in Portugal). Between 2008 and 
2013, the income quintile ratio (S80/S20) rose 
significantly in Greece (+0.7 points), Italy (+0.6) 
and Spain (+0.7). In 2013-2016 it continued to 
grow in Italy (+0.5) and Spain (+0.3), though it 
remained stable in Greece. In Portugal, the S80/
S20 ratio fell by 0.1 points in each period. In the 
EU28, it increased slightly (by 0.1 and 0.2 points 
in 2008-2013 and 2013-2016 respectively), though 
at 5.2 in 2016 it still remained well below the levels 
of Southern Europe (5.9 in Portugal, 6.3 in Italy, 
6.6 in Greece and Spain)122.
Estimates of the Gini index revealed similar 
trends. In 2008-2016, the value of the index rose 
significantly in Greece, Spain and Italy, and fell 
slightly in Portugal. In 2016, all four Southern 
European countries were clustered together near 
the top of the income inequality league table in 
the EU, ranking 5th to 8th, that is between 2 and 4 
percentage points above the EU average. Among 
all member states, the Gini coefficient was now 
higher only in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and 
Latvia – and, in the latter two countries, only very 
slightly so123.
121  See Eurostat “Labour productivity and unit labour 
costs [nama_10_lp_ulc]”, NA_ITEM: Real compensation of 
employees per hour worked based on hCPI, UNIT: Euro (2015 
prices). Last update: 20/12/2017. Extracted on: 30/12/2017.
122  See Eurostat “S80/S20 income quintile share ratio 
by sex and selected age group - EU-SILC survey [ilc_di11]”, 
INDIC_IL: Inequality of income distribution (income 
quintile share ratio). Last update: 18/01/2018. Extracted on: 
24/01/2018.
123  See Eurostat “Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable 
income - EU-SILC survey [ilc_di12]”. Last update: 08/11/2017. 
Extracted on: 13/01/2018.
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(40%), to a lesser degree in Italy (36%), and much 
less Greece (22%). In the EU as a whole, it stood 
at 47%.
It is difficult to miss the connection between the 
rise of anti-EU popular sentiments and political 
actors in Europe’s Southern periphery on the one 
hand, and the management of the Eurozone crisis 
by Germany and other core countries on the other 
hand. For instance, Italy used to be one of the 
most pro-EU countries in Europe. In 2011-2018, 
successive Italian governments (headed in turn by 
Monti, Letta, Renzi, and Gentiloni) failed to find 
solutions within the constraints of EU commit-
ments. Some of the reasons for that failure are 
obviously domestic. Some but not all: perhaps it 
is time we recognised that, given external cons-
traints, being a pro-EU reformer in the European 
periphery is next to impossible.
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As a result of these novelties, the new strategy was 
initially welcomed as a possible promising step 
towards a stronger social Europe (cf. Marlier et 
al. 2010). However, later contributions have cast 
doubts on the effectiveness of both the new strategy 
– and more generally the EU – in combating 
poverty and social exclusion (Pochet 2010; Cope-
land and Daly 2012 and 2014; Armstrong 2012; 
Peña-Casas 2012), due to limited progress along 
several dimensions (cf. Bouget et al. 2015; Frazer 
and Marlier 2016) and especially towards the 
target which seems, in fact, unreachable. 
Against such backdrop, this chapter asks whether 
and how Europe has mattered in the fight 
against poverty and social exclusion under the 
novel Europe 2020 institutional framework, 
by comparing the effects entailed in Italy and 
Germany, during the first five annual cycles of the 
European Semester. The two countries allow for a 
particularly stimulating comparative assessement, 
as they represent two rather opposite worlds of 
implementation (cf. Jessoula and Madama 2018), 
featuring distinct domestic patterns and effects 
that call for interpretation.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 
offers a comparative overview of the empirical 
evidence about the reception of Europe 2020 in 
the two countries and the national-supranational 
interactions around the issue of poverty and social 
exclusion over the first five cycles of the Semester. 
Section 3 deals with the factors affecting the diverse 
implementation of EU inputs at the domestic level 
in the two countries, emphasising the relevance of 
national politico-institutional contexts, as filtering 
EU’s influence. Section 4 concludes.
II. Accommodating EU‘s 
influence vs protecting 
national sovereignty: two 
worlds of domestic effects
The investigation of EU’s impact in the context of 
non-binding, soft coordination processes is not an 
easy task. After the launch of the Lisbon Strategy 
in 2000s, an intense academic debate has flour-
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I. Introduction124 
In the field of anti-poverty policies, which have 
constituted a major brick of ‘social Europe’ since 
decades (cf. Armstrong 2010), the EU’s over-
arching strategy Europe 2020 has actually marked 
a major discontinuity vis à vis the Social OMC 
of the Lisbon phase (2000–10). Not only did the 
new strategy provide an institutional framework 
– the European ‘Semester’ – for stronger (at least 
formally) integration between social – mainly 
anti-poverty – policies and the broader European 
framework for financial-economic governance. It 
also replaced the vague objective of ‘eradicating 
poverty’, included in the former Lisbon Strategy, 
with a possibly less ambitious but more realistic 
and potentially more incisive quantified poverty 
target. Lifting at least 20 million people out of 
poverty and social exclusion by 2020 is, in fact, one 
of the five targets as well as the main social innova-
tion of Europe 2020. In order to reach the quanti-
fied poverty target, in 2012 a key link between the 
new strategy and European funds was introduced: 
within the 2014–20 multi-annual financial frame-
work, Member States (MS) are actually required 
to allocate at least 20 per cent of European Social 
Fund’s resources to combating poverty.
124  This text elaborates on the findings collected in the 
volume “Fighting poverty and social exclusion in the EU. A 
chance in Europe 2020” (Jessoula, M. and Madama, I., eds., 
Routledge, 2018) and has been written in the context of the 
RESCEU Project (Reconciling economic and social Europe, 
www.resceu.eu), funded by the European Research Council 
(Advanced Grant no. 340534).
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an effect’ (Graziano and Vink 2007, p. 9), research 
strategies must be designed carefully – both 
analytically and theoretically – and are required to 
rely on several methods, such as in-depth process 
tracing and careful triangulation of empirical 
evidences.
Situating within this strand of research and 
drawing from the above mentioned consider-
ations, the analytical framework used to inves-
tigate the (possible) effects triggered by Europe 
2020 at the national level aimed at shortening the 
causal chain by exploring procedural (i.e. related 
to governance and policy-making processes), and 
substantive changes at the national level (i.e. policy 
reforms), rather than outcomes (i.e. poverty 
trends).125 More precisely, the empirical inves-
tigation of national-supranational interactions 
in the field of anti-poverty policy was driven by 
five original expectations concerning the possible 
impact of the supranational anti-poverty strategy. 
Drawing from the literature on Social-OMC and 
on the key institutional novelties of the EU2020 
strategy we expected that, compared to the OMC-
Lisbon phase, the Europe 2020 strategy could more 
likely produce substantive effects due to the exis-
tence of EU’s hard poverty target – also combined 
with growing ‘problem pressure’. This may have 
increased the salience of poverty (substantive 
effect no. 1), as well as prompted – under favour-
able conditions – agenda shifts and revision of 
national legislation (substantive effect no. 2). As 
for procedural effects, we expected an impact on 
both the integration and participation dimen-
sions, but in opposite directions: increased cross-
sector and cross-department coordination, that is 
more integration across policy sectors triggered by 
the Semester governance architecture (procedural 
effect no. 3) versus a step back in (multi-)stake-
holder involvement (procedural effect no. 4), due to 
125  From a methodological standpoint, the study relied 
on qualitative research methods, primarily ‘process tracing’ 
(Collier 2011), based on the analysis of several primary and 
secondary sources, complemented by a large number of 
semi-structured interviews with key informants – i.e. insti-
tutional, political and social actors at different government 
levels. Interviews were conducted between October 2012 and 
December 2015. For details, see Jessoula and Madama (2018).
ished around the potential and the limits of policy 
coordination mechanisms based on soft-law, as 
those foreween by the social-OMC. The assess-
ments of the effectiveness of such procesess to 
prompt national 
social policy developments in line with common 
objectives and/or supranational guidelines and 
recommendations have however resulted in 
rather contrasting findings. Some authors have 
emphasized the weakness of the Social OMC, 
suggesting that both its non-binding nature and 
the lack of sanctions have hampered the attain-
ment of commonly agreed objectives (i.e. Barbier 
2005; Armstrong 2006). Others have interpreted 
the lack of coercion as a fruitful condition for 
the unfolding of experimentations and learning 
processes through deliberative forms of gover-
nance, while respecting MS heterogeneity (for a 
review, cf. Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009) as well 
as sovereignty.
From an analytical standpoint, it must be acknowl-
edged that the non-binding, soft nature of this 
kind of coordination processes, within the realm 
of European social policy governance, makes 
EU’s impact more difficult to capture and isolate, 
because it tends to unfold gradually and rarely 
impacts on policy decisions, rather affecting ‘less 
tangible’ elements such as ideas, values and proce-
dures. Furthermore, as argued by Barcevičius 
et al. (2014, p. 35), when processes of soft coor-
dination are considered, ‘influences on policy-
making must be “domesticated” – that is must pass 
through national policy processes and be adapted 
to national contexts – before feeding into Member 
State policy decisions’. This branch of literature 
therefore comes with two main and opposite 
risks: on the one hand, the risk of downplaying 
EU-related factors in explaining domestic change; 
on the other, causal over-determination. 
As argued by Lehmkuhl (2007, p. 342), the disen-
tanglement of the net effect of Europe from other 
factors and the re-entanglement of mutually 
supporting or inhibiting factors remain at the top 
of the Europeanization research agenda. Yet, to 
avoid making ‘EU influence a cause in search of 
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social exclusion – and especially the anti-poverty 
target. Chancellor Angela Merkel herself explic-
itly affirmed, in March 2010, ‘I will not give any 
support for a quantitative target’ to be included 
in the European strategy against poverty (cf. 
Zimmermann and Petzold 2018). The government 
somehow exploited the critical juncture repre-
sented by the genetic moment of Europe 2020, and 
especially the launch of the strategy implementa-
tion at the national level, to strongly filter supra-
national ‘soft’ but strengthened pressures aimed to 
support the achievement of the Europe 2020 ‘hard’ 
poverty target. As further evidence of such resis-
tance against the perceived EU ‘intrusion’ in a field 
of national sovereignty, not surprisingly Germany 
did not define the national anti-poverty targets 
in accordance with AROPE indicators agreed at 
the EU level and opted for quantified targets that 
better matched national priorities and strategies, 
setting the reduction of long-term unemploy-
ment as the national objective in the Europe 2020 
framework. Therefore, claims about the defense of 
national ‘social’ sovereignty went in parallel with 
the domestic reframing and reinterpretation of 
the EU anti-poverty target in accordance with the 
national approach as well as government’ orienta-
tions to combat poverty and social exclusion.
The reactions were radically different in Italy, 
where the launch of Europe 2020, with its poverty 
target, was much less politically contentious. The 
country had broadly supported the introduction 
of a common quantified EU anti-poverty target 
(Copeland and Daly 2012), and the politicization 
of the matter during the critical juncture was low. 
When drafting the first NRP in 2011, the issue was 
mostly dealt with at the administrative level, with 
limited (or no) direct engagement of the main 
politico-institutional actors. Italy also complied 
with European prescriptions by setting the anti-
poverty goals in congruence with agreed indica-
tors: lifting 2.2 million people out of poverty or 
social exclusion by 2020.
Interestingly, Italy is one of the countries where 
the Europe 2020 strategy has produced the most 
relevant substantive effects in the subsequent 
the switch from the OMC to Europe 2020 gover-
nance framework. Last, we expected that effects 
might unfold slowly over time, from the first to 
the fifth cycle (procedural effect no. 5), as a conse-
quence of both the institutionalization of the iter-
ative governance processes and on-going supra-
national actions aimed at reinforcing governance 
mechanisms and EU’s steering power.
Field research has shown that significant varia-
tion has characterized the implementation of 
the Europe 2020 anti-poverty component at the 
national level in Italy and Germany. The main 
findings are summarized below, starting from 
substantive effects126.
Substantive effects: two diverse 
implementation patterns
With regard to effects in the political sphere 
entailed by Europe 2020 implementation, 
Germany and Italy have followed two rather 
different implementation patterns. In Germany 
the launch of Europe 2020 prompted a lively reac-
tion by the national government aimed at tack-
ling supranational ‘intrusion’ in domestic social 
policy-making. Such resistance, as well as oppo-
sition, by national governments was particularly 
strong in the initial phase of the new overarching 
strategy: the inclusion of the poverty target among 
the five main Europe 2020 quantitative objec-
tives was actually perceived to have the potential 
of greatly increasing the visibility of the issue at 
the supranational level, thus legitimizing further 
interference by European institutions in domestic 
anti-poverty agendas. 
In the Bundestag, the Conservative-liberal coali-
tion (CDU-CSU, FDP) overtly supported the first 
three Europe 2020 headline targets – concerning 
employment, R&D/innovation and climate 
change/energy – but clearly rejected the social 
dimension of the overarching supranational 
strategy – addressing education and poverty/
126  The comparative evidence presented here elaborates on 
the findings of the researches conducted by Zimmermann and 
Petzold (2018) and Madama, Natili and Agostini (2018).
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Germany. The shift from the Lisbon-OMC period 
to Europe 2020 actually resulted in very limited, 
and in fact diminished, stakeholder involvement 
– especially NGOs and anti-poverty groups. The 
drafting of the first NRPs in 2011 constituted a 
centralized exercise, which involved ministries 
and peak bureaucracy only in both countries. 
However, from the second cycle in 2012, things 
have slightly changed in Germany. This gradual 
change is in line with our fifth expectation about 
the effects unfolding slowly over time due to iter-
ated multi-level and multi-stakeholder interac-
tions. According to an institutionalized national 
procedure known as ‘Social Monitoring’ (Sozial-
monitoring), the Federal Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs invited several actors to hearings 
aimed at discussing the preparation of national 
reports. The audience was quite broad – including 
NGOs, social partners, the national network of 
EAPN and municipalities – and some organiza-
tions were also asked to comment on draft NRPs 
(cf. Zimmermann and Petzold 2018)127. 
In Italy, stakeholder involvement and actor partic-
ipation in drafting NRPs has remained limited, 
thus shaping a visible step back compared to the 
Social OMC. The Italian case however is more 
complex, and actually two-faced. On the one hand, 
openness to societal interests was low in drafting 
NRPs, especially in the area of poverty and social 
exclusion; on the other, this was in sharp contrast 
with the highly participatory approach adopted, 
still within the Europe 2020 framework, but in 
relation to the planning of structural funds for the 
2014–2020 cycle (cf. Madama et al. 2018).
III. Two worlds of domestic 
effects: investigating the 
factors behind
The empirical evidence presented in the previous 
section shows that Italy and Germany represent 
127 Although the European Semester cycles did actually 
provide opportunities to societal interests operating in the area 
of poverty and social exclusion of being heard by policy mak-
ers, in some cases stakeholders complained that their chances 
to influence governments’ decisions remained weak.
cycles. From the first to the fifth cycle, anti-
poverty policies gained momentum and substan-
tive effects could be detected in the ideational 
sphere, partly percolating into national legisla-
tion. This happened, first, through the initiatives 
aimed to re-direct the usage of ESF funds in order 
to tackle the poverty challenge in accordance with 
the national anti-poverty target; second, through 
the reform and the gradual expansion of the newly 
launched anti-poverty national measure (the 
Social Card pilot project, soon re-named Support 
for Active Inclusion, SIA). 
Procedural effects: a mixed 
picture after a weak start
When considering procedural effects, the imple-
mentation of the Europe 2020 strategy at the 
national level appears heterogeneous, and initial 
expectations about both (increased) cross-
sectoral integration and (reduced) multi-level and 
multi-stakeholder involvement were only partly 
confirmed.
With regard to the strategy potential to trigger 
more integration, and possibly coordination, across 
different policy fields and departmental (mainly, 
ministerial) structures, findings are mixed. In 
Germany NRP drafting was a centralized process 
in the hands of finance ministries, with only 
poor inter-ministerial coordination/integration 
between economic (and even employment) poli-
cies and social/anti-poverty measures. In Italy, an 
attempt to strengthen cross-sector policy integra-
tion was made in ESF planning for the 2014–2020 
budget cycle, a process which registered higher 
coordination and cooperation across ministries 
and government levels than in drafting NRPs.
With regard to the second dimension of proce-
dural effects, both horizontal (multi-stakeholder) 
and vertical (multi-level) participation once more 
revealed substantial variation. Our initial expecta-
tion about the possible reduction of stakeholder 
involvement – in light of the relatively weak 
Europe 2020 governance structure compared to 
the Social OMC – was confirmed in both Italy and 
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ments; (ii) national attitudes towards Europe; and 
(iii) domestic politics dynamics are key to explain 
the implementation of Europe 2020 at the national 
level (cf. Jessoula and Madama 2018).
On that respect, the two countries presented very 
different configurations. Germany was charac-
terized by robust national institutional legacy 
in fighting poverty and social exclusion and can 
thus be conceived as a typical case of ‘institutional 
pre-emption’ with governments actually reacting 
harshly against the perceived EU ‘intrusion’ in a 
sector of national sovereignty. The national govern-
ment in fact acted as ‘institutional gatekeeper’ 
within the Europe 2020 framework by ‘domes-
ticating’ the anti-poverty target (Jessoula 2016), 
limiting both stakeholder involvement and multi-
level coordination, centralizing NRP drafting in 
the hand of economic ministers. Furthermore, the 
fact that EU funds are not particularly relevant in 
the country, as well as the prevalence of centre-
right governments in the considered period, 
further contributed to national government 
behaviour, and the strategy implementation was 
overall weak: effects emerged almost solely in the 
political sphere, with argumentative/ideational 
clashes along the vertical axis (national/suprana-
tional) and the horizontal one (opposition parties 
vs. governing coalitions).
Quite the opposite, in Italy the launch of the novel 
supranational anti-poverty strategy and especially 
the quantitative target did not prompt a polit-
ical conflict along the vertical dimension, that 
is along the national sovereignty vs. EU integra-
tion (possible) line of tension, in the Europe 2020 
genetic moment. Here, domestic political actors 
and national governments did not act as gate-
keepers vis à vis the new European strategy, and 
the latter actually provided an institutional frame-
work that was exploited by domestic (institu-
tional, political and social) actors in order to rein-
force national anti-poverty measures. Why did the 
national governments in Italy not worry about the 
reinforced supranational framework and potential 
EU intrusiveness in a typical national competence 
domain such as anti-poverty policies? The three 
two rather distinct worlds of implementation of 
the Europe 2020 anti-poverty strategy. In Germany 
the elaboration as well as the initial implementa-
tion of the supranational anti-poverty strategy 
substantially increased the political salience of the 
poverty issue. This did not pave the way, however, 
for a smooth implementation of the strategy, or 
the setting of the national poverty target in accor-
dance with EU’s guidelines. Nor did increased 
political salience favour, especially in the initial 
phase, more actor participation and coordination 
across the different policy sectors and government 
levels. Rather, research findings revealed the emer-
gence of a main line of tension between the MS and 
the EU, related to national sovereignty/autonomy 
vs. European coordination mechanisms in the field 
of social and especially anti-poverty policies. The 
setting of the quantified poverty target within 
the Europe 2020 institutional framework actu-
ally provoked a government reaction in defense 
of national social sovereignty. The new Europe 
2020 strategy was actually perceived as a potential 
‘Trojan horse’ for competence creep in the social 
field and the government explicitly opposed it.
By contrast, in Italy governments showed a more 
positive attitude vis à vis the new European 
strategy in the field of anti-poverty policies, and 
the national-supranational ‘competence clash’ did 
not materialize. The strategy implementation was 
therefore non-contentious, and its effects turned 
out more far reaching especially along the substan-
tive dimension.
How can we solve the puzzle implied by such 
diverse effects, and consequent very different 
implementation, of the Europe 2020 anti-poverty 
strategy in the two countries? By integrating the 
main findings of the consolidated strand of liter-
ature  that has shed light on the major role of 
domestic factors in ‘filtering’ supranational pres-
sures (cf. Graziano et al. 2011; De la Porte and 
Heins 2016; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009), with 
more recent studies on the social dimension of 
Europe 2020 (cf. Jessoula 2015), and insights from 
comparative welfare state research, we contend 
that (i) domestic policy/institutional arrange-
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compared to 2008. The trend was therefore oppo-
site to what was expected and desired.
When looking at the domestic effects triggered 
by the EU strategy in terms of policy outputs and 
procedural dynamics – which have been at the core 
of our analysis – the picture is, however, less clear-
cut.
Policy coordination based on soft-law mecha-
nisms may well be ineffective. Acknowledging the 
EU’s ‘social competence gap’ also implies recog-
nizing that overcoming sovereignty and political 
constraints posed by reluctant MS (i.e. the German 
case) is de facto impossible. Our analysis however 
suggests that Europe 2020 anti-poverty strategy, 
under favourable conditions, had the chance to 
produce more significant effects in the country 
presenting a weaker ‘safety net’ (i.e. the Italian 
case), where in combination with EU fund allo-
cation, Europe 2020 actually provided resources 
and an innovative institutional framework that 
contributed to strengthen its national anti-poverty 
model. In particular, such institutional framework 
– resting on soft- law mechanisms, but backed by 
a ‘hard’ target – has allowed the EU and especially 
the Commission to act as an anti-poverty, social 
policy advocate through iterated interactions in 
the Semester. Parallel to this, supranational target 
and agency provided an opportunity for – as well 
as strengthened – national actors that exploited 
the Europe 2020 institutional framework to ‘voice’ 
in favour of more effective measures to achieve 
national(/EU) poverty targets. Without indulging 
in excessive optimism, adopting a ‘systemic’ 
perspective one could say that were the EU’s social 
strategies more effective in pushing policymakers 
to reinforce welfare arrangements and anti-
poverty policies (at least) where the latter were less 
robust, that would be already an important result 
for the Union as a whole. 
explanatory factors seem to have played a key role 
in this respect. On the one hand, the absence of 
a robust national anti-poverty legacy explains the 
lack of institutional pre-emption. On the other, 
empirical investigation revealed that such devel-
opment must be understood in light of the high 
relevance of EU structural funds for active inclu-
sion policies in the country: in a perspective of 
reciprocal acknowledgement of their respec-
tive institutional roles, the opportunity to access 
EU funds for social inclusion strategies actually 
pushed national governments to behave as ‘good 
pupils’, leading to a sort of ‘Europe is where money 
is’ effect. Notably, this dynamic fully appeared 
only when a pro-EU government came into power 
in 2011128.
IV. Conclusive remarks
The analysis presented in the previous pages 
prompts some final reflections on the potential 
relevance of the EU in the fight against poverty 
within the novel overarching Europe 2020 insti-
tutional framework. First and foremost, it must 
be said that, when looking at outcomes, figures are 
disappointing. In 2015, that is halfway through 
the Europe 2020 decade, the results produced by 
the new strategy were not satisfactory. Although 
the overall scenario was severely affected by the 
Great Recession and the Euro-crisis, the EU target 
of lifting 20 million individual out of poverty and 
social exclusion was out of reach: indeed, people 
in poverty or social exclusion have increased 
between 2008 (the reference year to assess prog-
ress towards the poverty target) and 2015: 1.8 
million more individuals were at risk of poverty 
and social exclusion in 2015, and 8.1 per cent of 
the EU28 population (40.4 million) experienced 
severe material deprivation. More recent figures 
show a slight improvement, but still 118 million 
people are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 
with an increase of about 800,000 individuals 
128  We do refer to the technocratic government led by 
Monti, in office from November 2011 till April 2013.
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that facilitate risk-sharing across the Member 
States is completely unrealistic. At the same time, 
demanding risk sharing in the absence of struc-
tural reforms is simply unsustainable.
Therefore, if we want to accelerate the path of 
structural reforms at the national level, we have to 
increase the pace of risk-sharing at the European 
level in at least one of the crucial areas. If, vice versa, 
we want to increase the degree of risk-sharing and 
make this sustainable, we have to strengthen the 
economic fibre of member countries by speeding 
up structural reforms. The bottom line is that 
risk-sharing and structural reforms must advance 
hand-in-hand in order to happen. In the absence 
of their co-ordinated advancement, neither can 
persist and European integration cannot advance. 
In order to make sure integration does happen, we 
have to correct the general perspective on what 
structural reforms and risk-sharing really entail. 
Let us analyse each of these issues in turn.
Structural Reforms Taken 
Seriously: The Importance of 
Political Ownership
If European integration requires structural 
reforms, structural reforms are the result of polit-
ical decisions at the national level and their often 
complex dynamics. Although structural reforms 
are one of the pre-requisites of European inte-
gration, the reasons behind them are deeper and 
broader: the European socio-economic model is 
under threat and urgently needs to be reformed to 
retain a satisfactory level of social protection. As 
member countries struggle to change their econo-
mies and welfare states, changes are progressing 
slowly. By today, Europeans have been talking 
about reforms for so many years that the European 
political discourse has developed its own rhetoric 
about the importance and centrality of structural 
reforms.130
130 For a discussion of the current prospects, it is useful to 
refer to Erik Jones and Anand Menon, “Europe: the Once and 
Future Union”, 2018 Annual Meetings American Political Sci-
ence Association.
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“In politics, nothing happens by accident. If it 
happens, you can bet it was planned that way.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Introduction
It has been some years since Europe lost its central 
role in world affairs. While the economic rise 
of Asia is mostly responsible for this outcome, 
today Europeans are facing a new challenge: the 
combination of unfavourable demography, vola-
tile migration flows and technological disruption, 
which questions the traditional economic identity 
of the European economy and the sustainability 
of the social standards that we take for granted. 
Enhanced European integration is often presented 
as an effective tool to respond to these challenges. 
This article discusses what is missing in our 
policy perspective in order to develop integration 
seriously and make sure it helps to address the 
combined challenges of globalisation and techno-
logical change.
European integration advances only if it secures 
stability and comparable economic development 
across Member States and regions. Both stability 
and economic growth are fed by structural reforms 
and risk-sharing. This is easier said than done: the 
discussion that follows wants to advance two very 
simple, fundamental and related points. The first is 
that advocating structural reforms at the national 
level without improving the European institutions 
129  I am grateful to Mark Gilbert, Erik Jones and Alberto 
Martin for comments and discussions on an earlier draft. Con-
tact info:SAIS Europe, Johns Hopkins University, Via Andre-
atta 3, 40125 Bologna, Italy. Email: ftaddei@jhu.edu.
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structural - because it is instrumental to provide 
a proper answer to the second question – why are 
structural reforms so difficult. In order to illus-
trate the point, it may be useful to draw from 
some of the latest experience of reform-making in 
Europe during and after the Great Recession. Italy 
can provide a very insightful dichotomy with two 
reforms that were deemed structural: the pension 
reform in December 2011, and the Jobs Act in 
2015. As I will argue, only one, though- the Jobs 
Act - possesses the degree of political ownership 
that makes it truly structural.
The Italian Pension Reform
In December 2011, only three weeks after Senator 
Mario Monti had been sworn in as Italian Prime 
Minister following Silvio Berlusconi’s resigna-
tion, his new government presented to the Italian 
Parliament a radical pension reform - the Fornero 
Reform, named after the Minister of Labour, Social 
Policies and Gender Equality, Elsa Fornero. The 
reform increased, with immediate effect, the stat-
utory retirement age to 66 years of age and linked 
it, from that moment onwards, to the evolution 
of life expectancy. If Italians, as is the case today, 
continue to be one of the most longevous people 
in the planet, their retirement age will continue to 
rise together with life expectancy.
The changes in 2011 put the Italian pension 
system among the most sustainable across devel-
oped economies and certainly as one of the most 
forward looking in Europe. The Italian Parlia-
ment, on the brink of political collapse and under 
pressure by the threat of rising government debt 
spread, weak growth and unsustainable public 
finances, approved the Government proposal with 
virtually no changes and with one of the largest 
majorities in the history of the Italian republic. 
By any metric, this reform addressed a negative 
legacy in the Italian economy and, thus, it fulfilled 
the necessary condition to be defined as struc-
tural: retirement rules have always overprotected 
the interests of the incumbent old generations 
at the expense of the young generations. Since 
As is often the case, this rhetoric is not helping. 
It is creating a perception of a continent split 
between a group of member countries that appears 
more eager to change and take responsibility, and 
another group that is doing anything it can to 
postpone the reforms and relies on others to bail 
them out. Although it is true that political will 
varies across countries, this perception is actually 
confusing our discussion rather than helping us 
focus to on the nature, the benefits, and the costs 
of reforming a country. Let us abstract from this 
misleading rhetoric to take two steps back and 
make an effort to ask two apparently simple ques-
tions. First, what is necessary for a reform to be 
structural? Second, why are structural reforms so 
difficult and slow?
We should refer to a structural reform as any 
change in institutions or legislation that is thor-
ough enough to deal with a fundamental factor 
in the economy or society, a factor that we could 
identify as an existing legacy. Negative legacies 
are the result of consolidated forms of behaviour 
that accumulated their effects through the years 
and turned out to be detrimental to either equality 
or growth or both. Rents inherited by groups or 
individuals, rules and incentives detrimental to 
equality of opportunities, large public debt, retire-
ment requirements responsible for generational 
inequality, welfare benefits addressed to politi-
cally active minorities rather than to those in need 
and inconsistencies in the tax system would all 
fall into the broader category of negative legacies. 
Although a reform needs to address a negative 
legacy in order to be structural, I want to argue 
that this is not a sufficient condition to define it as 
such. In the general political discourse, this is very 
often a point of confusion. Any change – reform 
-of a negative legacy is considered a structural 
reform. This is conceptually misconceived and it 
is an important mistake. In fact, this perspective 
is delaying the reform of European governance, 
and it is generating ineffective policies to support 
national reforms.
It is important to spend some time on this issue 
– what is sufficient to define a reform as being 
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Political Ownership, the 
Emergency Threat and Structural 
Reforms
As problematical as the political process behind 
the Jobs Act was, it delivered political ownership 
of the labour market reform. A political party – 
in this case, the Italian Democratic Party, which 
was ruling at the time – claimed ownership of 
the reform and invested the political capital (i.e., 
consensus) raised in the political market (i.e., elec-
tions) in a change in legislation that could produce 
the desired effects and rebuild the political capital. 
This is a striking difference with the pension 
reform. In fact, the pension reform was intro-
duced after almost no discussion and voted within 
three weeks by an overwhelming majority ranging 
from left to right parties. Apparently uncontrover-
sial and solid, it did not seek any popular support 
but was pushed through by the urgency created by 
the growing financial tensions surrounding Italian 
public debt. As a result of this process, the pension 
reform had no political capital invested in it and, 
therefore, could not have any political owner-
ship. Since no political group owns it, no political 
subject is responsible for its survival and everyone 
may feel tempted to modify it or even cancel it, as 
the currently ruling coalition is already proposing 
to do in the budgetary plan for 2019. As current 
events show, when no political actor is ready or 
willing to defend a reform, its persistence over 
time becomes uncertain.
It therefore seems quite misleading to define these 
kinds of reform, even if they address an impor-
tant negative legacy, as “structural”. They lack 
the necessary political ownership to survive over 
time. The Italian Pension Reform, soon to become 
a political orphan, was implemented and is still 
producing its effects. It is nonetheless continu-
ously under threat of cancellation and contributes 
to produce a sense of disenfranchisement in the 
citizens of its country. This is a common outcome: 
lack of political ownership quickly translates into 
lack of national ownership. This generates a disen-
franchisement that fails to overturn the practices 
2011, this overprotection is definitely more diffi-
cult, although the Italian government has recently 
announced a partial reversal of the reform, which 
highlights, as we will discuss below, that a reform 
cannot be easily categorised as structural if it lacks 
political ownership.131
The Italian Jobs Act
Few years later, in December 2014, following the 
initiative of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, leader 
of the Democratic Party, and his government, the 
Italian Parliament approved the framework legis-
lation determined to reform labour market insti-
tutions comprehensively – the Jobs Act. The vote 
in Parliament came after a very heated debate, 
one that divided the Democratic Party and which 
could only be recomposed through party loyalty. 
While the Pension reform was approved by a super 
majority, the Jobs Act was passed in the Senate with 
a very small margin. Shortly before and after this 
approval, the Prime Minister had organised and 
supervised, together with the Minister of Labour 
and Social Policies, Giuliano Poletti, a small group 
of policy experts to achieve a quick implementa-
tion of the framework legislation.
In the nine months that followed, at a pace unpar-
alleled in other structural reforms in Europe, the 
Italian labour market experienced the introduc-
tion a new paradigm: protection of workers would 
be delivered in the market rather than centred in 
the job post. Dismissal rules were changed and 
simplified to increase flexibility, unemployment 
insurance was extended in both coverage and 
duration, wage supplementation scheme were 
better protected from abuses and moral hazard, 
and active labour market policies were brought 
under national co-ordination for the first time. 
The reform was thorough and fast while the polit-
ical process that led to it was cumbersome and 
divisive.
131  As this paper is being finalised, the Italian Budgetary 
Plan for 2019 is in preparation. Although the policy reversal 
has not been finalised yet, the Italian Government and the 
parties in the supporting coalition have made clear announce-
ments regarding their intention to reverse this reform.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL OWNERSHIP:  
FICTION AND REALITY BEHIND STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND RISK-SHARING
Filippo Taddei
173
legacy – how severe problems are - and will – how 
quickly political capital can be invested to address 
them. The question that we should be asking is 
therefore how we can facilitate the emergence of 
the political will necessary to produce structural 
reforms in countries that are hampered by nega-
tive legacies.
In the face of the severe economic shock that 
hit the continent, the weaknesses of individual 
member countries have emerged, in some cases 
dramatically. We have observed the emergence of 
important regional asymmetries both as a conse-
quence of the common shock and in the policy 
responses that have emerged. It should be clari-
fied that this heterogeneity is mostly due to the 
different legacies present in the different Euro-
pean countries. These legacies are the reasons for 
reforms, structural reforms, but we have to eval-
uate whether mechanisms such as fiscal conver-
gence or the capital market union that insure and 
protect member countries from the asymmetric 
and country-specific effects of common shock can 
accelerate the domestic reform process.
Politics, like economics, forces decision-makers to 
address many objectives with limited resources. 
In policy-making, structural reforms remain a 
matter of prioritising medium- and long-term 
results over short-term responses. Some Euro-
pean policy-makers seem to believe that the pres-
sure of national emergencies could fast-forward 
structural reforms in member countries. As 
previously argued, this point of view is due to a 
conceptual mistake: such reforms, even when they 
happen, remain inherently fragile. Only reforms 
investing political capital and gathering consensus 
in their scope can persist in time and affect ordi-
nary economic and social behaviour. Only these 
reforms can have the ambition to become struc-
tural. This paper has argued that enhancing risk-
sharing to offer protection to the member coun-
tries from the severe effects of common shocks 
allows European countries to focus resources and 
efforts in raising the political capital necessary to 
advance structural reforms.
and forms of behaviour of citizens which lie at 
the root of the legacy that the reform was set to 
correct.
Comparing two Italian reforms – the Pension 
Reform and the Jobs Act – highlights a general 
point and a crucial distinction: a reform cannot be 
considered “structural” unless a sufficiently large 
share of the citizens feel to have a stake and a say 
in the process that determined it. Otherwise, the 
reform lacks the national ownership that only a 
fully-fledged democratic process may provide and 
remains inherently fragile. Incidentally, this also 
helps to answer our second question: why struc-
tural reforms are so difficult and slow. The reason 
is that building up sufficient political capital to 
avoid citizen disenfranchisement is a costly and 
often lengthy process. There are no short cuts, 
though. Relying on the push of emergencies to 
facilitate structural reforms is only an apparent 
short cut: it is a misconception that comes from 
confusion in the definition of structural reforms. 
Reforms motivated by some perceived national 
emergency are always at risk of being withdrawn 
once the perception of the emergency fades away. 
If we want to incentivise the development of 
properly defined structural reforms, capable of 
changing – both in depth and permanently - the 
fundamentals of society, we must understand that 
such reforms require the political ownership that 
only a thorough and often controversial political 
process may offer. As this process is already diffi-
cult per se, it is worthwhile thinking about how 
European institutions can help this. We turn to 
this issue now.
Risk-Sharing and Uneven 
Recovery: The European Level
The Great Recession has been followed by an 
uneven economic recovery within the European 
Union. This inequality is slowing down structural 
reforms. It is also hindering the development of a 
common and consistent perspective regarding the 
role of European institutions. When we ponder the 
likelihood of national reforms, we often confuse 
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European Integration Taken 
Seriously: Combining Risk-
Sharing and Structural 
Reforms
Not a single month goes by without an informal or 
formal invitation by some branch of the European 
institutions to increase the “pace of structural 
reforms” in the different Member States. Almost 
not a single day goes by without a national govern-
ment responding to this invitation with more or 
less eagerness.
Notwithstanding this, Europe is not changing at 
the pace we had hope for, democratic institutions 
are perceived as being less effective at addressing 
citizens’ demands, and concomitantly citizens feel 
increasingly disenfranchised from the political 
process and discourse. We have been here before 
in our common history: these are the funda-
mental factors and policy mistakes behind the rise 
of populist movements and parties, a rise that is 
taking place – unsurprisingly – in almost every 
major European country as European integration 
seem troubled and regional disparities consoli-
date.
This state of European affairs is not random but 
rather the consequence of a conceptually flawed 
definition of what a structural reform really means. 
It is not enough for structural reforms to address 
a fundamental weakness, they must also be char-
acterised by political ownership. It is very difficult 
for member countries to raise political capital if 
they are dealing with the tail-effects of the most 
severe economic recession since World War II. 
This is the reason why risk sharing at the Euro-
pean level and structural reforms at the national 
level can only progress together: by supporting 
each other, only their combination can advance 
European integration.
D THE LEGACY OF THE 
WELFARE STATE IN 
EUROPE
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hurdles are not based solely or primarily upon 
the provincial narrow-mindedness of the political 
representatives of the Member States. Rather, they 
are rooted in the complex heterogeneity of the 
28 Member States, which, for their part, do not 
operate in a vacuum but within the framework of 
a globalised world economy.
Upon this basis, many political and scientific 
observers have realised that – whatever form the 
Union may take in the more distant future – at 
present, a policy of strengthening social issues 
in the Union must always focus on the necessity 
that, at the very least, the law of the Union does 
not limit welfare state options at the national level 
too severely.132 There is every reason for this focus. 
After all, the pursuit of the common good in the 
Member States, particularly the labour and social 
law of the Member States, and finally parties to 
collective-bargaining agreements, have to comply 
with the strict requirements of the constitution 
of the internal market, in other words, market 
freedom and competition law. In addition, there 
are the functional imperatives of the euro, which 
impose strict compliance burdens on the deficit 
countries, which they must fulfil not least by 
re-structuring their collective-bargaining systems 
at the expense of the trade unions and by reducing 
social security.
Only rather naïve observers oppose this.133 
However, they do not support their arguments by 
referring to current developments or structures, 
but rely on the texts of the EU treaties: The Union 
is said to be a social market economy (Article 3 (3) 
(2) TEU); the social cross-sectional provision is 
argued to enshrine a kind of welfare state principle 
(Article 9 TFEU); the EU Charter of Fundamental 
132  Sacha Garben, in: European Constitutional Law Review 
13 (2017), 23 ff.; Christian Joerges, Social Justice in an ever 
more diverse Union, in: Vandenbrouke, Barnard, De Baere 
(eds.), A European Social Union after the Crisis, 2017, 92 ff.; 
groundbreaking: Fritz Scharpf, Regieren in Europa: Effektiv 
und demokratisch, 1999.
133  Among them are, specifically, the judges of the Second 
Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court, who made the 
decision on the Treaty of Lisbon: BVerfG, ruling dated June 30, 
2009, 2 BvE 2/08 at al., in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 427 ff. – Treaty of 
Lisbon.
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1. The “European Pact for 
Social Progress”
For decades the question of whether, and, if so, 
how, the European Union can become not only 
an economic and subsequently a currency union, 
perhaps also a community of shared values, but 
also a social union, has been the subject of political 
and scientific debate. For a long time, a predomi-
nantly optimistic scenario dominated. This was 
based upon the conviction that the steps towards 
integration in the internal market and then the 
common currency would simply compel further 
and substantial integration steps in social areas 
(including labour law and collective-bargaining 
agreements). In this phase, it was appropriate 
for unions and Social Democratic parties in 
particular to welcome every move towards inte-
gration, because, with each deepening, the overall 
dynamics would also be propelled forward. Ulti-
mately, this would lead to the “United States of 
Europe”, to a “European Republic”, in other words, 
to a state entity that would be politically and demo-
cratically integrated and able to act effectively 
in the social domain. Finally, the social control 
capacity lost in the meantime at the national level 
would be successfully recovered at a higher level.
After the Constitutional Treaty failed, the labels 
of the “United States of Europe” or a “European 
Republic” initially ceased to be used in the polit-
ical sphere and in the meantime have also fallen 
out of use in scientific discourse. Furthermore, 
the view that the emergence of a democratic and 
social union is not a necessity for the integration 
dynamic, but which is confronted by serious obsta-
cles, has gained ground. It has become increas-
ingly clear to open-minded observers that these 
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by the European Court of Justice. But the Euro-
pean Parliament has had no political access to the 
juridical mode of integration from the outset, at 
least when – as is often the case – the application 
of primary law is concerned.
Given the impracticality of these typical pro-
European responses, unions and social-demo-
cratic parties from Austria, Sweden and Germany 
want to adopt a different course. At a summit 
meeting in late November 2016, they decided on 
the “European Pact for Social Progress”.138 This 
pact builds on the demand of the European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC) for the adoption 
of a “Protocol on Social Progress”.139 The ETUC 
had initiated this demand in 2008 in response to 
ECJ rulings on EU-law restrictions on collective-
bargaining autonomy, in order to correct these 
decisions by amending primary legislation. The 
demands of the social progress protocol have now 
been taken up by trade unions and social demo-
crats in the three-country initiative, and specified 
and further developed in the “European Pact for 
Social Progress” just mentioned.
In Section 2, the European Pact emphasises the 
following demands based upon primary legisla-
tion:
1) The obligations of the Union regarding 
social market economy and social progress 
must be formulated so that these concepts 
clearly include strong workers’ rights, and 
should exclude competition at the expense 
of wages and working conditions.
2) The economic freedoms of the 
internal market should not be understood 
as a ban on unjustified restrictions but 
instead they should only ensure rights to 
equal treatment.
138  Alliance for a Social Europe formed from the SPD, 
SPÖ, SAP, DGB, ÖGB, and LO, A European Pact for So-
cial Progress, Vienna 2016, available at: http://www.dgb.de/
themen/++co++14093cce-b620-11e6-a970-525400e5a74a.
139  The fully worked out proposal is available here:  
https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/social_progress_proto-
colEN_1.pdf. 
Rights is claimed to contain fundamental social 
rights (Articles 27-38 EU-GRC), and recently a 
new “European Pillar of Social Rights”134 has been 
proclaimed; there is a chapter on employment 
(Articles 145-150 TFEU); there is a social chapter 
(Article 151 TFEU) and related EU legislation; 
equal pay is guaranteed (Article 157 TFEU), 
and so on. These rather naïve observers seek to 
counter the limitations of social achievements 
under EU law with the usual demands for “more 
integration”, i.e., the transfer of further powers to 
the Union, and “more democracy”, meaning the 
strengthening of the European Parliament.135 But 
this does not work in the social field. This has 
been explained many times136 and will thus only 
be briefly repeated here:
The economic, regulatory and political heter-
ogeneity in the Union is too great for a social 
policy to be formulated at Union level, let alone, 
enforced, which could even approach the levels 
in the developed welfare states within the Union. 
Consequently, it would be of no help if the Union 
acquired very comprehensive powers in the field 
of social affairs as well. The Union would not be 
able to use them. In addition, developments that 
are problematical for social issues are often the 
product of “integration through law”,137 and this 
means integration not through political legisla-
tion but through judicial application of the law 
134 Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publica-
tions/european-pillar-social-rights-booklet_en.
135  HaukeBrunkhorst is representative of this in his article 
“Auswegeaus der technokratischenFalle,” in: Leviathan 42 
(2014), 508 ff. 
136  For example: Wolfgang Streeck, GekaufteZeit: Die 
vertagteKrise des demokratischenKapitalismus, 2013, 141 ff.; 
Claus Offe, The European Model of “Social Capitalism”: Can it 
Survive European Integration, in: Journal of Political Philoso-
phy 11 (2003), 437 ff.; Alexander Somek, Concordantia Cath-
olica. Exploring the Context of European Anti-Discrimination 
Law and Policy, in: Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 15 (2005), 959 ff.; Florian Rödl, Arbeitsverfassung 
(labor constitution), in: Bogdandy/Bast (eds.), Europäisches-
Verfassungsrecht, 2009, 855 ff., see especially 877 ff.
137  The title of the anthology Mauro Cappelletti/Monica 
Seccombe/Joseph Weiler (eds.), Integration Through Law, 
makes the point. Vol 1, 1986; see Ulrich Haltern, Integration 
by Law, in: Bieling/Lerch (eds.), Theories of European integra-
tion, 2006, 399ff.
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Like every previous amendment to primary law, 
the enforcement of a future treaty change will 
depend crucially on the approval of European 
trade unions. The history of the recent amend-
ments made to the treaties, notably the failure 
of popular referendums, has demonstrated this 
impressively: if the trade unions (and social 
democratic parties that are not in power) do not 
stand up in the Member States for the necessary 
changes, ratification will be very difficult.
This constellation actually provides the unions 
with a strong negotiating position. All that is 
needed is for them to mobilise their power for 
a politically convincing and legally sustainable 
programme. The accusation of having switched 
over to the anti-European camp need not be feared. 
For a commitment to the programme of the Euro-
pean Pact for Social Progress would certainly not 
be an expression of a nationalist attitude. Against 
the backdrop of the legitimacy crisis of the Union, 
which is reflected not least in the political gains 
of right-wing populist parties, the programme 
of the European Pact is decidedly pro-European, 
because only upon this basis will it be possible to 
preserve what has been achieved and avoid squan-
dering the opportunity for further integration.
3. Outline
The following outlines the results of a study 
concluded in 2018 which was conducted to elabo-
rate the demands of the “European Social Progress 
Protocol” in legal terms:
1. In November of 2016, the EU Mem-
ber States Sweden (LO and SAP), Austria 
(ÖGB and SPÖ) and Germany (DGB and 
SPD) signed a European Pact for Social 
Progress, which seeks to carry out a reform 
of the constitution of the internal market 
of the Union.
2. In concrete terms, the European Pact 
calls for the law of the internal market to 
be adjusted in such a way as to give its 
employees strong rights and priority over 
3) In cases of conflict, fundamental 
social rights must take precedence over 
economic freedoms of the market and 
competition rules.140
These demands constitute a political programme 
to strengthen social rights and protect social 
achievements. However, they require further legal 
elaboration. This can be specifically gauged by 
whether or not they really do provide remedies 
for the problematical development of the legal 
integration dynamics identified here. Upon such 
a basis, the demands of the “European Pact for 
Social Progress” may eventually become a well-
founded negotiating position.
The history of the previous dispute over anchoring 
the claim of a more social orientation of the 
Union has shown the need for such an examina-
tion. For example, with social democratic govern-
ments predominating in the European institu-
tions, a chapter on employment was inserted into 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). It had no effect. 
Especially in the negotiations on the Constitu-
tional Treaty (2003), much effort was devoted to 
individual treaty provisions, such as the specifica-
tion that the Union is a social market economy or 
the so-called social cross-sectional provision, or 
even the social rights in the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. At no point has there been system-
atic examination of what legal force the relevant 
standards could actually develop. The results were 
ultimately sobering.
2. Implementation Prospects
The prospects of enforcing the programme are 
better than might be expected, given the political 
will on the part of unions and social-democratic 
parties, for a further deepening of economic and 
monetary union (as such) is on the agenda. With 
the presidency of Emmanuel Macron in France 
and a, certainly also in the future, pro-European 
government, new political scope has been created 
for this.
140  A European Pact for Social Progress, 2016, p. 3. 
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required by a supranational internal mar-
ket. On the other hand, they would lose 
their de-regulatory prevalence, a general 
shift in emphasis at the expense of the 
common good and social compensation.
6. The conception of market freedoms 
as super-civil liberties for companies is 
particularly difficult in the area of labour 
and social constitutions, which are primar-
ily structured by Member State law. While, 
at the Member State level, the respective 
purview of economic constitutions, on 
the one hand, and labour and social con-
stitutions, on the other, is determined by 
simple legislation and thus upon the basis 
of political-democratic decision-making, 
within the framework of the Union‘s in-
ternal market the economic constitution 
takes legal priority over the labour and 
social constitutions of the Member States. 
The national regulations that have been 
overturned cannot normally be compen-
sated for by EU legislation, mostly because 
of the lack of jurisdiction of the Union, but 
also because of the wide institutional and 
economic diversity of the Member States.
7. Development is driven to the extreme 
by the fact that not only state law, but also 
– through a questionable binding of pri-
vate interests to market freedoms – the 
processes of setting collective agreement 
standards within the framework of the au-
tonomy of collective bargaining guaran-
teed by EU law are equally obliged to re-
spect market freedoms.
8. The liberalist transformation of the 
Union’s single market constitution has 
given market freedoms considerable de-
regulatory power, and thus today limits 
the social and democratic powers of the 
Member States to a considerable degree. 
This is also seen everywhere in European 
law. The legal proposals in this context to 
contain this de-regulatory force of market 
market freedoms and competition rules. 
Furthermore, transnational competition 
upon the basis of labour costs should be 
excluded. Finally, it demands that the mar-
ket freedoms that are constitutive for the 
internal market should be reduced to a 
legitimate level, and that they should no 
longer be regarded as banning restrictions, 
but only as requiring equal treatment.
3. Thus, the “European Protocol for So-
cial Progress” is a response to a social and 
democratic problem of the integration 
process that has long been diagnosed in 
politics and political science. This has its 
origin in the liberalistic form of the legal 
constitution of the internal market. Con-
sequently, it cannot be remedied by deep-
ening integration or by strengthening the 
rights of the European Parliament.
4. The European Court of Justice has 
subjected the constitution of the inter-
nal market of the Union to liberalisation 
through its case law on market freedoms. 
It has conceived market freedoms as super 
freedoms for companies, which they may 
use, in addition to their guarantees, in the 
constitutions of Member States, of owner-
ship and freedom of acquisition, to bring 
down Member State rules for promoting 
the common good and social equality. 
Such a shift of emphasis in favour of en-
terprises and at the expense of the com-
mon good and social balance was neither 
intended nor provided for by European 
market integration.
5. A conception of market freedoms as 
principles of equal treatment would be 
correct: No company based in another 
Member State and no cross-border entre-
preneurial service should be treated less 
favourably than domestic companies and 
domestic services. Thus, on the one hand, 
market freedoms would prevent protec-
tionism on the part of Member States, as 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EU’S SINGLE MARKET?
Florian Rödl180
12. The conception of fundamental free-
doms as principles of equal treatment is 
compatible with the basic structure of es-
tablished internal market law. In particu-
lar, it does not undermine the principle 
of mutual recognition. On the contrary, it 
ensures that it only comes into effect if the 
interests of the receiving Member State are 
already completely fulfilled by the regula-
tions of the Member State of origin. Nor 
does it undermine the so-called free move-
ment of persons within the internal mar-
ket (freedom of movement for workers, 
freedom of establishment), but it restricts 
the guarantee to a legitimate level which 
complies with the guarantee of domestic 
freedom of movement.
13. Such a reduction of market freedoms 
to the principles of equal treatment would 
also remove the concern of the ETUC’s 
“Social Progress Protocol”, which main-
tains that social rights, and, in particular, 
the exercise of collective bargaining, would 
remain unaffected by market freedoms.
14. Alternatively, the reduction of mar-
ket freedom to equal treatment principles 
could be confined to the field of employ-
ment and social legislation of Member 
States, as defined in the competence stand-
ard of Article 153 TFEU. This would con-
tinue to address the concerns of the ETUC’s 
“Social Progress Protocol”, but Member 
State arrangements for the common good 
and social equality beyond those under the 
labour and social constitution of the Mem-
ber States would remain difficult.
15. Although it lies outside the focus of 
the “European Pact on Social Progress”, 
considering the interests of employees in 
the Union, it would be very urgent to re-
move the labour and social constitution of 
the Member States from the scope of com-
petition law and from actions sanctioned 
by macro-economic surveillance to stabi-
lise the euro.
freedoms (the keywords are “Keck exemp-
tion” and “market access criterion”) have 
already proved ineffective. Therefore, a 
correction of the internal market constitu-
tion in primary law is needed.
9. The proposal by the former constitu-
tional judge Dieter Grimm for a “de-con-
stitutionalisation of the internal market” 
does not remedy the situation. Even if mar-
ket freedoms were to fall within the scope 
of secondary legislation, the restrictions 
on regulatory freedoms of Member States 
would continue, because secondary legis-
lation also takes precedence over Member 
State law. A subsequent more regulatory-
friendly re-adjustment of market freedoms 
by means of ordinary EU legislators is not 
to be expected given the divergence of in-
terests of the Member States.
10. One remedy would be to scale back 
market freedoms from fundamental en-
trepreneurial rights to equal treatment. In 
this case, Member State rules would have 
to justify market freedoms only if they re-
sulted in discrimination. A mere restric-
tion of transnational enterprise, irrespec-
tive of unequal treatment in comparison 
to domestic companies or services, would 
automatically be lawful.
11. Discrimination that continues to be 
prohibited can occur openly (direct dis-
crimination) or covertly (indirect discrim-
ination). Conceiving indirect discrimina-
tion as factual discrimination fits in with 
the anti-discrimination law for the protec-
tion of socially-disadvantaged groups, but 
not with the rule of equal treatment in a 
supra-state internal market. However, the 
reproach of covert discrimination is not 
dispelled by the defence by Member States 
that they had good intentions, but instead 
when the arrangement pursues a rational 
purpose (public interest or social compen-
sation) and is appropriate and necessary 
for this purpose. 
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16. The principle of territorial equal pay, 
which is expressed by the formula “equal 
pay for equal work in the same place”, is 
central to preventing transnational compe-
tition based solely upon labour costs. This, 
in turn, is a pre-requisite for the continu-
ation of, or at least slow development in 
Member States of the welfare state, which 
can continue provided the internal market 
does too.
17. Market freedoms and current second-
ary legislation (Posting of Workers Direc-
tive, Regulation on Co-ordination of Social 
Security Systems) place legal limits on the 
implementation of the principle of territo-
rial wage equality. On the one hand, the 
principle requires, in part, treatment that 
is openly different and which would not 
allow market freedoms even after a reduc-
tion to equal treatment principles. On the 
other hand, secondary legislation exists 
which does not acknowledge the signifi-
cance of the principle of territorial wage 
equality.
18. Anchoring the principle of territorial 
wage equality in primary law promises jus-
tification for open differences in treatment. 
It must be added to the existing justifica-
tions for open differences in treatment 
provided by the applicable primary law for 
each of the market freedoms (Articles 36, 
52 (1), 62, 65 (1) (b) TFEU). In order to 
correct the misaligned secondary legisla-
tion as well, Member States would have to 
be allowed, by way of a protocol statement, 
to deviate from these rules, to the extent 
that they serve to implement the principle 
of territorial wage equality.
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Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) by 25 
Member States.142 These reforms strengthened 
the rules that guarantee budgetary discipline and 
changed the way in which decisions are taken at 
various stages of the surveillance procedures. In 
particular, the Six Pack established that sanctions 
in the context of the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
were to be decided by reverse qualified-major-
ity.143 This means that Commission recommen-
dations proposing to sanction a Member State is 
adopted unless a qualified-majority of Member 
States within the Council votes against it.
The hardening of budgetary rules and procedures 
was associated with the revamping of economic 
policy co-ordination through the creation of the 
European Semester. The Semester brings under 
the same umbrella different strains of EU policy 
co-ordination and surveillance that touch upon 
both economic and social policies.
If compared with previous co-ordination 
processes, the Semester sensibly enhances the 
capacity of policy formulation, guidance and 
monitoring of EU institutions in virtually the 
entire spectrum of Member State economic and 
social policies. This is mainly due to the combi-
nation of soft co-ordination processes with hard 
surveillance mechanisms. Despite nominally 
retaining a non-binding character, the recommen-
dations adopted in this context engender a level of 
compliance that is higher than that which may be 
inferred from Article 288 TFEU. Indeed, hard-law 
processes can be used to put pressure on national 
authorities so as to make them adopt the recom-
mended reforms in the social and labour fields. As 
plainly put by the Commission:
“[i]t is primarily in Member States’ own 
interests to implement the reforms that 
will help them recover from the crisis 
and create the foundations for sustainable 
142  Signed on 2 March 2012 and entered into force on 1 
January 2013.
143  Article 6(2) Regulation (EU) 1173/2011. See, generally, 
Rainer Palmstofer, “The Reverse Majority Voting Under the 
‘Six Pack’: A Bad Turn for the Union?”, (2014) 20 European 
Law Journal, 186-203.
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1. The Reform of the 
European Economic 
Governance: Strengthening 
the Disciplinary Powers  
of EU Institutions
1.1  The Co-ordination of 
Economic Policies within the 
European Semester
When the crisis struck, the Commission, backed 
by some Member States, was swift to point to the 
defects of the EMU legal framework as the main 
cause for the instability of the common currency. 
This argument, which conveniently overlooked 
the structural economic imbalances affecting the 
EMU, quickly became part of the dominant narra-
tive and paved the way for subsequent reforms 
which aimed at strengthening the disciplinary 
powers of EU institutions.
In 2011, the European Parliament and the Council 
adopted a package of six legal acts − the so-called 
Six Pack – in order to strengthen budgetary disci-
pline, introduce a new surveillance mechanism 
on macroeconomic imbalances and enhance the 
co-ordination of economic policies. The reform of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) went hand-
in-hand with the adoption of the Treaty on the 
Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the 
141*  The paper has been written in the context of the RES-
cEU project (Reconciling Economic and Social Europe, www.
resceu.eu), funded by the European Research Council (grant 
no. 340534).
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tion was problematical, and, in 2009, the Council 
formally opened an excessive deficit procedure 
against France.147 Little happened until 2013, 
when the Commission and the Council started 
to put greater emphasis on the link between the 
“correction of the fiscal imbalances” and “a cred-
ible implementation of ambitious structural 
reforms to increase the adjustment capacity and 
boost growth and employment”.148 In particular, 
France was recommended to reduce the cost of 
labour and to “ensure that developments in the 
minimum wage are supportive of competitiveness 
and job creation”.149 The same occurred, with only 
minor terminological variations, in 2014150 and 
2015.151 All these recommendations were adopted 
upon the basis of Article 6 Regulation (EU) No. 
1176/2011. In February 2015, the French Govern-
ment bowed to the pressure, passing a law that 
aimed at rendering the labour market more busi-
ness-friendly. The law was adopted by an execu-
tive order,152 so as to avoid the possibility of the 
Assemblée Nationale rejecting it and thus sending 
“the wrong signal to the European Commission, 
a week before deciding whether to fine France for 
missing its deficit targets”.153 The decision paid 
off as the Commission refrained from penalising 
147  Council Decision No. 2009/414/EC of 27 April 2009 
on the existence of an excessive deficit in France, OJ L 135 of 
30.05.2009, 19-20.
148  Council Recommendation of 9 July 2013 on the Nation-
al Reform Programme 2013 of France and Delivering a Council 
Opinion on the Stability Programme of France, 2012-2017, OJ C 
217 of 30.07.2013, 31.
149  Ibid.
150  Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the 
National Reform Programme 2014 of France and Delivering a 
Council Oopinion on the Stability Programme of France, 2014, 
OJ C 247 of 29.07.2014, 47-48.
151  Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 
National Reform Programme of France and Delivering a Council 
Opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of France, OJ C 272 
of 18.08.2015, 55.
152  The Loi Travail was published in the Journal officiel 
only on 6 August 2016, after several versions had been rejected 
either by the Assemblée Nationale or by the Senat.
153  A-S. Chassany, “French Government Overrides 
Parliament to Ram though Reforms”, Financial Times, online 
edition, 17 February 2015, available at: https://www.ft.com/
content/3e2f4314-b67b-11e4-a5f2-00144feab7de.
growth. […] As a last resort, there is the 
prospect of sanctions if Member States 
repeatedly fail to take action on public 
finances or macroeconomic imbalances 
(under the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
and the Excessive Imbalance Procedure, 
respectively).”144
Furthermore, the Semester allows EU institu-
tions to exercise quasi-normative functions, by 
issuing recommendations that are very detailed 
and that are not just “broad guidelines”, as envis-
aged by Article 121 TFEU. For instance, in 2017, 
the French government was recommended to:
“Consolidate the measures reducing the 
cost of labour to maximise their efficiency 
in a budget-neutral manner and in order 
to scale up their effects on employment 
and investment. Broaden the overall tax 
base and take further action to implement 
the planned decrease in the statutory 
corporate-income rate.”145
These recommendations constrain the autonomy 
of national authorities, leaving non-compliance as 
the main way out. Yet, this option is not readily 
available to all Member States. Due to its power-
based nature, the effectiveness of the mechanism 
depends on the vulnerability of the Member State 
to this threat. Those Member States at risk of being 
put under an excessive deficit procedure have few 
other options but to comply with the suprana-
tional recommendations.
The case of France and, more specifically, the adop-
tion of the so-called Loi Khomri (or Loi Travail) 
offers a good example in this regard.146 After the 
onset of the crisis, the French budgetary posi-
144  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-388_
en.htm.
145  Council Recommendation of 11 July 2017 on the 2017 
National Reform Programme of France and Delivering a Council 
Opinion on the 2017 Stability Programme of France, OJ C 261 
of 09.08.2017, 39.
146  R. Erne, “A Supranational Regime that Nationalizes 
Social Conflict: Explaining European Trade Unions’ Difficul-
ties in Politicizing European Economic Governance”, (2015) 56 
Labor History, 345, 348.
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2017, nine years after the launch of the first bailout 
programme, that the CJEU made it clear that the 
MoU is mandatory and “constitutes an act of an 
EU institution”, according to Article 267 TFEU.156 
However, the case in question concerned a specific 
financial assistance programme that, directed 
towards a non-euro Member State facing diffi-
culties with its balance of payments, was set up 
upon the basis of Article 143 TFEU and Regu-
lation 332/2002. As for non-EU-based bailout 
programmes, the CJEU has traditionally adhere 
to the vision according to which the Memoran-
dum’s provisions fall outside the EU legal frame-
work. Upon this basis, the CJEU rejected all the 
annulment actions brought by private applicants 
against these provisions and all the requests for 
preliminary rulings which sought to ascertain 
the compatibility, with the EU Charter on Funda-
mental Rights, of national measures adopted to 
implement the conditions set out in the MoU. The 
Court has recently been given the chance to shed 
more light on this issue, but it deliberately avoided 
it.157
2. The Subordination of 
Social Objectives to 
Economic Ones:  
Labour Reforms as Tools 
for Pursuing EMU-Related 
Objectives
Both the European Semester and bailout mech-
anisms were created to consolidate the EMU, by 
filling structural gaps. Thus, it is hardly surprising 
that they tended to focus on a narrow set of objec-
tives − such as budgetary discipline and competi-
tiveness − that are directly linked to the consoli-
dation of the EMU. Other conflicting objectives, 
such as social ones, have been mainly relegated to 
second-tier status, in a way that flies in the face of 
156  Florescu [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:448, para. 35. See 
Menelaos Markakakis and Paul Dermine, “Bailouts, the Legal 
Status of Memoranda of Understanding, and the Scope of 
Application” (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 643, 643-
671; Alberto Miglio, “La condizionalità di fronte alla Corte di 
Giustizia”, (2017) 11 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 763, 
763-770.
157  Judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos 
Juizes Portugueses, C-64/16.
France, despite its failure to bring the deficit under 
the 3 per cent threshold.154
1.2  Financial Assistance 
Programmes and Conditionality
The strengthening of capacity of supranational 
institutions to intrude into the regulation of 
national labour markets is even more intense in 
the context of financial assistance programmes. 
As is well known, each bailout entailed that the 
beneficiary Member State respected a set of policy 
conditions agreed with EU institutions, acting 
on behalf of the donors. Conditionality entrusts 
supranational institutions with an unprece-
dented capacity to engage in close surveillance 
and micromanagement of social policy, placing 
powerful constraints on the autonomy of national 
authorities in managing their social systems. This 
capacity hinges upon the uncertain legal location 
of the instruments governing the definition of the 
conditions attached to financial assistance pack-
ages.155 This allows EU institutions to exploit fully 
the political and economic power asymmetries 
between them and any Member State that is facing 
extreme financial difficulties.
The main legal source of bailout programmes is 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 
which details the requirements that the benefi-
ciary Member State must meet in order to receive 
financial assistance. The legal nature of this docu-
ment, and even its capacity to set legally-binding 
obligations, has long been – and, to some extents, 
still is – highly controversial. It was just in June 
154  European Commission, Recommendation for a Council 
Recommendation with a View to Bringing an End to the 
Excessive Government Deficit in France, 27 February 2015, 
COM(2015) 115 def.
155  Claire Kilpatrick, The EU and its Sovereign Debt 
Programmes: The Challenges of Liminal Legality, (2017) EUI 
Working Paper 2017/14, 3-8. See, also, Agustín José Mené-
ndez, “The Crisis and the European Crises: From Social 
and Democratic Rechtsstaat to the Consolidating State of 
(Pseudo-)technocratic Governance”, (2017) 44 Journal of Law 
and Society, 74-78 (hereinafter Menéndez, “The Crisis and the 
European Crises”); Francesco Munari, “Crisi dell’Euro e crisi 
delle regole: Rule of Law o ragion politica? Il diritto dell’Unio-
ne europea dinanzi a nuove sfide”, in: Ornella Porchia (ed), 
Governance economica europea. Strumenti dell’Unione, rapporti 
con l’ordinamento internazionale e ricadute sull’ordinamento 
interno, (Torino: Giappichelli, 2015), pp. 33-56.
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2011, the Council recommended Italy to “rein-
force measures to combat segmentation in the 
labour market, also by reviewing selected aspects 
of employment protection legislation including 
the dismissal rules and procedures and reviewing 
the currently fragmented unemployment benefit 
system taking into account the budgetary 
constraints”. For greater certainty, the Council 
made clear that these reforms, to be carried out 
in consultation with the social partners, had to be 
primarily aimed at ensuring that “wage growth 
better reflects productivity developments as well 
as local and firm conditions, including clauses 
that could allow firm level bargaining to proceed 
in this direction”.
The situation changed in 2015: from that cycle 
onwards, supranational institutions started to pay 
greater attention to other issues, such as promoting 
active labour market policies or enhancing labour 
market participation by women. This change is 
due to two main factors.
First, it reflects the push toward the so-called 
“socialisation” of the Semester, a process that 
started in 2013, which touches upon both its 
organisational and its substantive components.
With regard to the first aspect, since 2013, there has 
been an attempt to make the drafting of the CSRs 
more collaborative, involving Commission Direc-
torates General other than just ECOFIN. More-
over, the Commission has tried to enhance the 
participation of national and EU social partners 
in various supranational phases of the co-ordina-
tion process, establishing new venues for involve-
ment and providing better access to decision-
making fora. These changes, while potentially 
interesting, have had only a limited impact on the 
way in which the Semester works, at least to date. 
For instance, looking at the involvement of the 
social partners, a recently paper published warns 
against the risk that all these reforms may well end 
up increasing the opportunities for the social part-
ners to be listened to, while leaving their capacity 
the equal ranking model enshrined in the Treaties. 
In this context, labour market reforms have been 
mostly conceived as tools that should contribute 
to the pursuit of EMU-related objectives. The 
cases of Italy and Germany make no exception in 
this regard, even though the recommendations 
directed at the two countries are divergent as far 
as their content is concerned.
2.1  The Case of Italy
Italy was put under strong pressure to adopt 
reforms that could remove those elements that 
were perceived as “rigidities”, so to make its regu-
latory framework more flexible and, thus, capable 
of contributing to enhance the competitiveness 
of the national economic system. These reforms 
should foster internal devaluation, which, in a 
monetary union in which currency devaluation 
is no longer an option and in which there is no 
centralised fiscal capacity, has seemingly become 
the only adjustment variable to respond to struc-
tural imbalances.
This was the case of the (in-) famous letter158 sent to 
the Italian Government by the ECB President and 
the Governor of the Bank of Italy in August 2011. 
In particular, the letter urged “to further reform 
the collective wage-bargaining system allowing 
firm-level agreements to tailor wages and working 
conditions to firms’ specific needs and increasing 
their relevance with respect to other layers of 
negotiations”, and to engage in a “thorough review 
of the rules regulating the hiring and dismissal of 
employees [that] should be adopted in conjunc-
tion with the establishment of an unemploy-
ment insurance system and a set of active labour 
market policies capable of easing the reallocation 
of resources towards the more competitive firms 
and sectors”.
A similar approach was followed in the context 
of the co-ordination of national economic poli-
cies, especially in its early cycles. For instance, in 
158  The letter can be found here:  http://www.corriere.it/
economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-
ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml?refresh_ce-cp.
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tition-enhancing reforms of the labour market is 
due to the fact that, in 2014 and 2015, Italian law-
making authorities adopted a series of statutes and 
decrees commonly known as the “Jobs Act”. This 
reform transposed most of the recommendations 
issued by EU institutions into the Italian system, 
especially with regard to the flexibilisation of the 
labour market.
2.2  The Case of Germany
The recommendations addressed to Germany 
confirm the tendency to subordinate labour 
market reforms to the logic and objectives of 
EMU, even though, in contrast to the case of 
Italy, they do not aim to make the labour market 
more flexible or to reduce wages. On the contrary, 
Germany has been considered a role model for all 
the other Member States with regard to the adop-
tion of labour market reforms primarily directed 
at enhancing the competitiveness of the national 
economic system. Indeed, in 2003 and 2005 the 
German authorities had already adopted sweeping 
measures increasing the flexibility of the labour 
market through, inter alia, the de-regulation of 
mini-jobs.
However, starting from the 2013 cycle of the 
Semester in particular, the EU institutions began 
to put pressure on the German authorities to adopt 
measures that could enable wage growth and facil-
itate the transition from non-standard employ-
ment, such as mini-jobs, into more sustainable 
forms of employment. These recommendations 
were issued upon the basis of Article 6 of Regu-
lation 1176/2011, in the context of the preventive 
arm of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
The main aim of these recommendations is not to 
improve the situation of mini-workers, although 
this would be an inevitable side-effect, but to stim-
ulate internal demand and, consequently, reduce 
the current account surplus run by Germany.164 
The adoption of expansive measures with regard to 
164  As confirmed by the 2018 In-Depth Review carried 
out by the Commission, the German current account surplus 
is edging down, but it remains well above the 6 per cent MIP 
threshold.
to be heard substantially unchanged.159
Turning to the substantive dimension, the 
Commission sought to reinforce and deepen social 
and employment surveillance and co-ordination 
within the Semester. This mainly materialised in 
the introduction of new scoreboards and indica-
tors to monitor employment and social develop-
ments, confirming the Commission’s highly tech-
nocratic approach towards social policy and its 
continuous faith in numbers as governing tools. 
For instance, in 2014, the Commission included 
a number of auxiliary employment and social 
indicators within the group informing the Alert 
Mechanism Report of the macroeconomic imbal-
ance procedure (MIP) to complement the only 
social indicator already existing in that context, 
which focused on unemployment.160 This evolu-
tion is set to be bolstered by the adoption of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights, proclaimed with 
much fanfare in November 2017.161 According to 
the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 2018, the Pillar 
should “serve as a point of reference for the further 
implementation of the European Semester”, 
as it is “a compass for renewed convergence 
towards better working and living conditions”.162 
Concretely, the document is set to inspire a 
further set of indicators aiming at “monitor[ing] 
‘societal progress’” and detecting “the most signifi-
cant employment and social challenges facing the 
Member States, the EU and the euro area, as well 
as progress achieved over time”.163
Second and, to some extent, more importantly, 
the decision to reduce the pressure on the Italian 
government with regard to the adoption of compe-
159   S. Sabato, B. Vanhercke and S. Spasova, Lis-
tened, but not Heard? Social Partners’ Multilevel Involvement in 
the European Semester, OSE Paper Series, Paper No. 35/2017.
160  European Commission, Alert Mechanism Report 2014, 
Brussels, 13 November 2013, COM(2013) 790 final, 10.
161  S. Garben, “The European Pillar of Social Rights: 
Effectively Addressing Displacement?”, (2018) 14 European 
Constitutional Law Review 215.
162  European Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2018, 22 
November 2017, COM(2017) 290 final, 3.
163  Commission Staff Working Document, Social Score-
board, Brussels, 26.04.2017, SWD(2017) 200 final, 2.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LABOUR LAW IN THE EU ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS: 
THE CASES OF ITALY AND GERMANY
Francesco Costamagna
187
labour market regulation is, thus, primarily meant 
to address these imbalances, thereby contributing 
to reinforce the stability of the EMU.
The main problem lies with Germany’s compli-
ance with these recommendations and, more in 
general, with the credibility of the whole process. 
An assessment carried out by the Commission 
in March 2018 admitted that Germany has made 
only limited progress in promoting the transi-
tion towards more stable forms of work and in 
promoting real wage growth, among the other 
things. This could be partially attributed to the 
choice made by the EU institutions, and the 
Commission in particular, to consider Germany 
to be in a situation of “macroeconomic imbal-
ances” and not in one of “excessive macroeco-
nomic imbalances”. This means that there are no 
signs that Germany might be placed under an 
Excessive Deficit Procedure any time soon and, 
thus, be forced to adopt corrective actions. From 
a legal perspective, there are no obstacles for this 
step to be taken: the notion of “excessive imbal-
ances” is vague enough to cover situations such as 
the one in hand.
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billion in 2017 to 335.5 in 2018), (Bundesfinan-
zministerium 2017) Germany has every reason 
to feel assured of the aptness of its social market 
economy, the success of its growth model and its 
economic policies. With the current budget, it can 
thus confidently respond to calls for both fiscal 
prudence and more investments and continue 
the status quo politics Angela Merkel has attained 
notoriety for (Kohler 2013; Sirleschtov 2017).
Accordingly, strengthening the EMU’s social 
dimension is not a policy priority for the German 
government. In his speech in May 2018, the 
German minister for Labor and Social Affairs, 
Hubertus Heil, identified four priorities for his 
department: reserves for cyclical unemployment; 
structural unemployment; digital upskilling of 
the labor force; and the integration of people with 
disabilities into the labor market (Heil 2018). 
None of them relate to the EU.
Beyond these issues of system maintenance and 
incremental improvements, forward-looking 
debates are taking place in German ministries. 
These revolve around broader considerations 
about the future sustainability of the German 
social market economy. Managing digitalization 
and coping with demographic change are priority 
issues, as evident from constant debates about 
the sustainability of the pension systems and the 
comprehensive consultation activity in connec-
tion with the “forth industrial revolution” (e.g. 
“Work 4.0”; “Industry 4.0”; “Mittelstand 4.0”). The 
necessity to update employment- and social policy 
for the 21st century also informs Germany’s posi-
tion towards the European level, where it calls for 
a comprehensive update of the European Social 
Acquis (Bundesregierung 2016). Any revision 
of the social model on national level, or further 
development on the European level has to pay due 
diligence to the trends that are expected to trans-
form the world of work.
Nonetheless, whoever had hoped for the pro-
European focus the SPD appeared to promise in 
the run-up to the elections was left disappointed. 
Not only the lacking portfolios from the Ministry 
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“Everywhere in Europe I said: a German finance 
minister is a German finance minister, regardless 
of his party card. I believe the message was well 
received”165
-Olaf Scholz, German finance minister, 22.03.2018
It is my aim to highlight some of the guiding prin-
ciples of the German position towards the EMU’s 
social dimension in order to ascertain what can 
be expected from the German government for its 
development. The paper begins by contextualizing 
Germany’s current macroeconomic position. It 
then elaborates on cornerstones of Germany’s 
policy towards the EMU’s social dimension. These 
are exemplified in the case study of the German 
position towards the European Pillar of Social 
Rights (EPSR). It concludes with expectations this 
position raises for the future of German efforts 
towards strengthening the EMU’s social dimen-
sion.
Background – Germany’s 
position and priorities
In order to assess the German position, it is impor-
tant to first realize the current socio-economic 
reality in Germany. The employment statistic 
looks historically well. 2017 not only marked the 
record year in terms of employment – with 44.28 
million employed – but also a record low in terms 
of unemployment (2.53 million or 5.7%)(Bundes-
regierung 2017a). With growth of 2.3% of GDP 
projected for 2018 and 2.1% for 2019 (Bundes-
ministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2018), 
decreasing sovereign debt (Reiermann 2018) and 
increasing national budget (increase from €329.1 
165  Translation by the author
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member states as virtuous savers or undeserving 
rule-breakers (Offe 2015). Ordoliberalism thus 
lent the theoretical justification of German crisis 
politics that focused on austerity and structural 
reforms.
Germany invested much political capital in 
upholding these imperatives: both domestically – 
the contestation of which brought forth the Alter-
native für Deutschland as anti-Euro party, and in 
Europe - where its approach reaped particular 
scorn from southern Europeans (for the Italian 
case see Olmastroni and Pellegata 2018). Compat-
ibility with it is the underlying theme was a there-
fore a precondition for any measure in social- and 
employment policy. Any initiative in this domain 
has to be evaluated on terms of financial sustain-
ability and international competitiveness, and 
must not relieve pressures for national structural 
reforms or induce moral hazard (Bundesregierung 
2016).
The protection of the post-crisis architecture as first 
cornerstone is reflected in the German policy 
priorities, (Scholz 2018) and in its discourse. 
Whereas the completion of the Banking Union 
is an often-discussed priority, distinctly social 
portfolios receive very little attention.167 Instead, 
the German discourse about a more social 
Europe draws on a variety of portfolios, such as 
the Banking Union and the transformation of 
the ESM to an EMF that are regarded as instru-
ments for “help to help themselves”168 (Schäuble 
2014), and thus contributing indirectly to social 
justice. Secondly, dossiers with questionable social 
implications receive a distinctly social framing. 
This became clear in the debate surrounding the 
Posted Workers Directive, which was hailed by the 
government as an advancement of the social rights 
of posted workers (Bundesregierung 2017b). The 
alternative view that the aim of the revision was 
the protection of domestic workers from “undue” 
167 Incidentally, Angela Merkel abstained from the Go-
thenburg Social Summit to oversee the coalition talks, leaving 
Germany without a representative at the occasion (Riegert 
2017)
168 Translation by the author.
of Labour and Social Affairs, but the reassurance 
of finance minister Scholz that “a German finance 
minister is a German finance minister, regardless of 
his party card“ (Scholz 2018) confirm the Grand 
Coalition’s outlook on the Eurozone has not 
changed much since its reelection. In its coalition 
agreement, the relevant portfolio remains meager 
and vague.166 
Ascertaining that Germany’s position will likely 
not change significantly leads to the question of 
what this position rests on. The next section iden-
tifies cornerstones of the German position towards 
developing the EMU’s social dimension and relate 
them to current debates.
Cornerstones of the German 
position towards the EMU’s 
social dimension
The German position towards the EMU’s social 
dimension shaped by a number of constraints 
on the national and European level that prevent 
it from taking meaningful action to address the 
asymmetry between economic and social integra-
tion. On the European level, one core dictum is 
compatibility with its overall approach towards 
the governance of the EMU.
The German imprint on the EMU is often said to be 
ordoliberal (Blyth 2013; Dullien and Guérot 2012; 
Stiglitz 2015). Although clear differences between 
the post-crisis EMU and the ordoliberal ideal type 
can be distinguished (Hadeed 2017; Hien and 
Joergesn 2018), the strengthening of the osten-
sible rule-based system that marked crisis-resolu-
tion adheres on first glance to the de-politicization 
of economic decisions already envisioned by the 
ordoliberal founding fathers (Böhm, Eucken, and 
Grossmann-Doerthe 1989[1936]). Regardless of 
the ideological (in)coherence of those reinforcing 
measures, they fit the pervasive German narrative 
166  It includes the vague calls for fair conditions for work-
ers, better coordination of employment policies, a framework 
for minimum wage and national basic social security schemes, 
as well as better comparability of education standards (Coali-
tion Agreement 2018, 7)
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Transfers are interpreted broadly, spanning not 
only direct payments but also those that result 
from differences in the quality of social structures. 
An ardent argument against a European Unem-
ployment Insurance has long been that it would 
disproportionately benefit member states with 
weaker active labor market policies. This would 
not only relieve reform pressures but also induce 
moral hazard (Feld and Osterloh 2013).
Combined these constraints result in a reluctant 
Germany that focuses on maintaining and consol-
idating its own socio-economic model, as well as 
the general thrust of the EMU post-crisis gover-
nance.
Nonetheless, drivers for reform also exist. the 
German government is not unaware of the social 
challenges and the need for socio-economic 
convergence in the EU. It sees the social challenge 
on the European level as twofold: (1) coping with 
the persistent challenges of the crisis and diver-
gence; and (2) making employment- and social 
policy future-proof with regard to globalization, 
digitalization and demographic change (Bundes-
regierung 2016). 
To address the former, Germany argues for 
continued structural reforms, particularly in 
Member States with persistent struggles. The 
recent proposals by Angela Merkel for a new 
investment budget and the development of the 
ESM into and EMF are the core of the German 
vision for convergence (Gutschker and Lohse 
2018). In contrast, realigning social- and employ-
ment policies, convergence of social standards and 
living conditions and “future-proofing” of social 
systems should be pursued through softer instru-
ments, particularly the development of bench-
marks and best-practice exchange (Bundesr-
egierung 2016). The constraints elaborated above 
prevent any meaningful action towards addressing 
the EMU’s social imbalance with the same type of 
rigidity as issues of competitiveness.
The result is a German approach towards the 
development of the EMU’s social dimension that 
is both, endorsing in principle, and rejecting in 
competition and indeed impeding on the social 
rights of posted workers – a position articulated 
by seven particularly affected Member States169 
in an open letter to the Commission (Kalfin et al. 
2015) – received rather little attention.
The second principle shaping Germany’s general 
outlook on the EMU’s social dimension revolves 
around the protection of its national socio-economic 
system from outside reform pressures. Its insis-
tence on the primacy of national competencies 
relies on three distinct concerns. Legal limitations 
arise not only in view of the Treaties, but also of 
the German Basic Law. This insistence is backed 
by the German Constitutional Court in the EMU 
case: As long as there is no democratic equivalent 
to national parliaments on EU level and an expan-
sion of competencies through new legal bases, a 
transfer of competencies in employment- and 
social policy cannot be compatible with Germa-
ny’s democratic character (Bundesverfassungs-
gericht 1998). Neither can it change the consti-
tutional identity, in which pillars of the social 
market economy are enshrined (ibid). Particularly, 
the status of the social partners, which have the 
constitutional right to free collective bargaining 
(Tarifautonomie) limits the instruments that can 
be used to foster convergence by excluding the 
possibility of wage-coordination regimes, a vital 
tool to address divergence in the Eurozone (e.g. 
Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014; Manow 2016).
Beyond these legal concerns, the German govern-
ment fears forced convergence might lead to down-
ward pressure on the German social system, and 
disregard the institutional particularities in which 
policies must be evaluated (Bundesregierung 
2016). In an environment of such institutional 
divergence, fear of such pressures is a powerful 
constraint on German policy. Lastly, a red line for 
the German government is the idea of a transfer 
union (Bollmann and Kloepfer 2018). It opposes 
German economic orthodoxy (Sachverständi-
genrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftli-
chen Entwicklung 2017), and is politically toxic.
169  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
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This can be viewed as an encouraging sign for 
a more accommodating German vision for the 
future of the Eurozone, but it is only one of three 
concrete proposals of the German government, 
and the remaining, the ESM’s transformation into 
an EMF, and the investment budget for the Euro-
zone reinforce the mantra of the cash-for-reform 
approach as path towards improved living condi-
tions in the EMU (Gutschker and Lohse 2018). 
This is in line with the overall German mantra of 
boosting competitiveness and consolidating the 
“achievements” of crisis politics. The German posi-
tion towards the Commission’s initial proposal for 
a European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) exem-
plifies the discussed factors and gives a compre-
hensive view on a German vision for fostering 
social convergence.
The German assessment of the 
EPSR
In April 2016, the European Commission published 
a Communication introducing a first draft for the 
EPSR, kicking of a comprehensive consultation 
process to which stakeholders, member states 
and ordinary citizens could contribute (Euro-
pean Commission 2016). In December that year, 
the government of the previous Grand Coalition 
submitted its comprehensive assessment of the 
EPSR to the Commission. It welcomed the Pillar’s 
basic orientation as a step towards strengthening 
and operationalization the EMU’s social dimen-
sion (Bundesregierung 2016). This endorsement 
was, however, conditional on keeping the current 
division of competencies and the absolute preven-
tion of pooling of costs for social systems. This 
relates to the constraints of preventing outside 
reform pressure and being drawn into financial 
obligations. A categorical no was directed at any 
transfer of competences to the European level 
and the primary “Gestaltungskompetenz” was to 
remain with Member States (Bundesregierung 
2016). It concluded that therefore the EPSR could 
only take the form of a recommendation, (ibid.) 
which is by nature non-binding. The pillar is 
effect. The elaborated drivers and constraints 
create the following dilemma: Germany’s 
constraints prevent it from committing to strong 
instruments for convergence, which is – by alle-
viating concerns of downward pressure or trans-
fers – simultaneously a precondition to agree on 
binding measures. The failure of convergence is 
thus at the same time the source and the result of 
the German inhibition (Bundesministerium der 
Finanzen and DIW Berlin 2018). This circular 
reasoning has yet to be broken.
Naturally, there are also political drivers. The 
uptick in populism in recent years, not least the 
elections in Italy, combined with an ambitious and 
increasingly impatient French president Macron 
undoubtedly pressure the German government 
to “do more”. Between the ongoing MFF-negoti-
ations, the upcoming European Parliament elec-
tions in 2019, and the official British withdrawal, a 
window of opportunity is for decisive action is still 
open, but quickly closing. 
The extent to which these political consider-
ations motivate Germany to agree to concessions 
in its position is yet unknown. Movement can be 
observed on the dossier of a European Unem-
ployment Reinsurance scheme. The German 
government had consistently rejected proposals 
made first by then Commissioner László Ándor 
(Wettach and Krumrey 2014) and later Italian 
finance minister Pier Carlo Padoan (Maggiore 
and Leontopoulos 2017). With its labor market in 
excellent shape, the German government fearing 
that such an arrangement would induce moral 
hazard and result in permanent transfers, thusly 
rejecting the proposal – a position shared by the 
German Council of Economic Experts (Sach-
verständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesam-
twirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 2017). The recent 
endorsement for an unemployment reinsurance 
by finance minister Scholz (Reiermann and Sauga 
2018) might be a nod to the elaborated polit-
ical drivers, and skepticism about the economic 
benefit still exists in the German finance ministry 
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2017). 
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tion of active employment policy and minimum 
standards of social security.170 Here, Germany 
sees great potential for improvement, primarily 
not with its own institutional structures, but espe-
cially in those countries that suffer most from 
high unemployment (ibid.). Other policy fields, 
chief among the pension systems, would not lend 
themselves to any kind of coordination, due to 
the difference in their institutional anchoring. 
Outright rejected are those proposals concerning 
the coordination of wage-setting processes, such 
as on minimum wages. Both of the elaborated 
cornerstones of German policy thus become 
visible in the approach and substance endorsed by 
the German position.
Conclusion – what to 
expect from Germany for 
the EPSR and wider social 
integration?
What can be drawn from these considerations to 
assess what can be expected from Germany for the 
future of the EPSR and the social dimension of the 
EMU more broadly?
Boosting the EMU’s social dimension is not a 
priority for the German government, and is not 
featured in the coalition agreement, the rele-
vant ministry’s list of priorities, or the increas-
ingly visible vision for reforming the EU in the 
coming years. The example of the EPSR shows 
how the dilemma of the German position towards 
social convergence prevents it from commit-
ting to binding measures. Consent for dossiers to 
strengthen the EMU’s social dimension can only 
be expected where German particularities and 
national competencies remain shielded, and the 
overarching goals of convergence through struc-
tural reforms remains unchallenged. These are the 
preconditions for purposeful German endorse-
ment. They dim hopes for German efforts towards 
meaningful social convergence in the EMU. Polit-
170  This is not surprising insofar as Germany had previ-
ously also supported the Youth Guarantee, the Recommenda-
tion on the integration of the long-term unemployed into the 
labor market, and the Skills Agenda.
viewed as useful to foster upwards convergence 
of social security systems in specified domains, 
improve coordination between Member States 
and identify common principles. Crucially, this 
upward convergence is understood to be achieved 
through structural reforms targeting efficiency 
and effectiveness of national social systems. This 
speaks to the alignment of social policy port-
folios with the general thrust of the post-crisis 
EMU. The government therefore ensured that 
no binding measures could exert pressure on its 
social system, while encouraging such pressures in 
other Member States. It saw austerity politics and 
efficient social policy as intrinsically linked with 
each other. Only fiscal sustainability, achieved 
through structural reforms, can guarantee effi-
cient social systems. Conversely, the efficiency of 
social systems contributes to competitiveness and 
thus fiscal sustainability of member states(ibid.). 
In this view, austerity and social convergence are 
compatible. The government made a compelling 
leap to connect conceptually what opposed each 
other empirically: austerity and social progress. 
Thereby moving into a policy stance in which it 
could well declare its support for the initiative 
while insisting on its compatibility with the domi-
nant governance regime.
In this light, the EPSR’s integration into the Euro-
pean Semester via the Social Scoreboard can be 
viewed as a consolidation of the structural reform 
approach. Its integration and its non-binding legal 
character ensure both the general thrust of the 
post-crisis EMU governance structure remained 
unchallenged by social considerations, ostensibly 
resolving the dichotomic relationship between 
fiscal and social demands. This position equally 
secured the maintenance of Eurozone governance’ 
character and safeguarded the German social 
market economy from outside pressure, adhering 
to the German cornerstone of system mainte-
nance. 
In substance, too, the German position follows a 
logic of safeguarding its own institutional struc-
tures. Endorsement was given to the coordina-
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ical drivers, and a window of opportunity have 
led to limited movement on the issue of a Euro-
pean Unemployment Reinsurance scheme, but 
the main thrust of Germany’s recent proposal 
underscores its insistence on the primacy of struc-
tural reforms, and the preference for non-binding 
measures as the core mechanisms to achieve social 
convergence in the EMU. It falls in line with and 
must be compatible with the German overall 
approach towards the Eurozone and must protect 
the German social market economy from outside 
pressures. The verdict is thus a rather gloomy one: 
without resolving the constraint dilemma, one 
cannot expect much from Germany in the quest 
for a more social EMU.
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However, the optimism of the EU institutions, 
which accompanied the creation of the Social Pillar 
from its first announcement by President Juncker 
to the Proclamation of the final text in Gothen-
burg, might seem not to be coherent with what 
their ultimate accomplishment has to offer.176 The 
final result strongly resembles a non-legally-bin-
ding declaration of rights which, for the most 
part, already exist,177 and raises scepticism about 
the Pillar’s capacity to remedy the problems that it 
has identified effectively.178 Thus, this contribution 
looks behind the enthusiasm accompanying the 
Pillar, and sets out to examine its value through 
the concept of the “EU political culture of total 
optimism”, as defined and elaborated by Giando-
menico Majone.179 The contribution argues that 
the Social Pillar is another example of the EU poli-
tical culture of total optimism, rather than being 
capable of adding a genuine social dimension to 
the European integration project. The argument 
will proceed in three steps. (1) First, the EU culture 
of political optimism and its three main features, 
according to Majone, will be outlined. (2) The 
second section analyses the Pillar’s objectives and 
its capacity to meet them, showing why it reflects 
the EU political culture of total optimism in exem-
plary fashion. (3) The last section concludes by 
considering the possible consequence.
176  See Florian Rödl, Soziale Rechte in Europa: Von 
irreführenden Versprechen und notwendigen Kämpfen, WSI-
Herbstforum 2017; Martin Höpner, “Mogelpackung: Warum 
soziale Individualrechte die Europäische Union nicht sozialer 
machen”, 25 May 2017, available at: http://www.ipg-journal.
de/rubriken/europaeische-integration/artikel/mogelpack-
ung-2047; Simon Deakin, “What Follows Austerity? From So-
cial Pillar to New Deal”, in: Frank Vandenbroucke, Catherine 
Barnard and Geert De Baere (eds), A European Social Union 
after the Crisis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017).
177  The Pillar does introduces a few new rights; see more 
in Zane Rasnača, “Bridging the gaps or falling short? The Eu-
ropean Pillar of Social Rights and what it can Bring to EU-level 
Policymaking”, ETUI Working Paper 2017.05.
178  See note 6 above.
179  Giandomenico Majone, “The Deeper Euro-Crisis 
or: The Collapse of the EU Political Culture of Total Opti-
mism,” Working Paper, 2015, http://cadmus.eui.eu//han-
dle/1814/35281.
THE EU POLITICAL CULTURE 
OF TOTAL OPTIMISM IS NOT 
DEAD: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF 
SOCIAL RIGHTS
Vladimir Bogoeski
Hertie School of Governance
Introduction
In his “State of the Union Address” of September 
2015 the President of the Commission Jean-
Claude Juncker made a sincere confession, admit-
ting that the Union was not in a good state.171 But 
his speech was not entirely pessimistic, not even 
when he addressed the economic crisis. Rather, 
he announced a set of ambitious proposals, one of 
which was the European Pillar of Social Rights.172 
Reminiscent of the Maastricht pillars and their 
not so long history, it drew the attention of stake-
holders, civil society and academics to speculate 
about what was behind this pompous announ-
cement. By now, almost three years from its first 
announcement, the Social Pillar has not only been 
pinned down in an official Document, with stated 
principles and rights, but it has also been solemnly 
proclaimed by the Commission, the Council, and 
the European Parliament.173 The intention behind 
the Social Pillar, as initially expressed by the 
Commission, is to respond to the social conse-
quences of the economic crisis, on the one hand, 
and to contribute to the completion of a deeper 
and fairer EMU, on the other,174 for which a 
social dimension is understood to be necessary.175 
171  President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the European 
Union (SOTEU) Address, European Parliament, Strasbourg, 9 
September 2015.
172  Ibid.
173  Proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights 
(EPSR), Gothenburg, 17 November 2017.
174  COM(2016) 127 final, Launching a consultation on a 
EPSR, at 3.
175  EPSC Strategic Note No. 5, (2015) “The Social Dimen-
sion of Economic and Monetary Union: Towards Convergence 
and Resilience”.
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potential to strengthen the social dimension of the 
EU and tackle the problems that it identifies.
2. The European Pillar 
of Social Rights as a 
Reflection of the EU 
Political Culture of Total 
Optimism
The optimistic aura of the Social Pillar has been 
evident since it was first mentioned by Presi-
dent Juncker as a way forward after a decade of 
economic crisis.185 The term Pillar, which apart 
from the reminiscence of the Treaty of Maastricht 
pillars might bring to mind the biblical pillar of 
strength,186 also implies that it is an instrument with 
a certain political weight and with certain ambi-
tions, which should bolster and mean progress for 
Social Europe. Europe-wide consultations took 
place over the course of ten months in 2016, stake-
holders provided around 200 position papers, and 
16,500 replies to the online dedicated question-
naire were received, upon the basis of which the 
Commission has recommended a final text for 
the Pillar.187 This provided for a wide presence of 
the Pillar in various EU and Member State level 
debates. Finally, the optimism came full circle at 
the Social Summit in Gothenburg on 17 November 
2017, where the EU institutions expressed support 
for and commitment to the Pillar in signing the 
official Proclamation.188 But what is actually in 
the final text of this instrument, which has, for a 
moment, raised the hopes of affected stakeholders, 
civil society and Social Europe advocates? Did the 
mountain that shook bring forth a mouse? What 
can the final instrument, which we now call the 
Social Pillar - a non-legally-binding declaration of 
(mostly) already existing individual rights – actu-
ally do?
185  SOTEU Address in note 1 above.
186  “The Lord is my pillar, and my fortress …”, Psalm 18:2-
4, The Holy Bible, Modern English Version.
187  SWD(2017) 206 final, Report on the public consulta-
tion, Brussels, 26.4.2017, at 5. 
188  Note 3 above.
1. The EU Political Culture 
of Total Optimism
In a paper entitled “The deeper Euro-crisis or: 
The collapse of the EU political culture of total 
optimism”, Giandomenico Majone argues that 
one of the multiple dimensions of the euro-crisis 
has been its impact on the political culture of EU 
leaders.180 His central thesis is that, during the 
euro-crisis, the previously dominating EU poli-
tical culture of total optimism was replaced by 
“panic-driven austerity”.181 Majone understands 
the concept of political culture as a collective 
property, “a system of empirical beliefs, expressive 
symbols, and values which defines the situation in 
which political action takes place”.182 As the Euro-
pean Union (still) consists of 28 Member States, in 
which political culture varies greatly both across 
and within polities, he recognises that it would be 
misleading to speak of a political culture of the EU 
as a whole. In Majone’s understanding the concept 
of political culture, in the case of the EU, makes 
sense only if it is applied to the élites operating in 
the EU framework.183
Majone identifies three defining characteristics of 
the EU political culture of total optimism amongst 
the political élites, which also constitute the 
outcomes of the same mindset: 1) the emphasis 
on the process rather than the results; 2) the igno-
rance of feasibility constraints and possible risks; 
and 3) the disregard for the limits of collective 
action.184 The following section analyses the goals 
and the content of the European Pillar of Social 
Rights in accordance with these characteristics of 
total optimism, in order to answer the question of 
whether the Pillar itself is a reflection of this polit-
ical culture, or whether it entails some genuine 
180   Ibid., Abstract.
181  Ibid.
182  Majone relies on Verba’s definition of political culture 
as in Sidney Verba, “Comparative Political Culture”, in: Lucien 
W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds), Political Culture and Politi-
cal Development, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1965), pp. 512-60.
183  Majone, note 9 above, at 2.
184  Ibid.
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convergence as a process overshadows the concrete 
goal to which all the Member States and the EU 
itself should converge. This paradigm seems to be 
the contested “flexicurity” model that the Pillar 
intends to petrify as the European recipe for 
balancing social rights and economic freedoms,193 
by fostering the already well-known discourse of, 
in the words of Ruth Dukes, the “overestimation of 
the extent of shared interest between workers and 
employers”.194 Nonetheless, it becomes clear that 
the Pillar intends to activate a continuous process, 
but what remains unclear is its operative part, as 
well as when and what kind of concrete results 
should be expected.
The (In-) Feasibility of the 
Pillar
The question of results requires an inquiry into 
the feasibility of the Pillar’s goals. The feasibi-
lity problem that Majone identifies with the EU 
political culture of total optimism arises due to 
the ignorance of the existing constraints and the 
possible risks when political decisions are made. 
In the case of the Pillar, we could talk of the factual 
or given constraints, on the one hand, and the 
feasibility constraints directly attributable to the 
Pillar’s approach, on the other. As to the factual 
or pre-existing constraints, the Pillar does recog-
nise the limits to common European social policy 
due to the high level of diversity of the national 
social models and the different levels of economic 
development among the Member States.195 It even 
emphasises that the diversity of Member States’ 
social models needs to be respected, thus alloca-
ting most of the implementation tasks to the 
Member States themselves.196 Notwithstanding 
this, the most relevant constraint to the Pillar’s 
193  COM(2016) 127 final, at 5; SWD(2017) 201 final, at 22 
ff.
194  Ruth Dukes, “From the Labour Constitution to an Eco-
nomic Sociology of Labour Law”, final draft of a contribution 
to a Book Symposium, forthcoming in the journal Jurispru-
dence.
195  Rec. 19, Preamble, EPSR.
196  COM(2017) 250 final, at 2.
The Social Pillar as a Process
The consultations that took place between March 
and December 2016 identified four broad trends 
that the Pillar should address: (i) the social conse-
quences of the crisis, including increasing poverty 
and exclusion, inequalities and unemployment, 
and low growth and competitiveness; (ii) the 
future of work and the emerging digital labour 
market; (iii) demographic developments, that is 
to say, the ageing of Europe’s population; and (iv) 
economic divergence across the Member States.189 
Their common denominator is the Pillar’s ambi-
tion to complement the existing EU “social 
acquis” by “giving new and more efficient rights 
to citizens, which set an agenda for better perfor-
ming economies and more equitable and resilient 
societies”.190 This ambition becomes more flawed 
and ambiguous in the course of development of 
the several documents accompanying the Pillar. 
At certain point, in a contradictory manner, one 
of the documents says that the recognition of 
new rights is not the focus, but rather the enfor-
cement of rights (the take up).191 However, the 
documents repeatedly state that the Pillar needs 
to be seen as an instrument which will serve as a 
compass of convergence within the Euro area,192 
which brings us to the first feature of Majone’s 
culture of total optimism, namely, the focus on 
the process, rather than the outcome. The Pillar 
aims to steer a process of further social conver-
gence among the Member States of the Eurozone, 
which should eventually lead to deeper economic 
and monetary integration. The Pillar should guide 
both the EU’s and the Member States’ social policy 
choices towards achieving the ideals of the social 
rights that it contains, and they should - one day - 
converge under this guidance. The focus on social 
189  COM(2017) 250 final, Establishing a European Pillar of 
Social Rights, Brussels, 26.4.2017, at 4.
190  Note 19 above, at 4.
191  Ibid, at 7.
192  SOTEU Address in note 1 above; COM(2016) 127 
final, note 4 above; COM(2017) 250 final, note 19 above; 
COM(2018) 130 final, Monitoring the implementation of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights.
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resources.202 The Social Pillar could neither make 
a considerable contribution to the establishing of 
the required legal framework and institutional 
structure, nor could it respond to the most crit-
ical point of weakness of such previous declara-
tions of social rights, namely, that Member States 
could still invoke the pretext of “maximum avail-
able resources”.203
As the effectiveness of most of the Pillar’s rights and 
principles will depend on creating the necessary 
institutional set up mainly at Member State level, 
both the diversity of the national social models 
and the differences in economic development 
will probably be echoed in the Pillar’s outcome. 
The Pillar itself acknowledges that judicial recog-
nition and enforcement will not be enough to 
realise its programmatic principles effectively,204 
but does not give a clear lead as to how Member 
States are to establish and sustain the structures 
imperative for actualising rights and entitlements, 
such as childcare and support for children, social 
protection, unemployment benefits, minimum 
income, old age income and pensions, etc.205 These 
concerns question the Pillar’s capacity to deliver 
on its commitment to social convergence in the 
Eurozone and/or the EU in general.
The Limits of Collective Action
As Majone submits, collective actors face limit-
ations compared to individual decision-makers, 
and “the larger the group, the further it will fall 
short of providing an optimal amount of a collec-
tive good”.206 In the case of the Pillar, however, we 
could not talk of a total disregard of/for the limits 
of collective action. What its approach finally 
shows us is the acknowledgement of the contra-
diction between the accepted diversity of national 
social models and the advancement of the idea of 
a fully-harmonised social sphere at supranational 
202  Ibid.
203  SWD(2017) 201 final, at 4.
204  Preamble recital (14), EPSR.
205  Chapter III “Social Protection and Inclusion”, EPSR.
206  Majone, note 9 above, at 6.
objectives to countervail successfully the social 
consequences of the economic crisis, market inte-
gration and labour market developments, is its 
inadequate approach to remedy these problems by 
declaring individual social rights.
Despite its solemn proclamation, the Pillar none-
theless remains a non-legally-binding document 
that declares 20 principles containing 35 individual 
social rights.197 Many of these can be found in pre-
existing documents, such as the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the European Social Charter 
of Turin 1961, and the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989.198 
The language interchangeably referring to princi-
ples and rights is itself obscure.199 However, it is not 
its non-legally-binding nature, but its approach 
to addressing the structural challenges of market 
integration and the years of austerity policies, such 
as inequality, poverty and inclusion, through indi-
vidual rights, that is the Pillar’s main weakness.
In his latest book, entitled Not Enough: Human 
Rights in an Unequal World, Yale’s professor of 
Law and History, Samuel Moyn, argues that 
economic and social rights have failed to chal-
lenge inequality and distributive fairness both in 
the national and in the global political economy.200 
In a similar manner, the Pillar fails to recog-
nise the constraints of the rights approach, thus 
possibly foreclosing on searching for other visions 
for serious re-distributive politics. Florian Rödl 
describes the pursuit of structural social objec-
tives merely through the language of rights as 
the “juridical misconception” of social rights.201 
Social rights are different in nature from civil 
and political rights, as their effective realisation 
requires not only absence of arbitrary state action, 
but also elaborate legal structures and material 
197  See Höpner, note 6 above.
198  Rec. 3, Preamble, EPSR.
199  Frank Hendrickx, “Editorial: The European Pillar of 
Social Rights: Interesting Times Ahead”, (2017) 8 European 
Labour Law Journal, 191-92.
200  Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an 
Unequal World, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2018).
201  Florian Rödl, note 6 above.
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result of the necessity to act against the rising EU 
scepticism, attempting to countervail the argu-
ments that the EMU, on the one hand, and the 
single market, on the other, have had negative 
consequences for social justice at both EU and 
Member State level.211 The ubiquity of the debate 
on the Social Pillar together with its inter-institu-
tional proclamation, have, without doubt, raised 
hopes, as we can, for example, observe in an official 
statement from a recent conference of trade union 
leaders from the Visegrád countries,212 where, in 
support of their plea for an upward wage conver-
gence and reduction of the East-West gap, they 
explicitly referred to Principle 6 of the Pillar.213 
However, as the disappointment of broken prom-
ises may easily result in increasing, rather than 
decreasing, Eurosceptic sentiments, the future of 
the EU’s social dimension will largely depend on 
both the EU’s and the Member States’ capacity to 
go beyond the Pillar when developing and imple-
menting concrete social policies in order to set 
and achieve social objectives. The Pillar leaves us 
with more questions than answers, but the polit-
ical actors and stakeholders should nonethe-
less explore further the possible productive ways 
of using it, which should in no way foreclose on 
pursuing more progressive alternatives, following 
the latest example of the “European Pact for Social 
Progress”.214
211  On the context of the Pillar, see Sacha Garben, “The 
European Pillar of Social Rights: Effectively Addressing Dis-
placement?”, (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review, 
210-230, at 212 ff.
212  Statement, Meeting of trade union leaders of the Viseg-
rád countries, Budapest, 10-11 May 2018.
213  Principle 6, EPSR: “Workers have the right to fair wages 
that provide for a decent standard of living.”
214  A European Pact for Social Progress, Vienna, 29 
November 2016. See Florian Rödl, “Austerity and Marketisa-
tion: Viking, Laval and the Proclamation of the New Social 
Dimension”, Paper presented at the conference“Responses of 
European Economic Cultures to Europe’s Crisis Politics: The 
Example of German-Italian Discrepancies”, Villa Vigoni, 26-27 
June 2018.
level.207 It is not only the budgetary constraints, 
but also the accepted varieties of capitalism208 
and socio-economic cultures within the EU that 
have lead researchers to recognise that full social 
harmonisation will not be the blueprint solution 
for the European social model.209 In the light of 
this, in the pursuit of the collective good, defined 
as upward social convergence for better perfor-
ming economic and monetary integration, the 
Pillar might downplay the diversity of the chal-
lenges that the different Member States are facing. 
Promoting this collective good of social conver-
gence, the Pillar fails, first of all, to offer concrete 
and adequate protection to the existing Member 
States’ social models from the potential negative 
effects of economic and monetary integration. It 
provides clear and concrete response to none of 
the two most pressing issues, namely, neither to 
the Viking-Laval controversy which has accom-
panied the decade of austerity policies, nor to the 
scenario in which future austerity policies could 
override national social objectives.210
Conclusion
As decision-makers in a political culture of total 
optimism would focus on the process rather than 
on concrete results, lessening the relevance of the 
existing feasibility constraints and the limits of 
collective action, offering some kind of a response 
might seem preferable to not offering a response 
at all. The Social Pillar represents this political 
culture in an exemplary fashion. It has come as a 
207  See Höpner, note 6 above; Christian Joerges, “Social 
Justive in an Ever More Diverse Union”, in: Frank Vanden-
broucke, Catherine Barnard and Geert De Baere (eds), A 
European Social Union after the Crisis, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017).
208  Peter Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: 
The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
209  See more on the concept of European Social Union in 
Vandenbroucke et al., note 6 above.
210  See Marcel Hadeed, “What to Expect from Germany 
for the European Pillar of Social Rights?”, Paper presented at 
the conference, “Responses of European Economic Cultures 
to Europe’s Crisis Politics: The Example of German-Italian 
Discrepancies”, Villa Vigoni, 26-27 June 2018.
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Given the legitimation crisis that has been aff ecting 
the European Union in the last years, the way in 
which EU institutions, and in particular, the Presi-
dent of the Commission as the EU main represen-
tative, communicate with the public plays a funda-
mental role in fostering reclaiming legitimacy not 
only for EU decisions, but for the EU integration 
process as a whole. Accordingly, the aim of this 
paper is to study the communicative strategies of 
the two latest Presidents of the Commissions to 
investigate their active role in reclaiming legiti-
macy and support for the EU.
Since the onset of the Eurozone crisis, the leader-
ship role of the Commission amongst EU insti-
tutions has been deemed to be in decline (Bauer 
and Becker 2016). On the one hand, the diffi  cult 
governance of the crisis witnessed the relative 
weakening of the supranational vis-a vis the inter-
governmental approach, with the emergence of 
the European Council as the key political player 
(Dinan 2016; Fabbrini 2015). On the other hand, 
the political governance of the crisis has been to 
an extent replaced by an economic governance, 
strengthening, and to an extent, ‚politicizing‘ 
(Verdun 2017), the role of the European Central 
Bank (Tortola and Pansardi 2018). 
A number of commentators (Christiansen 2016; 
Dinan 2016; Kassim 2017; Kassim et al. 2017), 
however, have highlighted a change of direction 
in the leadership role of the Commission aft er the 
appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as its Presi-
dent. In particular, the literature suggests the 
emergence of a visible diff erence between Barro-
so’s and Juncker’s overall approaches to the Presi-
dency (Kassim 2017; Kassim et al. 2017). Juncker 
himself, in the fi rst of his State of the Union 
Addresses (2015), appeals to the Treaties in clai-
ming for his mandate a ‚more political‘ role - impli-
citly intending, according to Dinan (2016), ‚more 
political‘ than the leadership style adopted by his 
predecessor, José Manuel Barroso, oft en accused of 
lacking assertiveness and being too deferential in 
dealing with national leaders, in particular those 
of Germany and France (Dinan 2016: 103). What 
has changed with Juncker‘s presidency, however, 
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Th e multiple crises that have been aff ecting the EU 
since 2008 – the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, 
the Brexit, to name a few – and the failure of EU 
institutions in eff ectively addressing them have 
posed a severe challenge to very foundations of 
the project of European integration (Börzel 2016: 
25) and have led to what Juncker described as an 
‘existential crisis’ (Juncker 2016). A crisis, fi rst of 
all, in legitimacy and support, made more severe 
by the ‘blame-shift ing’ model that permeates the 
rhetoric of Eurosceptic parties and movements. 
In spite of this, the registered level of support for 
the EU and EU institutions varies greatly among 
member states. When comparing Germany and 
Italy, we immediately notice that these two count-
ries align themselves on the opposite side of the 
continuum between a full and a scarce support. 
Data from EP Eurobarometer 2018 allow for an 
immediate comparison: While, between 2010 and 
2018, Germany steadily attests itself above the 
means of EU countries, Italy constantly shows a 
level of support inferior to the average level (and, 
even more signifi cantly, always below the 50%). 
Figure 1 presents the results for these two count-
ries contrasted with the EU overall level.
Figure 1. Support for the EU: comparison 
between Italy and Germany
Source: Socio-demographic trendlines -EP Eurobarometer 
2017-2018. Item: Membership of the European Union.  
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dents‘ communication, and the results of these 
two strains of analysis will jointly allow us to 
empirically verify the claims of a greater ‚politici-
zation‘ of Juncker‘s Presidency in terms of the use 
of language.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first 
section, I present the theoretical framework 
and main results of the analysis of the discur-
sive legitimation strategies developed in Pansardi 
and Battegazzorre (2018) based on a qualitative 
analysis of the ‚symbols‘ included in the speeches. 
In the second section, I introduce the methodo-
logical perspective that shape the original soft-
ware-based quantitative analysis of ‚charismatic 
language‘ in details. In the third sections, I present 
the results and offer a first assessment of the empi-
rical findings. The last section discusses the results 
and concludes.   
1. The study of the 
discursive legitimation 
strategies (SOTEU 2010-2017)
As expounded in Pansardi and Battegazzorre 
(2018), a way to investigate the Presidents‘ role 
in communicating the EU is to analyse how they 
have attempted to discursively represent and 
reclaim legitimacy for the EU in a particularly 
significant institutional setting: the delivery of the 
State of the Union Address (SOTEU). The SOTEU 
speech, first introduced in 2010, is the institutional 
occasion on which the President of the Commis-
sion openly addresses the past achievements, the 
most pressing challenges that the EU is currently 
facing, and sets the Union’s priorities for the years 
to come. It is thus a public occasion for reflection 
on the identity and the future of the European 
Union. Accordingly, the SOTEU speech provides 
the paramount opportunity for the President of 
the Commission to speak not only to EP members 
and national governments, but also – to an extent – 
directly to European citizens, and to communicate 
his/her view on the nature and legitimacy of the 
European project, as well as to engage in rhetorical 
attempts to reclaim legitimacy for the EU.  
does not entirely derive from personal styles and 
choices: the introduction of the Spitzencaditaten 
system, in fact, and the President‘s possibility 
to claim for a personal, and more ‚democratic‘, 
mandate, has somehow contributed in strengthe-
ning the role of the President. While individual 
agency, characterized by differences in personality 
and individual leadership style certainly has an 
effect on the role that leaders claim for themselves, 
the introduction of the Spitzencaditaten procedure 
undoubtedly had an effect of Juncker‘s interpre-
tation of his role, providing him with a different 
opportunity structure than the one of his prede-
cessor. 
In this paper, my aim is to empirically investigate 
and assess the presence of visible differences in 
the leadership styles of the two latest Presidents of 
the Commission as they emerge from their use of 
language in official speeches. While the content - 
in terms of topics touched and the relevance given 
to each of them - is undoubtedly fundamental in 
assessing the political perspective of a leader and 
his/her political goals, in this paper my focus will 
be rather on the rhetorical aspects of the speeches, 
with a particular focus on the tone of the language 
used: in particular, whether the language can be 
deemed to be a neutral, descriptive and unemo-
tional language or whether it is closer to the ideal-
type of charismatic, politicized language that often 
accompanies political leadership. While starting 
by summarizing the main points of previous work 
(Pansardi and Battegazzorre 2018) on the so-called 
‚discursive strategies‘ of the two Presidents - based 
on a qualitative content analysis of a small number 
of highly significant speeches (the seven State of 
the Union Speeches from 2010 to 2017) aimed at 
investigating the rhetorical strategies used by the 
speakers in defining and reclaiming legitimacy for 
the EU -, the current work focuses on a quantita-
tive assessment of the tone of the language used 
by the two Presidents in all of their official spee-
ches (2010-2017) thanks to a dictionary-based 
analysis performed with the software DICTION 7. 
The paper will accordingly offer a mixed-method 
interpretation of the changes in the two Presi-
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conceptions of the EU’s legitimacy present in the 
literature and the four discursive legitimation 
strategies listed by Van Leeuwen. While the prev-
alence of references to goals and effects, which 
indicates legitimation through rationalization, may 
reveal an output-based conception of legitimacy, 
the prevalence of references to (democratic) rules 
and procedures, which indicates a case of legiti-
mation through authorization, may be seen in 
connection to an input-based conception of the 
EU’s legitimacy. Moreover, an extensive reference 
to moral values – which characterizes legitima-
tion through moral evaluation – and the presence 
of mythopoetic elements may denote an under-
standing of legitimacy of a substantial, Weberian 
kind (Cerutti 2008: 10; Schmidt 2013:11).
The investigation of the discursive legitima-
tion strategies in the SOTEU speeches proposed 
by Pansardi and Battegazzorre (2018) consists 
in a qualitative content analysis of the evalua-
tive aspects of a speech, which includes: “assi-
gnment of categories to text as qualitative step, 
working through many text passages and analysis 
of frequencies of categories as quantitative step” 
(Mayring, 2014: 10). In practice, the method 
consists in the manual coding of the evaluative 
content of speech transcripts in light of a classi-
ficatory grid.215 The grid – the coding scheme – 
was built on the basis of a deductive and inductive 
process. General distinctions derived from overall 
accepted categories in the study of politics. The 
distinction among the political (at the EU level 
and at the Member State level), economic, social 
and intellectual spheres was based on the Webe-
rian classification of the value-spheres, unders-
tood as the loci of value rationalization in which 
individual action is shaped through the capacity to 
take a position on the world and ascribe a meaning 
to it (Weber 1949; Oakes 2003). Specific categories 
resulted from the analysis and identification of 
significant recurrent elements in the seven Spee-
ches on the State of the Union and a number of 
215 Texts were coded with NVivo 10. The work of the two 
independent coders showed a good degree of inter-coder 
reliability, with a Kappa coefficient ranging from 0.76 to 0.94 
for the various symbols categories.  
Whilst legitimacy concerns the actual assessment 
of a particular state of affairs, legitimation consists 
in the process by which the belief in the right-
fulness of the authority is claimed or conferred 
(Barker 2001; Hurrelman 2016). Top-down legi-
timation strategies should be understood as acti-
vities – institutional or discursive (Gronau and 
Schmidtke 2016) – distinct, at least in analytical 
terms, from the other activities of a political body. 
Following Gronau and Schmidtke, Pansardi and 
Battegazzorre (2018) define top-down legitimation 
strategies as: “goal oriented activities employed to 
establish and maintain a reliable basis for diffuse 
support for a political regime by its social consti-
tuencies” (Gronau and Schmidtke 2016: 541). 
The particular need for top-down legitimation 
activities in the case of the EU, sometimes inter-
preted in terms of “political community-buil-
ding and/or mythical foundations of identity” 
(Hansen and Williams 1999: 235) has always 
been recognized, and it proves of the utmost 
importance in dealing with the current crises. 
As Theiler writes: “fostering political legitimacy 
always has a ‘top-down’ symbolic dimension. This 
entails elite-driven construction and dissemina-
tion of symbolic categories which, if successful, 
stimulates more ‘bottom-up’ communicative 
and deliberative processes” (2005: 4). Legitimi-
zing discourses are an integral aspect of political 
communication, and they consist of references to 
“specific linguistic resources and configurations 
of linguistic resources” (Van Leeuwen 2007: 92). 
In order to analyze the discursive legitimation 
strategies employed by the two Presidents of the 
Commission, Pansardi and Battegazzorre (2018) 
employed a typology formulated by Van Leeuwen 
(2007; see also Vaara 2014) that differentiates 
among four legitimation strategies. These strate-
gies can be present separately or in combination, 
and consist in: 1) Authorization; 2) Moral evalua-
tion; 3) Rationalization; 4) Mythopoiesis.
The conception of legitimacy that the speaker 
endorses undoubtedly affects how s/he shapes his/
her discursive strategies. In particular, in this case, 
it is possible to identify a relation among the three 
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minance of symbols belonging in the ‘goals’ cate-
gory, especially ‘economic goals’. The legitimacy of 
the EU is asserted through ‘rationalist’ and ‘util-
itarianist’ arguments (Thelier 2005: 22), and it 
is attested insofar as the EU produces beneficial 
outcomes for the ‘political community’. 
Barroso’s speeches, moreover, present elements 
of authorization. The kind of authority evoked, 
however, is predominantly the authority of 
economic expertise (Reyes, 2011) supported by 
the high frequency of references to economic 
values.
What emerges from Barroso’s choices in terms of 
discursive legitimation strategy is an underlying 
output conception of legitimacy (Scharpf 1999; 
Schmidt 2013): the community is not the source of 
power per se; it is, by contrast, the ultimate recip-
ient and judge of the activities and decisions of the 
EU. In this perspective EU authority and proce-
dures are then motivated and justified in light of 
their capacity to make ‘good decisions’ for EU citi-
zens. In Barroso’s speeches, the legitimazing prin-
ciple is accordingly the classic, functionalist inter-
pretation of the ‘rationality’ of the EU’s decisions 
in terms of, mainly, economic outputs, supported 
by reference to merely economic principles and 
values – as well as by a non-conflictual, techno-
cratic language (Olsson and Hammargård 2016: 
552-3): Barroso’s attempt to reclaim legitimacy for 
the EU in times of crises thus goes in the direction 
of the depoliticization of current conflicts in light 
of the rationality of EU decisions. 
The findings for the SOTEU speeches delivered 
by Juncker allow us to depict a quite different 
picture. Juncker’s speeches devote little atten-
tion to the economic sphere in general, and to 
symbols concerning economic goals and values 
in particular. Juncker’s reference to values is made 
predominantly in terms of ethical, social and, 
especially in the last two speeches, political values. 
Symbols concerning the EU political sphere are 
overall predominant, and particular reference is 
made to symbols concerning the sources of legiti-
macy. Despite differences between Juncker’s three 
other speeches by the Presidents of the Commis-
sion. Definition of the categories and sub-cate-
gories and the allocation of ‚symbols‘ (the unit 
of analysis) among the relevant categories allows 
for quantification and overall comparison of the 
content of the speeches. 
To investigate the understandings of legitimacy 
present in the seven SOTEU speeches delivered 
between 2010 and 2017216, Pansardi and Battegaz-
zorre (2018) rely on the frequency217 of specific 
categories and sub-categories of symbols in the 
total of symbols registered in the single speech. 
The choice of the relevant symbolic categories is 
guided by the intent to operationalize Van Leeu-
wen’s (2007) typology of discursive legitimation 
strategies in light of the three different concep-
tions of legitimacy (input; output; substantial) 
expounded in the previous section. The catego-
ries identified as relevant to the study of legiti-
macy are: 1) values; 2) goals; 3) sources of legiti-
macy; 4) interpretations of the political commu-
nity (Pansardi and Battegazzorre 2018: 9). 
The empirical study of the frequency of symbols 
conducted by Pansardi and Battegazzorre (2018) 
allows us to identify clear differences, in terms 
of symbolic content, between the speeches by 
Barroso and the more recent speeches delivered 
by Juncker. Barroso’s speeches make predomi-
nant reference to economic goals and values, while 
devoting little attention to symbols concerning the 
sources of the EU’s legitimacy – privileging, in this 
case, the reference to ‘Treaties’ – and providing an 
interpretation of the political community as a bene-
ficiary of the EU’s decisions and of the European 
integration process. Referring to the typology of 
discursive legitimation strategies identified by 
Van Leeuwen (2007), Barroso’s speeches comprise 
a discursive strategy mainly directed at legitima-
tion through rationalization given by the predo-
216  Speeches were downloaded from the European Com-
mission Press Release Database: http://europa.eu/rapid/search.
htm
217  The relative frequency of a category is obtained in 
relation to the entire symbolic content of the speech. Symbols 
that do not pertain to any of the categories relevant to this in-
vestigation are included in the category ‘Other’. 
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want to live in is illustrated by those who are helping. 
The Europe I don’t want to live in is a Europe refu-
sing those who are in need (Juncker 2015: 6).
The use of these two latter discursive strategies 
seems intended to provide and reinforce thicker 
symbols of identification and narratives for legiti-
mizing the EU, and upholding, as well as repro-
ducing, a substantial conception of legitimacy of 
the Weberian kind described by Cerutti (2008) 
as based on collective identification and shared 
beliefs. 
On the basis of these findings, we can thus high-
light a clear shift in the overall legitimizing stra-
tegies of the two Presidents. Whereas Barroso’s 
speeches are designed to depoliticize conflicts 
and reproduce the commonly held assumption of 
the EU as “a polity based on rationality and func-
tional interests, not emotional appeals” (Della Sala 
2010: 2), Juncker’s speeches are ‘more political’ 
and characterized by ‘a marked assertiveness’ and 
‘bold proposals’ (Dinan 2016: 103) associated with 
stronger legitimacy claims. 
2. The study of the 
Presidents‘ of the 
Commission charismatic 
language (2010-2017)
While the discursive legitimation strategies chosen 
by the Presidents (together with their speech-
writers and presumably attesting the line of the 
Commission as a whole) in the particular occa-
sion of the State on the Union Addresses tell us 
part of the story of their attempts to have a public 
political impact on national governments‘ and EU 
citizens‘ attitudes on the EU project as whole and 
on the role of the Commission in particular, the 
assessment of the overall tone of the Presidents‘ 
communication is fundamental in understan-
ding the styles of leadership that the Presidents 
reclaim for themselves. In particular, in the inves-
tigation of leadership styles, whether the language 
used can be claimed to proximate an idealtype of 
charismatic, politicized language, or whether it 
SOTEU speeches – concerning mainly the 2016 
speech, where was registered a slight increase in 
the reference to economic values and goals and a 
decrease in the reference to the sources of legiti-
macy – the overall similarities hold in the compar-
ison with Barroso’s speeches.   
The discursive legitimation strategies employed by 
Juncker can thus be described as rather different 
from those used by Barroso. Firstly, the frequency 
of symbols of the sub-categories ‘political commu-
nity’ and ‘popular sovereignty’ as sources of legi-
timacy indicates a legitimation through authori-
zation in terms of (democratic) rules and proce-
dures, where authority is understood in terms of 
the classic repertoire of democratic legitimacy. 
The underlying conception of legitimacy that 
shapes Juncker’s discursive strategies thus seems to 
consist in an input-based understanding of legiti-
macy whereby citizens are not only the judges of, 
but also the prime actors in, the decision-making 
process.
Secondly, the frequent reference to symbols 
in the ‘values’ category, in particular the refe-
rence to values pertaining to the ethical sphere 
- almost absent in Barroso‘s speeches - high-
lights the presence of a strategy of legitimation 
through moral evaluation, where actions and deci-
sions are explained and justified by reference to a 
commonly shared set of values. Lastly, Juncker’s 
speeches include also elements of legitimation 
through mythopoesis, supported by the high rate of 
symbols concerning the ‘common historical expe-
rience and memory’ (especially in the SOTEU 
2015) and by the inclusion of actual mythopoetic 
narratives. The following passage from Juncker’s 
2015 speech exemplifies this point:
Pushing back boats from piers, setting fire to refugee 
camps, or turning a blind eye to poor and helpless 
people: that is not Europe. Europe is the baker in 
Kos who gives away his bread to hungry and weary 
souls. Europe is the students in Munich and in 
Passau who bring clothes for the new arrivals at the 
train station. That’s those at the Munich rail station 
applauding and welcoming refugees. The Europe I 
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The studies by Shamir have been the basis for a 
number of empirical analyses of charismatic 
leadership in times of crisis (e.g. Bligh et al. 
2004; Bligh & Hess 2007; Davis & Gardner 2012; 
Bastardoz et al. 2015). Recently, this theoretical 
framework has also been applied to the case of 
the euro crisis to study the charismatic rhetoric 
and leadership of the President of the European 
Commission (Olsson and Hammargård 2016). 
The study of Olsson and Hammargård, which 
provides an analysis of all the speeches delivered 
by Barroso between 2006 and 2011, offers some 
unexpected result. In contrast with the common 
theoretical assumption of a positive effect of 
crises on charismatic leadership, they found that 
in the cases under investigation the language of 
President Barroso became less charismatic in the 
periods of manifest exacerbation of the Eurozone 
crises. This finding is even more significant if read 
together with the study of Tortola and Pansardi 
(2018), which, for the same period of time, attests 
an increase in the charismatic language of another 
central player in the dealing of the Eurozone crisis, 
namely the President of the European Central 
Bank (at the time, Jean Claude Trichet).  
2.1 Methods and research design
While the manual coding of the SOTEU speeches 
allows for the investigation of the discursive legi-
timation strategies used by the two Presidents, 
the study of the overall degree of charisma of the 
Presidents‘ communication relies on a compu-
ter-assisted analysis of all speeches delivered 
between 2010 and 2017. Accordingly, I conducted 
an analysis of the entire corpus of speeches from 
the inception the second Barroso Commission on 
9th February 2010 to 31 December 2017.218 The 
corpus consists of 783 speeches, of which 709 deli-
vered by President Barroso, and 74 by President 
Juncker. Considering that the time spans under 
investigation for the two Presidents are not extre-
mely dissimilar - around four and half years for 
President Barroso, and a little more than three 
218  Speeches were downloaded from the European 
Commission Press Release Database: http://europa.eu/
rapid/search.htm
should be deemed to consist in a neutral, descrip-
tive and technical language devoid of emotional 
appeals, may allow to provide a fuller picture of 
the leadership role that the President choses for 
himself, and accordingly, allows us to test, for 
one, whether the ‚more political‘ role that Juncker 
claimed for himself is attested by the tone of his 
overall communication. 
While charisma, in the classical Weberian inter-
pretation, consists in exceptional qualities of the 
leader, which manifest themselves especially 
in his/her action, language represents a funda-
mental aspect of charisma, because only through 
language the charismatic actor is able to attest and 
reclaim its leadership role. It is primarily through 
communication that charismatic leaders represent 
themselves as such, and transmit their values and 
vision to followers (Tucker 1968; Antonakis et al. 
2011; 2016). 
Shamir, House and Arthur (Shamir et al. 1993; 
1994), have identified seven principal traits that 
distinguish charismatic language: 
1. More references to collective history 
and to the continuity between the past and 
the present; 
2. More references to the collective and 
to collective identity, and fewer references 
to individual self-interest;
3. More positive references to followers’ 
worth and efficacy as individuals and as a 
collective; 
4. More references to the leader’s 
similarity to followers and identification 
with followers; 
5. More references to values and moral 
justifications, and fewer references to 
tangible outcomes and instrumental 
justifications; 
6. More references to distal goals and 
the distant future, and fewer references to 
proximal goals and the near future; and
7. More references to hope and faith 
(Shamir et al. 1994: 29).
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Relying on a well-established method (Bligh et al. 
2004; Bligh & Robinson 2010; Davis & Gardner 
2012; Bastardoz et al. 2015; Olsson & Hammar-
gård 2016; Tortola and Pansardi 2018), I have 
analyzed the corpus of speeches by combining 
DICTION variables into seven composite cons-
tructs, building on the linguistic characteristics 
of charisma listed in the previous section. Table 
2 summarizes the seven constructs and the corre-
sponding formulas of DICTION variables, along 
with sample words for each variable.
years for President Juncker -, the difference in the 
number of speeches is quite surprising (please note 
that a consistent number of speeches by Juncker 
were excluded from this investigation - around 60 
- because they were delivered in a language diffe-
rent from English, mostly in French or in a mix of 
French, German and English; yet, this exclusion 
does not account for this extreme difference in 
number).
To analyze the texts I have relied on the use of the 
DICTION 7 software (Hart 2001). Created speci-
fically to analyze the tone of political discourse, in 
speeches and other types of texts, DICTION codes 
text on 31 pre-defined variables using in-built 
dictionaries and assigning scores reflecting the 
presence and weight of dictionary terms. 
Table 2. The seven charismatic constructs and operationalization in DICTION 7 (Tortola and 
Pansardi 2018)
Construct DICTION 7 variables Sample terms
Collective focus: charismatic leaders show a 
collective orientation and describe their ac-
tions and goals as directed towards common 
achievements and interests.
Collectives Assembly, cabinet, humanity, mankind, nation.
+ People references Crowd, residents, constituencies, majority, 
citizenry, population
- Self-reference I, I’d, I’ll, I’m, I’ve, me, mine, my, myself, race, 
union
Temporal orientation: charismatic leaders use 
more temporal references and tend to highlight 
continuity between the past and the present.  
Present concern Become, care, desire, make, need, request, take
+ Past concern Became, cared, desired, made, needed, re-
quested, took, wanted want
Follower’s worth: charismatic leaders high-
light the positive aspects of the followers and 
reinforce their sense of awareness vis-à-vis the 
achievement of collective goals (collective self-
efficacy).
Praise Admirable, brave, delightful, intelligent, kind, 
lovely, respected
+ Inspiration Ambition, devotion, ideals, leadership, merit, 
optimism, promise, reassurance
+ Satisfaction Comfort, cherish, delight, fascinate, gratify, 
laugh, love, pleasure, rejoice 
Similarity to followers: charismatic leaders 
highlight their own similarity to followers by 
describing themselves as “one of them”.
Levelling Anybody, everybody, fully, obvious, perma-
nent, totally, unquestionably 
+ Familiarity About, between, for, on, past, than, who, with
+ Human interest Children, family, friends, parents, relatives, 
widows, yours, charity, blessing, eternal, faith, 
hope, mercy
Tangibility: charismatic leaders devote less at-
tention to concrete and short terms goals, and 
are more prone to discuss their expectations 
and goals in abstract and general terms. 
Concreteness Animal, baseball, cancer, factory, household, 
movie, school, silk, sugar
+ Insistence Score calculated on the basis of repetition of 
key terms.
- Variety Score calculated by dividing the number of dif-
ferent words in a passage by the total words
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Action; charismatic leaders use an action-ori-
ented language in order to mobilize followers 
and describe themselves as “proactive”.
Aggression Attack, challenge, combat, dominate, furious, 
hurt, kill, oppose, preempt
+ Accomplishment Achieve, aspire, create, fi nish, motivate, pur-
suit, resolution, succeed
- Passivity Accept, acquiesce, complacent, disinterested, 
hesitate, lackadaisical
- Ambivalence Blur, confound, hesitate, puzzle, quandary, 
vacillate, wonder
Adversity: charismatic leaders describe the situ-
ation as intolerable with the aim of supporting 
the proposed alternative “visionary future” and 
moving to action.
Blame Contemptible, desperate, guilty, incompetent, 
mediocre, rash, senile
+ Hardship Confl ict, crisis, death, fear, insecurity, loss, 
outrage, sorrow, tension
+ Denial Didn’t, hadn’t, never, wasn’t, wouldn’t
2.2 Findings
Th e next step in answering the research question 
about an increase in the ‚politicization‘ 
of Juncker‘s communication in compa-
rison to Barroso‘s is to analyze the results 
obtained aft er running DICTION 7 on 
the whole corpus of the Presidents of 
the Commission speeches between 2010 
and 2017. Th e charismatic constructs 
presented in Table 2 are aggregated in a 
single indicator of charismatic rhetoric, 
by subtracting the value of tangibility 
from the sum of the six remaining cons-
tructs.219 Figure 2 presents a fi rst over-
view of the charismatic content of the corpus under 
exam by plotting the year-by-year mean value of 
the speeches’ aggregate indicator of charisma. A 
fi rst visual inspection is not very telling: while two 
peaks can be immediately detected (a high peak in 
2013 and a low peak in 2017), the remaining years 
under investigation present a degree of charisma 
of the Presidents‘ speeches that seems overall cons-
tant, and accordingly not aff ected by the change in 
the occupant of the presidency. Overall, however, 
this fi rst investigation does not seem to depict the 
increase in charismatic rhetoric with the passage 
from Barroso to Juncker that we were expecting in 
light of Juncker‘s own assumption of a ‚more poli-
tical‘ interpretation of his role as President of the 
Commission, nor to replicate the fi ndings of the 
qualitative analysis of the SOTEU speeches.  
219  The aggregation formula follows Bligh et al. 
(2004: 225).
Figure 2. Charisma indicator mean per year
To assess the statistical signifi cance of a change 
in charismatic rhetoric, so as to establish whether 
an actual variation occur between the rhetorical 
styles of the two Presidents, I follow the litera-
ture on charismatic rhetoric (e.g. Bligh et al. 2004; 
Bligh et al. 2010; Davis & Gardner 2012; Schroedel 
et al. 2013; Olsson & Hammargård 2016, Tortola 
and Pansardi 2018), and rely on a multivariate 
analyses of co-variance (MANCOVA), a technique 
for testing the signifi cance of mean diff erences in a 
dependent variable of interest (in our case charis-
matic language) across samples, while also cont-
rolling for a number of factors (covariates) that 
might be related to that variable. In the absence of 
statistical signifi cance, the null hypothesis that the 
underlying populations are the same, and that any 
increase is due to sheer chance, cannot be safely 
discarded.
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The multivariate test, as a result, does not allow us 
to obtain straightforward answer to the question 
of which of the two Presidents make use of a more 
charismatic rhetoric. Nonetheless, if we take into 
account only the statistically significant results, we 
should consider that, in contrasts to our expecta-
tions, the tone of Juncker‘s speeches appear to be 
less charismatic than the one found in the spee-
ches by Barroso, leaving us with a finding that 
goes against the results obtained by performing 
the qualitative analysis of the SOTEU speeches.
3. Discussion and conclusion
By relying on the qualitative analysis of the SOTEU 
speeches reported in the first part of this paper, 
we can highlight a radical change in the two Presi-
dents‘ interpretation of their role as key actors in 
the promotion and support of the project of Euro-
pean integration.  On the specific occasion of the 
delivery of the SOTEU speech, the two Presidents 
did not only rely on extremely different strategies 
for top-down legitimation, but also adopted diffe-
rent vision of the nature of the legitimacy of the 
EU. The growing attention reserved by the Euro-
pean community to the SOTEU speeches may 
have the result of rendering these speeches the 
paramount opportunity for expressing rhetorical 
strategy, charisma, and vision, and accordingly, to 
concentrate the rhetorical 
efforts of the President in 
that particular event.
A possible explanation of 
the differences between 
Barroso‘s and Juncker‘s 
SOTEU speeches may 
come from taking seri-
ously into account the 
role of the Spitzencadi-
daten system in changing 
the President‘s perspec-
tive about the legitimacy 
and nature of his/her own mandate. If, on the 
one hand, the content and the discursive strate-
gies employed in the speeches highlight the role 
I accordingly run a one-way multivariate analysis 
of covariance (MANCOVA) comparing the 
measure of the speeches seven charismatic cons-
tructs taken individually (the dependent vari-
ables) for the two Presidents (the independent 
variable), including the total number of words in 
each speech as a covariate, to control for speech 
length. The multivariate test shows a significant 
difference between the two Presidents‘ overall 
charismatic rhetoric: Wilks’s Lambda = 0.941, F 
(7, 774) = 6.976, p < 0.001. However, the direc-
tion of the difference - namely, which President 
scores the best in terms of overall charisma - is 
more difficult to assess. As Table 3 shows, the 
test determined that four out of the seven cons-
tructs present statistically significant differences 
for the two Presidents: Followers’ worth, Similarity 
to followers, Action and Adversity. However, while 
President Barroso scores higher on the first three 
variables, Juncker scores higher on the last one, 
namely Adversity. Moreover, if we look at the other 
variables that do not show a statistically significant 
variation, we see that Juncker scores higher (and 
lower, in the case of Tangibility, which is expected 
to decrease to attest charismatic rhetoric) in two 
out of three. 
Table 3. The charismatic rhetoric of the two 
Presidents. Results by single construct 
Notes: Barroso N = 709; Juncker N = 74. *p < 0.05; **p < 















1.015 .223 1.484 .835 .245ns .621 .000
Temporal 
Orientation
13.614 .181 12.540 .532 3.224ns .073 .004
Follower’s 
Worth
22.759 .322 17.571 1.076 19.708*** .000 .025
Similarity to 
Followers
163.626 .763 157.291 1.871 7.324** .007 .009
Tangibility 95.145 2.133 89.455 6.745 .215 .643 .000
Action 5.126 .330 0.705 1.391 13.522*** .000 .017
Adversity 6.690 .167 8.461 .616 5.950* .015 .008
A ‘MORE POLITICAL’ LEADERSHIP FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION?  
A MIXED-METHODS LANGUAGE-BASED ANALYSIS
Pamela Pansardi
210
on his new appointment procedure, Juncker has 
been able to include in his speeches discursive 
strategies directed at the legitimation of his own 
role and of the EU’s policy proposals in terms of 
democratic authorization, thus offering an overall 
interpretation of the EU’s legitimacy in terms of 
input. Moreover, in light of his stronger leader-
ship, Juncker has been able to reinforce his legiti-
macy claims by including discursive strategies of 
top-down legitimation through moral evaluation 
and mythopoesis, overall contributing to an inter-
pretation of the EU as a ‘community of values’ in 
terms of a substantial, Weberian, conception of 
the legitimacy of the EU (Pansardi and Battegaz-
zorre 2018).
However, the quantitative analysis of the tone of 
the language of the two Presidents depicts a quite 
different picture. Not only the tone of Juncker‘s 
speeches is not more charismatic then the one 
found in Barroso, but can  - with a few precau-
tions  -  be described as overall less charismatic. 
This accounts for two possible explanations. A 
first explanation may assume the peculiar nature 
of the State of the Union Addresses as the reason 
why Juncker concentrates his efforts - in terms of 
rhetorical language and top-down discursive legi-
timation - on these specific speeches. To support 
this explanation, there is also the great and unex-
pected difference in the overall number of speeches 
of the two Presidents in the period under scru-
tiny. Overall, it may appear that Juncker prefers 
to contract the number of occasions in which he 
openly speaks to the public, and - with the exclu-
sion of the SOTEU - to reserve his open commu-
nication to more ‚coordinative‘ and less ‚commu-
nicative‘ speeches. A second, not alternative expla-
nation, refers to the new opportunity structure 
offered by the institution of the Spitzencaditaten 
system: differently from Barroso, Junckers‘ may 
not see the need to negotiate the legitimacy of its 
own role in each single occasion, and accordingly, 
not only ‚speaks less‘, but when he does, he goes to 
the heart of the matter in a more ‚direct‘ and less 
‚emotional‘ language. 
of agency in attesting Juncker’s willingness to 
present himself and communicate as a ‘more poli-
tical’ President than Barroso – the latter being 
often criticized for a lack of political assertive-
ness (Dinan 2016: 102) – on the other hand, the 
differences in the communication style of the two 
Presidents may be interpreted as also related to 
changes in the political and institutional context. 
While agency is certainly central in the selection 
of the discursive strategies, Pansardi and Battegaz-
zorre (2018) highlight how the introduction of the 
Spitzencandidaten system has been fundamental 
in providing the two Presidents with a different 
discursive opportunity structure. 
Firstly, the different procedure of appointment 
has undoubtedly endowed the two Presidents 
with a different symbolic repertoire. As sugge-
sted by Christiansen, the introduction of the Spit-
zencandidaten procedure “provided a powerful 
symbolic change” (2016: 993) – that may also 
be interpreted, following Gronau and Schmidke 
(2016), as an institutional strategy for legitima-
tion – in the nature of the Presidency. While the 
appointment of Barroso and his predecessors was 
the result of intergovernmental negotiations and 
merely ‘approved’ by the European Parliament, 
the new appointment procedure allows Juncker to 
claim a sort of electoral mandate, and, as a conse-
quence, offers him the opportunity to resort more 
directly to the symbolic repertoire of democratic 
legitimacy. Secondly, the nature itself of the Spit-
zencandidaten system has allowed Juncker to 
claim a sort personal mandate (Kassim 2017; see 
also Dinan 2016), offering him the opportunity to 
claim more legitimacy for his role and enabling a 
stronger leadership. As Christiansen points out: 
“The President of the Commission, less encum-
bered than his predecessor by the need for support 
and approval from the majority of member states, 
has been able to assume a leadership role unseen 
since the days of Jacques Delors” (2016: 1007). 
Accordingly, the new opportunity structure 
created by the introduction of the Spitzencan-
didaten system has allowed Juncker to shape his 
discursive strategies in a way just precluded to 
his predecessor. ‘Building’ (Dinan 2016: 103) 
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With regard to the overall research question 
guiding this analysis, we have to conclude that, 
at least in terms of the analysis of language and 
communication, we cannot describe Juncker as 
‚more political‘ than Barroso. Rather, we should 
see their use of language as strongly affected by 
the institutional changes introduced with the Spit-
zencaditaten system which also affects the way in 
which language is politicized. 
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THE EU AS “HONEST BROKER”? GERMAN AND ITALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON AN ADMINSTRATIVE BODY
Anna Katharina Mangold
debates about alternatives – as the bureaucratic 
and technocratic conception of the EU Commis-
sion still inhibits debate about political alterna-
tives.
1. Historical origins of the 
Commission
When the British considered joining the Euro-
pean Community of Coal and Steel (ECSC) that 
French Foreign Minister Robert Schumann had 
suggested be built among European nation states, 
Prime Minister Clement Attlee explained on the 
27 June 1950 in the House of Commons:
“We on this side are not prepared to accept 
the principle that the most vital economic 
forces of this country should be handed over 
to an authority that is utterly undemocratic 
and is responsible to nobody.”221
a. The High Authority of the ECSC
It is surely true that the High Authority of the 
ECSC can be considered the truly supranational 
element of the first Treaty on European Integra-
tion – the very term “supranational” was intro-
duced to describe both the functioning of the 
High Authority and the competences of its 
221  Prime Minister Clement Attlee replying to MP Winston 
Churchill in a debate about the Schumann plan, Hansard, 27 
June 1950, p. 2169 (Italics added), available at: https://api.par-
liament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1950/jun/27/schuman-
plan-1 . The British had intentionally been left out of this plan 
from the very beginning, as can be gathered from the fact that 
the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, was only informed 
about Schumann’s proposition on the morning of the very 
same day that Schumann anounced his plan; see, with further 
references, A.K Mangold, Gemeinschaftsrecht und deutsches 
Recht, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), p. 35 fn. 14.
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From its very beginning in the European Commu-
nity of Coal and Steel (ECSC), the leading organ 
of European integration, that was later to become 
the EU Commission, was designed as a merely 
bureaucratic, a-political agency, and an “honest 
broker” between the Member States. From these 
early days, this has been a blunt lie about the nature 
and inner workings of the then High Authority of 
the ECSC and later the European Commission. In 
this paper, I argue, that nothing has changed very 
much over time. In fact, I argue that we need to 
get rid of the understanding that there is such a 
thing as a “neutral”, “merely bureaucratic”, Euro-
pean Commission.
Two recent scandals surrounding the Juncker 
Commission may shed some light on the current 
state of affairs in the EU Commission: the promo-
tion of Martin Selmayr as Secretary-General of 
the Commission, and the interview of Commis-
sioner Günter Oettinger on the Italian elections. 
Drawing on these two recent scandals within the 
EU Commission, I try to show how a more polit-
ical understanding of the role of the EU Commis-
sion could help to bring about a more nuanced and 
politicised vision of European integration. Such 
a vision is necessary to make room for political 
220*  This paper is part of an ongoing project trying to trace 
the origins of current understandings and theoretical con-
ceptualisations of the organs and institutions of the European 
Union. In a previous paper, I looked into the exclusive right to 
initiate legislation conferred upon the EU Commission which 
the European Court of Justice has turned into a veritable veto 
position in the informal Trilogue legislative mechanism. I now 
want to trace the historical origins of the Commission as an 
institution of the EU and its theoretical conception in the Trea-
ties, in political life, and in European Studies. I am very grate-
ful for all suggestions and hints (mangold@jur.uni-frankfurt.
de).
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the competences. Historical research has again 
and again shown how especially the legal service 
of the Commission was the driving force behind 
the ECJ’s seminal decisions of the 1960s225 and 
also the 1970s.226 The ECJ could only perform 
its activist role in European integration because 
it could rely on the Commission to provide well 
prepared cases, and in fact test cases that were 
laboriously drafted to bring about jurisprudence 
that would allow for enhancing the competences 
of the Commission.227
Despite Attlee’s complaints about the ECSC 
High Authority, no major changes took place in 
the conception of the Commission in the EEC. 
The Commission’s composition228 and account-
ability229 were not very convincing when pitched 
against the powers of this institution. The worries 
deepened over time as the Commission took an 
activist and teleological approach to interpreting 
its own competences, which the ECJ backed in 
nearly all cases.230
In the case of the Commission, the “law in the 
books” and the “law in action”231 never added 
225  A. Boerger-de Smedt and M. Rasmussen, “The Mak-
ing of European Law: Exploring the Life and Work of Michel 
Gaudet”, (2017) 57 American Journal of Legal History, pp. 51-
82.
226  Unpublished paper by Bill Davies and Walter Much 
presented at the conference of the Max-Planck-Institute for 
Legal History Frankfurt/Main “Key Biographies in the Legal 
History of European Union, 1950-1993”, 21-22 June 2018 (on 
file with the author).
227  1960s: It has been argued that van Gend en Loos was 
in fact a test case. 1970s/1980s: The Defrenne litigation both 
gave Art. 157 TEEC (equal pay for men and women) a new 
and much broader meaning, thus bringing this dorment Treaty 
provision to life, and provided a new policy field to the Com-
mission, namely establishing non-discrimination in labour 
relations which in eventually would lead to the far reaching 
antidiscrimination directives of the early 2000s.
228  Art. 158 TEEC: appointment by the Member States.
229  Art. 160 TEEC: removal of Commissioners from office.
230  The notorious exception was the Tobacco advertise-
ment directive which, in its first version, was not upheld by 
the ECJ, C-376/98, 5 October 2000, and was accepted only in 
the second attempt by the Court, ECJ, C-380/03, 12 December 
2006.
231  R. Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action”, (1910) 44 
American Law Review, pp. 12-36.
members.222 Jean Monnet famously envisaged 
the High Authority as a technocratic administra-
tion free from parliamentary and political over-
sight, and, indeed, any control whatsoever.223 
Thus, Attlee was certainly right in stating that the 
High Authority was not in any traditional under-
standing of the term “democratically” elected or 
responsible.
b. The Commission of the EEC
The Commission of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) partly was less powerful than 
the High Authority of the ECSC in that the Treaty 
of Rome was much broader in its wording and 
conferred less precisely defined competences 
to the newly established Commission. Partly, 
however, the Commission became much more 
powerful because the Treaty of Rome comprised 
everything “economic”. Over time, the Commis-
sion interpreted the term “economic” in a very 
broad sense so that it came to encompass liter-
ally everything from cultural performances to 
the disposal of waste, from radio broadcasting to 
the protection of the environment. This approach 
was to some extent foreseen and envisaged in 
the Treaty itself.224 The progressive narrative was 
bound to lead to a teleological understanding of 
222  Art. 9 paras. 5 and 6 TECSC (1951): “(5) The members 
of the High Authority shall exercise their functions in com-
plete independence, in the general interest of the Community. 
In the performance of their duties, they shall neither seek nor 
take instructions from any Government or from any other 
body. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with the 
supranational character of their functions.
(6) Each Member State undertakes to respect this supranational 
character and not to seek to influence the members of the High 
Authority in the performance of their tasks.” (Italics added.)
223  A. Boerger-de Smedt, “La Cour de Justice dans les 
négociations du traité de Paris instituant le CECA”, (2008) 
12 Journal of European Integration History, pp. 7-33 (passim, 
expressly p. 12).
224  Art. 2 TEEC (1957): “It shall be the aim of the Com-
munity, by establishing a Common Market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of Member States, to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious development 
of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, 
an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of 
living and closer relations between its Member States.” (Italics 
added.)
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2. The Promotion of Martin 
Selmayr as Secretary-General 
of the EU Commission: 
Independence from 
Parliamentary Oversight
The first scandal surrounds the promotion of 
Martin Selmayr from Chief of Staff to the Presi-
dent of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, to the position of Secretary-General 
of the European Commission, the most senior 
civil servant position in the Commission, and, 
basically, the right hand of the President of the 
Commission.235
As is well known by now, in a meeting of the 
EU Commission in early February 2018, Martin 
Selmayr was first promoted to the position of Vice 
Secretary-General of the Commission. In the same 
meeting, the then Secretary-General resigned, to 
the surprise of everybody except Juncker, who 
had known that he wanted to resign for some 
time. Selmayr was appointed Secretary-General. 
A pro forma alternative candidate, later to become 
Juncker’s Chief of Cabinet, withdrew her candida-
ture. Hence, Selmayr was promoted twice within 
just nine minutes.236
Criticism followed suit. Juncker remained adamant 
and even threatened high-ranking members of his 
own party, the conservative EPP, with his resigna-
tion if Selmayr was forced to step down.237 Criti-
cism was directed both at the opaque procedure 
and at the fact that yet another German is now 
holding a top position in the EU bureaucracy.
235  The history of this position shows that the relationsship 
between Commission Presidents and secretary-generals was 
always politically important. Émile Noël and Walter Hallstein 
had a very trusting relationship. Noël served as secretary-gen-
eral from 1957 until 1987. Jacques Delors replaced him with 
the British David Williamson and in doing so tried to involve a 







up. Room for charismatic leadership existed, and 
it was filled in a memorable way by the famous 
“Delors Commission” in the 1980s.232
c. The Commission of the EU
The same is still true for the Commission of the 
Lisbon Treaty. Article 17 TEU is a lengthy article 
which tells law students little about the actual 
workings of the EU Commission. The number 
of Commissioners has not been decreased as 
foreseen in Article 17 para. 4 TEU because the 
Member States decided to maintain their respec-
tive “national” Commissioner.233 The composition 
in itself seems paradoxical: according to Article 
17 para. 3 TEU, the Commission’s term of office is 
five years and has, thereby, adjusted to the legisla-
tive term of the European Parliament (EP). None-
theless, it is not the EP which has the decisive say 
in the composition of the Commission, but the 
European Council, even though Article 17 para. 
7 TEU requires that it take “into account the elec-
tions to the European Parliament”.
The ensuing “Spitzenkandidaten” or “Lead/Top 
Candidates” process was hotly debated in 2014234 
and is far from established as the guiding political 
principle for the selection of the President of the 
Commission following the elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament next year (2019).
232  See, e.g., White Paper “Completing the Internal Mar-
ket”, COM(85)310, Brussels, June 1985.
233  European Council Decision 2013/272/EU of 22 May 
2013 concerning the number of members of the European 
Commission, OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 98.
234  See, for example, the debate on Verfassungsblog in 
April 2014, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/category/
debates/spitzenkandidaten-fuer-die-europawahl, and later in 
June 2014 between Matthias Kumm (https://verfassungsblog.
de/der-europaeische-rat-ist-verpflichtet-juncker-vorzuschla-
gen) and Kenneth Armstrong (https://verfassungsblog.de/
european-council-legal-duty-appoint-jean-claude-juncker).
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albeit informally.242
Implicitly, the idea of national belonging appar-
ently has a strong foothold in the conception of 
both parts of the Commission, the College of 
Commissioners and the Commission bureau-
cracy. If Jürgen Habermas argues, for the demo-
cratic setting, that the EU bridges Union citizen-
ship, on the one hand, and Member State citizen-
ship, on the other,243 this may well be criticised 
for being overly optimistic and in need of being 
legal implementation.244 For the organisation of 
the EU Commission, Member State citizenship is, 
apparently, still the decisive factor. As long as this 
remains the case, the Commission will not become 
a politically independent “government of the EU”.
3. The Interview of 
Commissioner Oettinger on 
the Italian elections:  
Italy as Periphery?
In an interview on the 29 May 2018 with Deutsche 
Welle, Budget Commissioner Günter Oettinger 
was asked about the outcome of the Italian elec-
tions of March 2018. The Interview took place 
at a time, in May, when Italy was still without a 
government because of the outcome of the elec-
tion. Oettinger said the following:245
“It is my worry and expectation that the 
next weeks will show that the markets, that 
the government bonds, that the economic 
development of Italy could be so radical 
that this possibly turns into a signal for 
voters not to vote for left and right populists. 
242  U. Haltern, Europarecht I, 3rd ed. 2017, p. 222 marg. 
no.479.
243  J. Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay, (Ber-
lin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2011), pp. 86 et seq.
244  A.K. Mangold, “Democratic Legitimacy of EU Law. 
Two Proposals to Strengthen Democracy in the European 
Union”, in: Johan van der Walt and Jeffrey Ellsworth (eds), 
Constitutional Sovereignty and Social Solidarity in Europe, 
(Baden-Baden-London: Nomos-Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 165-
192.
245  In my account of the events, I follow a report of 
Tagesschau, available at: https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/
oettinger-italien-wirbel-101.html.
There are many questions to be asked about this 
particular promotion, and indeed the EP asked 
several, 134 to be precise.238 However, in the end, 
the EP could only mildly admonish the Commis-
sion for the intransparency of the whole proce-
dure.239 This partly has to do with the still flawed 
wording of the Treaty on the European Union. 
Article 17 para. 8 TEU only enables the EP to ask 
for the resignation of the Commission “as a body”.
The EU Ombuds”man”, Emily O’Reilly, re-elected 
for five years in December 2014, will look further 
into the affair.240 Franklin Dehousse, former Justice 
at the CJEU, predicts that this scandal will haunt 
both the Commission and the EU as a whole for 
months, and possibly years, to come.241
If we were to consider the position of Secretary-
General just as an ordinary civil servant posi-
tion, then, of course, the procedure employed in 
promoting Martin Selmayr warrants heavy criti-
cism: for the lack of transparency, the missing 
advertisement of the position, and the ensuing low 
number of (alleged) candidates. However, if we 
think of the Secretary-General as a clearly polit-
ical position, it becomes self-evident why Juncker 
would want a loyal follower in this key position.
However, the appointment procedures put 
Member State interests centre stage, not the polit-
ical allegiances of the College of Commissioners, 
which is not a government cabinet in the tradi-
tional sense of a national government organisa-
tion; rather, Commissioners are chosen according 
to Member State preferences.
The same is true for positions in the Commission 
bureaucracy, even – and maybe especially – for 
high-ranking positions. National quotas still play 
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fate does not lie in the hands of the financial 
markets. Regardless of which political 
party may be in power, Italy is a founding 
member of the European Union that 
has contributed immensely to European 
integration. President Juncker is convinced 
that Italy will continue on its European 
path. The Commission is ready to work 
with Italy with responsibility and mutual 
respect. Italy deserves respect.”249
Interestingly and maybe surprisingly, later that 
same week, in a Q & A Session in Brussels on 31 
May 2018, Juncker was cited by the Guardian:
“Italians have to take care of the poor 
regions of Italy. That means more work; 
less corruption; seriousness.”250
These events, I argue, show that, even though 
Italy and Germany were founding members of the 
ECSC, they are no longer on equal footing when it 
comes to their current position both in the EU and 
vis-à-vis the EU Commission. Rather, these events 
highlight a perception in the Commission of the 
relationship between Germany and Italy as one of 
“centre and periphery” where Germany is a centre 
state and Italy a mere peripheral state. It is, I hold, 
not coincidental that the German Commissioner 
Oettinger was the one to state bluntly what can be 
taken to be a general sentiment in the Commission 
when it comes to Italy.251 In the Commission, there 
seems to be an understanding that there are more 
important and less important Member States. This 
calls into question whether the Commission can 
really play the role of an “honest broker” between 
competing Member States among themselves, and 
between Member States and the EU. Again, a truly 
political institution could take political positions 
openly if the Commission were to be democrati-






251  The former Justice at the CJEU rather cruelly charac-
terised Oettinger thus: “Oettinger’s explanations are generally 




… Even now, developments on bond 
market, the market value of banks, and 
Italy’s economy in general have darkened 
noticeably and negatively. This has to do 
with the possible government formation. I 
can only hope that this will play a role in 
the election campaign and send a signal 
not to hand populists on the right and left 
any responsibility in government.”246
The interviewing journalist of Deutsche Welle, 
Bernd Riegert, captured this in a short Tweet, 
which read:
“The markets will teach the Italians to vote 
for the right thing”, #EU commissioner 
#Oettinger told me [….].”247
The now Italian Minister of Economic Develop-
ment and Labour, Luigi Di Maio, responded on 
Twitter that Oettinger’s allegations were “absurd” 
and continued:
“These people treat Italy as a summer camp 
where they can spend their holidays.”248
Swiftly, on the very same day, the President of the 
EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, issued a 
statement implicitly castigating Oettinger for his 
interview remarks:
“The President of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, wishes 
to put on record his conviction that Italy’s 
246  English translation at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Günther_Oettinger#Intervention_in_Italian_politics. In the 
original German: “Meine Sorge und meine Erwartung ist, 
dass die nächsten Wochen zeigen, dass die Märkte, dass die 
Staatsanleihen, dass die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Italiens so 
einschneidend sein könnten, dass dies für die Wähler doch ein 
mögliches Signal ist, nicht Populisten von links und rechts zu 
wählen. … Schon jetzt ist die Entwicklung bei den Staatsan-
leihen, bei dem Marktwert der Banken, beim wirtschaftlichen 
Verlauf Italiens generell deutlich eingetrübt, negativ. Dies hat 
mit der möglichen Regierungsbildung zu tun. Ich kann nur 
hoffen, dass dies im Wahlkampf eine Rolle spielt, im Sinne 
eines Signals, Populisten von links und rechts nicht in die 
Regierungsverantwortung zu bringen.”
247  The tweet of 29 May 2018 has since been deleted. 
However, it is still depicted as a screen shot in several tweets, 
most notably in one of the now Italian Interior Minister 
Matteo Salvini: https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/sta-
tus/1001437881880272896.
248   My translation. In the original Italian: “Questa 
gente tratta l’Italia come una colonia estiva dove venire a pas-
sare le vacanze”, available at: https://twitter.com/luigidimaio/
status/1001474208269045760.
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able institutions. In the absence of opportunities 
for open contestation, EU emergency governance 
oscillates between moments of heightened politi-
cisation, in which ad hoc decisions are justified as 
necessary, and the (sometimes coercive) appeal to 
the depoliticised rule of rules.
Introduction
One of the many consequences of the euro crisis, 
which began in 2010, has been the politicisation 
of policy areas and decision making processes 
in which most Europeans previously had little 
interest - including the decisions and policies of 
the European Central Bank (ECB). However, 
it has not lead to any meaningful democratisa-
tion of monetary policy making, nor of any other 
aspect of the crisis response. On the contrary, the 
regulatory space in which the ECB operates has 
expanded during the crisis years. This expansion 
was driven by the Bank itself, which, for a variety 
of reasons, seized the initiative at the height of the 
crisis, including by taking decisions that have rede-
fined what constitutes a monetary policy measure.
Moreover, the euro crisis has revealed deficien-
cies and pathologies in EU governance that go far 
beyond the intricacies of monetary policy making. 
In short, I argue that the EU has moved from a 
mode of governance centred on law as agent and 
object (integration-through-law, ITL), to one 
predicated on expediency (integration-through-
crisis, ITC). I use the ECB as a point of depar-
ture to illustrate that transformation. How and 
why did a highly independent, deliberately-insu-
lated and narrowly-mandated body become such 
a powerful political actor? The answers reveal 
shortcomings in the EU’s institutional architec-
ture and political culture. The former include the 
difficulty of formally amending the EU’s trea-
ties, and the incomplete construction of EMU as 
a monetary union without a fiscal counterpart. 
These, in turn, hint at the latter: National and 
EU leaders are reluctant to attempt treaty reform 
because doing so would require referendums 
in at least some member states, the outcomes of 
which would be highly uncertain. Similarly, there 
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Abstract
Integration-through-crisis has affected EMU 
governance in myriad ways. This paper focuses 
on two trends, both of which have negative impli-
cations for democratic legitimacy in the EU and 
its member states. Firstly, the crisis has led to an 
increased reliance on non-majoritarian modes of 
policy-making, at the expense of democratically 
accountable institutions and processes. Secondly, 
the crisis has led to a new emphasis on coercive 
enforcement in EMU, at the expense of the volun-
tary cooperation that previously characterised 
(and sustained) the EU as a community of law. 
The ECB is implicated in both of these trends. In 
relation to the first, while the ECB was already 
unusually independent - even by the standards 
of central banks - this could be justified, prior to 
the crisis, by the specificity, technicality and low 
salience of its monetary policy mandate. However, 
the crisis has resulted in both the politicisation of 
the Bank’s mandate and its de facto expansion, in 
ways that render its insulation from democratic 
politics highly problematic. Indeed, it is made all 
the more problematic by the ECB’s involvement in 
the second trend; the coercive turn in EMU gover-
nance. In this connection, the ECB, in its role as 
provider of liquidity to eurozone banks, has been 
instrumental in pushing debtor states towards 
acceptance of harsh austerity policies.
Thus, the ECB’s (over-)empowerment may be 
viewed as a synecdoche of a wider problem: The 
EU’s tendency to resort to technocratic gover-
nance in the face of challenges that require political 
contestation mediated by democratically account-
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dissemination of EC/EU legal norms. The Court 
of Justice created the legal framework for this 
dissemination through its groundbreaking artic-
ulation of the principles of direct effect and EC 
legal supremacy in the 1960s. Combined with 
the preliminary reference procedure, direct effect 
and legal supremacy enabled the CJEU to issue 
binding treaty interpretations, the normative 
force of which was amplified by the fact that they 
were incorporated into the judgements of national 
courts in cases brought directly by member state 
nationals. It is in this way that the EU’s founding 
treaties were constitutionalised (Weiler 1994). 
ITL’s crucial insight concerned the dual nature of 
law in the then-EC: Law was both object and agent 
of integration (Cappelletti et al. 1986). In other 
words, ITL conceptualised a project of integration 
by law (court-driven constitutionalisation of the 
treaties) and towards law (a closely integrated and 
legally bound union of people and peoples). 
EMU, as framed by the Maastricht Treaty, adapted 
the logic of ITL, but did not adopt it completely. 
Like the single market, EMU was to be a ‘commu-
nity of law’, with fiscal discipline guaranteed by 
formally binding rules. However, EMU norms do 
not have direct effect, and are not subject to the 
kind of judicial dissemination that so effectively 
constitutionalised the single market. Instead, 
implementation of EMU norms required the kind 
of concerted legislative and administrative action 
that, prior to the crisis, was often lacking. In sum, 
EMU was a political project, framed by formal 
rules, but without giving law the kind of agency it 
had enjoyed in relation to the single market.
The financial crisis became a European crisis in 
2010. Initially framed as a problem caused by 
excessive and unsustainable sovereign debt (a 
narrative that has since been shown to have been 
inaccurate, but which continues to colour the 
response), the crisis manifested most urgently in 
relation to Greece. In May 2010, Greece received 
the first in what was to become a series of bail-
outs, the initial one taking the form of bilateral 
loans from European partners (Louis 2010). I will 
are major disagreements among national govern-
ments about how best to proceed - e.g. on whether 
the eurozone ought to have its own budgetary 
resources, or on the creation of a eurozone finance 
minister.
The paper is organised as follows. The first section 
discusses ITC as a distinct integrative mode, 
contrasting it with ITL. In the second section, I 
continue the elaboration of ITC via a focus on 
the role of the ECB as a regulatory body that is 
both very powerful and highly insulated from 
majoritarian democracy. In particular, the ECB 
has come to symbolise two key characteristics 
of ITC: Firstly, the exacerbation of the EU’s pre-
existing tendency to concentrate power in the 
hands of executives and non-majoritarian bodies. 
Secondly, the belated and misguided turn to coer-
cive enforcement of EMU’s rules. These tenden-
cies are discussed in the third and fourth sections, 
respectively.
Again, what makes the crisis-driven empower-
ment of the ECB so significant is what it tells us 
about more serious deficiencies of EU governance, 
which leaves insufficient space for the kind of open 
political contestation that is necessary for demo-
cratically legitimate policy-making. It is telling, 
for example, that the ECB’s bold redefinition of its 
own mandate was legally ratified by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), rather than 
through any legislative process. Herein lies the 
connection between ITL and ITC: Both prioritise 
non-majoritarian modes of policy making in the 
advancement European integration, but with an 
emphasis on different types of ‘experts’ (e.g. judges 
as opposed to bankers). Thus, the concluding 





ITL describes the dynamic whereby courts drive 
the integration process forward through their 
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a new governing coalition in Italy between the 
populist Five Star Movement and the eurosceptic 
Lega, or by fractures within the German governing 
coalition.
The ECB as an agent of 
integration-through-crisis
It is in the context of the transition from ITL to ITC 
that the ECB took centre stage. Since its creation 
in 1998, the ECB has been an important compo-
nent of the EU’s regulatory state. It is an indepen-
dent agency, insulated from direct majoritarian 
pressure, which has been mandated by member 
states to set monetary policy for the eurozone. 
As is common with regulatory bodies, the ECB’s 
mandate (constitutionalised in the Maastricht 
Treaty) is explicitly circumscribed in some areas, 
but vague, or ‘incomplete’ in others. 
In the case of the ECB, two key aspects of its 
mandate are made explicit. Firstly, the Bank is 
confined to monetary policy making and excluded 
from the realm of economic policy making, 
which is left to individual national governments. 
Secondly, the Bank is given an explicit hierarchy of 
objectives to pursue - price stability is its primary 
goal, though it may also act to support the general 
economic policies of the Union so long as such 
actions do not conflict with the objective of price 
stability. Yet, there are other, equally important 
aspects, in which the principal-agent contract is 
incomplete. ‘Price stability’ is not defined, and 
neither are the policy instruments by which the 
ECB may pursue its mandated objectives. 
The crisis offered an opportunity to fill in some 
of those gaps. Faced with possible collapse of the 
eurozone in 2010-2012, the ECB began to adopt 
a number of unconventional policy instruments, 
including the Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) programme, and to take a bigger role in 
providing much-needed finance to euro area 
banks via the Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
(ELA) programme. The Bank’s actions over the 
crisis years have often been described as ‘neces-
sary’ (though cf. Sinn 2014: 280-293). But how are 
not recapitulate the story of the euro crisis and 
its evolution here. The important point, for our 
purposes, is that the crisis precipitated a transition 
to a new mode of integration, which I term Inte-
gration through Crisis (ITC) (Scicluna 2017). The 
key characteristics of ITC may be summarised as 
follows:
• It is ends-driven; the end being the preservation 
of EMU, with its current membership, and 
without turning it into a transfer union,
• It is extra-constitutional, in the sense of 
avoiding treaty reform by going outside the 
treaty framework,
• It exacerbates pre-existing tendencies in 
the EU to avoid political contestation by 
concentrating power in the hands of executives 
and non-majoritarian bodies,
• It places more emphasis on the coercive 
enforcement of EMU’s rules (including 
those adopted through ad hoc and extra-
constitutional processes) on debtor states,
• And, finally, it is justified through emergency 
rhetoric.
Thus, ITC does not abandon law. On the contrary, 
the ‘rhetoric of rules’ (i.e. the emphasis on the 
importance of following the rules) has been 
pervasive throughout the crisis response. In fact, 
this rhetoric mirrors the dominant, though inac-
curate, narrative of Northern ‘saints’ and Southern 
‘sinners’ - the latter got themselves into trouble 
precisely because they did not follow ‘the rules’.
ITC might provide short term fixes, but it does not 
provide long term solutions to the EU’s myriad 
crises because it is an integration mode that specif-
ically relies on avoiding the kind of major institu-
tional and legal reform that EMU needs. Moreover, 
the highpoint of ITC may already have passed. 
ITC relies on there being an elite consensus, or 
something close to an elite consensus, in order to 
circumvent the popular constraining dissensus. 
But that elite consensus is breaking down, as may 
be evidenced, for example, by the formation of 
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Gauweiler, and others was couched in constitu-
tional terms. It centred on the claim that the ECB 
had acted ultra vires in announcing OMT, since 
this was an economic policy, outside of the Bank’s 
monetary policy remit, and, furthermore, that the 
programme breached Article 123 TFEU’s prohibi-
tion of monetary financing of government debts. 
The case came first to the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court (FCC), which referred certain 
questions to the CJEU - the first time in its history 
that the FCC had used the preliminary refer-
ence procedure. In this respect, the constitu-
tional significance of the case extended beyond its 
particular subject matter to take in the relation-
ship between national courts and the CJEU in the 
EU’s informally constitutionalised judicial order 
(Scicluna 2015). For, although the FCC’s utilisa-
tion of the preliminary reference procedure could 
be regarded as indicating acceptance of the CJEU’s 
exclusive competence to interpret EU law, the text 
of the referral made it clear that the situation was 
not so settled (Fabbrini 2016: 4). 
Indeed, the potential for direct conflict between 
the two courts was flagged by the German Court’s 
invocation of its own previously established test of 
whether an EU institution has exceeded its compe-
tences.252 That is, the FCC suggested that the OMT 
programme constituted a ‘manifest violation’ 
of the ECB’s powers that caused a ‘structurally 
significant shift’ in the allocation of competences 
between the national and supranational levels.253 
The FCC’s very ability to articulate such a test is 
not accepted by the CJEU, which claims for itself 
sole competence to find the act of an EU institu-
tion ultra vires. Hence, the Gauweiler case was an 
opportunity to test not only the legality of the euro 
crisis response - particularly its expansion of the 
space available for technocratic decision making at 
the expense of democratically-accountable policy 
252  BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06 vom 6.7.2010, Absatz-Nr. 
(1 – 116), available at www. bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html (Honeywell case). 
253  BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 vom 14.1.2014, Absatz-Nr. 
(1 – 105) available at www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html (OMT referral), paras. 36-43.
we to understand and evaluate necessity under 
these circumstances, and how does it relate to 
legitimacy? Indeed, notwithstanding the rhetoric 
of necessity, the policy problems addressed by the 
ECB are very much distributional in their effects 
and, therefore, not suitable for technocratic reso-
lution. Consequently, the ECB’s empowerment 
has contributed to the crisis-hit EU’s ‘politicisa-
tion without democratisation’ (Scicluna 2014), as 
may be illustrated by reference to the Gauweiler 
litigation over the OMT programme.
The Gauweiler litigation: 
Constitutionalisation of 
regulatory overreach
The Gauweiler litigation marked, perhaps, the 
most significant test of the constitutionality of 
the euro crisis response (Fabbrini 2016: 3). The 
case concerned the compatibility with EU law of 
the OMT programme, an initiative announced by 
the ECB in September 2012, according to which 
the Bank would purchase the debt instruments of 
eurozone member states on secondary markets, 
in exchange for the affected state entering into a 
programme of financial assistance with the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM), the eurozone’s 
permanent bailout fund. The OMT programme 
was, thus, the policy manifestation of Mario 
Draghi’s famous pledge, made in July 2012, that 
the ECB would do ‘whatever it takes’ to guarantee 
the eurozone’s survival. Measured against its aim 
of calming markets so as to ensure the smooth 
transmission of ECB monetary policy, the OMT 
programme was highly successful. So successful, 
in fact, that it was never used. Its mere announce-
ment had the desired effect. 
Nevertheless, the fact that it was never used did 
not allay concerns over the programme’s alleged 
illegality. This was especially so in Germany, where 
most steps in the crisis response have elicited 
fears that, notwithstanding the provisions put in 
place in the Maastricht Treaty, EMU is becoming 
a transfer union. The complaint brought by the 
Christian Social Union (CSU) politician, Peter 
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for the Court to make clear that while the EU trea-
ties may interpreted flexibly, their letter and spirit 
cannot be blatantly disregarded (see e.g. Joerges 
2016).
As it is, the Gauweiler decision has left the ECB’s 
discretion to interpret its own mandate effectively 
unchecked. Now that the CJEU has endorsed the 
Bank’s unorthodox policy manoeuvres, only treaty 
reform - with all of its prohibitively high barriers 
- could reintroduce constraints. Thus, while the 
ECB’s unprecedented empowerment was driven 
by the circumstances of the euro crisis, it will 
long outlast the ‘state of emergency’ (White 2015: 
593–9). Meanwhile, the FCC declined to follow up 
on its implied threat to overrule a binding inter-
pretation issued by the CJEU. In its final ruling 
on the Gauweiler case, delivered in June 2016, 
the German Court cast doubt upon the CJEU’s 
reasoning, including its uncritical acceptance 
of the ECB’s interpretation of the purposes and 
nature of the OMT programme, but it neverthe-
less accepted the Court of Justice’s conclusion.256 
Thus, a clash between two of Europe’s most 
powerful courts, which could have threatened the 
basic tenets on which the EU as a community of 
law was founded, was avoided. Despite its occa-
sionally strong rhetoric, the FCC continues to will-
ingly endorse the supremacy of EU law, embodied 
in the CJEU’s extensive and exclusive power to 
determine the outer limits of the competence of 
EU institutions. 
However, at the same time, the Gauweiler liti-
gation, by constitutionalising the ECB’s regula-
tory overreach, contributes to a deeper and much 
more serious crisis of EU constitutionalism: That 
is, the EU’s shift from a Europäische Rechtsgemein-
schaft (European community of law), premised 
on voluntary cooperation, to a Zwangsgemein-
schaft (community under duress), which places 
more emphasis on coercive forms of integration 
(Bogdandy 2017). This idea is explored further 
below.
256  BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 
2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13 decision from 21.06.2016.
modes - but also either to reaffirm or reconfigure 
core features of the EU’s constitutional settlement.
The CJEU announced its decision in the Gauweiler 
case on 16 June 2015.254 The Court affirmed the 
legality of the OMT programme, applying an 
objectives-based, rather than effects-based, test. 
This allowed OMT to be qualified as a mone-
tary policy measure, owing to the ECB’s over-
arching price stability objective, notwithstanding 
the programme’s potentially significant economic 
policy effects, including its requirement that a 
beneficiary state undertake a macroeconomic 
adjustment programme (Louis 2016: 60-1). 
What are the consequences of the Gauweiler 
verdict? Formally, the ECB’s mandate has not 
changed. It retains its exclusive monetary policy 
competence, while eurozone member govern-
ments retain their economic policy competences. 
Yet, de facto, the ECB has expanded the scope of 
its powers considerably - an expansion that the 
CJEU has gone some way towards constitutional-
ising. In particular, the objectives-based test takes 
the ECB at its own word. OMTs must be a mone-
tary policy measure because the Bank’s stated aim 
in announcing the policy was to safeguard the 
‘singleness’ of eurozone monetary policy, itself a 
prerequisite of the Bank’s effective pursuit of its 
core goal of price stability. 
The CJEU’s deferral to the ECB’s expertise on the 
question of what constitutes monetary policy is 
neither surprising nor without justification (see e.g. 
Zilioli 2016). As the Court itself pointed out, since 
preparation and implementation of a programme 
such as OMT requires the ECB ‘to make choices of 
a technical nature and to undertake forecasts and 
complex assessments’, the Bank ‘must be allowed, 
in that context, a broad discretion’.255 Certainly, it 
would not make sense for the Court to attempt to 
substitute its own judgement on the highly tech-
nical questions involved in the case for that of the 
ECB. Yet, deferral to expertise cannot be limitless, 
and the Gauweiler case was surely an opportunity 
254  Case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler et al. v Deutscher Bun-
destag (Gauweiler case)
255  Case C-62/14 Gauweiler, para. 68.
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ated between the government and the ‘Troika’ 
of creditors (comprising the European Commis-
sion, the IMF and the ECB itself), which contro-
versially required the imposition of a tax on all 
Cypriot bank deposits over 20,000 euros. The ECB 
responded by issuing an ultimatum on 21 March 
that Cyprus either secure a new bailout before 
25 March, or lose its ELA funding (Wearden and 
Amos 2013). The amended bailout package was 
duly adopted a few days later, in a form that did 
not require parliamentary approval (Smith 2013). 
Thus, the ECB was able to use the ELA programme 
to pressure the Cypriot government into accepting 
an austerity-linked bailout that the Bank itself, as 
part of the Troika, had helped to design and would 
help to oversee. It contributed to the undermining 
of democratic oversight in Cyprus by encouraging 
the Cypriot government to adopt policy in a way 
that bypassed the parliament.
The final example concerns the infamous Trichet-
Draghi letter that was sent to the Italian govern-
ment of Silvio Berlusconi on 5 August 2011. In the 
letter, which was intended to be confidential but 
was later published by an Italian newspaper, Jean-
Claude Trichet, then ECB president, and Draghi, 
his heir, outlined a number of reform measures, 
which they urged the Italian government to 
undertake with the utmost speed.257 The ECB 
had, and has, no legal basis make such a request, 
which called for comprehensive and detailed 
legal reform in areas including the labour market, 
public administration and pensions - all areas of 
national competence. It was, rather, a coercive 
form of ‘implicit conditionality’, enabled by the 
ECB’s leverage over national banking systems and 
justified by the prevailing atmosphere of emer-
gency (Sacchi 2015).
What all three examples have in common is that 
they involve the technocratic, non-democratically 
accountable ECB playing the role of teacher and 
disciplinarian in order to ‘discipline and punish’ 
the eurozone’s delinquent member states (Kund-
257  The letter is available at https://www.corriere.it/econo-
mia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-ea59-
11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml?fr=correlati. 
The ECB and the coercive 
turn in EMU governance
The second characteristic of ITC on which this 
paper focuses is its tendency to emphasise coer-
cive enforcement of ‘the rules’, however those 
rules may have come into existence. As Chris-
tian Kreuder-Sonnen (2018: 452-4) has noted, the 
crisis years have produced an ‘authoritarian turn’ 
in European politics that afflicts both EU-level 
and national-level governance. At the EU level, 
‘traits of authoritarianism’ manifest in an emer-
gency politics that privileges non-democratically 
accountable discretion in policy making. Again, 
the ECB is heavily implicated in this ‘authoritarian 
turn’, as three examples shall suffice to illustrate.
We may firstly point to the ECB’s decision, in 
mid-2015, not to increase the level of ELA to Greek 
banks to a level that would be necessary to counter 
the capital flight that the country’s banking system 
was experiencing. This decision was taken in the 
midst of fierce contestation between Greece and 
its creditors over whether it would receive further 
financial assistance and under what conditions. In 
fact, the ECB made its decision on 28 June 2015 
- the day following Greek Prime Minister Alexis 
Tsipras’s announcement of a referendum on the 
bailout terms offered by the creditors. It resulted 
in a three-week closure of Greek banks, which 
began days before the referendum was held. 
It is debatable whether the ECB was simply 
applying the ELA eligibility rules in a technical 
manner (with unfortunate timing), or whether it 
was deliberately signalling to Greeks the conse-
quences of voting to reject austerity. In some ways, 
it does not matter. A decision that shuts down a 
country’s banking system days before a major vote 
in that country is a political decision. The ECB 
simply lacks the legitimacy resources to take such 
a consequential action.
The second example concerns the ECB’s interven-
tion in Cyprus two years prior to the Greek ELA 
decision. On 19 March 2013, the Cypriot parlia-
ment rejected a ten-billion euro bailout negoti-
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They impoverish democracy and fuel the turn to 
populism within member states, and they under-
mine the legitimacy on which the EU rests.
More broadly, the idea that the EU could regu-
late itself out of crisis; that restoring confidence 
and stability to the eurozone was primarily a 
matter of putting the right policy settings in place; 
was misplaced and misguided. The regulatory 
approach to the euro crisis - of which the ECB has 
been at the forefront - overestimated fidelity to the 
rules and to the idea of the ‘rule of rules’ amongst 
member states. It underestimated the extent to 
which acceptance of, and adherence to, rules was 
contingent on there being a virtuous circle of 
cumulatively causal integration (Jones 2018). In 
short, the regulatory approach to crisis was based 
on a misunderstanding of the nature of the EU 
as a community of law. The EC/EU worked rela-
tively well as a voluntary community of law - elic-
iting compliance through powerful instrumental 
and normative logics without the need for hard 
enforcement. However, the euro crisis has severely 
disrupted the economic benefits-driven virtuous 
circle that powered European integration. EMU’s 
‘coercive turn’ has only made the integration proj-
ect’s problems worse. 
Concluding remarks
The euro crisis has created a ‘postfunctionalist 
dilemma’ for European elites. Functional pres-
sures continue to push national executives towards 
integrative steps - bailout mechanisms, banking 
union, fiscal surveillance, etc. However, growing 
popular resistance to ‘more Europe’ has made it 
impossible to adopt and embed crisis initiatives 
into the existing framework of EU constitution-
alism via treaty change. Consequently, emergency 
politics in the EU has taken on a distinctly extra-
legal character (Hooghe and Marks 2017: 8-9). 
To put it differently, over the last several years, 
extraordinary policies have been adopted via 
extraordinary means. These policies are then 
embedded via a ritualistic insistence (usually 
made by EU institutions and creditor states 
nani 2018). Such attempts at coercive enforce-
ment betray the EU’s purposes and values, and 
contribute significantly to the degradation of 
democracy in Europe, particularly in the coun-
tries of the eurozone’s periphery.
As noted above, there is a tendency among 
scholars and observers of the EU to allow the ECB 
considerable room to manoeuvre on the grounds 
of ‘necessity’. However, even if the Bank’s actions 
are deemed necessary, it is worth asking why this 
is so. The fact that no other EU institution could 
act so decisively exposes the EU’s lack of actor-
ness; its weakness as a political construct. It also 
exposes the anti-democratic, market-beholden 
logic that has driven the crisis response: The need 
to placate ‘the markets’ (explicitly invoked, e.g., 
in the Trichet-Draghi letter) is treated as consid-
erably more important than the need to placate 
disaffected voters.
A recent illustration of this phenomenon occurred 
in May 2018, when it looked like Italians would 
have to return to the polls for the second time in a 
matter of months to resolve a government forma-
tion deadlock. In an interview with Deutsche Welle, 
Günther Oettinger, the European Commissioner 
for Budget and Human Resources, suggested that 
the markets would teach Italians not to vote for 
populists. Such sentiments, however carelessly 
expressed, reflect the underlying teleological 
assumptions that many practitioners, as well as 
scholars, continue to hold about the purpose and 
end point of European integration. These assump-
tions may be summarised in the idea that more 
integration is the solution to any and all of Europe’s 
problems. Deviations from the path towards ever 
closer union are exactly that - deviations; mistakes 
in need of correction.
It is in this context that regulators take on ever-
expanding political roles. If national publics, and 
even national governments, are fickle and short-
sighted, then it is for regulators - dispassionate, 
objective, far-sighted - to keep the process of 
European integration on the right track. However, 
these attitudes are very much part of the problem. 
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towards debtor states) on the need to follow the 
rules - an insistence which ignores the dubious 
ways in which the ‘rules’ that make up the EU’s 
emergency politics came into existence. Both ITL 
and ITC are problematic from a democratic stand-
point – the former empowered courts to decide on 
fundamentally political questions, while the latter 
empowers executives and technocratic experts. 
Combined with politicisation and disregard for 
maintaining the coherence of EU constitution-
alism, ITC further damages the EU’s legitimacy.
As I have argued in this paper, the case of the ECB 
is particularly illustrative. Without any formal 
change to its narrow, monetary policy-focused 
mandate, its role has been significantly expanded 
and politicised. The ECB is guarantor of the euro’s 
continued existence. It is lender of last resort for 
the eurozone’s troubled banks and sovereigns. 
And it is teacher and disciplinarian to those 
governments and publics that attempt to escape 
the dictates of austerity.
Perhaps national executives and EU leaders judged 
the regulatory approach to the euro crisis to be 
the ‘path of least political resistance’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2017: 9). However, this judgement is likely 
to prove incorrect over the longer term. Just as 
European integration is cumulatively causal, so 
too is disintegration (Jones 2018). As domestic-
level political resistance - expressed, for example, 
via the election of eurosceptic populists - accumu-
lates, the constraining dissensus that operates at 
the European level is strengthened. As European 
elites continue to push against the constraining 
dissensus, so national-level democracy is under-
mined, and EU-level legitimacy weakened.
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These introductory remarks will define the ob-
jectives of my intervention. They are ambitious 
but this may not be so readily apparent and may 
hence require some explanations. The difficulty is 
twofold: My disciplinary focus is on law but my 
type of argument does not comply with the rules 
prevailing in legal studies. On the other hand, the 
announcement of a discussion of a legal problem 
tends to disappoint non-legal quarters from the 
very outset. I hope to explain why my legal queries 
mirror conceptual and theoretical issues of general 
importance, namely the mainstream understand-
ing of the functions of law and the judiciary in the 
integration process. The critique which I submit 
is related to the big names in my subtitle and the 
fierce controversy over the relationship between 
the nation state and the Union (Section I.). The 
follow-up section will turn to the implications of 
my critique. My argument will be as immodest 
as the announcement in the conference agenda. 
We have to abandon, so I will submit, the “ever 
more Europe” mantra, take instead the fortunate 
motto of the ill-fated Draft Constitutional Treaty 
of 2004 seriously, and explore what it might entail 
for Europe to be “united in diversity (“in Vielfalt 
geeint”) (Section II.).
1.  The Failures of the 
“Integration through Law” 
Orthodoxy
As late as 1990, the former President of the EUI, 
Joseph Weiler, and his successor to the presidency, 
Renaud Dehousse, co-authored an article on the 
“legal dimension” of the integration project in a 
prestigious collection of essays edited by William 
Wallace.1 The law, so the most famous and much 
cited sentence of the article reads, is both “the 
object and the agent” of integration.2 Nearly eve-
rything that went wrong in the integration project 
is summarised in this perplexing pronouncement.
The famous motto was coined at the height of the 
American law and society movement, which pro-
moted the sociological study of law and all sorts of 
interdisciplinary “law and …” explorations. How 
could European law scholarship defend views and 
visions on the potential of “law as such” which had 
long since been discredited? These methodologi-
cal irritations coincide with substantive concerns. 
On what grounds could the unity of law in the 
(then) Community be understood as an end in 
itself? To be sure, the implicit assumption of the 
unity doctrine that “one size would fit all” and “be 
best for all” was not as implausible in the foun-
dational period as it has now become. However, 
even in the relatively homogenous orders of the 
former EEC, any unification at European level 
had disintegrative effects within national legal 
orders. The reference procedure of the EEC Treaty 
cannot accomplish anything beyond some poin-
tillist “harmonisation” here and there. The inte-
gration-through-law agenda is therefore deficient 
where “positive integration”, i.e., the replacement 
of national legislation by a comprehensive Euro-
1  Renaud Dehousse and Joseph H.H. Weiler, “The legal 
dimension”, in: William Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of Euro-
pean Integration, (London: Pinter, 1990), 242-260, at 243.
2   Ibid., 243.
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sphere of social norms within which the law oper-
ates and upon which its functioning depends.7
Gunther Teubner has re-published his essay in the 
legendary Hall and Soskice volume on the Vari-
eties of Capitalism.8 This is indeed, in my view, 
the background for the disintegrative effects of 
integration through law. What seems so irritat-
ing to the community of European lawyers hardly 
requires any explanatory exercises in the present 
context. If there is a kernel of truth in the message 
about the varieties of the socio-economic systems 
of the Member States of the EU, it is simply in-
conceivable that their integration can be brought 
about “through law”. It is totally unsurprising that 
the orchestrators of Europe’s crisis politics argue 
that they have to impose a convergence of the 
economies and policies of the Member States in 
order to ensure the functioning of the “new modes 
of economic governance”. This is, of course, not 
to suggest that these efforts will overcome the dif-
ficulties of the integration-through-law agenda. 
Teubner’s “irritants” make themselves felt in the 
resistance of legal and economic cultures.9
Our conference has explored these issues more 
7   Karl-Heinz Ladeur, “‘Conflicts Law as 
Europe’sConstitutional Form’ … and the Conflict of Social 
Norms as its Infrastructure”, in: Christian Joerges and  Carole 
Glinski (eds), The European Crisis and the Transformation of 
Transnational Governance: Authoritarian Managerialism versus 
Democratic Governance, (Oxford-Portland OR: Hart Publish-
ing, 2014), 383-396.
8   “How Unifying Law Ends up in New Differences”, in: 
Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage., (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2001), 417- 441.
9  See Gunther Teubner, “Eigensinnige 
Produktionsregimes: Zur Ko-evolution von Wirtschaft und Recht 
in den varieties of capitalism”, (1999) 5 Soziale Systeme, 7-26 
[Idiosyncratic Production Regimes: Co-evolution of Economic 
and Legal Institutions in the Varieties of Capitalism, in: John 
Ziman (ed.), The Evolution of Cultural Entities: Proceedings of the 
British Academy 112. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 161-182], and 
the works of Werner Abelshauser, e.g., “Europa in Vielfalt einigen. 
Eine Denkschrift”, in: A.B. Atkinson, P.M. Huber, H. James and 
F.W. Scharpf (eds), Nationalstaat und Europäische Union. Eine 
Bestandsaufnahme, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016), 275-294; W. 
Abelshauser, D. Gilgen and A. Leutzsch, “Kultur, Wirtschaft, 
Kulturen der Weltwirtschaft”, in: Wener Abelshauser, David 
Gilgen and Andreas Leutzsch (eds), Kulturen der Weltwirtschaft, 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 2013), 9-29.
pean scheme is envisaged.3 To be sure, such piece-
meal steps have been undertaken from early on, 
in particular in the field of consumer protection, 
but they could not transform the pointillist modes 
of legal integration. The reasons should have been 
obvious. Back in 1982, the America scholar and 
judge Guido Calabresi had examined the ten-
sions between the common law system and prob-
lem-specific legislative corrections.4 It is obvious 
that what is difficult to accommodate within the 
common legal culture of the US is more problem-
atical in a Community of six or more Member 
States with diverse legal traditions. And last, but 
not least, on what grounds can one argue that an 
ever more uniform legal order deserves the same 
degree of recognition throughout the entire Com-
munity?
The “Integration through law” agenda tends to 
cause the disintegration of national legal systems 
without establishing a European substitute because 
“the logic of integration” (as practised through 
“negative integration”) is at odds with the “logic of 
post-classical private law”.5 In a seminal essay, enti-
tled “Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law, Or 
How Unifying Law Ends up in New Differences”,6 
Gunther Teubner has made comparative lawyers 
aware of this phenomenon, which is both unsur-
prising and unavoidable, as Karl-Heinz Ladeur 
has added, because European law cannot reach the 
3   Locus classicus: Friedrich A. von Hayek,  “The Econom-
ic Conditions of Interstate Federalism”, in: Friedrich A. Hayek, 
Individualism and Economic Order, (Chicago IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1949), 255-272 (reprinted from the New Com-
monwealth Quarterly V. 2 (September 1939), 131-149.
4   Guido Calabresi. A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, 
(Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard UP 1982).
5   See Christian Joerges, “The Impact of European Integra-
tion on Private Law. Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts 
and a New Constitutional Perspective”, (1997) 3 European Law 
Journal, 378-406. Gert Brüggemeier and Christian Joerges, 
“Europäisierung des Vertrags- und Haftungsrechts“, in: Peter-
Christian Müller-Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1993, 2nd. 
ed. 1999), 301-360.; Christoph Schmid, Die Instrumentalisier-
ung des Privatrechts durch die Europäische Union. Privatrecht 
und Privatrechtskonzeptionen in der Entwicklung der Eu-
ropäischen Integrationsverfassung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2010), passim.
6   Modern Law Review 61 (1998), 11-32.
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“The social” became more deeply engrained in the 
discourse theory of law and democracy.
The nation state and its welfare accomplishments, 
Habermas submits, is merely a nostalgic option, 
a hideaway in the sovereign powerlessness of the 
overrun nation (eine “nostalgische Option für eine 
Einigelung in der souveränen Ohnmacht der über-
rollten Nation”).16 There is some unity in the di-
versity of the two opponents. Both invoke the 
interdependence of facticity and validity. They 
share the premise that economic liberalism is far 
too insensitive to the quests for social justice and 
should therefore be subjected to political correc-
tions. They disagree about “the level of govern-
ance” at which such corrections can be realised. 
This, however, is anything but a trivial disagree-
ment. It is one which reveals a deep lacunae in 
extensive legal debates on what has been charac-
terised in ever more intensity as “Europe’s Justice 
Deficit”.17 This notion is of a revealing vagueness. 
What exactly is Europe supposed to do? Should 
it compensate justice failures with the Member 
States, for example, by imposing a uniform “Eu-
ropean Social Model”? Should it, instead, super-
vise the inter-state relations and ensure “justice 
between” its Members?
Streeck’s political and normative conclusion builds 
coherently on his sociological analysis – including 
his extensive discussion of the varieties of capital-
ism.18 His logic is both sociologically and legally 
compelling: under European rule, the social state 
cannot survive. We have hence to replace the su-
premacy of European law by a primacy of the 
nation state. His argument is also richer than the 
usual rejection of European claims to supremacy:
16  Jürgen Habermas, “Demokratie oder Kapitalismus. 
Vom Elend der nationalstaatlichen Fragmentierung in einer 
kapitalistisch integrierten Weltgesellschaft”, Blätter für deutsche 
und internationale Politik 5/2013, 59-70 (“Nostalgische 
Kleinstaaterei”, 62).
17  Europe’s Justice Deficit?, co-edited by Dimitry 
Kochenov, Gráinne de Búrca and Andrew Williams, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2015).
18  Streeck, MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/ 12; Blätter 
2013: Was nun, Europa? Kapitalismus ohne Demokratie oder 
Demokratie ohne Kapitalismus.
thoroughly. My objective as a lawyer, however, is 
distinct. I am primarily concerned with the nor-
mative – legal and constitutional – implications 
of Europe’s diversity. It is this concern which the 
debate between Habermas and Streeck, to which 
my subtitle refers, illustrates quite instructively.
Their exchange10 builds on well-known arguments 
and is somewhat repetitive.11 There is a strong 
legal dimension in their controversy, which fits 
well into the agenda of our conference. Streeck 
questions the potential of Europe to establish, 
at a transnational level, an equivalent to the na-
tional Sozialstaat. In Streeck’s understanding, 
which is informed by the constitutional theory 
of Hermann Heller,12 Sozialstaatlichkeit, as it has 
been endorsed by the eternity clause of the Basic 
Law, is a democratic essential.13 Because of the 
ongoing erosion of social protection provisions in 
the integration process, he opts for a defence of the 
nation state and its institutions against a deepen-
ing of economic integration.14 Habermas shares a 
commitment to Hermann Heller – small wonder, 
as Wolfgang Abendroth, with whom he wrote his 
habilitation thesis, wrote a famous defence of Hel-
ler’s in the first great post-war Verfassungsstreit.15 
10  Jürgen Habermas, “Demokratie oder Kapitalismus? 
Vom Elend der nationalstaatlichen Fragmentierung in einer 
kapitalistisch integrierten Weltgesellschaft”, (2013) 5 Blätter für 
deutsche und internationale Politik, 59-70; Wolfgang Streeck, 
“Small-State Nostalgia? The Currency Union, Germany, and 
Europe: A Reply to Jürgen Habermas”, (2014) 21 Constellations, 
213-221.
11  The earliest encounter of which I am aware is Streeck’s 
– unpublished -- reaction to Habermas’ plea for a European 
constitution in his “Hamburg Lecture” of 26 June 2001 on 
“Warum braucht Europa eine Verfassung?”, published in DIE 
ZEIT and still available at: http://www.zeit.de/2001/27/200127_
verfassung.xml/seite-7. “Voluntarism” is the core objection in 
Streeck’s paper (“Das ‘soziale Europa’ und seine Verfassung: 
Fragen zu einem politischen Projekt“, on file with author).
12  See, e.g., his recent “Heller, Schmitt and the Euro”, 
(2017) 21 European Law Journal, 361-370.
13  Art. 79 III GG.
14  Wolfgang Streeck, “Small-State Nostalgia? The 
Currency Union, Germany, and Europe: A Reply to Jürgen 
Habermas”, (2014) 21 Constellations, 213-221.
15  See Christian Joerges, “The Rechtsstaat and Social 
Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European 
Integration Process”, (2010) 9 Comparative Sociology, 65-85..
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2.  Institutionalising the 
United in Diversity Vision
The observations just submitted are somewhat 
emphatic and abstract. I should not proceed with 
their defence without mentioning Habermas’ ob-
jections. His three main points are (I reproduce 
only the substance of his messages; his German is 
impressive and would get hurt by a translation of 
mine):
There is a concession to the diversity vision: 
“In keinem demokratischen Gemeinwesen 
darf das historisch gewachsene politisch-
kulturelle Selbstverständnis nationaler 
Minderheiten der Assimilation an die 
Mehrheitskultur geopfert werden.”
However, we should not equate cultural 
identities with economic cultures: “Aber 
können wir den wohlbegründeten 
Rechtsschutz für kulturelle Identitäten 
umstandslos auf Wirtschaftskulturen, 
auf die, wie Wolfgang Streeck sagt, 
‘parochialen’ Formen des Kapitalismus, z.B. 
auf Systeme von Arbeitsbeziehungen oder 
auf sozialpolitische Regime ausdehnen? 
“Ich sehe nicht, wie sich ein kultureller 
Naturschutz für ein jeweils bestehendes 
Ensemble von sozioökonomischer 
Praktiken begründen ließe.”
We should instead trust that a postnational 
identity and solidarity will emerge: “Es ist 
nicht unrealistisch anzunehmen, dass sich 
die, im Laufe der Nationalstaatsbildng 
sehr allmählich etablierte staatbürgerliche 
Solidarität in dem Maße über die Grenzen 
des Nationalstaates hinaus erweitert, 
wie die Bürger von supranationalen 
Entscheidungen nicht nur betroffen, 
sondern daran nach demokratischen 
Verfahren auch beteiligt werden.”
Never take Habermas lightly. Fortunately enough, 
however, I can invoke the authority of another 
classic, namely, the founding father of economic 
sociology, Karl Polanyi, for my critique of his ar-
gument.
“[W]hat I would suggest to call the acquis-
es démocratiques of the national demoi in 
Europe … importantly comprises a wide 
range of political-economic institutions 
that provide for democratic corrections of 
market outcomes – for democracy as social 
democracy.”19
This is one of the very few suggestions to take the 
insights of the studies of the varieties of capital-
ism both normatively and seriously. I am aware of 
only three German jurists – there will be more! 
-- who have submitted like arguments, namely, 
Anna Beckers,20 Ulrich K. Preuß.21and Gunther 
Teubner22 They have all understood the legal im-
plications of the varieties studies. Legal rules and 
institutions do not operate in splendid insulation, 
but constitute interdependencies. The deeper level 
of the gist of the matter can be explained with the 
help of a famous dictum of the German constitu-
tional scholar and judge Ernst-Wolfgang Böck-
enförde: secularised democracies, he held, live 
on normative resources, which they cannot gen-
erate themselves.23 In the European context, the 
integration project lives on cultural and norma-
tive resources, which cannot be produced wilfully 
or by some political or legislative fiat. In a more 
mundane version, democratic legitimacy in the 
EU lives on the quality of the democracies in the 
Member States, their historical experiences, idea-
tional traditions, and political preferences. Europe 
can promote and protect these accomplishments. 
To replace national endeavours by the prescrip-
tion of some uniform political rule risks their de-
struction.
19  Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End?, (London: 
Verso Books, 2016), 198, n. 20.
20  Anna Beckers, Enforcing Corporate Social 
Responsibility Codes. On Global Self-Regulation and National 
Private Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015, 50 ff.
21  Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuß, “The Union’s Course: 
Between a Supranational Welfare State and Creeping Decay”, 
in id. and Claus Offe, Citizens in Europe. Essays on Democracy, 
Constitutionalism and European Integration, Colchester: ECPR 
Press, 2015, 15 ff.
22  Teubner above, n. 8.
23  Ernst-Wolfang Böckenförde, “Die Entstehung des 
Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation”, in id. Staat, Gesellschaft, 
Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht, 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1975, 42-64.
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to envisage a better future. Polanyi’s considera-
tions deserve attention for three additional and 
interrelated reasons. For one, he re-states his 
foundational argument that the capitalist market 
economy is not an evolutionary given, but a politi-
cal product – “laissez-faire was planned”27 – which 
requires institutional backing and continuous 
political management. To put it slightly differ-
ently, “the political” is inherent in “the economic”; 
market economies “are polities”.28 A second insight 
of topical importance follows from this: capital-
ist market economies will exhibit varieties which 
mirror a variety of political preferences, historical 
experiences, and socio-economic configurations. 
This is what we can expect, and, so I conclude, 
should respect, once our societies have gained the 
“liberty to organise national life at will”. The third 
point is only alluded to in half a sentence. It is an 
implication of the new freedom. Polanyi predicts 
and advocates “collaboration”; diversity, we can 
assume, is there to stay.
Three follow-up queries have to be addressed:
Even if we concede that the diversity 
of the institutional infrastructures of 
the European economies deserves, in 
principle, recognition, we have to concede 
that these infrastructures are not written 
in stone. Endogenous democratic change 
must remain possible, and insulation 
against the impact of Europeanisation 
and globalisation is inconceivable. What 
precisely distinguishes a variety of an 
economic culture from a Habermasian 
“Schrebergarten”?
Query (1) assumes implicitly that both 
Streeck’s defence of the nation state and 
Habermas’ defence of European rule 
are going a step too far. What we need 
instead is a channelling of change. It is 
27  “… planning was not”, Polanyi, at 147.
28  For a very dense re-construction, see Fred Block, 
“Towards a New Understanding of Economic Modernity”, in: 
Bo Stråth, Peter Wagner, Christian/Joerges (eds), The Economy 
as Polity: The Political Constitution of Contemporary Capitalism, 
London: UCL Press 2005,, 3-16.
Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation is concerned 
with the emergence of “market societies”, where 
“instead of the economy embedded in social re-
lations, social relations are embedded in the 
economy”.24 Writing at the end of the Great War, 
Polanyi had witnessed the destruction of liberal 
economic ordering by Fascism and Nazism. 
However, by now, at the end of the Second World 
War, the rebirth of alternative counter-movements 
was in sight and nurtured hopes in a better na-
tional and international future: alternatives to the 
Fascist transformation, namely, social counter-
movements which would undermine the working 
of the market system (“the tension between a con-
stant push towards self-regulating markets and 
spontaneous resistance to the subordination of 
society to market forces”, Dorothee Bohle). His 
somewhat enigmatic views are difficult to deci-
pher. “The Great Transformation can legitimately 
be read either as an anti-capitalist manifesto or 
as a social democratic bedtime story.”25 Be that as 
it may, my shortcut is a passage in which Polanyi 
considers that:
“… with the disappearance of the 
automatic mechanism of the gold standard, 
governments will find it possible to […] 
tolerate willingly that other nations shape 
their domestic institutions according to 
their inclinations, thus transcending the 
pernicious nineteenth century dogma of the 
necessary uniformity of domestic regimes 
within the orbit of world economy. Out of 
the ruins of the Old World, cornerstones of 
the New can be seen to emerge: economic 
collaboration of governments and the 
liberty to organize national life at will.”26
Was this just wishful thinking? The passage was 
written at a time when Keynes and the like-mind-
ed American economist and politician Harry 
Dexter White were working towards the post-war 
settlement of Bretton Woods. There were reasons 
24  Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 57.
25  Gareth Dale, Karl Polanyi. A Life on the Left, New York: 
Columbia UP, 2016, 286.
26  Polanyi, 253-254.
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law and security policy, but rather into 
far more fundamental constitutional 
structures of political representation 
and democracy, as well as regulatory 
frameworks of national economic steering 
and social re-distribution. And it is here, in 
the unravelling of the nationally-bounded, 
majoritarian politics and policies of 
economic and social integration through 
intensified globalisation that political 
populism has found its niche, and that 
academic thought struggles to identify 
the new paradigms of political, social and 
economic organisation,30 which might 
bridge the gap between a traditional, 
spatially-delineated world and a post-war 
globe of universalising aspirations and 
complex interdependencies.”31
Ad (2) The second is by no means more demand-
ing, but, due to the technicalities of its structure, 
more difficult to restate. A very brief summary 
must suffice here.
Back in 1997, Jürgen Neyer and I submitted the 
core ideas of the conflicts-law approach (“delib-
erative” as opposed to orthodox supranational-
ism) in an essay on European comitology.32 Our 
basic premise and intuition was very simple: it 
is a core premise of theories of democracy, most 
notably of Habermas’ discourse theory of law and 
democracy, that we, the citizens, must be able to 
understand ourselves as the authors of the legal 
provisions with which we are expected to comply. 
Under conditions of Europeanisation and globali-
sation and ever more growing interdependences, 
30  Christian Joerges, “Brother, can you Paradigm?”, 
Review Essay of Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone 
Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2014), (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 769-
785.
31  “A Very Cosmopolitan Citizenship: But Who Pays 
the Price?”, in: Michael Dougan, Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Eleanor 
Spaventa, About Empowerment and Disempowerment of the 
European Citizen, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), Chapter 6..
32  Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, “From 
Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: 
The Constitutionalisation of Comitology”, (1997) 3 European Law 
Journal, 273-299.
precisely this which is the objective of the 
conflicts-law approach which promises 
to institutionalise the united-in-diversity 
vision, thereby offering an alternative to 
both Streeck’s nation state nostalgia and 
Habermas’ European utopia.
The normative credentials of this 
alternative deserve special attention. It 
seems noteworthy that the conflicts-law 
approach is by no means as idiosyncratic 
as my terminology may insinuate. 
Ad (1) The first query is the easiest to cope with. 
It seems obvious that Habermas reproduces his 
famous dual of “system and lifeworld”, that is, his 
“two-level theory of society, which distinguishes 
the lifeworld reproduced through communicative 
action from the functional integration of the ad-
ministrative and economic subsystems, narrows 
the capitalist economy to exchange mediated 
by money”. The economy is not “a polity”, but a 
purely functional machinery?! I restrict myself to 
citing an essay by the Tilburg legal theorist Hans 
Lindahl, who reminded European lawyers of the 
enduring currency of Hannah Arendt’s concept of 
“spatiality” as:
“[N]ot merely a geographical term. It 
relates not so much, and not primarily, 
to a piece of land as to the space between 
individuals in a group whose members are 
bound to, and at the same time separated 
and protected from each other by all kinds 
of relationships, based on a common 
language, religion, a common history, 
customs, and laws.”29
As Michelle Everson commented: 
“For lawyers, the complex of sociological 
and cultural artefacts that are called 
upon to instantiate spatial community 
may appear opaque, but they translate 
not simply into jurisdictional notions, 
or territorial instruments of nationality 
29  Hans Lindahl, “Finding a Place for Freedom, Security 
and Justice: The European Union’s Claim to Territorial Unity”, 
(2004) 29 European Law Review, 461-484, at 466.
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er that we have to distinguish “justice within” con-
solidated polities, on the one hand, and “justice 
between” them, on the other - and that we have 
to work in both spheres.34 Last, but not least, it 
should be underlined that the conflicts approach 
seeks to defend the idea of the law-mediated legit-
imacy of public rule. A lot more on the conflicts-
law approach can be said and has been said.35 We 
focus here on the third query.
Ad (3) Again, my terminology is only seemingly 
idiosyncratic. As long as there is diversity in the 
EU, the law will have to cope with differences. 
Conflicts law is simply the name of the discipline 
doing this. Europe can, in the foreseeable future, 
not live without it. It can only consider design, 
its principles and methodology. The norma-
tive intuitions which my version of conflicts-law 
seeks to institutionalise are certainly outside the 
mainstream of European studies. But I can point 
to similar approaches. Among them is Daniel In-
nerarity’s concept of “inter-democracy”.36 Two of 
his insights are particularly important for my ar-
gument. The first concerns Europe’s heterogene-
ity, which excludes all “one-size-fits-all” recipes. 
Instead, “If the EU is going to be more democratic, 
it will be so in the style of complex democracies. 
And that complexity is not only related to the di-
versity of its citizens but to the variety of issues 
about which it needs to decide, some of which 
may require proximity, but others that demand a 
certain distance”.37 “Inter-democracy” is his key 
concept: the democratisation of interdependen-
cies must replace state-like or federal hierarchical 
models, he argues forcefully. And, 
“The states are increasingly more incapable 
of democratic action because they cannot 
34  Christian Joerges, “Social Justice in an Ever More 
Diverse Union”, in: Frank Vandenbroucke, Catherine Barnard and 
Geert De Baere (eds), A European Social Union after the Crisis, 
(Cambridge UP 2017), 92-119; available at: SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2697440.
35  References to FS Petersmann and TLT Special Issue. 
36  Daniel Innerarity, Democracy in Europe. A Political 
Philosophy of the EU, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
37  See the Introduction “Understanding European 
Complexity”, at 7.
this is no longer conceivable. To cite Habermas 
himself:
“Nation-states … encumber each other 
with the external effects of decisions that 
impinge on third parties who had no say in 
the decision-making process. Hence, states 
cannot escape the need for regulation and 
coordination in the expanding horizon of 
a world society that is increasingly self-
programming, even at the cultural level 
...”33
It is difficult to reject these insights. The impli-
cations are, of course, controversial. Among the 
three just-named alternatives – state-building, 
down-scaling of integration, and co-operation - 
I opt for the third. In the European case, we can 
build on European law’s potential to compensate 
for the legitimacy deficits of national rule. Euro-
pean law can derive its own legitimacy from this 
function: its mandate is to implement the commit-
ments of the Member States towards each other by 
two legal claims, namely, the requirement to take 
the interests and concerns of their neighbours into 
account when designing national policies, and by 
imposing a duty to co-operate. The very notion 
of co-operation indicates that this kind of rule 
cannot be some “command and control” exercise, 
but must rely on the deliberative quality of co-op-
erative interactions. Two important implications 
should be underlined. The first: there is no in-
built-guarantee that such co-operative efforts will, 
in the end, be successful; but such limitations need 
not be damaging per se; quite to the contrary, they 
may document mutual respect of essential, yet dis-
tinct, values and commitments of the other (the 
ordre public in the parlance of conflict of laws and 
private international law). The second implication 
is more drastic: socio-economic, institutional, po-
litical and cultural diversity is particularly strong 
and difficult to overcome. This, however, is by no 
means a plea for inactivity; it is, instead, a remind-
33  Jürgen Habermas, “Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des 
Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?“, in id., Der gespaltene Westen, 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004, 113-193, at 175.
SHOULD THE SPECIFICS OF NATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURES BE CHARACTERISED AS “DEMOCRATIC ACQUIS” AND CAN THEY 
BE DEFENDED BY LAW? BEYOND THE NOSTALGIA-CONTROVERSY BETWEEN JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND WOLFGANG STREECK
Christian Joerges
236
of the primacy of the economic liberties over the 
democratic Rechtsstaat (“economic constitution-
alism” in my parlance) towards a principle of re-
straint, namely, to respect the limits of European 
competences” which requires that “the law of the 
Union does not limit welfare state options at the 
national level too severely”.41 We will hear more 
from Florian directly.
Instead of an Epilogue
It may not be so readily apparent how all this is 
related to the agenda of this conference and to the 
search for a new future. It is, in fact, although cer-
tainly not in perspectives which would be shared 
by everybody. “United in Diversity” is an anti-
centralist, con-federal, rather than federal vision, 
a defence of political autonomy against imposed 
convergence, combined, however, with duties to 
co-operative problem-solving. How much realism 
is in this “united in diversity” vision? It is to be 
conceded that the praxis which this vision envis-
ages certainly depends, to invoke Böckenförde’s 
famous dictum again,42 on cultural and normative 
resources, which cannot be produced wilfully or 
by some political or legislative fiat. European inte-
gration research used to be aware of such depend-
encies and has sought to identify them.
41  The “European Pact for Social Progress” Program”, at 2.
42  Böckenförde, “Die Entstehung des Staates”, .n. 23 
above.
include everyone affected by their decisions 
in the electoral process and, on the flip side, 
citizens cannot influence the behaviour of 
those who are making decisions in their 
name. This is the principal democratic 
deficit that the European Union should 
rectify. Extraterritorial effects and the 
burdens that one state imposes on others 
cannot be justified by recourse to domestic 
democratic procedures and require 
another type of legitimacy. That is why 
we can affirm that the fact that national 
actors keep outside interests in mind 
may improve the representation of true 
domestic interests, since they are no longer 
circumscribed by the state arena either. 
In this sense, we might think that the EU 
helps strengthen the democratic authority 
of the member states, to the extent to 
which it can serve as a measure to manage 
externalities in an efficient fashion.”38
A second one, so it seems to me, is Damian Chal-
mers’ still unpublished essay on the “Democrat-
ic Authority and the Resettlement of EU Law”.39 
This quest for a resettlement is ground-breaking 
and much more elaborated than my own: “EU law 
allows [Chalmers departs from Article 2 TEU] … 
for another approach in which the European Union’s 
mission become resettled around the promotion of 
democratic authority within Europe. The central 
question would be whether a measure has sufficient 
democratic credentials to warrant obedience over 
its alternatives, with EU law only justified where it 
would promote the quality of democracy within a 
Member State. EU law would, thereby, become an 
instrument for the cultivation of politics and the 
values of political community rather than some-
thing which suppresses these to secure a policy.”40
The third is a contribution to this conference, 
namely, Florian Rödl’s suggestion to re-orient the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU from its promotion 
38  See Chapter 3 (“What Should Be Democratized? The 
Peculiarity of Democracy in Europe”, at 73.
39  Ms. Singapore 2018 (on file with author)
40  Ibid., 1 (italics in the original).
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1. Universality of Norms 
and the Emergence of More 
Complex Markets
The financial crisis of 2008 has exacerbated the 
differences within the economic systems of the 
Member States. As one of the less visible conse-
quences of this crisis, there is no longer a paradig-
matic market that can serve as model for a Euro-
pean policy of an economic dynamic. This, in my 
view, is due to the fact that the new market for 
information services, in particular, is much more 
complex than the telecommunications market. 
The difficulties consist in the fact that these new 
emerging markets do not follow a stable universal-
ising trajectory. Universality - as an order building 
principle - may have had its time in general. The 
new markets follow a more network-like experi-
mental path of trial and error upon the basis 
of complex knowledge that is difficult both to 
access and to use in regulatory strategies. In such 
a constellation, there is no single trajectory of 
development that is carved out by a central regu-
latory agent upon the basis of technology and 
market observation. The difficulty is exacerbated 
by the fact that Europe is weak in the develop-
ment of new computer technologies and software. 
The “Lisbon Process” which should have brought 
Europe to the top of technological development 
has been a complete failure. This drawback finds 
its repercussions in the missing knowledge base 
that can only be generated and understood in 
permanent co-operation with the relevant indus-
tries. There is a new tendency towards hybrid 
public-private interconnected systems or platform 
markets that undermine the difference between 
public and private, between customer and whole-
sale services. In my view, this is not only relevant 
for the specific markets to which I refer but this 
also demonstrates for Europe that universality as 
a constitutional principle that extends its effects 
beyond the economic system has lost at least some 
of its integrative power. More and more, we are 
challenged by the rise of “modular technologies” 
for complex information services that are difficult 
to assess beforehand and no longer lend them-
selves to the construction of steady state markets, 
and, as a consequence, the rather stable regula-
tory strategies of the past begin to move on slip-
pery ground. At the same time, the interests of 
Member States are becoming much more hetero-
geneous. This development requires a more open 
network-like model of regulation. Technologies 
develop more within “ecosystems” of different 
networks that allow for experimentation and do 
not follow established paradigms of organisa-
tion. The focus of the European project should no 
longer be the super-state, but a more focal model 
that is meant to push the technological processes 
of the future, i.e., nano-technology, smart energy 
technologies, but also the ecological transforma-
tion of agriculture, the future of ageing popula-
tions, ideas for rural development, etc. I think that 
the ongoing economic and technological transfor-
mation of postmodern societies is crucial for the 
conception of a European constitutional order, 
as well: universality is no longer a guiding prin-
ciple for the organisation of regulatory strategies 
at the level of the nation state, nor for the manage-
ment of difficult economic questions. Regulation 
can only follow a trend towards differentiated 
“network governance”. And, more generally, one 
might take the view that a model of a “consocia-
tional governance” is necessary. That is to say, the 
organisation model can no longer be conceived as 
uniform and stable for every kind of market, but 
should get involved in regulatory strategies that 
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2. The Change of Political 
Causalities within an 
Incomplete Federal System
All this demonstrates that the idea of a universal 
order for Europe - or even the world - that is 
modelled on the example the traditional nation 
state is outdated. A system like the EU that still 
follows the “one size fits all” rule is doomed to fail. 
Universality may work on paper, but, in reality, 
it deepens the cleavages within the EU. It even 
creates a perverse expectation of a universal rule 
that should guarantee equal outcome of different 
sovereign strategic action. One cannot take the 
view that it is the construction of the EU that is 
fine and that the problems are to be attributed 
to the bad policies of Member States. Once a 
“union” has been established, a logic that distrib-
utes responsibility in a haphazard and irrational 
way is unavoidable. Despite the different polit-
ical options left to the Member States, one can, 
of course, demand a re-distribution of the profits 
that have been collected unevenly by the Member 
States. And this is what happens in the European 
debate. However, this will, of course, meet with the 
opposition of the richer Member States that will 
claim that their advantage is due to more intelli-
gent sovereign policy. The incomplete model of 
the “union” changes the political causalities, which 
leaves the hitherto established rationality of the 
nation state behind without having the power to 
develop a new consistent pattern of the attribution 
of responsibilities that is characteristic for a federal 
state with its strong position of the federation. The 
state of the “union” instead allows for a perverse 
combination of sovereignty and the claim for a 
federalist responsibility for the negative conse-
quences of sovereign decision-making. Under the 
present legal conditions, Member States cannot 
impose claims for a transfer union on opposing 
Member States, although they can threaten to 
“communitise” a factual risk by overburdening the 
common monetary system even if they themselves 
will suffer from such a strategy more than other 
Member States (“raise your neighbours costs”). In 
rely more on a mixture of principles (“métissage”) 
and for different types of governance according to 
the technology or the issue that is at stake. We need 
more project-like regulatory strategies that are to 
be formulated by a limited number of Member 
States according to their interests with differen-
tiated models of action involving private interest 
groups. Uniformity should not be imposed on 
Member States that do not consent to potential 
common strategies.
We need organisational strategies that experiment 
with the eclecticist “métissage” of components of 
different, even contradictory, political reperto-
ries and the management of conflict of norms as a 
response to the emergence of ill-structured social 
and economic problems. A paradigm for the latter 
is the Euro crisis.
Apart from creating worrying problems and the 
almost unmanageable complexity of an emer-
gency regime (Joerges 2016) that has given enor-
mous power to the ECB, the Monetary Union has 
also opened the Pandora’s box of a transfer union 
which, to a certain extent, has to be accepted 
by the northern states. At the same time, the 
southern states should be more aware of the errors 
that they themselves have committed in the past: 
The northern states (not just Germany) are more 
advanced because of the technological reform of 
their production and organisation – it is not the 
myth of the (relative) social dumping of salaries.
The limits to the conception of a universality of 
rules and principles can also be observed in the 
field of regulation of other data-driven tech-
nologies. Such a regulatory strategy can itself 
only follow a model of “evolutive networks” 
(M. Amstutz). Under conditions of uncertainty, 
stable goals for the regulatory process can only 
be formulated to a limited extent. Such a strategy 
is useful in so far as certain risks can be analysed 
and described beforehand – and these are the risks 
of the past. This is why, first of all, the internal 
risk management of firms (financial services in 
particular) should be strengthened.
THE END OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF NORMS AS A MODEL FOR EUROPE: 
THE ERROR OF “SEEING LIKE A STATE” (J.S. SCOTT) IN THE POSTMODERN CONDITION
Karl-Heinz Ladeur
239
modes of finding “arrangements” in late-night 
bargaining processes. This development should 
not just be reduced to a momentary difficulty. This 
is a symptom of a transformation that will not pass 
away within a short lapse of time. It asks for a new 
strategy of a management of diversity also with the 
EU. Moral appeals will not work.
4. The “Instituted” and the 
“Constituted Society” (V. 
Descombes)
Rather, the tenacity of “Seeing like a state” (J.S. 
Scott) – as opposed to indulging in the observa-
tion of the fragmented realities of different socie-
ties with their own multiple histories that are full 
of specific hidden intricacies of implicit social 
norms, patterns of behaviour, forms of life, memo-
ries, etc., seems to determine the rationale of the 
EU. The facticity of social norms is characteristic 
for the “instituted society”, as opposed to the “cons-
tituted society” which is based upon explicit (legal) 
norms. This seems to be a productive distinction 
that has been introduced by the French philoso-
pher Vincent Descombes.
The idea of progress leads to a superimposition 
of the forward looking “horizon of expectation” 
(“Erwartungshorizont”) on the backward looking 
“space of experience” (Reinhart Koselleck 2004)). 
Many of the conflicts over European “constitu-
tionalism” can be explained with a view to the 
dominance of the “Erwartungshorizont” of a new 
political constitution and the establishment of a 
new “constituted society”: the “Erwartungshori-
zont” can be broadened: it is already less certain 
that one can give up the “Erfahrungsraum” of the 
nation state and, as a consequence, the nation-
based society. However, the nation state cannot be 
reduced to a nationalist ideology and state-based 
constitution that can be given up or just fade away. 
Pierre Manent (2008) has opposed “la raison des 
nations” to the illusionary assumption that we have 
just to expand the territorial base of the demo-
cratic state in order to regain its historical role 
as rule giving rational power. One might call this 
my view, the change of political causalities is the 
most devastating consequence of uniform law that 
touches Member States in increasingly divergent 
modes. The implementation of norms needs, first 
of all, a common idea of its social and technical 
pre-conditions, and, secondly, a common idea of 
its implementation, one that is - at least in part 
- generated in “real time” ex post. This approach 
demands a common knowledge base and an idea 
of shared political causalities. Causality in politics 
does not mean an objective factual relationship 
between input and output. Causalities are more or 
less social constructions that allow for variation 
and contestation, but they pre-suppose some form 
of consensus – which apparently does not exist 
in many fields of European law. Uniform laws or 
uniform strategies may even deepen the inequality 
among the Member States. This is also true beyond 
economic policy: the German push for a (tempo-
rary) “refugees welcome” option probably gave 
the Brexit votes the one or two per cent that they 
needed for their victory. The victory of the Polish 
national-conservative party is also attributed to 
Angela Merkel’s refugee policy.
3. The Role of Social Norms 
as Opposed to Legal Rules 
Becomes more Visible
The role of the social norms, the rules of action, 
the patterns of “how things are done” (Charles 
Taylor 2004: 55), have all, from the outset, been 
very different in the Member States, but, for a 
rather long time, the market regimes have had 
the power to function as a kind of liberal consti-
tutionalism that has been able to impose a certain 
level of uniformity and consensus on fragile 
processes of compromise-finding (cf., gener-
ally, Joerges 2016). The rise of economic hetero-
geneity among the Member States and the deep-
ening of the differences of interests, for example, 
in the “refugee crisis”, while the markets them-
selves are increasingly fragmenting at the same 
time; the market regime and the universality of 
rules in general have undermined the established 
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(2016: 29 et seq.). The economic heterogeneity of 
Europe is undeniable, but the normative idea of 
the Eurocrats (including the majority of specialists 
of European law) pre-supposes a smooth adapta-
tion of weaker states to a more rational form of 
economic behaviour – naturally, with the benevo-
lent help of the different “programmes” of the EU 
– this is their “Erwartungshorizont”.
5. The Unavoidable 
Difference of European Law 
in Member States
One of the illusions of the “Eurocrats” – in this 
case, the term is legitimate – and of the special-
ists of European law is the assumption that Euro-
pean law is the same in all countries: equal law 
leads to equal conditions of life, at least in the long 
run. The possibility that equal law imposed under 
unequal conditions of life can even deepen differ-
ences is discarded. Countries such as Germany and 
other “northerners” have reacted to the “uniform 
internal market” by modernising their formal and 
informal institutional rules (e.g., of industrial rela-
tions). Countries such as France and Greece have 
reacted to pressure by expanding their civil service 
– financed by public debt. This has deepened the 
heterogeneity between the Member States, as we 
can now observe. This would be an example for the 
different “repertories” of political and economic 
action in Member States.
At the same time, the EU tries to impose a 
uniform rule of free movement of workers on all 
Member States in spite of the fact that the social 
and economic situation is completely different 
in every Member State: just take the UK with its 
long history of different waves of immigration, or 
Bulgaria, whose health system will be confronted 
with a catastrophe in the near future if the emigra-
tion of medical doctors and other qualified people 
continues at the present rate. One rule fits all? The 
same is true for immigration. Can and should the 
“Eurocrats” just force citizens to accept immigra-
tion according to the rules? Is “free movement 
of workers” a dogma that can only be called into 
question by “exit”? Some Member States might be 
the “acquis étatique” that, according to observers 
such as Jürgen Habermas, can be and should be 
re-established in conditions of globalisation which 
undercut the state’s authority because of the split 
between its territorial limitation and the unlim-
ited economic networks of transactions. Clearly, 
Habermas (2011; and others) have a point, but it is 
only one point (for critique cf. Grimm 2016).
“La raison des nations”, in the sense of Pierre 
Manent (2008), is not to be interpreted as a 
nationalist idea that is focused on the nation as an 
“imagined community” (Benedict Anderson) – a 
concept that is based upon the constructivist idea 
that societal imagination is mainly the product of 
an intersubjective construction. Instead, it refers 
to a deeper “social imaginary” that consists in the 
mainly practical “repertory” of decision models, 
patterns of action, etc., in a society (Charles Taylor 
2004) – the “instituted society”, as one may put it 
according to V. Descombes (2004). In the market 
related field of law, co-ordination is, to a certain 
extent, mainly managed by economic actors them-
selves, be it spontaneously or via the mediation 
brought about by the lex mercatoria or other self-
organised private institutions. However, this looks 
completely different in fields where co-ordination 
has to absorb and mitigate much more conflicts 
such as in industrial relations, administrative 
action, budgetary discipline, welfare practices, etc. 
In these domains, law - to a large extent - plays 
a secondary role, as compared to societal norms 
and patterns of action.
The “instituted society” is, in many respects, 
regarded by progressive political scientists as based 
upon power relations – which is true. However, 
this is not the whole story: it is also a network of 
societal rules, life forms, patterns of action, which 
even left-wing political scientist should acknowl-
edge as being characterised by different power rela-
tions according to “varieties of capitalism” (Peter 
A. Hall & David Soskice 2001). Clearly, variety 
matters! Astonishingly, in the controversy over the 
EU, this matters only for (political) economists. 
In the “Eurocrats” book, this finds an expression 
in (political scientist) Fritz W. Scharpf ’s analysis 
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willing to follow the British example in the future. 
At present, the situation in the UK is difficult to 
handle – much more so than the Brexiteers could 
ever have imagined. Immigration is different in all 
Member States, in spite of uniform laws. Shouldn’t 
we think about just adapting the law to different 
social constellations? We should think about more 
heterogeneity!
6. The Exhaustion of the 
Simple Market Regime and the 
Need for New Ideas for the 
EU
One may criticise the early market orientation 
(“Ordnungspolitik”) or the rise of diverse regula-
tory approaches as being too technocratic and not 
open to democratic deliberation. However, there 
was still room for deliberation at a meta-level 
about alternatives. At the same time, the market 
regime has at least worked satisfactorily to bring 
about a certain level of uniformity, and it has, in 
a way, established some kind of political integra-
tion as a side-effect. It has limited the effects of the 
divergence of the European law at Member State 
level. It has always been an illusion that the EU 
suffers from a “democratic deficit”. It has been the 
strength of the EU that it was not supposed to be 
a super-state. Deliberation alone, that is, without 
a common “political grammar” (de Ligio 2018), 
without a common cause, will not compensate 
for the lack of a common project, and, at the same 
time, a sense of shared practical life-forms. The 
emergence of more heterogeneity by the new tech-
nological and economic dynamic and other ill-
structured problems of postmodernity such as the 
immigration problems, clearly do not lend them-
selves to solutions based upon uniform, universal 
rules. The introduction of EMU, in particular, has 
completely changed the game: the EU is just stuck 
in a stalemate, it cannot go on forwards towards 
more integration (it would be a complete illusion 
that the treaties can be changed in this respect – 
and although this could work as an institutional 
solution), and it cannot stay where it stands. The 
only possibility that might open a new perspective 
is, as a consequence, to take a step back.
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eignty or that the EU was insufficiently demo-
cratic. The argument that the EU is fundamentally 
unjust is quite new.  
Any adequate response to claims about the EU’s 
alleged injustice requires, I think, a two-fold stra-
tegy. First, it is necessary to provide some justi-
fication for the project of European integration 
(Why bother? Why not get rid of it in favour of a 
Europe of sovereign nation states, as Brexiters and 
Italian populists demand?) Second, it is necessary 
to justify a conception of justice within the EU. 
In an earlier work, I tried to justify the project of 
European integration in terms of a conception of 
security (Morgan 2005). The point or purpose of 
the EU, so I argued, is to make its members more 
secure, less exposed to domestic and international 
threats to the basic liberal values that define the 
European way of life. In that work, I didn’t have 
much to say about the distributive consequences 
of the project of European integration.  Nor did 
I have anything to say about the duties owed to 
people who might be wrongfully harmed (if indeed 
there are such people) in the course of the Euro-
pean project.  To address these issues, a concep-
tion of justice that includes both distributive and 
rectificatory components is needed. In this paper, 
I want to summarize part of an argument that 
addresses the “justice deficit,” as it has been called, 
of my earlier argument (de Burca, 2015). 
My paper proceeds in two sections. Section One 
restates and updates my earlier argument that the 
principal justification of the project of European 
integration is to deliver security for its members. 
The EU, I argue, is first and foremost a security 
project; the effort to construct a Single Market 
regulated by an overarching legal and regulatory 
system is secondary — a means -- to that end.  In 
order to realize this security project, the EU needs 
greater state capacity. Section Two examines one 
argument—that of John Rawls—in support of 
the claim that a Federal Europe (the very type of 
Europe needed, I think, to deliver for its members 
security) is incompatible with justice.
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Fans of the EU often forget that the single market 
is basically just Thatcherism on a continental scale 
…. It was built by business, for business.
The best trick the Commission ever played was to 
convince the easily led that the EU is an avatar for 
diversity, multiculturalism, inclusion and all those 
fluffy things that appeal to „progressives.“
In fact the Commission … realised that those 
same „progressives“ are almost all middle class, 
and therefore neatly aligned with the interests of 
big business (being as they are far bigger benefi-
ciaries of it than the working class).
The real losers every single time are the worst 
off, and of course the countries who lose all of 
their young (Poland, Romania, Portugal etc). It‘s 
a genuine disgrace, and every EUphile on here 
abusing Brexiters as racists, bigoted etc are a big 
part of the problem.
“CodeIs4500” [Random anti-EU leftist Guardian 
Commentator]
In recent years, Eurosceptics have voiced a new 
type of argument against the EU: it’s unjust. 
The project of European Integration benefits 
the wealthy at the expense of the poor, business 
at the expense of labour, liberal cosmopolitans 
at the expense of conservative nationalists, the 
Northern European countries at the expense of 
the South, and the Western European countries to 
the detriment of the East.  The angry post above 
(from somebody called CodeIs4500) contains the 
essence of this criticism. 
The claim that the EU is unjust – a claim that could 
be heard throughout the Eurozone Crisis, the 
Brexit debate, and the recent Italian elections—
marks a shift in the focus of Eurosceptics. The 
traditional complaint of such people was either 
that the EU was incompatible with national sover-
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ming regulatory system.258 Others think that the 
point and purpose of the EU is and ought to be to 
rescue the European welfare state.  It is impossible 
to draw a normatively compelling justification of 
the European project out of this contested history. 
Not only did different states--and political actors 
within those states--have different goals in mind 
(Lacroix and Nicolaides 2012). But these goals 
changed over time. It’s a social scientific fallacy to 
think that the factors decisive in the formation of 
a phenomenon in one period must be decisive in 
another.  
Notwithstanding the contested nature of the Euro-
pean project, we have to recognize the salient role 
played by economic processes in driving this 
project forward. But again merely because the EU 
relied upon the spill-overs from different forms 
of economic integration, we should still leave 
open a space for a normative argument that chal-
lenges the salience of this way of making Europe. 
Perhaps the process of European integration—i.e. 
the mechanism of European Union formation—
ought to be turned over to Europe’s citizens, orga-
nized as a bottom-up, grass-roots movement. One 
of the dangers the EU currently faces is that it is 
so closely tied to the Euro and to the laws gover-
ning the Single Market that any threat to the latter 
endangers the former. In short, we can disagree 
both about the project of European integration 
(what is its telos?) and the process of European inte-
gration (how much should we rely upon economic 
processes?)
So far as the telos of the European project is 
concerned, it is certainly possible to view Euro-
pean integration as a peace project. But peace as a 
normative value has some significant drawbacks. 
The trouble with peace is that it can be achieved at 
the price of independence and influence. Liechten-
stein is small, peaceful and without any influence 
in the wider world. Europe (whether measured in 
terms of the EU or the Council of Europe) has a 
258  The Single European Act of 1986 was primarily the 
creation of Mrs Thatcher’s neo-liberal trade expert, Arthur 




The modern history of Europe is a history of 
violent conflict and war. Wars of plunder and mili-
tary glory; wars of dynastic succession; religious 
wars; imperial wars; vastly destructive industrial 
wars; genocidal wars; wars that lasted one hundred 
years: Europe has seen them all. And then war 
stopped--at least on a large scale. One reason, 
although certainly not the only one, is European 
integration. The EU was initially envisaged by its 
Founding Fathers as a Peace Project in the tradi-
tion of Abbe de Saint Pierre and others (Bideleux, 
2012). The very structure of the EU – Council, 
Commission, Court, etc.— was taken over from 
the League of Nations, which Jean Monnet served 
in the inter-war period as Deputy Secretary 
General. Even the decision in the post-war era to 
focus the initial steps of European integration on 
a Coal and Steel agreement were done with a view 
to controlling the raw materials that might fuel 
a military arms race.  It’s certainly true that after 
the failure of the Pleven Plan and the European 
Defence Community in 1952, the history of Euro-
pean integration set in motion by the Schuman 
Plan (ratified in 1957 in the Treaty of Rome) has 
been primarily a history of economic integration. 
But it is important not to lose sight of this alter-
native track—call it the peace or security track—
which, even if it has played a secondary role, has 
never wholly disappeared and resurfaces in such 
institutions and policies as the European External 
Action Service, the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy, and even the Galileo Project.
From an analytical point of view, it is helpful to 
have available some categories that allow us to 
approach the EU as a contested project. People 
disagree about the importance—both historically 
and normatively—of the economic and peace or 
security tracks. Likewise, they disagree—again 
both historically and normatively—about the 
process by and through which the post-war project 
of European integration has (and can) come about. 
Some maintain that the point and purpose of the 
EU is and ought to be to produce a market-confor-
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security is perfectly sensible so far as it goes. But 
it doesn’t tell us enough about the form of secu-
rity worth possessing. Here I can do no more than 
stipulate a position that draws upon the type of 
security that people today enjoy in Europe. Euro-
pean security has, I think, five dimensions. We 
are only full secure when all five dimensions are 
present.
1. An individual is secure when he or 
she enjoys an adequate range of personal 
and political rights necessary for liberal 
democratic citizenship;
2. An individual is secure when he or 
she has the opportunity to acquire wealth 
(which I understand in the Smithian sense 
of “the necessaries and conveniences of 
life”) through the sale of his or her labour, 
skills, property, and/or products in a well-
ordered market economy;
3. An individual is secure, when he 
or she is guaranteed an adequate level of 
social welfare (including access to health 
care, housing, and pensions), which can 
be relied upon to compensate for the 
uncertain rewards of the market economy; 
4.  An individual is secure when he or she 
has adequate safeguards against violence, 
whether from individuals, criminal gangs, 
terrorists, officers of his or her own state, 
and foreign powers;
5. An individual is secure, only when 
he or she is not dependent on an arbitrary 
public or private power.    
This barebones account of security begs a lot of 
questions, including what counts as adequate in 
(1. ), (2.), (3.), and (4.). But probably the most 
controversial of these five dimensions is the last 
one. (5.) In some respects, this injunction against 
arbitrary power is merely a corollary of the first 
one (1). But (5.) goes a lot further than (1) in 
recognizing that an adequate range of domestic 
rights might itself prove insufficient protection 
against threats to security arising from internati-
population and GDP larger than the United States. 
For Europe to go the same way as Liechtenstein 
would be a betrayal of, what Max Weber had in 
mind, when he spoke of the responsibility of a 
great power (Weber 1994 [1916]).259
Embedded in the public culture and shared 
history of Europe—embedded in the lifeworld, 
as it were--is a conception of itself as one of the 
great world Civilizations, a repository of unmat-
ched culture and learning, a distinctive and most 
pleasing way of being in the world.  At the core of 
the European way of life lies a set of fundamental 
and universal values, which are nicely captured by 
Article 2 of the Treaty of European Union: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law, and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
I mention the idea of Europe as a Civilizational 
power that possesses a distinctive way of life not 
because I think that this settles anything norma-
tively, but because it provides the ideational 
framework that any justification for the project of 
European integration must incorporate—at least 
if it is to have any persuasive purchase. Partly for 
this reason, I think it is better to conceptualize the 
project of European integration less in terms of 
peace than in terms of security, which envisages 
an altogether more active role in the creation and 
maintenance of peaceful global relations.
Security is, as John Stuart Mill noted, the most 
fundamental and universal of all individual human 
interests. Without security, individuals can’t enjoy 
any other pleasure (Mill 1860). Mill’s claim about 
259  Weber was, of course, especially in this 
period, a German nationalist. It is, however, 
possible to reject the nationalist reasons Weber 
himself relied upon to justify Germany’s world 
historical role, while accepting that “good states” 
with the potential to become great powers ought 
to become so—especially if the alternative is for 
“bad states” to be the only great powers in the 
international system. For a discussion of this 
point, see (Morgan 2018b).  
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is roughly equivalent to a US Constitution that 
would allow the 50 state governors the right to 
veto US foreign and defence policy.
If the EU is to provide Europeans with an adequate 
level of security, the EU needs to acquire greater 
state capacity.  This is no easy task. I conclude 
this section with a couple of remarks about state 
capacity.  
The modern state—first conceptualized in the 
seventeenth century by Thomas Hobbes, albeit 
a long time before it actually existed in modern 
Europe—has two components that together 
constitute a form of impersonal public power: (i) 
a system of representation; and (ii) a system of 
administrative infrastructure. 
(i) The system of representation allows 
the modern state to legitimate itself by way 
of a myth that the people (the represented) 
are themselves the authors of everything 
the state does—it acts in their name. If a 
state cannot successfully deploy this myth, 
then it is in trouble. State capacity is thus 
partly a function of the ability to deploy 
the myth of popular representation.
(ii) The system of administrative 
infrastructure allows the state to structure 
the lives of the people that fall within 
its boundaries. An administrative 
infrastructure includes inter alia a public 
bureaucracy capable of extracting revenue, 
a system of laws and regulations, and some 
enforcement agencies.
Whether we are referring to (i) or (ii), the EU in its 
present form is weak—indeed, it is so weak that no 
one could sensibly describe the EU as a modern 
state (Morgan 2018a).  The EU’s system of repre-
sentation allows only for a mediated form of citi-
zenship. The EU Constitution recognizes as the 
EU’s component entities member states and indi-
viduals. We are members of the European Union, 
only insofar as we are citizens of a Member State. 
This point is further confirmed by the nature of 
civic identification within the EU. Most people in 
onal society (including foreign powers, whether 
enemies or allies.)   In other words, we need, as 
neo-Republicans like Philip Pettit argue, “a certain 
independence in relation to the state; … control of 
its doings in such a way that [we] are not unpro-
tected in relation to  imperium  or public power” 
(Pettit 2014, p.77). Yet, as Pettit and other neo-
republicans neglect to mention, it’s not just our 
own state that we need a certain independence 
from; we also need to avoid dependence upon 
foreign states—including our nominal allies who 
have very different agendas from our own, whose 
reliability is questionable, leadership erratic, and 
prone to swing wildly between isolationism and 
adventurism. 
Notwithstanding the underspecified account 
given here of security, I want to argue—or, so far 
as the present paper goes, stipulate—that a Euro-
pean polity (whether a Europe of nation-states, 
an Intergovernmental Europe, a more central-
ized Federal Europe) that provides security for 
its members thereby constitutes “a Good Polity;” 
conversely “a Bad Polity” fails to provide secu-
rity for its members. By the same token, I want to 
argue that members of a Good Polity have duties 
to each other to support and sustain the condi-
tions of security.    
One of the great weaknesses of the EU in its current 
form is that it lacks any capacity to play anything 
other than a subaltern role in international affairs. 
European states depend for their security on an 
asymmetrical military alliance funded largely by 
an increasingly reluctant United States. It is widely 
accepted that the European states need to spend 
a lot more on their defense capabilities. It is less 
widely noted that no matter how much money 
European states devote to this task, the EU is 
unlikely to be able to play much of an indepen-
dent role in global affairs without centralizing its 
foreign, security, and defense policy.  The Euro-
pean level of government is in charge of Europe’s 
Agricultural Policy, its Foreign External Trade 
Policy, and (at least for Eurozone countries) its 
Monetary Policy. Foreign and defense policy is 
largely decentralized to 27 member states. This 
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of economic growth, onwards and upwards, with 
no specific end in sight, fits this class perfectly.  If 
they speak about distribution, it is [al]most always 
in terms of trickle down.  The long–term result of 
this — which we already have in the United States 
— is a civil society awash in a meaningless consu-
merism of some kind.  I can’t believe that that is 
what you want. (Van Parijs, 2003; Morgan 2008).
Although expressed in a personal exchange of 
letters rather than as a considered philosophical 
position, Rawls’s judgement is fully compatible 
with the basic idea that the European Union—a 
Union of different nation-states—is one thing; the 
United States, a Federal Union, is another. The 
sting in this observation is the suggestion that 
if the EU were to move in a Federal direction—
to become, in short, a Federal Union--it would 
acquire the deficiencies, the forms of injustice, 
that we see in the United States.  Rawls’s claim here 
certainly does not exhaust the repertoire of those 
who allege EU’s injustice, whether actual or poten-
tial. But it’s an important argument—echoed in 
some respects by Wolfgang Streeck (Streeck 2015) 
and other Eurosceptics--and deserves a response.
Viewed more closely, Rawls’s argument about the 
EU seems to have not two things in mind-- the 
nation-state and the Federal Union--but four or 
even five different things:
• (i) the European nation-state as it now is; 
• (ii) the EU as it now is (call it an 
Intergovernmental Europe);
• (iii) the EU as Rawls fears it might become 
(call it a Bad Federal Europe);
• (iv) the US as a Federal Union (also Bad);
And lurking in the background—although not 
specifically mentioned by Rawls--there is:
• (v) A Good Federal Europe
The position that Rawls wishes to defend with 
respect to the EU might be elaborated as follows:
• (a) We owe duties of distributive justice only 
(or primarily) to fellow citizens (i.e. members 
of our nation-state);
most member states think of themselves first and 
foremost as nationals (French, German, Italian 
etc.) and only secondarily as Europeans. A lot 
could be said about the conditions conducive for 
greater form EU civic identification. But clearly 
one condition not conducive is a widespread belief 
that the EU in its present form is unjust. 
II
One of John Rawls’s most distinctive contribu-
tions to political theory is the argument that diffe-
rent principles of justice apply to different social 
and institutional arrangements (Ronzoni, 2009, 
Sangiovanni 2013). As Rawls put is, “the correct 
regulative principle for a thing depends on the 
nature of that thing (Rawls 1999, 25).” This basic 
idea forms one of the grounds of Rawls’s contro-
versial approach to global justice. We owe a lot 
more to our fellow citizens--indeed, we owe 
them duties of distributive justice—than we do 
to foreigners (no matter how poor they might 
be). Our thing is not, as it were, their thing. This 
position also helps explain Rawls’s surprisingly 
Eurosceptic position on the European Union. In 
a passage that CodeIs4500 might well have been 
proud to have authored himself, Rawls writes (in a 
letter to Philippe Van Parijs)
One question the Europeans should ask them-
selves, if I may hazard a suggestion, is how far–
reaching they want their union to be.  It seems to 
me that much would be lost if the European union 
became a federal union like the United States.  Here 
there is a common language of political discourse 
and a ready willingness to move from one state to 
another.  Isn’t there a conflict between a large free 
and open market comprising all of Europe and 
the individual nation-states, each with its separate 
political and social institutions, historical memo-
ries, and forms and traditions of social policy. 
Surely these are great value to the citizens of these 
countries and give meaning to their life.  The large 
open market including all of Europe is [the] aim 
of the large banks and the capitalist business class 
whose main goal is simply larger profit.  The idea 
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European level of governance, it might be 
argued that an Intergovernmental Europe 
is inherently flawed and beyond reform.  
Streeck (2014, 2015, 2016) comes close 
to holding this position. Many Brexiters 
draw the same conclusion. Yet rather than 
drawing the conclusion that the flaws of 
an Intergovernmental Europe justify a 
regression to a Europe of independent 
sovereign nation-states, it would be 
possible to accept the premise but draw 
the conclusion that an Intergovernmental 
Europe must be replaced by a Federal 
Europe—ideally a Good Federal Europe 
(g).  In other words, Eurosceptics and 
Federalists could find common cause in 
their misgivings about Intergovernmental 
Europe (whether actual or reformed), but 
hold very different views of the type of 
polity that ought to replace it. Federalists 
must then then find some way of denying 
(f) and (g).  Of course, the Federalist 
argument raises various difficult questions 
about feasibility.  But there is no obvious 
reason why Rawls must reject the very 
idea of a long-term progression towards 
a European level of government with the 
kinds of social interaction and cultural 
similarity sufficient to sustain duties of 
justice. Indeed, Rawls himself allows that 
“relations of affinity are not a fixed thing, 
but may continually grow stronger over 
time as people come to work together in 
cooperative institutions” (Rawls, 1999, 
112).261 
261 Although I can’t pursue the argument here in the length 
that it needs, a similar type of counterargument might be made 
against Sangiovanni’s rich and nuanced argument concerning 
the status of the current institutional arrangements of Europe 
(Sangiovanni 2013). Yes, it might be said, the EU in its present 
form sustains different kinds of social interactions. Yes, they 
are at present denser, richer, and so forth at the national rather 
than the European level. But there is no obvious reason why 
this current arrangement cannot (and ought not) change. If I 
am right about the non-sustainability of this current arrange-
ment; if, in other words, I am right to think that even a refor-
med Intergovernmental Europe is incompatible with security 
(as I have defined it), then it would be better to replace this 
type of Europe with (what I have called) a Good Federal Euro-
pe.
• (b) The European nation-state is good insofar 
as it sustains duties of justice;
And either 
• (c) The current Intergovernmental Europe 
is good, because it supports and sustains the 
good European nation-state (b);
Or
• (d)   A reformed Intergovernmental Europe is 
good, insofar as it can support and sustain the 
good European nation-state (b);260 
• (e) An Intergovernmental Europe—whether 
(c) or (d) -- is durable in the face of shifting 
global power relations;
• (f) Any attempt to turn an Intergovernmental 
Europe into a fully-fledged Federal Europe 
will lead to a Bad Federal Europe (i.e. a Europe 
where neither the nation-state nor the Federal 
level of government will be able to sustain 
duties of distributive justice).
• (g)   There is no realistic possibility of a Good 
Federal Europe (i.e. a Europe whose members 
sustain duties of justice).
If this argument were to go through, then Rawls 
would have a convincing argument against the 
project of European integration. 
There are, I think, four different (although not 
mutually exclusive) ways of responding to an 
argument of this type. 
Counterargument One—reject (a).  This is 
the move of liberal cosmopolitans (Caney 
2001, 2005). I do not discuss this move 
here. Instead I will assume that (a) is, for 
one reason or another, valid. I will also, for 
the sake of argument, accept (b)
Counterargument Two—reject (c) and (d). 
Against the claim that the EU in its present 
form either currently constitutes (or 
can be reformed to produce) a desirable 
balance between the nation-state and the 
260 This is the position, I think, that Sangiovanni (2013) 
defends. For him, the central task of a normative theory of the 
EU is to justify a fair distribution among member states of the 
collective goods that an Intergovernmental Europe produces.   
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this gap by assuming greater state capacity. 
This will likely entail a transition towards a 
more Federal Union. If my argument here 
is correct then we must reject the idea of an 
Intergovernmental Europe as a stable and 
secure place. We must by extension reject 
(c) and (d).
Counterargument Four -- reject (f) 
and (g). In rejecting (e), we are left 
with the dystopian possibility that an 
Intergovernmental Europe (whether 
actual or reformed) is unstable in the face 
of shifting global power relations and 
its alternative—some form of a Federal 
Union—is incapable of sustaining the 
duties of distributive justice to qualify it 
as a Good Federal Europe.  Are there any 
grounds to reject (f) and (g)?
This brings me to my (unfortunately rather incon-
clusive) concluding point.
A Federal European Union will mark a funda-
mentally different type of polity from the modern 
democratic nation-state. It will probably be as diffe-
rent from the nation-state as was the nation-state 
from the early modern dynastic kingdom. If we 
accept the Rawlsian argument that different types 
of political association have different regulatory 
principles, then we can infer that a Federal Euro-
pean Union will have different regulatory princi-
ples than the nation-state. I have argued in this 
paper that in order for a Federal European Union 
to account as a good polity is must guarantee its 
members security. Members of such a polity owe 
each other the duty to guarantee the conditions of 
security.  This duty will have distributive implica-
tions, but different distributive implications than 
within a nation-state. 
In the long transition to a Federal Europe—in all 
likelihood, a multigenerational project—Europe 
will experience many different challenges to the 
changes underway.  From the point of normative 
political theory, I doubt that any grand theory can 
be of much help here, not least because normative 
arguments need to be pitched at a level of comple-
Counterargument Three—reject (e).  An 
alternative route to the same conclusion 
reached in Counterargument Two is 
to focus attention on (e), the more 
or less unstated assumption that an 
Intergovernmental Europe is sustainable in 
the face of shifting global power relations. 
This assumption is highly debateable, not 
least because of some of the problems that 
Rawls’s own argument against European 
integration mentions.  The US is, in his 
account, a Bad Federal Union, which 
lacks a fair distribution of goods and is 
awash in “meaningless consumerism.”  If 
those terms exhausted its predicates, then 
Europe could ignore the United States. The 
trouble for Europe is that the United States 
is a hegemon, the bulwark of the global 
liberal order, and an asymmetrical supplier 
of Europe’s security.  More than this, the US 
variety of capitalism has deeply penetrated 
European societies, whose individual 
governments are relatively powerless 
whether in conflicts with the largest US 
tech. companies or the US state.262  The 
notion that individual European states can 
gain leverage against this concentrated 
form of power is a fallacy--call it the 
Brexiters’ fallacy. It is only by acting as a 
unitary actor--as happens when the EU’s 
Trade Commission acts--that Europeans 
have any leverage at all.   
The difficulty for an Intergovernmental 
Europe comes when the United States, its 
protector, becomes unwilling to supply 
the collective good of European security, 
a good for which the United States pays 
a disproportionate amount of the cost. I 
argued earlier that the EU could only fill 
262 One can gain some sense of the scale of Europe’s 
problem here, when one realizes that the market cap of the 
top four US internet companies (Google, Apple, Amazon, and 
Facebook) are roughly 3 trillion dollars—larger than every 
European member state other than Germany and 60 times 
greater than the combined value of Europe’s top four internet 
companies (Spotify, Adyen, Zalando, Asos).     
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xity not too far above the grasp of ordinary citi-
zens.  Among the different challenges that will 
likely need to be addressed are the following.
1. Some people contend that the 
European project embodies a distinctively 
liberal way of life hostile to traditional 
forms of religion and ethnic conceptions 
of belonging.
2. The challenge from people who seek 
to secede from a European member state 
or seek a form of representation within 
Federal Europe commensurate with that 
of a member state. We are already seeing 
demands of this sort, first in Scotland in 
2014 and more recently in Catalonia.
3. The challenge from people demanding 
restrictions on freedom of movement, 
both within Europe and from outside. 
This challenge raises the broader question 
of how far a Federal Europe based on the 
primary good of security must involve 
itself in the internal affairs of neighbouring 
countries in, say, Northern Africa and the 
Middle East. 
4.  The challenge from people who 
contend that the EU’s current economic 
architecture is unfair. In recent years, the 
central complaint of this nature has arisen 
in the context of the Eurozone Crisis.
5. A final challenge to consider concerns 
the range of acceptable ways that a Federal 
Europe might deploy its trade regulations. 
In the context of the Brexit debate, a 
common argument made by Brexiters is 
that the EU has “bullied” the UK and in 
its Withdrawal Agreement is imposing 
a range of so-called Level Playing Field 
Conditions that will reduce the UK to “a 
vassal state” (Morgan 2018b). 
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to provide the euro area with more fiscal policy 
competences cannot be separated from the ques-
tions of which institution(s) should exercise them. 
Secondly, the position of two large Member States 
(MS) – Germany and Italy – that are founding 
members of the EU and have followed all the steps 
of integration taken to date, is key to any attempt 
to reform the euro area. When dealing with EU 
reform proposals, the literature tends to focus on 
the contraposition between Germany and France. 
Thirdly, Germany and Italy are of particular 
interest because they developed a different reading 
of the euro crisis. The timeframe of the analysis 
goes from when the idea of an EMEF first emerged 
to the positions of the current German and Italian 
governments.
1. The Proposal for a 
European Minister of Economy 
and Finance
The EMU launched in the Maastricht Treaty (MT, 
1992) foresaw full delegation of monetary policy 
to the European Central Bank (ECB). No corre-
sponding supranational institution was estab-
lished for fiscal policy, which was kept in the hands 
of the MS. The new policy regime was thus born 
incomplete, because the euro area had – and still 
has – one single monetary policy and 19 different 
fiscal policies. The EU has only a small budget 
with comparatively few resources (De Feo 2017). 
Because of this, it is prevented from adopting 
counter-cyclical policies during times of crisis 
and, more generally, from fostering public goods 
that benefit all the MS. European institutions do 
not have the power or the means to exert a stabili-
sation function (De Grauwe 2014).
This is why it has repeatedly been argued that the 
EU needs to become a fiscal union.264 Fiscal unions 
can vary according to the tools and competences 
that are assigned to the centre. They can display 
different kinds of fiscal capacity. The fiscal power 
264  The term “union” refers to a certain relationship that 
territorial entities (usually states) establish among themselves 
on the basis of an agreement. Unions have a centre and some 
constitutive units (states).
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The following paper deals with the proposal to 
provide the EU with a European Minister for the 
Economy and Finance (EMEF). The EMEF is part 
of the long debate on granting the EU more powers 
on fiscal policy,263 thus aligning integration to the 
level that has been reached in monetary policy. To 
complete the economic side of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) raises the issue on which 
institution(s) should be involved in this process. 
The paper focuses on the proposal, put forward by 
the European Commission in December 2017, to 
create an EMEF.
The paper aims to answer two research questions: 
1) How to assess the Commission’s proposal for an 
EMEF?; and 2) What is the position of Germany 
and Italy on this proposal? The paper is divided 
as follows. The first section re-constructs when 
the discussion about an EMEF was first launched, 
which actors pushed it ahead, and how the 2017 
European Commission’s proposal finally came 
out. The second section presents the Commis-
sion’s proposal and the third section evaluates it. 
The fourth section analyses Germany’s position, 
while the fifth section does the same for Italy. The 
sixth section assesses the position of the two coun-
tries. The last section concludes.
There are at least three reasons why these research 
questions are important. Firstly, the debate on how 
263  For the sake of brevity, in the paper, I often use the ex-
pression “fiscal policy” to refer to “fiscal and budgetary policy”.
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member of the Commission (one of its Vice-pres-
idents) and the President of the Eurogroup. More-
over, he or she would have a second intergovern-
mental role as chair of the Board of Governors of 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).266
The Commission stressed that political account-
ability would be established between the EMEF 
and the European Parliament (EP). The EMEF 
would be subject to the same provisions foreseen 
for the Commission. Regarding appointment, 
starting with the 2014 EP elections, the Spitzen-
kandidaten267 system applies. The EP has to grant 
a vote of consent to the President of the Commis-
sion, to the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)268 
and to the other commissioners. After obtaining 
the consent, the European Council appoints the 
Commission by qualified majority (TEU, Art. 
17.7). As for dismissal, the EP can also approve269 
a motion of censure that forces the Commission as 
a whole, including the HR, to resign. The duty to 
resign also occurs by request of the Commission’s 
President (ibid., Art. 17.6c).
Accountability of the EMEF towards the EP would 
take place through so-called economic dialogues 
envisaged by EU legislation,270 which may also 
involve hearings in front of the EP. In addition 
to this, “national Parliaments could request the 
266  The ESM is an intergovernmental institution that 
grants financial assistance to MS in crisis provided they 
“implement tough reform programmes” (ESM.eu). Currently, 
the President of the Eurogroup chairs the ESM.
267  When proposing a candidate to the EP, the European 
Council must take into account the results of the EP elections. 
Every party presents its candidate for the role of President of 
the Commission. The European Council must then propose to 
the EP the candidate of the party that got most votes (seats).
268  The HR is Vice-President of the Commission.
269  In order to be approved, the motion of censure needs 
“a two-thirds of the votes cast, representing a majority of the 
component members of the European Parliament” (TFEU, Art. 
234).
270  The Six Pack (five regulations and one directive), 
approved in 2011, states that the EP can start an economic 
dialogue with other EU institutions (i.e. including single com-
missioners) on the prevention (Reg. 1174/2011), the surveil-
lance (Reg. 1175/2011) and the correction (Reg. 1176/2011) 
of excessive macroeconomic imbalances. The EMEF would 
interact on a regular basis not only with the EP but also with 
national Parliaments.
of the centre may consist in regulating the fiscal 
policy of the units (as is the case of the EU) or in 
managing a budget made up of own resources.
Here is where the debate on the EMEF comes in. 
The rationale is to create an institution that could 
manage the EU budget in a more efficient way. The 
proposal for an EMEF goes hand in hand with the 
reform of the EU budget. The debate on an EMEF 
gained momentum with the so-called “Five Presi-
dent’s Report” in 2015, in which the Commission 
called for a stronger president of the Eurogroup, 
taking into account the possibility of making him 
or her a full-time president with a clear mandate, 
inter alia representing the euro area on the global 
stage (European Commission 2015).
In May 2017, the Commission published a “Reflec-
tion Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and 
Monetary Union”. It discussed the possibility of a 
“full-time permanent chair” (European Commis-
sion 2017a: 27) of the Eurogroup and of merging it 
with the Commissioner for Economic and Mone-
tary Affairs and the euro. The paper then deals with 
a euro area Treasury that “could be placed under 
the responsibility of an EU Finance Minister, who 
would also be Chair of the Eurogroup/ECOFIN” 
(ibid., p. 28).
The debate around the EMEF intensified in 2017, 
and in December the Commission put its first 
proposal into concrete terms.
2. The Commission’s Proposal 
for an EMEF
On 6 December 2017, the Commission outlined 
the rationale, the appointment and the tasks of the 
EMEF (European Commission 2017b). First and 
foremost, it specified that the creation of the EMEF 
would not require amendments to the European 
treaties. The treaties already allow the Eurogroup 
to elect a president.265 The EMEF would be both a 
265  See Art. 2 of the Protocol Nr. 14 on the Eurogroup. 
This has been interpreted as if the president should be elected 
among its members, i.e. should be a national minister of 
finance. However, according to the Commission, this is part of 
the informally agreed working methods of the institution and 
could be changed by simple majority.
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The merger between the figure of Vice-President 
of the Commission and President of the Euro-
group is meant to assure the organic represen-
tation of the euro area and the EU (European 
Commission 2017b). But are the interests of euro 
and non-euro area countries always coinciding? 
Not necessarily. If there is a conflict of interest, it 
might not be easy for the EMEF to mediate. To 
this, one has to add his or her role as chair of the 
board of Governors of the EMF, which is to say 
that he or she has to reconcile differences between 
the MS on crucial decisions regarding financial 
assistance programmes.
As Xanthoulis (2018) underlines, the EMEF is not 
accompanied by an extension of EU competences 
nor does it transfer of new ones from national 
to EU level. Hence, from a legal point of view, 
the European treaties seems not to stand in the 
way of the Commission’s proposal. The fact that 
the Commission’s proposal passed the legal test 
does not mean that it will also stand the political 
one. The person elected as Vice-President of the 
Commission might not be the same that is elected 
as President of the Eurogroup. Each electing insti-
tution might have a veto power depending on 
who first completes the selection/election process: 
in the former case, it is the Council, in agree-
ment with the President-elect of the Commis-
sion regarding the appointment, the EP regarding 
approval; in the latter case, the national finance 
ministers sitting in the Eurogroup.
The Commission proposed the EMEF as a step 
towards deepening integration after the euro 
crisis. But what this crisis has proved is that the 
MS have different perspectives on what they want 
from the EU. Some are willing to go further into 
the process of integration. Others want to partici-
pate only in the single market (Fabbrini 2015). The 
way the EMEF is designed does not consider the 
different perspectives. It follows a one-size-fits-all 
approach. Although it differentiates between the 
euro area and the EU as a whole, this distinction 
is not adequately reflected in the tasks assigned to 
the EMEF. It is not clear how the EMEF will be 
able to identify a general interest that fits both the 
euro area and the non-euro area Member States.
Minister to present the Commission opinion on 
the respective Draft Budgetary Plan to them” 
(European Commission 2017b: 7).
As the EMEF would be part of both a supranational 
and an intergovernmental institution, he or she 
would have a number of tasks. The first would be 
to represent the common interests of the EU and 
the euro area. Secondly, the EMEF could support 
economic policy co-ordination between the MS 
and the EU institutions, particularly the Commis-
sion. It could oversee the implementation of the 
existing economic, fiscal and financial rules. This 
entails close co-operation with national authori-
ties and the EP, with the view to promote reforms 
in the MS. Thirdly, the EMEF could lay down 
fiscal policy decisions to support and complement 
monetary policy by the ECB, working to “find a 
balance between the fiscal interests of the Member 
States and the best solution for the euro area as 
a whole” (ibid., p. 4). This also includes co-ordi-
nating the “surveillance of Member States’ fiscal 
policies, ensuring fiscal sustainability and applying 
the Stability and Growth Pact […]” (ibid., p. 4). 
Finally, he or she could oversee the EU and euro 
area budgetary instruments (European Commis-
sion 2017b: 7).
3. Assessing the 
Commission’s Proposal
This section assesses the Commission’s proposal 
with the aim of identifying potential drawbacks. 
Fromage (2018) argues that the three different 
roles of the EMEF (Vice-President of the Commis-
sion, President of the Eurogroup, and chair of 
the ESM Board of Governors) would limit his 
or her accountability towards the EP. According 
to Xanthoulis (2018), the powers of the EMEF 
are not clearly specified. Most importantly, “the 
Minister appears not to have authority to adopt 
decisions, formulate policy or enforce rules” 
(ibid., p. 10). Concerning external representation, 
the EMEF would probably have to divide this task 
with the existing actors that already exert it, i.e., 
the Commission and the European Council.
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But the Commission’s proposal assigns him or 
her the task of co-ordinating “the use of relevant 
EU and euro area budgetary instruments and 
maximis[ing] their impact in support of shared 
priorities” (European Commission 2017b: 5). 
This sentence is quite vague and does not seem to 
imply real budgetary decision-making powers of 
the EMEF. In sum, the EMEF does not prove able 
to solve the situation of “representation without 
taxation” that currently applies to the EU.
4. Germany’s Position on the 
EMEF
The following section re-constructs the German 
position on the EMEF. Since the beginning of 
the euro crisis, Germany has showed “fear of 
provoking moral hazard and lowering incentives 
for reforms” (Schwarzer 2018: 50). It has managed 
to make sure that financial assistance is condi-
tional on domestic structural reforms.
The German position on the EMEF emerged only 
recently, when the issue entered the debate. In 
order to infer this position, it is useful to look at 
the traditional stances of the country towards the 
EMU. The 2013 coalition agreement states that the 
allocation of competences in the EMU must follow 
the principle that the level (EU or national) that 
takes decisions must also bear the responsibility 
for them (Koalitionsvertrag 2013). The document 
is clear in stating that “national budgetary respon-
sibility and supranational, shared liability are 
irreconcilable” (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2014: 
103).
The then Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, 
and the President of the German Bundesbank, 
Jens Weidmann, argued that establishing a fiscal 
union was a viable integration process because it 
would mean that decisions in and responsibility 
for fiscal policy rests at EU level. However, this 
implies national transfer of this competence to 
the EU. The EU could then intervene in national 
fiscal policy and the MS would ultimately have 
to comply with European decisions. The alterna-
tive would be to maintain national responsibility 
On the one hand, the EMEF might be under polit-
ical pressure by national finance ministers in the 
Eurogroup. This is true particularly with regard 
to the stronger (creditor) MS. On the other hand, 
the President of the Commission could force the 
EMEF to resign individually, while the EP could 
dismiss him or her together with the whole College 
of Commissioners. Formally, the Eurogroup does 
not have this power. It could exert it only through 
political pressure. However, in this case, the 
President of the Commission and the EP might 
not agree. As for the appointment, also for the 
dismissal there will always need to be consensus 
between the intergovernmental and the suprana-
tional side. But this cannot be taken for granted.
The role of the EMEF in assuring compliance with 
the SGP would be crucial, in particular within 
the framework of the excessive deficit proce-
dure (EDP). How the function of overseeing and 
co-ordinating this procedure could be carried out 
by the EMEP is not clear. Since he or she has a 
linkage to both institutions involved, but the final 
decision in the EDP is political, he or she might 
end up aligning with the relevant actors and find 
it difficult to bring in his or her own position. In 
sum, it is unclear how the EMEF will be able to 
move between different countries and different 
institutions.
The proposal for an EMEF is not able to enhance 
the EMU’s fiscal capacity towards a complete (i.e. 
political) union significantly. It must be accom-
panied by an increase in the EU’s own resources. 
However, it seems unlikely that this process will 
happen soon, considering the strong resistance 
in some of the MS. A transfer of more resources 
to EU level also opens the door to a transfer of 
further competences. In the light of the different 
preferences that the MS have on the integration 
process, only some countries, if any, might agree. 
But this would show the limitations of an EMEF 
that should represent both the euro area and the 
non-euro area countries.
The EMEF would have a sufficient degree of legit-
imacy for playing a role in budgetary decisions. 
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national central bank272 and the Federal Constitu-
tional Court.273
5. Italy’s position on the 
EMEF
The following section re-constructs the Italian 
position on the EMEF. As for Germany, Italy’s 
position on the EMEF can be inferred from the 
country’s more general position on the reform of 
the euro area governance. In turn, this position is 
also influenced by the country’s reading of the euro 
crisis. Italy has interpreted the crisis as a being 
caused by abrupt speculative attacks of financial 
markets. This is why the key aspects of its stance 
are greater solidarity and risk-sharing at EU level. 
Increasing the EU budget to promote investments, 
to support domestic reforms and to absorb asym-
metric shocks would probably find the support 
of any Italian government (right-wing, left-wing, 
technocratic or populist) (Jones 2018).
In the 2016 document “A Shared European Policy 
Strategy for Growth, Jobs, and Stability”, the 
Italian government called for a finance minister 
for the euro area, who should adopt an aggregate 
fiscal policy and manage the European budget 
(IAI 2016). Managing the budget would primarily 
mean creating public goods.274 The budget should 
result in a “fiscal capacity based on specific revenue 
sources as well as a mutualized funding mecha-
nism which could entail issuance of common 
bonds”275 (MEF 2016b: 6). The Italian proposal 
does not assign the role of supervising European 
fiscal rules to the EMEF.
The EMEF should have a political mandate and 
should be accountable to EU citizens. He or she 
272  See, for instance, Weidmann (2014) and Weidmann 
(2018).
273  See, for instance, the Lisbon Treaty judgement (2009) 
and the ESM/Fiscal Compact judgement (2012). 
274  Reference is made to “borders, security, large scale 
investments, defence” (MEF 2016b). 
275  This is considered the most “visible and constrain-
ing commitment that can convince the markets that member 
countries are serious about the future of the euro” (De Grauwe 
2014: 224). 
for fiscal policy and strengthen the existing set of 
rules (Der Spiegel 2012 and Weidmann 2015). 
Germany’s stance in the first years of the euro 
crisis was marked by doubts and uncertainty. 
Actually, the country “did not, for instance, 
provide any answer or devise an ensuing initia-
tive to the Four Presidents’ Report of 2012 […] or 
the Five Presidents’ Report of 2015” (Schwarzer 
2018: 51). Angela Merkel is not against an EMEF. 
She underlined that the question is which compe-
tences he or she would have, how he or she would 
be appointed, how his or her relationship with the 
other institutions and the MS would be regulated, 
etc. (Bundeskanzlerin 2017).
The 2018 coalition agreement again takes up 
the traditional view of the country. EMU should 
(continue to) work through a linkage between 
risk (in the sense of control over competences) 
and liability (Haftungsverantwortung, Coalition 
agreement 2018: 9). The document suggests that 
Germany will also apply its rule-based approach 
to EMU with regard to the EMEF. It is in favour 
of an EMEF that controls and supervises MS 
compliance with the rules of the SGP (Schwarzer 
2018). In particular, it wants him or her to have 
an apolitical role, focusing on the enforcement of 
the existing regulatory framework.271 The govern-
ment is not likely to support the part of the 
Commission’s proposal that foresees the EMEF’s 
use of budgetary resources for countering asym-
metrical shocks. The concern that EMU could 
move from a stability union (Stabilitätsunion) to 
a transfer union (Transferunion) is deeply rooted 
in the Germane élite (see, for instance, Fuest 2018, 
and König 2018). Both before and during the 
euro crisis, this concern has been shared by the 
271  Germany criticises the EDP as being too political 
because, although the process starts following a Commission’s 
recommendation, it is the Council that takes the final decision 
(Schwarzer 2018). During the euro crisis, attempts to depoliti-
cise the EDP led to the adoption of so-called “reverse qualified 
majority voting” (RQMV): If, within 10 days, the Council does 
not reject or amend the Commission’s recommendation by 
RQMV, the latter is “deemed to be adopted” (Reg. 1173/2011, 
Art. 4.2).
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With regard to Germany, the analysis has outlined 
that its stance towards the EMEF is connected 
with the country’s traditional attitude towards 
EMU. Emphasis is placed on risk reduction, crisis 
prevention, and solidarity through condition-
ality (i.e., in exchange for structural reform). In 
Germany, the debate is centred on the compe-
tences that the EMEF should have. In Italy, it is 
centred on the policies that he or /she could adopt, 
particularly with regard to the provision of public 
goods.
Germany would support the EMEF if he or she 
were to supervise and enforce fiscal rules. The aim 
is to depoliticise the surveillance of national fiscal 
policies. The EMEF should primarily be account-
able to the German Parliament. The centrality of 
the Bundestag in fiscal and budgetary policies has 
repeatedly been stated by the German Constitu-
tional Court. The stress on fiscal regulation and 
supervision (EDP) also implies that Germany 
would prefer to reform the economic governance 
of the EU as a whole, rather than deal separately 
with the euro area.
In contrast to Germany, Italy has different priori-
ties: risk sharing, crisis mitigation, and solidarity 
in the face of financial turmoil, with less or no 
emphasis on conditionality. The Italian proposals 
for the EMEF are referred to the euro area. The 
idea is that this group of states would be willing 
to accept institutional reforms because they have 
already reached a certain degree of integration.
The proposal is centred on the policies that the 
EMEF could contribute to adopt. Italy wants 
the EMEF to have some discretionary power in 
deciding how to spend EU resources. The aim is to 
politicise this figure with regard to spending deci-
sions. No reference is made to his or her role of 
supervisor of fiscal rules. The EMEF should relate 
to national parliaments but its main accountability 
should be to the EP.
Interestingly, neither of the two strictly opposes 
further delegation of competences on economic 
and fiscal policy to the EU. Germany calls for 
what has been defined a “surveillance model” 
(Hinarejos 2013: 1634). The Member States hold 
should be a member of the Commission and have 
“a strong link with both the European Parliament 
and Council” (MEF 2016b: 3). The proposal sees 
the EMEF as chair of the Eurogroup. Institution-
ally, it would be similar to the High Representa-
tive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, even 
though no reference is made to an administrative 
structure as is the case of the EEAS for the HR. 
The Italian Minister of Finance and Economy, Pier 
Carlo Padoan, endorsed the EMEF because the 
EU needs institutional improvement (Il Sole 24 
Ore 2017). 
As for Germany, the position in Italy of the 
national central bank (Banca d’Italia) was also in 
line with the government: its governor, Ignazio 
Visco, argued that an EMEF would have to manage 
common resources and tools that would differ-
entiate him or her from the Commission. The 
EMEF should not only vouch for the rules, but 
also politically interpret them. He or she should 
manage a common budget, acting as counterparty 
to the monetary policy of the ECB (Economia.rai.
it 2016).
After political elections held on 4 March 2018, the 
Five Star Movement and the League signed a coali-
tion agreement. As in the German coalition agree-
ment, there is no explicit mention of the EMEF. 
As far as the EU budget is concerned, the parties 
state that it has to be renegotiated in order to 
make it compatible with the coalition agreement. 
The most important part is where Five Star Move-
ment and League affirm that European economic 
governance has to be changed, together with the 
other MS. In particular, amendments should be 
introduced to monetary policy, the SGP, the Fiscal 
Compact, the ESM and the EDP (Contract for a 
Government of Change 2018).
6. Germany’s and Italy’s 
Position on the EMEF 
Compared: An Assessment
The last section compares the position of the two 
countries on the EMEF and tries to see whether 
at least a common denominator can be identified 
between them.
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ferring to him or her liability for decisions taken at 
national level. For example, he or she could decide 
to spend EU money to make up for the effects of 
(profligate) national fiscal policies. This would be 
equal to a decoupling of control and liability. In 
the German view, it entails the risk that the EMEF 
would use common EU resources to compensate 
for fiscally irresponsible decisions of the MS.
This is why, for Germany, the EMEF should only 
perform supervisory tasks. The Italian proposal, 
which is focused on public goods, does not take this 
“either/or” position between the levels to which a 
certain competence is assigned. By dividing fiscal 
policy competence according to the type of goods 
to be produced, the proposal also implies that part 
of this competence continues to be exercised at 
national level. Currently, the MS are not ready to 
transfer fiscal policy competences fully to the EU. 
Hence, in the German view, as long as they main-
tain control of their fiscal policy, they have to be 
liable for it. If competences and political discre-
tion moved to the EU level, this would imply that 
the MS have given them up.
Clearly, the German ordoliberal attitude is missing 
in Italy. The debate over decoupling liability and 
control does not play the same role in that country.
Conclusions
This paper has analysed the proposal for an EMEF 
presented by the Commission on 6 December 
2017.
The EMEF would be President of the Eurogroup 
and Vice President of the Commission. He or she 
would have four main tasks: 1) external economic 
representation (euro area/EU); 2) policy co-ordi-
nation and supervision of fiscal rules (euro area/
EU); 3) fiscal policy decisions (euro area); and 4) 
the overseeing of budgetary instruments (euro 
area/EU). The EMEF would be accountable to the 
EP.
While this would not raise legal problems, from 
a political point of view, there are some critical 
aspects. To perform three different roles (President 
fiscal policy competence while the EU has regu-
latory power (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2015): 
it enforces a number of legal rules aimed at 
constraining the fiscal policy discretion of the MS. 
Italy calls for a “classic fiscal federalism model” 
(Hinarejos 2013: 1635). Here, both the EU and the 
MS retain fiscal policy competence with taxing 
and spending powers, but in different realms. The 
EU would retain this competence for the creation 
of public goods, which is precisely what the Italian 
proposal states. The MS would keep fiscal compe-
tence on those policies/goods that they can better 
deliver themselves.
The dividing line between the two countries is 
clearly visible in Schäuble’s “Non-paper for paving 
the way towards a Stability Union”: “we must keep 
fiscal responsibility and control together, to avoid 
moral hazard” (Schäuble 2017: 1). In the German 
view, this is the position that applies to any transfer 
of competences to the European level. If the actor 
that takes decisions is not the same person who is 
liable for those decisions, the risk of moral hazard 
emerges. Why is this position so deeply rooted 
in Germany? Because it belongs to the German 
ordoliberal tradition.276
The above-mentioned models – surveillance and 
fiscal federalism – do not fully take account of 
Germany’s approach to the EMEF. More precisely, 
what the country follows is a model that one could 
define competence-liability. Germany would 
agree to an EMEF equipped with regulatory 
and spending budgetary powers only if the MS 
accepted to transfer fiscal sovereignty completely 
to the EU beforehand.277 If this were not the case, 
granting the EMEF the power to make use of 
resources from the EU budget would mean trans-
276  The basic idea can be found in Walther Eucken’s book 
The Principles of Economic Policy (1952/04). According to 
the so-called liability principle (Eucken 1952/04), who takes 
advantage of something, must also bear the costs (Wer den 
Nutzen hat, muß auch den Schaden tragen, Eucken 2004: 279). 
From this stems that who is responsible for an action, is also 
liable for it. The rationale is that this should foster prudent 
decisions. Ordoliberalism is against any decoupling of control 
from liability. In the EMU control and liability are at national 
level for economic and fiscal policy and at European level for 
monetary policy. The no-bailout clause makes sure that this 
situation remains unchanged. 
277  This would also imply that the EU could intervene in 
national budgets. 
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hand. As long as the MS want to retain compe-
tence, they must continue to be liable for the 
consequences of their decisions. If the EMEF were 
allowed to use political discretion with regard to 
the EU budget, he or she would be liable for what 
MS have done at national level. The model that the 
country supports can more properly be defined as 
competence-liability.
The German attitude represents a hindrance to the 
establishment of the EMEF. Completing the EMU 
can and will not happen overnight. Particular 
attention has to be given to the composition of the 
EU budget. The EMEF and the reform of the EU 
budget must go hand in hand. Because of this, it 
should also not be faced through an all-or-nothing 
approach. The focus should be on those parts of 
fiscal policy where the MS might be willing to give 
up competences.
That would be as easy as the process would serve 
the creation of European public goods. Following 
a step-by-step approach would perhaps make it 
possible also to preserve the link between the level 
(EU or MS) that takes decisions and the level (EU 
or MS) that is responsible for the consequences of 
those decisions. By doing so, Germany and Italy 
would overcome what is currently the deepest 
discrepancy in their positions towards the EMEF.
of the Eurogroup, Vice-President of the Commis-
sion, and also chair of the Board of Governors of 
the EMF) would not be easy to combine. One the 
one hand, the EMEF might be subject to pressure 
from the supranational or, more probably, from 
the intergovernmental side of his or her role. On 
the other hand, the fact that his or her tasks are not 
clearly specified further complicates this point. By 
making the EMEF the representative of the euro 
area and the EU as a whole, the proposal does 
not take clearly into consideration the different 
perspectives that have emerged on the integration 
process. Last, but not least, it is doubtful whether 
it could really contribute to complete the EMU. 
In the absence of a larger EU budget that he or 
she can somehow control, an EMEF with no clear 
defined powers risks undermining the potential of 
the reform.
Germany’s position on the EMEF is in line with its 
traditional approach to EMU. The EMEF is seen 
as an institution that should primarily supervise 
and enforce fiscal rules, with the aim of (further) 
depoliticising the SGP and the EDP. The country 
supports a surveillance model. In contrast, Italy 
sees the EMEF as an institution that should manage 
a (larger) EU budget in order to face EU-wide 
asymmetric shocks. The focus is not primarily 
on the EMEF as the watchdog of the regulatory 
framework. The country supports a classical fiscal 
federalism model.
Although, in principle, both Germany and Italy 
would accept further transfers of economic and 
fiscal competence to the EU, the real discrepancy 
between them seems to be the relationship between 
the level (national or European) that takes deci-
sions and the level (again national or European) 
that bears responsibility for these decisions. The 
relationship between control and liability, which is 
part of the German ordoliberal tradition, is a red 
line for the country, whereas it does not have the 
same importance in Italy.
Germany would support an EMEF responsible for 
European fiscal policy only if competence on this 
policy were entirely transferred to EU level before-
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Italian economies as they functioned under the 
drachma or lira. Likewise, Brexit shows that it is 
very difficult for a Member state to disentangle 
itself from the EU order and certainly costlier than 
staying out altogether – or having stayed out in 
the first place rather than joining and then exiting 
altogether.  As aptly noted by Bauböck, ‘the Euro-
pean Union has become in this – prosaic and not 
at all romantic – sense a community of destiny’ 
(2017, p.33).
Yet, precisely because causal dynamics inter-
sect in complex and chaotic ways, the European 
Union remains vulnerable to collapse, as each 
crisis becomes exponentially more difficult to 
disarm. In complex systems, nonequilibrium is 
the norm rather than the exception. Steering a 
complex adaptive system like the European Union 
is thus difficult and demanding: a change in the 
policy making mindset is required. Complex 
systems should focus on resilience, i.e. the capa-
city to adapt to external and internal shocks even 
under severe adversity. Contrary to mainstream 
economics and economic policy - emphasizing 
equilibrium, determinacy, rule-based deductions 
- complexity economics recommends ‘putting 
carefully thought-out controls in place’ in order to 
safeguard a systemic resilience based on heteroge-
neity and dynamic adaptation. 
Conceiving the EU as a CAS allows us to better 
diagnose a prime root of the existential crisis, 
namely the misalignment between its irreducible 
properties and its authority structure.  The latter 
is today  unsuited to steer the EU qua complex 
system as it lacks adequate instruments for addres-
sing the common risks generated by integration as 
such, as well as the negative externalities arising 
from democratic interdependencies. These flaws 
make polity maintenance an extremely difficult 
task, continuously exposed to the risk of existen-
tial failure. 
EMU is still largely steered within the traditional 
frame of ‘methodological nationalism’, i.e. treating 
the Member States and their political economies 
as intrinsically self-determined units. But this 
summation logic can no longer serve as an effec-
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The very existence of the European Union is today 
under attack by an increasingly virulent Euroscep-
ticism. In our view, the prime root of this “deep” 
political crisis  is the sharp misalignment between 
the new nature of the EU after the establishment 
of  EMU, its authority structure, and the norma-
tive order which underpins cooperation and the 
“sharing code”  among the member states. Dange-
rous centrifugal forces feed on the apparent lack 
of awareness among national and European poli-
ticians about  the “deep” causes of prolonged insta-
bility and existential threats. Yet survey evidence 
signals that a “silent majority” would be potenti-
ally available to support a far-sighted project of 
institutional reforms and of solidarization of the 
EU. 
EMU as a complex adaptive 
system without adequate 
steering
EMU has produced an unprecedented fusion of 
national economies by bringing to completion the 
single market and introducing a common currency. 
When the degree of interconnection and the pres-
sures to mutual adjustment among the parts of a 
collective goes beyond (or is made to go beyond, as 
with the formal establishment of EMU) a critical 
level, such collective becomes a complex adaptive 
system (CAS). This is the key notion of comple-
xity theory. The emergent properties of a CAS are 
not merely causally active but become irreducible 
and irreversible. Irreducibility means that it is 
virtually impossible to disentangle systemic from 
sub-systemic causal dynamics: systemic proper-
ties are non-localizable and non-aggregative. Irre-
versibility means that initial conditions cannot be 
reconstituted via decomposition. The breakup of 
the euro (strongly advocated by some Eurosceptic 
parties) would not bring back to life the Greek or 
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A faulty moral order
Aligning the fact of EMU-induced  “fusion”  in the 
economic and monetary spheres with an authority 
structure capable of effective functional steering 
and polity maintenance requires the mediation of 
an adequate symbolic framework or, more preci-
sely, a ‘moral order’. Moral orders are sets of prin-
ciples defining ‘what is proper to do and reaso-
nable to expect’ (Wuthnow, 1989, p. 14) in asso-
ciational relationships, accompanied by clear 
normative criteria ‘by which people and their acti-
vities are valued’ (Harré, 1987, p. 219). In the poli-
tical sphere, a key component of the moral order 
are principles and criteria about sharing, i.e. what 
- and why- the members of the collectivity owe to 
each other. A certain degree of adequacy between 
such norms and the facts of socio-economic 
cooperation and institutionalized “togetherness” 
must obtain in order to buffer legitimation dyna-
mics. 
Togetherness evokes ideas such as continuity and 
compactness: in a word, solidarity (from the Latin 
term solidus, which refers to ‘a firm and compact 
body’). Solidarity is a contested concept, but its 
prime meaning is relatively straightforward: it 
connotes, precisely, the set of feelings of belon-
ging together, which supports attitudes of mutual 
acceptance, cooperation and support. Solidarity in 
this sense is partially grounded on the interest in 
the integrity of a shared form of life that includes 
one’s own well-being, which gradually becomes 
ethically charged and turns into a moral commu-
nity, whose members feel ‘co-responsible’ for the 
actions and desires, faults and merits of each other. 
The early architects of the EU were aware that 
economic integration required a solidaristic 
ethos to activate mutual feelings of community 
and sustain EU integration. The Thomson Report 
prepared with the view of establishing the Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund (set up in 
1975), stated in turn that a harmonious develop-
ment of the Community as a whole was a ‘moral 
and human requirement’: without sustaining local 
communities, the ‘idea of European unity’ would 
be doomed to ‘disenchantment’. In 1977, the Euro-
tive compass (let alone as the only compass) for 
making policy choices and, even prior to that, for 
arriving at correct causal imputations. Public poli-
cies always suffer from interaction effects which 
are difficult to disentangle. Yet, with the advent of 
EMU, interaction effects have grown exponenti-
ally: local outcomes have multiple roots and some 
of them are not local, but systemic.  It must also be 
noted that interaction effects also result from hori-
zontal ‘democratic externalities’ (Nicolaïdis, 2013, 
p. 351). Domestic leaders face problems for their 
own demos which are the consequence - some-
times quite visibly - of other EU demoi’s deci-
sions and policies (Cheneval and Nicolaidis, 2016) 
and, in turn, adopt solutions that are very likely 
to generate cross-border effects (Bellamy, 2013, 
p. 505). National self-determination is obviously 
still possible and can make a great difference in 
terms of functional performance. But in a growing 
number of sectors, the separation of responsibi-
lities between supranational, transnational and 
national actions and dynamics has turned into a 
difficult balancing act, subject to major epistemic 
constraints (after a point, we just cannot know).
A second root of inadequacy is that this delicate 
balancing act is largely performed by non-majori-
tarian institutions, entrusted with the task of iden-
tifying and applying rules and technical formulas 
for steering national fiscal policies (Chalmers 
et al., 2016). The belatedly acknowledged chal-
lenge of interdependence has been met, in other 
words, by adopting a technocratic mode of gover-
nance based on strict surveillance, discipline and 
sanctions and aimed at an ever-closer top-down 
harmonization of the standards and practices of 
Member States.
The institutional reforms adopted during the 
euro-crisis have not only proved ineffective in 
terms of outcomes but have also been eroding 
the necessary conditions for polity maintenance, 
unleashing the demons of populism and pushing 
them into attacking the EU as such: for its lack of 
democratic representation, its constraining rules 
on budgetary decisions and its erosion of territo-
rial sovereignty and border controls (Hutter et al., 
2016; Kriesi et al., 2012).




The difficulty of further strengthening and solida-
rizing the EU is often imputed to the shift from 
‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’ 
on the side of national constituencies (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2009). No common identity, no 
demos, no electoral room for a political union, let 
alone a Transfer Union: this is the prevailing line 
of the reasoning. But can we confidently say that 
domestic public opinions share this unsolidaristic 
ethos? 
A survey we recently conducted has provided 
surprisingly hopeful results (Ferrera and Pelle-
gata, 2017). We asked 9326 respondents in six 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden) to investigate their disposition to support 
a solidarization of Europe. First, we tested what 
kind of symbolic image citizens associate to the 
EU. Four different metaphors were proposed 
by the survey: 1) the EU as the ‘common home’ 
of all European citizens; 2) the EU as an ‘apart-
ment building’ in which national peoples, with 
legitimate diversities, live next to each other; 3) a 
‘playground’ (a commons) that facilitates mutually 
beneficial economic exchanges; 4) a ‘sinking ship’ 
from which Member States should escape as fast 
as they can – the Eurosceptic view. The preferred 
image turned out to be the apartment building 
(30.1%), followed by the playground (26.0%), the 
common home (23.8%) and, finally, the sinking 
ship (20.3%).
The survey also asked more concrete questions 
about possible EU policies inspired by pan-Eu-
ropean solidarity norms. Almost all respondents 
(89.1%) agreed that the EU should ensure that no 
citizen remain without means of subsistence. In 
addition, more than three respondents out of four 
were in favour of a specific EU funded scheme to 
fight poverty. 
One may object that people may be in favour of 
solidarity, but they are not really willing to pay for 
it. Yet, 77% of respondents were in favour of an 
pean Commission appointed a high-level working 
group on the budgetary implications of EMU, 
chaired by Donald MacDougall. The final report 
suggested that a future ‘Federation in Europe’ 
should in principle adopt a public budget of 
‘around 20-25% of aggregate GDP, as in the U.S.A. 
and the Federal Republic of Germany’, although 
MacDougall considered 5-7% a more realistic 
figure in the beginning (as it is known, the EU 
budget today only amounts to ca. 1% of aggregate 
GDP). The Report proposed a Community Unem-
ployment Fund to cushion temporary setbacks, 
a budget equalization scheme for weak member 
states up to 65% of the average fiscal capacity, and 
a ‘conjunctural convergence facility’ to counteract 
cyclical crises (MacDougall, 1977, pp. 12–13). It 
was through this sequence of initiatives that the 
‘social dimension’ of integration made its silent, 
but tangible appearance within the EU symbolic 
and institutional framework and that the value of 
solidarity – in particular inter-territorial solidarity 
– came to be a part and parcel of the European 
‘ethos’. 
Contrast this early sensitivity with the current 
predicament. The transition towards a ‘Union of 
national adjustments’ is a dramatic change of para-
digm in both descriptive and prescriptive terms. 
The new outlook assumes that the EMU frame-
work - as currently configured - is essentially well 
designed and that structural adjustment is funda-
mentally a matter of homework and rule compli-
ance. The derogatory connotation attributed to the 
idea of a Transfer Union in Brussels and in various 
Northern capitals testifies to this anti-solidaristic 
drift of the EU value framework, especially for 
the Eurozone. The ‘myth of the beggar’, the idea 
that solidarity would prevent market pressure and 
remove incentives to reform has rapidly prompted 
a de-solidarizing and harshly conflictual polariza-
tion between ‘deserving’ richer and ‘undeserving’ 
poorer Member States, saints and sinners, indus-
trious ants and indolent grasshoppers.
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of political authority: almost a deliberate recipe 
for undermining the conditions of polity mainte-
nance. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the inability to govern the unstable 
new reality of Europe’s irreducible and irrever-
sible integration is alarming. While a polari-
zing political rhetoric divides Europe’s quibbling 
politicians, there still is a surprising amount of 
consensus that could be activated by responsible 
leaders. 
In the run-up to the German elections of 2017, 
Angela Merkel and Wolfgang Schäuble repea-
tedly stated that in EU politics ‘this is no time for 
visions’. We disagree.  As famously argued by Max 
Weber, world images and visions can sometimes 
operate as switchmen, channelling historical 
developments towards new directions. But ideas 
need political ‘carriers’. Today we see some promi-
sing ideas with potential popular support, but no 
available carrier. In this post crisis but still turbu-
lent phase, the long-term sustainability of the EU 
cannot be taken for granted. 
increase of the EU budget to support jobless people 
during a crisis. In particular, the fact that more 
than two thirds of Germans are ready to support 
a partial mutualisation of the risk of unemploy-
ment is remarkable, considering the reluctance of 
the German government when it comes to mutua-
lisation policies. In addition, more than three out 
of four respondents in the six countries were in 
favour of increasing the EU budget to foster social 
investment policies (75.9%). By contrast, ‘only’ 
56% supported the introduction of Eurobonds, a 
percentage that drops to 37.3% if one considers 
only Germany. Yet, even these numbers mean that 
potentially one every three Germans is supportive 
of Eurobonds, a fact which sharply contrasts with 
the absence of political parties in Germany cham-
pioning this proposal.
It must also be noted that the results of our survey 
have been robustly confirmed by other recent 
investigations (e.g. Gerhards et al., 2017). On 
this basis, it can be suggested that voter resis-
tance and electoral constraints cannot explain that 
process of de-solidarization of the EU which we 
have described above previous section. Quite to 
the contrary, a ‘silent majority’ seems to potenti-
ally available for supporting a strategy of realign-
ment between the deep togetherness created by 
the EMU, on the one hand, and the institutional 
and symbolic architecture of the EU, on the other. 
The absence of such strategy represents a clear 
failure of European political elites. An elective (i.e. 
choice based) partnership such as the EU, based 
on forward looking objectives, can turn onto fully 
fledged “familiy of nations” to the extent that their 
leaders engage in some fraternal nudging. The 
exercise of ‘socioemotional leadership’, capable of 
developing a collective fraternal idioculture has 
become difficult in a world increasingly based on 
fluid social relationships, self-seeking behaviours 
and rational-legal authority (Brint, 2001). But 
the EMU elite has made long steps in the oppo-
site direction, emphasising difference and apart-
ness between national communities and their 
governments, denigrating, also symbolically, any 
mechanism of mutual support, promoting a histo-
rically unprecedented rule-based formalization 
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the political responses to it. Indeed, many schol-
arly analyses of the Eurozone see precisely the 
North-South diversity as the key source of the 
systemic weakness of the monetary union (Hall, 
2014; Johnston and Reagan, 2016). At the same 
time, however, both Germany and Italy are coun-
tries with important internal diversity, be it the 
diversity of religious denominations and their 
associated economic ideas, as apparent in the 
Protestant and Catholic traditions in Germany, 
or the diversity in social capital and economic 
capacities, as apparent in Italy, which itself unites 
differentially competitive North and South under 
the same political and economic institutions. The 
contributions to this volume are based primarily 
on the discussions of Germany and Italy, but also 
tackle broader questions of European integra-
tion and thus offer numerous important insights 
for scholarship and practice of politics in Europe. 
While it would be impossible to elaborate on all 
of them in detail, the goal of these concluding 
remarks is to point to some of the most important 
ways in which this volume advances our current 
understanding of the economic and political chal-
lenges in Europe and opens promising avenues 
for further research. The paper will be organised 
around four main themes that emerge from the 
contributions: the role of diversity in the inter-
pretations of the crisis, the notion of interdepend-
ence, the importance of economic cultures, and 
the politics of crisis responses.
Diversity and the crisis
The causes of the Eurozone crisis have been widely 
debated in the academic and policy discussions, 
with positions ranging from placing the blame 
on the fiscal profligacy of the Southern coun-
tries and their weaker governance structures, to 
the incompleteness of the European Monetary 
Union with a single currency but multiple states. 
In comparative politics and political economy, the 
view that has gained the most attention has been 
informed by the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001), and, more 
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Integrating diverse economies and societies under 
the umbrella of ever wider set of common rules 
has been a persistent challenge for European inte-
gration, from the launching of the Single Market, 
through the creation of the monetary union, 
and the subsequent Eastern enlargement. The 
Eurozone crisis, in particular, has brought the 
problem of North-South imbalances firmly onto 
the EU agenda, raising further questions about 
the economic, but also institutional and cultural, 
divergence as a source of inherent tensions in inte-
gration. The crisis has also fuelled political chal-
lenges, with the rise of the Eurosceptic parties in 
many Member States rendering “united in diver-
sity” an ever more elusive and contentious goal. 
What are the main aspects of this diversity that 
matter for the ongoing crisis and how has the 
crisis affected different economic institutions 
and cultures in Europe? What are the prospects 
for political responses that would contribute to 
enhancing mutual benefits from diversity across 
Europe, rather than leading to disintegration?
The study of Germany and Italy as the prin-
cipal focus of this volume offers a great oppor-
tunity for exploring these questions. On the one 
hand, Germany and Italy are paradigmatic cases 
of Northern export-oriented growth model and 
co-ordinated market economy versus the Southern 
demand-led model and mixed market economy 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; Molina and Rhodes, 
2007, Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016). Compara-
tive analysis of these two countries can thus show 
how domestic institutions and economic cultures 
mediate their vulnerability to the crisis as well as 
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spread image of the lack of competitiveness, high 
labour costs and excessive public and/or private 
debt as the problems in the Eurozone South, 
Italy was pushed into crisis primarily due to the 
reactions of the financial markets and sudden 
capital outflows motivated by fears of contagion, 
rather than by domestic fundamentals (Jones, 
2018). Thus, instead of focusing predominantly 
on domestic socio-economic models leading to 
imbalances in the Eurozone, it might be more 
fruitful to examine the implications of financial 
market integration and the importance of capital 
account movements. In addition, as Kohl and 
Spielau argue, wage-bargaining institutions are 
not the only domestic institutions that matter, as 
Europe is also marked by the diversity of housing 
regimes which itself might tilt the economy and 
capital inflows towards non-tradeable sectors, 
such as construction, rather than export-oriented 
ones (Kohl and Spielau, this volume). Academics 
but also policy-makers hence need to look beyond 
the focus on competitiveness and especially labour 
costs as the drivers of imbalances, and, instead, 
pay more attention to the financial market inte-
gration, capital movements and the institutions 
which govern non-tradeable sectors in order to 
address the systemic weaknesses of the Eurozone.
Interdependence
A further challenge for comparative analysis 
stems from the fact that the Eurozone crisis 
made it very clear that European economies 
have become deeply interdependent so that the 
German responses to the crisis cannot be under-
stood without taking into account Italian political 
and economic dynamics and vice versa. Including 
the premise of interdependence presents a host 
of conceptual and methodological challenges for 
comparative analysis, from the adequate choice of 
the unit of analysis to the selection of a research 
strategy that could reflect causal processes in the 
world in which “no polity can realistically connect 
cause and effect through its own institutions and 
policies without regard for the actions of others” 
recently, the Growth Models perspective (Baccaro 
and Pontusson, 2016). For the VoC, in particular, 
one important systemic weakness of the Euro-
zone stems from the diversity of socio-economic 
models and institutions governing markets in the 
North and in the South (Hall, 2014; Johnston and 
Reagan, 2016). One of the key aspects of this diver-
sity is usually seen in the wage-bargaining institu-
tions, with co-ordinated bargaining in the North 
yielding higher export competitiveness vis-à-vis 
the lack of such co-ordination in the European 
South (Höpner and Lutter, 2017, Hancke, 2013, 
Iversen and Soskice, 2013).
While institutional diversity certainly represents 
an important aspect of understanding the chal-
lenges of monetary integration, the contribu-
tions to this volume nevertheless revise this styl-
ised account in several ways. To begin with, the 
standard image of wage co-ordination between the 
public and private sector is challenged by Di Carlo 
(Chapter 3 in this volume). In contrast with the 
predominant views, his analysis shows that wage 
restraint in the German public sector does not 
result from effective inter-sectoral co-ordination 
or the dominance of the social block concerned 
with export competitiveness. Rather, it stems 
primarily from the particular structure of the 
German federal state. Similarly, public sector wage 
inflation in Italy has more to do with its role as 
socio-economic stabiliser and with the dynamics 
of political party coalitions in Italy, than with the 
inability of the government or the export-oriented 
sector to tame the demands of the sheltered public 
sector employees (Di Carlo, Chapter 3 in this 
volume. Given that public sector wages are a key 
element of the overall labour cost differentials in 
the Eurozone, this analysis provides an important 
corrective of the VoC based approaches.
Another pertinent question is whether labour 
costs and the concomitant loss of competitiveness 
actually represent the most important drivers of 
imbalances and crisis in the Eurozone. Erik Jones’ 
analysis of the Italian case (Jones, 2018) clearly 
shows that many of the usual narratives about the 
crisis do not apply to Italy. Contrary to the wide-
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zone that set the EU on the path of irreducible and 
irreversible integration (Ferrera and Burelli, this 
volume). Yet, as important as the Eurozone and its 
North-South integration is, one might add that the 
dynamics of European political economy cannot 
be fully grasped without taking into account the 
simultaneous increase of West-East interdepend-
ence. 1997, the year of the birth of the Stability 
and Growth Pact, is, at the same time, the year in 
which the EU officially decided to start accession 
negotiations with countries of the former socialist 
bloc. Besides the creation of the Eurozone, the 
late 1990s were thus also the period in which East 
European countries became increasingly inte-
grated in the European market and opened their 
economies towards foreign direct investment – an 
openness often helped by various aspects of the 
EU enlargement strategy (Bohle and Greskovits, 
2012, Vukov, forthcoming).
This East-West integration has many important 
implications, both for the North and the South of 
the Eurozone. As Manow shows, the re-location of 
German business to the East helped to keep wages 
under control (Manow, this volume). Furthermore, 
it also increased the productivity of the German 
economy through the re-organisation of cross-
border production chains. The four Visegrád 4 
countries, taken together as a region, is the largest 
German trading partner, thanks, primarily, to 
transnational production chains. After the USA, 
they are also the largest supplier of components for 
German exports (Poplawski, 2016). The borders 
of competitive German industry are thus far from 
coinciding with the borders of German socio-
economic institutions.Similarly, the first channel 
through which the Italian financial system turned 
out to be vulnerable in the 2008 financial crisis was 
through its exposure via subsidiaries in Eastern 
Europe (Pagoulatos and Quaglia, 2013). The map 
of interdependence among core and peripheral 
countries in Europe cannot thus be confined to 
the North-South monetary integration. Rather, it 
is part of a more complex picture in which North-
South coincides and overlaps with the East-West 
interdependence, and in which monetary union 
(Schmitter, 2009: 18). For comparative political 
economy, taking interdependence seriously would 
also mean departing from the prevailing meth-
odological nationalism and understanding socio-
economic models, such as the German and Italian 
models, as part of a common and complex system, 
rather than as self-contained comparative units of 
analysis.
Many contributions in this volume already take 
a step precisely in that direction. Ferrera and 
Burelli (this volume) make a strong argument 
for conceiving of the EU as a complex system, 
which is both irreducible and irreversible. Simi-
larly, German export success partly appears as a 
result of the crisis, rather than preceding it, and 
is also associated with the concomitant return of 
capital from the periphery to the core, rather than 
merely resulting from superior German institu-
tions (Manow, this volume). The extent of North-
South interdependence is particularly relevant 
in the illuminating comparison of Germany and 
Japan, where Japan’s experience figures as a useful 
counterfactual as to what would have happened 
had Germany not been part of the Euro and the 
EU. As Estevez-Abe (this volume) shows, Germa-
ny’s capacity to become an exporting powerhouse 
was crucially shaped by its participation in the 
Eurozone. The latter provided additional quasi-
domestic markets and prevented the German 
currency from appreciation, while membership in 
the EU protected it from bilateral trade negotia-
tions with the US – all the advantages that Japan 
was not able to enjoy. An important point is thus 
that Modell Deutschland functions as well it does 
precisely because the other countries in the Euro-
zone are not the same as Germany and because 
Germany managed to benefit from integration far 
more than other, in particular peripheral, coun-
tries (Ferrera and Offe, 2018).
With Germany and Italy as the focus of this 
volume, many contributions naturally focus 
primarily on the interdependence of European 
North and South, which was particularly strength-
ened after the creation of the Euro. For Ferrera 
and Burelli, it is precisely the creation of the Euro-
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istic spirit” and promoting corporatist institutions 
shaped some of the key elements of the economic 
order in post-War Italy (Hien, this volume). In 
addition to cross-national differences in policy 
ideas about crisis responses (Bruno, this volume), 
the concept of economic cultures suggests that we 
should explore the ways in which these ideas stem 
from broader norms, traditions, historical experi-
ences and historically-shaped forms of meaning-
making (Hien, this volume). The politics of Euro-
pean integration thus also implies integration of 
such diverse economic cultures and the key ques-
tion is how to govern this diversity in a way that 
would foster co-operation (Joerges, this volume) 
rather than cultural conflict.
The notion of culture usually implies sort of a 
long-durée perspective – if institutions are sticky, 
traditions and values are usually seen as even 
stickier and more difficult to change as they 
emerge from deep layers of historical experi-
ence. Moreover, culture is often assumed to mean 
national culture, nation seen as the most stable 
and durable cultural community, tied by language, 
common history, and, in some cases, religion. Yet, 
the contributions to this volume challenge both of 
these assumptions. The story of economic culture 
in post-War Germany is very much the story of 
cultural change, with multiple shifts and mutual 
adjustments between Protestantism and Catholi-
cism (Hien, this volume). Similarly, Blome (this 
volume) brings a fascinating account of changing 
family values and gender norms in Germany, 
though not in Italy. Further research would thus 
need to explore what prompts such cultural 
change and under what conditions it is more or 
less likely to happen. Moreover, the papers also 
challenge the view of monolithic national cultures. 
Germany managed to successfully combine 
economic ideas and institutions stemming from 
both Protestantism and Catholicism, while Italy 
also seems far from a nationally unique economic 
culture, as noted already by Putnam (1993) and 
as apparent in the different implications of corpo-
ratism in the North and South of Italy (Hien, this 
volume). The diversity of economic institutions is 
represents only one among several forms of core-
periphery integration, each with their own devel-
opmental challenges (Bruszt and Vukov, 2018).
Taking interdependence seriously is thus crucial 
for better theorising about the causes and conse-
quences of the crisis. But it is also necessary for 
normative reasons – understanding interdepend-
ence can lead to different attributions of respon-
sibility for the crisis and is thus one of the key 
aspects of considerations of justice in the Eurozone 
(Morgan, this issue). Furthermore, the awareness 
of interdependence is also a fundamental ingre-
dient of solidarity (Sangiovanni, 2018). Social 
sciences thus have an important role to play in 
providing the foundations for such an awareness 
and in contributing to public debates with insights 
that would go beyond methodological nation-
alism.
Economic Cultures
An important innovative aspect of this volume is 
its focus on the ways in which economic cultures, 
traditions and predominant ideas shape economic 
integration in Europe. That markets are embedded 
in broader social relations and norms is a well-
known premise of economic sociology which 
has more recently received increased attention, 
especially with the revival of the work of Karl 
Polanyi. Notwithstanding this, not much has 
been done to date to tease out what exactly this 
means for the organisation of markets in Europe 
and, in particular, for their integration. Hien 
(this volume) tackles precisely this question with 
his analysis of the impact of different religious 
traditions on post-War economic institutions 
and responses to the crisis in Germany and Italy. 
The Protestant roots of ordoliberalism with its 
emphasis on individual self-reliance were instru-
mental in the German approach to the economic 
crisis of the 1930s and have also been the back-
bone behind the conditionality that German 
leaders required from Southern countries after 
the Eurozone crisis. On the other hand, Catholic 
social doctrine condemning the “evil individual-
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the famous motto of European integration thus 
may not be simply about creating conditions for 
harmonious co-existence of diverse and stable 
blocs. Instead, it should be thought of as the search 
for the modes of channelling change (Joerges, this 
volume) in mutually beneficial, rather than mutu-
ally destructive, ways.
Politics of interdependence
How to attain such governance is, of course, a 
political question par excellence and the one that 
can hardly be answered in a single volume. As 
Ferrera and Burelli (this volume) argue, the EU 
has evolved into a complex system, but one which 
lacks adequate instruments to address the risks 
of integration and to govern the interdependen-
cies among its Member States. The contributions 
here point to numerous deficiencies of Euro-
pean governance and several ways in which it has 
become particularly problematical in the after-
math of the Eurozone crisis. Historically, Euro-
pean integration has been based upon integration 
through law, which has always had its limitations, 
visible primarily in the de-politicisation of deci-
sion-making. After the crisis, however, the EU has 
witnessed the shift towards integration through 
crisis, which made it simultaneously less demo-
cratic and less legitimate (Scicluna, this volume). 
Furthermore, Mangold (this volume) argues 
that the European Commission has increasingly 
turned from being an “honest broker” towards 
becoming a political actor, while not being 
directly politically accountable to the electorate. 
The problem of accountability is also emphasised 
by Ferrera and Burelli (this volume), who submit 
that the structure of authority in the EU suffers 
from two important shortcomings: it continues to 
treat the Member States as self-determined units 
rather than taking the complex interdependence 
among them into account, and its governance is 
based largely upon non-majoritarian institutions 
which function through technocratic surveillance, 
discipline and sanctioning. While the EU can 
certainly be seen as a possible means to resolve 
also paralleled by the diversity in political choices 
which again demonstrate a clear divide between 
the Italian North and South (Kriesi, this volume). 
An important question is thus what enables more 
or less sustainable configurations of economic 
and cultural diversity, and whether Europe could 
possibly learn something from the experiences of 
its internally diverse Member States.
The concept of economic cultures, as elaborated 
in this volume, builds upon the Varieties of Capi-
talism (VoC) literature but seeks to complement 
it by showing how socio-economic institutions 
emerge out of historically specific practices and 
how they are also embedded in economic ideas, 
traditions and exercises of “meaning-making”. 
While the contributors here recognise various 
amendments and criticism of the VoC, one line 
of criticism which I believe is particularly relevant 
for the study of Europe is the one developed by 
Crouch (2005). In his book, Capitalist Diversity 
and Change, Colin Crouch takes issue with the VoC 
argument of institutional complementarity and 
consistency as the roads to viable and/or competi-
tive capitalist models. Rather than celebrating neat 
institutional homogeneity, Crouch argues that it is 
institutional heterogeneity that facilitates innova-
tion, by presenting actors with alternative strate-
gies when existing paths seem blocked, and by 
making it possible for them to make new combi-
nations among elements of diverse institutional 
configurations (Crouch, 2005). Perhaps, the same 
could be thought of culture: one might even posit 
that it was precisely the cultural diversity and the 
possibility of productive cultural re-combina-
tions between Protestant and Catholic thought 
that contributed to the relative success of German 
post-War model, either in its more corporatist or 
in its more liberal version. The key issue for Europe 
thus remains the question of the forms of govern-
ance that could bring about new institutional and 
cultural re-combinations, and that could foster 
the appearance of ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ 
(Crouch, 2005), capable of using the elements of 
diversity for creating institutional innovations 
and fostering new paths. “United in diversity”, 
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capital, which, to date, national political élites 
seem neither ready nor willing to take up.
What could be done to foster the emergence 
of political actors who would tap into this soli-
daristic capital? A useful starting-point here is 
Sangiovanni’s analysis (2018) of the concept of 
solidarity as being constituted by two parts: recog-
nition of mutual dependence, and the joint action 
that follows in its wake. While the importance of 
interdependence has already been mentioned, his 
discussion also suggests that one of the key distin-
guishing features of joint action based upon soli-
darity as opposed, for example, to love, is that we 
are disposed to share the fate of our fellow man 
only in ways that are related to the shared goals of 
our joint action. 
“When we act in solidarity with one 
another, we take into account only our 
relation as defined by the ground of our 
solidarity, and hence disregard what else 
might divide us. What matters is that we 
are workers, not that you are a farmer and 
I am a factory worker; what matters is that 
we are fellow nationals, not that I am a poet 
and you are a banker’ (Sangiovanni, 2018).
[italics in original] 
From this point, it seems that one of the key prob-
lems with Europe and its current political insti-
tutions is precisely that they fail to foster visions 
and political projects that would enable the crea-
tion of trasnsnational relations of solidarity which 
emphasise aspects of identity other than the 
national one. Solidarity among Europeans where 
it would matter that they are both workers, rather 
than a German worker and a Romanian worker; or 
that they are both feminists, rather than a Swedish 
feminist and an Italian feminist, is not actively 
forged in any of the European electoral arenas, 
precisely because such arenas remain organised 
around national electoral institutions.
In addition to national democracies and national 
forms of representation, governing interdepend-
ence in Europe might thus also require transna-
tional forms of political representation in which 
the emerging democratic deficit of nation-states 
which are increasingly limited in their policy 
options because of globalisation and growing 
interdependence (Joerges, this volume; Inner-
arity, 2018), it has failed to supplant this deficit 
with new democratic procedures and forms of 
governing interdependence at the supranational 
level. Such authority structure has also helped 
fuel the rise of populism with citizens increasingly 
turning against the EU, which they perceive as 
undermining territorial sovereignty and lacking 
democratic representation (Ferrera and Burelli, 
this volume; see, also, Kriesi, this volume).
What are the prospects for changing this kind of 
dysfunctional authority structure? The papers in 
this volume offer a mixed picture. On the one hand, 
the findings show important differences among 
the German and Italian élites in in how they view 
the crisis and possible European-level solutions 
(Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra, this volume; 
Bruno, this volume; Quaglia, this volume), as well 
as their mutual distrust (Pellegata, this volume), on 
the other. Nevertheless, survey results also show 
that the majority of citizens in Italy as well as in 
Germany tend to attribute the blame for the crisis 
to the banks, rather than the excessive spending of 
the Southern Eurozone members (Pellegata, this 
volume). In other words, the narrative of Southern 
responsibility which is predominant in the overall 
discourse and élite representations of crisis in 
Germany (Ferrera and Offe, 2018) seems to be 
endorsed by only one third of the German popu-
lation. Similarly, the surveys carried out within the 
RESCUE project show that the majority of Euro-
peans across the Member States are in favour of 
an increase of the EU budget to support jobless 
people during a crisis and display a solidaristic 
ethos when thinking about Europe (Ferrera and 
Burelli, this volume). Thus, it seems that, at least 
at the level of citizens, there might be more space 
for trans-European solidarity and more scope for 
policies that would go beyond the zero-sum game 
than is commonly assumed. As Ferrera and Burelli 
argue, it would, however, require responsible élites 
who were capable of exploiting this solidaristic 
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at least some political élites would have stakes 
precisely in creating new coalitions and forging 
new solidarities which transcend national bound-
aries. While this is not an easy task, the alterna-
tive that is currently in place is leaving all conten-
tious EU-level issues to the outcomes of national 
elections and having them debated primarily 
through the prism of national interest. As we 
can see in a number of European countries, not 
least Germany and Italy, such a prism primarily 
strengthens various strands of nationalism which, 
in its extreme versions, may also take the form of 
attacking the basic tenets of liberal democracy. 
Matching economic integration with the creation 
of political institutions that could foster polity-
building based upon the notion of interdepend-
ence, mutual trust and solidarity remains a chal-
lenge that Europe will need to resolve if it wants 
to ensure not only the path of integration, but also 
democracy itself.
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done by the ECB. At the same time, the extremely 
low interest rate, also determined by the ECB, 
benefits the winners by making their public debt 
easier to service. For instance, experts speak of 
294 billion Euros, a figute that comes close to an 
annual Federal budget, that the German public 
debt burden has been made lighter since 2007 
through low interest rates. Another way in which 
the Euro benefits winner countries is that it works 
as an export subsidy due to its uniform external 
exchange rate. Absent the Euro, the new Deutsch-
mark would dramatically appreciate its exchange 
rate with the outside world and German export 
industries would largely collapse as a conse-
quence. No wonder that winners such as, most 
of all, Germany indulge in their obsessions with 
automatic rules and austerity. Yet the German 
government does not show any inclination to 
share this windfall profit with those whose plight 
has indirectly given rise to it. This all looks like 
what the Hungarian-born historian Karl Polanyi, 
referring  to the “veritable abyss of human degra-
dation” that occurred under early capitalism, has 
called a “satanic mill”. One feature that makes the 
mill particularly „satanic“ is the fact that nobody, 
neither losers nor winners, can rationally (and 
actually does in earnest) opt for leaving the Euro. 
Unilateral exit from the EMU is, in spite of some 
demagoguery to the contrary, a plain non-starter 
due to the huge damages exiteers would have to 
cope with as a consequence. Unless there is a way 
to reform and to some fair compensation of losers, 
we remain trapped in the „mill“. Yet the longer it 
operates and inflicts damages on losers and grants 
profits to winners, the harder it becomes politi-
cally to embark on a serious path of reform that 
opens a credible prospect of convergence. Such 
reform, together with winners funding large scale 
border-crossing investments programs, remains 
the only collectively rational way out. But for char-
ting such path time may be running out.
MF: This logic was partly there from the beginning 
of EMU. Don’t you think that some institutional 
reforms introduced in the early 2010s – such as the 
Fiscal Compact, the strengthening of  supranational 
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MF: You have recently written a lot about Europe 
and the increasing North-South divides within the 
Eurozone.   You are also one of the few influential 
German intellectuals who openly criticizes German 
governments and their orientations on EMU. Do 
you see a nexus between the EMU’s dysfunctiona-
lities and the social and political crisis, especially in 
Southern Europe?
CO: Yes, I certainly do. The monetary regime of 
the Euro under which 19 very diverse national 
economies within the EU now live and operate is 
plainly dysfunctional. It does not serve its alleged 
and promised purpose of convergence but does 
the exact opposite. It is economically and politi-
cally divisive: Some participants win, others lose 
and the gap becomes wider.
The Euro ties the hands of the losers, roughly the 
Mediterranean region of the EU.   They can no 
longer adjust to challenges of competitiveness by 
devaluing their national currency because there 
is none any more. If they need to adjust, they 
must do so „internally“, i. e. by depressing wages, 
pensions, and state (in particular welfare) expen-
ditures, all of which is detrimental to growth, 
employment, and the prospects of reducing public 
debt through a fiscal dividend resulting from 
growth. Today, Italian GDP per capita is still 8 per 
cent below of what it was in 2008. Yet that does 
not seem to be enough to boost Italian unit costs 
of labor, the key determinant of competitiveness 
in international trade. The living conditions of 
ordinary people have been severely depressed, 
giving rise to discontent, resentment and angry 
if often misdirected protest. Loser economies are 
no longer allowed, under the EMU regime,   to 
set their targeted rate of inflation because that is 
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mies of the Eurozone; they are even dictated by its 
long term and well-considered interest in making 
the EMU a robust and inclusive monetary regime.
MF: As the largest Member State and as the 
economic powerhouse of Europe, one would expect 
Germany to somehow serve as a benign hegemon, 
capable of reconciling her own national interests 
with the interests of others and especially with the   
long term economic and political sustainability of 
the EU
CO: During the long crisis Germany has in fact 
largely abdicated its responsibility in and for 
Europe. The German government’s obsession 
with rules, austerity and conditionality has been 
the main driving force behind the growing diver-
gence of EMU economies and the devastating 
social shocks which has hit Southern member 
states.   Germany has tried to push through her 
own economic and social model, based on flawed 
assumptions that we might call a „flower pot 
theory”. Such theory is the favorite mode of thin-
king of winners. Their message: the rules that 
have worked so advantageous in „our“ case are 
the same that would work to the benefit of „you“ 
as well – if only you could overcome yourself to 
follow „our“ rules which you are most welcome, in 
fact required, to adopt and follow. Flowers in sepa-
rate flower pots develop similarly if you use the 
same seeds, the same fertilizers etc. What is wrong 
with this comfortable mode of thinking is that it 
ignores and denies systemic interdependence. 
However, there is a powerful intellectual antidote. 
It is captured in a sentence by authors  Mathijs and 
Blyth, often quoted in the scholarly literature on 
the EU. It reads: „The Eurozone as a whole cannot 
become more like Germany. Germany could only 
be like Germany because the other countries were 
not.“ Germany is like Germany, we might add, 
because of its reaping of unreciprocated advan-
tages from the system of EU member states and 
their interdependencies – the opposite of separate 
flower pots.
controls and conditionality, the adoption of  demo-
cratic “monsters” such as reverse qualified majority 
rule for macro-economic and fiscal decisions – have 
severely aggravated EMU’s dysfunctionality?
CO: Absolutely. The new tools of enforcing „disci-
pline“, austerity and control are widely recog-
nized  to be counterproductive in their effects. But 
they are the only tools the EU, driven by a cons-
tant and no doubt realistic fear of the disasters 
the „markets“ may inflict upon its stability, has at 
its disposal and which are within the reach of the 
intergovernmental making of   treaties between 
EU member states. They confirm the image of 
„Brussels“ as an illegitimate foreign power impo-
sing rules without being itself subject to demo-
cratic accountability. We now have a rich evidence 
in Europe of the electoral outcomes to which this 
economic and monetary regime gives rise. The 
EU lacks the requisite state capacity to deal with 
the partly disastrous consequences caused by the 
operation of its monetary system. If the EU were a 
federal state, and a democratic federal state at that, 
it would have at its disposal the governing capacity 
to tax and to redistribute its resources across state 
borders and compensate losers for at least parts of 
their systematically generated losses. In its present 
institutional shape, it is still far from having the 
authority to do so.
MF: The obvious question is then: cui prodest?  Who 
are, let us name then, the EMU winners? And do 
you think there was a deliberate power strategy?
CO: As I said, Germany has been the main benefi-
ciary of the institutional architecture and measures 
that were put in place since 2008. That fact need 
not be due to what you call a „deliberate power 
strategy“ or conspiracy of sorts. Power, as poli-
tical scientist Karl Deutsch has famously pointed 
out, is the ability to afford not to learn. In that 
sense German power consists in the unwilling-
ness of German political elites (as well as, it must 
be added, major parts of ill-informed non-elites) 
to promote and adopt reforms needed to remedy 
the worst institutional pathologies of the EMU. 
Such reforms are not only affordable for one of the 
biggest and currently one of the wealthiest econo-
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poor sociology. In a complex system such as EMU 
is it still possible to determine with any politically 
relevant precision those effects which can be traced 
back to domestic policy decisions and therefore 
implicate national “responsibility”? Moreover, it is 
in the nature of all social interaction that we are not 
rewarded for all positive effects we cause for others, 
nor are we bound to compensate others for all the 
negative externalities we cause for them. Of course I 
am not denying that there are numerous policy areas 
in which domestic decision still make the difference 
and therefore do implicate national responsibility. 
And we know that some governments even cheated 
Brussels when the crisis erupted. But don’t you think 
that the rhetoric of “saints” and “sinners” espoused 
by German leaders (including social, media and 
intellectual elites) has grown beyond limits of epis-
temic, moral and political acceptability?
CO: I couldn’t agree more. Again, the questions 
takes us into the field of legal philosophy. To what 
extent can actors alone be held responsible for the 
misfortune they suffer or the gains they achieve? 
Again,  winners tend to ascribe their profit to their 
own talents and efforts, while losers like to frame 
themselves as victims of adverse circumstances. 
Winners depict losers as having failed to obey 
the commands of prudence and moral consis-
tency, while losers look at winners as having bene-
fitted from sheer luck or the uncompensated help 
of others. These conflicting narratives must be 
checked case by case for their relative merits, and 
care must be taken that the narratives of winners 
do not prevail over other narratives and frames, 
as they often tend to do in the multilingual and 
hence fragmented public sphere of the EU.
The German framing of the problem of the EMU 
and the EU is often described and criticized as 
an obsession with „order“. In fact, the economic 
policy doctrine of „ordo liberalism“ that was cano-
nized by committed protestant professors and poli-
ticians in the early post-war period of the Federal 
Republic is inspired by the deep intuition that a 
stable and robust social order is best built when 
rules are irreversibly put in place and decisions 
and discretionary interventions – be it by corpo-
MF: In the flower pot theory a key role is played by  
rules and decision making procedures.   The motto 
of German and Northern elites during the crisis has 
been pacta sunt servanda.  That is fair enough. But 
Roman law foresaw an additional clausola rebus 
sic stantibus: treaty obligations can remain  unful-
filled due to a compelling change in circumstances. 
Only the jus cogens based on basic principles was 
peremptory, with no possibility of derogation….Can 
we say that such rather obvious distinctions have 
been forgotten during the crisis – or possibly even in 
the original design of EMU?
CO: This question takes us into the difficult field 
where we must explore the relation between rules 
and decisions. Rules of social and political life are 
not in any sense „given“; they are man-made and 
have been adopted at some point by decision. Follo-
wing rules as a matter of routine can be a highly 
efficient way to avoid the need to make decisions. 
But social agents can also decide to break rules 
rather than comply with them, and sometime there 
are even good and justifiable reasons for doing so, 
e. g. when the rebus sic stantibus proviso does 
not apply. For instance, the rules may be biased 
and favor one of the conflicting parties to which 
they apply. Nota bene: uniform rules do not create 
a level playing field. Absent such reasons, there 
are reasons to enforce rules. But efforts at enfor-
cement can fail, or it can involve the violation of 
other rules. It all boils down to the issue of how we 
judge the quality of those respective reasons. This 
conflict may be resolved by bending or tempora-
rily suspending rules in order to avoid having to 
break them, or by reforming them. Insisting on 
rules being valid once and forever can be an atti-
tude that is driven by self-interest of those whom 
the rules favor rather than an attitude inspired by 
sincere respect for the rules. As we easily recog-
nize, each of these ramifications play a role in the 
day-to-day discourse and conflicts over European 
integration and Eurozone politics.
MF: Another shibboleth of neoliberal doctrine 
is that we cannot separate control and liability: 
whoever decides to do something must be solely 
held responsible for its consequences. This is simply 
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rate actors or political authorities – are banned 
or kept to a minimum. This doctrine has always 
reminded me of a story told by Bertolt Brecht in 
his collection of anecdotal sketches called Flücht-
lingsgespräche (conversations of refugees [from 
Nazi Germany in the 1930s]). One is a physics 
professor, the other a metal worker. The latter 
concludes their conversation on the nature of 
order by musing: „We might put it this way. Where 
nothing is in its right place, there is disorder. Yet 
order is where in the right place there is nothing.“ 
The professor agrees: „Order is a phenomenon of 
something missing.“ Just to illustrate: As reported 
in a recent comment in the Financial Times (May 
6, 2018), one paragon of fiscal probity and auste-
rity, namely Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian 
dictator, boasted a budget surplus of 9 billion 
dollar in 1989. By the end of that year, his regime 
had suddenly collapsed and he was no longer 
among the living.
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Two pertain to the sphere of macroeconomic 
policy proper, i.e. wage and fiscal policy. One has 
to do with an empirical manifestation of macro-
economic policy in the German balance of trade, 
i.e. persistent current account surpluses. The last 
criticism is centred on the growth model itself 
and considers the implications of the German 
export Weltmeister for the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), as well as global 
imbalances). In what follows I focus solely on the 
EUROpean perspective and leave the issue of 
global imbalances to others.
Germany’s ‘unbalanced’ 
economy and the EMU
German policy makers, the argument goes, should 
rein in the country’s trade surplus and allow for 
symmetric adjustments in the EMU. Germany 
is accused of engineering economic growth at 
home by free-riding on other European coun-
tries’ aggregate demand. Some even go as far as to 
argue that Germany is “artificially” and “purpose-
fully” repressing domestic household consump-
tion, government spending and private invest-
ments to sustain a mercantilist model. Germany 
allegedly refuses to correct trade imbalances and – 
given fixed exchange rates – grows at the expense 
of other EMU participants, which have to go 
through painful internal devaluations and fiscal 
austerity. What is thus being asked of Germany is 
to reduce its budget and trade surpluses to provide 
a more symmetric adjustment mechanism to the 
single currency via the expansion of its domestic 
demand for EMU exports.
In the eyes of the critics, Germany’s increased 
imports are thus supposed to work as a func-
tional equivalence for the lack of supranational 
adjustment mechanisms in the monetary union. 
In other words, Germany should act as a fixer of 
last resort in the Eurozone and, to fulfil this role, 
domestic macroeconomic policy should follow 
suit. Since participating in the EMU entails a loss 
of sovereignty over exchange rate and monetary 
policies, both criticism and policy advice focus on 
wage and fiscal policy.
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Ever since the financial and sovereign debt crisis, 
the political and economic implications of Germa-
ny’s unbalanced economy have lured the attention 
of academics, policy institutions, the public and 
politicians across Europe and beyond. Frequent are 
the pleas made to the German political establish-
ment to rebalance its export-oriented economic 
model, increase fiscal expenditures and thus rein 
in the world’s largest current account surplus. The 
issue has become so controversial that one reads 
economic commentators venturing into pictur-
esque appraisals, comparing today’s Germany to 
Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania.
But what is Germany being criticised for? In 
essence, the controversy revolves around macro-
economic policy making and what the German 
growth model implies for the rest of the world. 
There are four constitutive elements in this debate. 
278 This piece has originally appeared, in the form of a blog 
post, on the LSE Europp Blog on 14/9/2018, available at: http://
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/09/14/germany-is-quietly-
rebalancing-its-economy-but-this-will-not-fix-the-eurozones-
flaws/, and on Social Europe on 20/9/2018, available at: https://
www.socialeurope.eu/germany-is-quietly-rebalancing-its-eco-
nomy-but-this-will-not-fix-the-eurozones-flaws.
 The version presented here has been slightly modified with re-
spect to the original blog post in order to incorporate critiques 
and suggestions.
279 I am grateful to Benjamin Braun, Sebastian Diessner, 
Martin Höpner, Fritz Scharpf and Jachim Truger with whom 
I had the chance to discuss these issues to refine my thinking. 
All mistakes are my sole responsibility.
 I am especially thankful to Dr. Paul Steinhardt who has written 
a thoughful critique to my original piece. This has helped me 
substantially to refine my thinking and correct initial mistakes 
I had committed. His critique has appeared as a blog post 
(in German) on the Makroskop blog on 28/9/2018, available 
at: https://makroskop.eu/2018/09/wissenschaftliche-sensa-
tion-deutschlands-stilles-rebalancing-wurde-entdeckt.
GERMANY IS QUIETLY REBALANCING ITS ECONOMY – BUT THIS WILL NOT FIX THE EUROZONE’S FLAWS
Donato Di Carlo
283
What has Germany done since the crisis and what 
can it possibly do, given the institutional setting?
In general terms, the criticism on such a high 
current account surplus is certainly valid. Yet, 
what the critiques have in common is that they 
rarely ask what Germany has done since 2010 to 
address these issues. It thus seems appropriate to 
ask whether the trends of wage restraint and fi scal 
austerity, visible before 2008, have been reversed in 
the post-crisis era or whether Germany continues 
to “beg her neighbours”.
Figure 1: Unit labour costs: total economy (1999 
and 2010=100)
ULCs in post-crisis Germany (fi gure 1) have 
increased steadily. Since 2010, the trend of internal 
depreciation so much pronounced during 1999-
2008 has been reversed and Germany has under-
gone a substantial REER appreciation (fi gure 
2) vis-à-vis its EMU peers, forced into a path of 
internal devaluation. Th e REER competitiveness 
gained in the pre-crisis period has not been fully 
reabsorbed yet. Still, the trend has clearly reversed.
Let’s start with the criticism. People concerned 
with wage policy argue that Germany has under-
gone a substantial internal devaluation of its unit 
labour costs (ULCs): wages have fallen behind the 
economy’s productivity rates in both the private 
and public sector, thus yielding a cost and price 
competitiveness premium to the German export 
secto rbest captured by its remarkable ULC-based 
Real Exchange Rate (REER) depreciation. Th ose 
who point at fi scal policy stress the German 
budget surplus, bemoaning the lack of government 
spending. Defl ationary wage policies (decreasing 
real wages) are said to deter household consump-
tion at home and imports from abroad. An austere 
fi scal policy contains the govern-
ment’s fi nal consumption and 
contributes to keeping imports 
artifi cially low. At any rate, the 
combination of a restrictive wage 
and fi scal stance represses total 
domestic demand (public and 
private), leads to relatively low 
infl ation, REER competitive-
ness and trade surpluses – which 
prevent the possibility for other 
EMU participants of adjusting 
via an export-led recovery.
Now the policy advice: what should Germany 
do? Policy remedies follow consistently from the 
critiques. ULCs in Germany should rise faster 
than its competitors’ so as to experience an appre-
ciation of its REER and hence a loss of the compet-
itiveness (unfairly) acquired before 2008. Addi-
tionally, the German government should spend 
more money. Th e eff ects of this policy mix would 
set in motion two complementary mechanisms 
for adjustment. On the one hand, the wage and 
price infl ation deriving from higher wage rates 
and an expansionary fi scal stance will decrease 
(ULCs- and CPI-based) REER competitiveness 
and help rebalance the current account – allowing 
other EMU countries to “breathe”. On the other, 
increased households’ purchasing power (due to 
higher real wages) and government consumption 
will increase domestic demand and imports from 
abroad.
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Figure 2: Real Exchange Rates in Germany and 
the EMU (1999 and 2010=100)
Surely, criticising Germany for its own sake may 
lead to one always ask “how much is enough”. 
Th is would perhaps be a fair question given the 
remarkable pattern of wage restraint observable 
before the crisis. But a constructive and – real-
istic - critique should go beyond a mere numer-
ical macroeconomic argument 
and include institutional struc-
tures in order to elaborate on the 
feasibility of an extraordinary 
internal appreciation, given the 
German wage setting systems.
Tarifautonomie allows for no 
government interference in 
private sector wage negotia-
tions and, frankly, it sounds quite 
absurd to expect the German 
government to ask the social 
partners to price themselves out of 
the market in order to purposefully lose competi-
tiveness vis-à-vis its EMU peers.
Regarding public sector wage setting, aft er the 
reforms of the mid-2000s it is now the fi nance minis-
ters of the Länder who are in charge of negotiating 
wage increases for the public employees they are in 
charge with, i.e. the majority. Given that the Länder 
lack the possibility to manipulate their marginal 
tax revenues - and that personnel pay is the most 
burdensome item in State administrations’ books 
(approx. 45% of total expenditures)- it would be 
pointless to expect substantial wage increases in 
the TV-L contract without a fi scal 
federalism reform that attrib-
utes more money to subnational 
governments. Even more funda-
mental is that it is unclear why 
one should expect the fi nance 
minister of a German State to 
respond to Eurozone impera-
tives, while being accountable to 
their local constituency.
Th e only instrument the German 
government could use to inter-
vene in wage-setting is to legis-
late for an increase of the minimum wage above 
infl ation. Th is has already been agreed and the 
government is about to ratify an above-infl ation 
increase of 4%.
Figure 3: Real Compensation per Employee, 
defl ator is HCPI (1999-2019)
Even assuming that it would be structurally 
possible to raise German price infl ation far above 
the EMU average via wage push infl ation, this is 
likely to create more damage than relief. Given 
Germany’s size in the EMU, it will rather put enor-
mous political pressures on the soon-to-be new 
governor of the ECB to tighten monetary policy. 
Th e eff ect for the EMU would be the opposite of 
the desired symmetric adjustment: countries in 
the periphery would be pushed into even direr 
straits.
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What about the German fi nance ministers, are 
they really so stingy? In terms of real government 
expenditures (net of interest payments), Germany 
has since the crisis spent considerably more than 
most other OECD countries, even more than the 
increase in spending in the United States – oft en 
praised for its post-crisis Keynesian stance.
Figure 4: Real total expenditure excluding 
interest of general government (2008=100)
Th e fact is that focusing on the 
budget surplus may be misleading 
since, in a buoyant economy, it is 
relatively faster growth of reve-
nues that drives the calculation 
up. It is thus perfectly possible 
to continue expanding invest-
ment spending at a moderate yet 
steady pace, while still remaining 
in a territory of surplus. It is 
certainly true that the public-
investments/GDP ratio remains 
below the Eurozone average and that there are 
innumerable fi elds in which Germany could (and 
should) invest more (e.g., in physical and digital 
infrastructure). I certainly agree with this plea. 
But one should also notice that, according to BMF 
data, since 2005 public investment spending in 
Germany has been increasing at an average annual 
growth rate of 3.8%, i.e., at a faster pace than both 
total expenditure and nominal GDP.
Calculations based on AMECO data also confi rm a 
reversal of the trend: a moderate but steady expan-
sion of Governments’ expenditures. In the decade 
before the crisis (1999-2008), total expenditures 
in Germany (excluding interests) have increased 
at an average annual rate of 1.9% (4.2% in the EU 
– 4.2% in the EMU). Aft er the crisis spending has 
increased at an annual average of 3%, while it has 
collapsed to 1.9% in the EU and 1.7% in the EMU. 
Th e same trend can be observed with regard to 
Government’s gross capital formation. During the 
pre-crisis era, annual average growth of invest-
ment spending in Germany was 1.9% while it has 
increased at an annual pace of 3.4% during the 
period 2010-2018, while in the EU as a whole, in 
the post-crisis period it has been fallen to 0.6% 
(from 5.5%) and even negative in the EMU, -0.1% 
(from 4.7%).
Figure 5: Governments’ total expenditures 
(excluding interests) and gross fi xed capital 
formation (1999-2018)
Since gross fi xed capital formation of general 
government does not consider the eff ect of capital 
depreciation, a better measure to look at addi-
tional investment activity on tangible and intan-
gible assets is net fi xed capital formation (gross 
fi xed capital formation – depreciation). Figure 
6 shows the impressive decline in public fi xed 
capital formation in Germany since 1991. Before 
the crisis, two periods are striking: 1993-1997 and 
2000-2005.
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Th ere are three ways in which this fall in public 
investment can be interpreted: (1) to read these 
shift s as the result of a conscious mercantilist 
strategy aimed at compressing domestic demand 
and price infl ation to maintain export-competi-
tiveness at the expenses of trading partners; (2) to 
read them as the fetishism for balanced budgets 
at all costs; (3) as lack of administrative capacity 
to plan and implement investments. I would argue 
that there is a fourth, more historical, interpreta-
tion.
On July 17th 1992, the Bundesbank raised interest 
rates to unprecedented levels in German post-war 
history (even higher than the June 1973 peak). 
Th is engineered an economic slowdown whose 
eff ects would be felt for fi ft een years. Th e Bundes-
bank’s policy had the precise purpose of punishing 
the expansionary fi scal stance of the Kohl govern-
ment (meant to pay for reunifi cation) and the wage 
setters’ loss of discipline (both the private sector IG 
Metall and the public sector ÖTV) which ensued 
from the infl ationary post-reunifi cation period (in 
the 1991 and 1992 wage rounds). In this contin-
gency, throughout the 1990s, the Kohl govern-
ment decided to slash public investment, to reduce 
the size of the unifi ed public sector and to force 
public sector wage restraint in order to rein in the 
budget defi cit and comply with the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) by the fi scal year 1997. Ironi-
cally enough, it was Mr. Th eo Waigel who wanted 
the SGP which then haunted Germany until 2006. 
During the early 2000s, Germany (a then sick man) 
had hard disputes with the Economic Commis-
sioner Pedro Solbes (in the Prodi Commission) 
to comply with the 3% fi scal rule which it repeat-
edly broke, unpunished. In a scenario in which the 
Commission barks at your back, the easiest way 
for a government to bring the budget defi cit down 
in the short term is to cut/freeze public sector 
wages (and benefi ts) and slash public investment – 
this is, in fact, what also the countries of the EMU 
periphery did aft er 2010/2011. Th is is surely not 
a smart long-term strategy, but it does the job, if 
that is the political objective to be achieved in the 
short term, given the rules of the game at a specifi c 
point in time.
From a more historical perspective it becomes 
hard, in my view, to claim that Germany purpose-
fully (and in bad faith!) neglected public invest-
ments. Germany could not spend more in the 
early 2000s because it had already fi scal problems 
due to high unemployment and low growth, hence 
weak revenues and high social expenditures for 
automatic stabilisers. My interpretation is rather 
that this was a contingent strategy and that now 
that times are good again, the trend of public 
investment (as well as of domestic demand) will 
gradually increase, as it has already gone back to 
the levels of the mid-1990s and is now line with 
the trend of public spending expansion in France.
It makes much more sense, instead, to argue that 
the countries which are desperately in need of 
public and private investments are those asym-
metrically hit by the crisis – it is suffi  cient to look 
at Italy in fi gure 6.
Figure 6: net fi xed capital formation at current 
prices: general government (1991-2019)
Surely enough, one can ask how much is enough. 
But, again, considering that approximately 2/3 
of fi scal spending in Germany takes place at the 
decentralized level, we should ask ourselves why 
should local administrators respond to Eurozone 
imperatives while being accountable to their local 
constituencies?
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German Federal and local administrators would 
be better off investing in the future of their citi-
zens, especially given the cheap funding possi-
bilities Germany enjoys today. This is an obvious 
statement with which it is easy to agree. But, real-
istically speaking, I don’t see why one shouldn’t 
also be open to the possibility that, more simply, 
the timing may be wrong to ask Germany for a 
Teutonic New Deal: it is perfectly conceivable, in 
fact, to imagine German local administrators to 
currently maintain a preference for a moderate 
(yet steady) expansion of investment rather than 
a massive fiscal stimulus.
In other words, there seems to exist an inconsist-
ency in the very pre-conditions for the implemen-
tation of Keynesian economic policies in a system 
of multilevel governance: i.e., a clear mismatch 
between the possibility – and the incentives – for 
German fiscal authorities to implement Keynesi-
anism at home (in Germany) with the hope to 
engineer Keynesianism abroad (in the EMU). This 
is because of the asymmetric effects of an incom-
plete EMU. After all, to be completely honest: 
didn’t Keynes also say that hoarding money in 
good times is functional to governments’ counter-
cyclical spending in hard ones?
What about Germany’s current account surplus 
vis-à-vis its European partners in the single 
market? Ever since the crisis, German exports of 
goods to the EU have decreased substantially rela-
tive to its imports. The intra-EU export/imports 
ratio has been going down significantly. In fact, 
the core countries of the EMU, together with the 
Visegrád Group, show a higher exports/imports 
ratio than Germany.
It will be argued, perhaps correctly, that the bulk 
of this decrease is due to fiscal austerity and wage 
restraint in the periphery of the EMU. I am not 
in principle against this objection, but I would 
like to ask the reader to consider two qualifica-
tions. First, figure 6 shows that when the ratio for 
Southern European countries starts going up after 
the beginning of austerity measures in 2010, the 
German adjustment in the single market, which 
started in 2008, is almost completed, i.e. lower 
imports from Southern Europe are not the whole 
story here. Secondly, the collapse of demand in 
the South could(and should!) have been avoided 
regardless of the German current account surplus: 
it is due to the lack of stabilization mechanisms 
at the supranational level and, especially, to bad 
policy choices.
So, where does the German current account 
surplus come from? Neither from the EU Single 
Market, nor from the Euro Area.
Ever since summer 2008, Germany’s trade surplus 
with EMU partners has disappeared and the 
current account surplus has been driven solely 
by extra-EMU trade. In this sense, Germany 
quietly exited the euro in 2008 to then assail inter-
national markets in 2011. OECD statistics show 
that the driving markets behind export growth 
in Germany have been the US, the UK and the 
People’s Republic of China - all of them outside 
the EMU.
It is exactly this that makes Donald Trump and 
his colleagues very angry. Global imbalances and 
the German extra-EMU current account surplus 
do constitute a serious political and economic 
issue in advanced capitalism, not least because 
the surplus makes Germany (and hence the whole 
EMU) fragile vis-à-vis exogenous shocks beyond 
her control. But in this essay - it is good to repeat 
- I leave this issue out of the analysis and only deal 
with the EUROpean perspective.
Here again, it will be argued that the closing of the 
intra-EMU surplus is due to the fall in imports 
from the Periphery. Again, I would subscribe 
to this objection if it weren’t for the fact that 
reasoning in this way constitutes a genetic fallacy: 
the fact that since 2010 the German intra-EMU 
surplus has disappeared because of austerity and 
internal devaluations in the periphery does not 
make the intra-EMU rebalancing less true.
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Figure 7: Intra-EU exports divided by intra-EU 
imports (2002-16)
Figure 8: German trade balances with the Euro 
Area and Extra-Euro Area partners (1999-2018)
As far as the single market is concerned, Germany 
is virtually the largest importer for all its members. 
Germany, thanks to its size and industrial sector at 
the core of the EMU, already provides a very wide 
market for EMU exports. Th is will not come as a 
surprise to many, but it is simply taken to show 
that there will be limits to the extent that Germany 
can realistically expand its imports from its 
EMU peers – especially until these upgrade their 
productive structures (with smart investments – 
not via internal devaluations!). Will, on the other 
hand, asking Germany to slow down its extra-
EMU export engine benefi t the EMU? I think it is 
hard to tell. Possibly, it is instead likely to reduce 
German imports from its EU trade partners even 
further.
Figure 9: Top-three partners of each member 
state in intra-EU exports of goods (2016)
Is economic growth in Germany driven by exports, 
i.e. net trade (exports minus imports)? Or, in 
other words, does Germany “steal” growth from 
abroad? When decomposing GDP growth (Figure 
10) in the aft ermath of the crisis, we ascertain 
that export-led growth is an historical parenthesis 
rather than a structural feature of the German 
economy. GDP growth was strongly driven by net 
exports during 2001-2007. In the aft ermath of the 
crisis, given increased real wages and government 
expenditures, GDP growth has been driven mostly 
by household consumption, public and private 
investment. Yes, the export share in total GDP 
remains high in relative terms, but data suggests 
that net exports have not been the main drivers 
of GDP growth in post-crisis Germany: the trend 
has been reversed.
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itself. I would argue that, contrary to what is 
usually claimed, there are indications to main-
tain that the pre-crisis trend is being reversed and 
that Germany has made some important steps 
towards a “quiet” rebalancing. This is good news 
and should be kept in mind if we aspire to having 
constructive politics in the EU.
But does this mean that Germany, and the EMU, 
are safe and sound? No, not at all.
As for Germany’s extra-EMU current account 
surplus, there is probably only one person real-
istically capable of tackling the issue. This person 
sits in Washington and we should expect him to 
sooner or later deal with it. It is likely to be nasty 
and the EMU should be ready when the next exog-
enous shock will arrive.
An incomplete EMU remains fragile and requires 
upkeep. German politicians are not immaculate in 
this story and, if they want others to stop teaching 
them how to run their fiscal and wage policies, 
they should stop opposing projects to fine-tune 
the EMU and venture into a serious reform plan 
that envisages blühende Landschaften for EUROpe 
as a whole and not for Germany alone. Whether 
they like it or not, they belong to a common 
project now.
There seems to be one priority around which 
accusers and defendants should come together 
before the next shock arrives: to avoid asymmetric 
macroeconomic adjustments based solely on the 
compression of wages and public investment. Two 
institutional changes could serve the purpose. 
Broadly speaking, a pan-European unemploy-
ment benefit scheme based on national (or better 
regional) PPPs would work as an automatic stabi-
liser to support household consumption when 
countries most in need are forced to switch them off in 
their budgets. Secondly, one could imagine an ECB 
that supports a European Growth Bond by the Euro-
pean Investment Bank in the context of a proper 
European Investment Plan. Unfortunately, the 
importance of both these reforms for the stabilisa-
tion of the EMU has been eclipsed by the attempts 
to create a Capital Markets Union to engineer a 
financial fix to the structural flaws of the EMU.
Figure 10: Contributions of different compo-
nents of aggregate demand to change of GDP 
(1996-2019)
CONCLUSIONS
Before moving to the conclusions I shall make 
clear what this essay does not argue, in order to 
avoid any misunderstanding. I am not arguing that 
the German current account and fiscal surpluses 
are good and desirable. Most importantly, I am not 
arguing that what documented here is enough for 
Germany and the EMU to cheer up, as well as I 
am not arguing that German wages should not rise 
further or that German authorities shouldn’t invest 
in the future of their citizens. My aim was to play 
a bit the devils’ advocate and ask two questions 
which seem to be forgotten in this very contro-
versial debate: what has Germany done since 2010 
to address its unbalanced growth? And, from a 
realistic and constructive perspective, what could 
Germany do given its institutional setting (i.e. 
wage setting structures and fiscal constitution)?
In so doing, I have attempted to go beyond a pure 
macroeconomic reasoning based on accounting 
identities and tried to push the reader into 
reflecting upon historical contingencies and the 
institutional constraints on a strategy of Teutonic 
Keynesianism that shall rescue the Euro from 
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inconsistency problem. It is a short circuit which, to 
be solved, requires today an irrational politician in 
Germany to drive a process of institutional change 
which tomorrow will benefit also Germany and 
the People of Europe.
A big obstacle to a constructive debate remains, 
alas, the fact that German authorities have never 
bothered to acknowledge the issue of German 
responsibilities in the first place. This is regret-
table and does not pay justice to the need to play 
cooperatively in a monetary union. Yet, it is also 
time for critics (me included) to face the fact that, 
while being necessary, an acknowledgment of the 
problem of Germany’s unbalanced growth will not 
be sufficient to trigger the supposed spectacular 
German expansion that shall cure the sorrows of 
the young Euro. In my view, it is a mistake to insist 
that Keynesianism in Germany will fix the Euro-
zone’s problems: Germany should not and cannot 
be the fixer of last resort for the single currency. 
Supranational adjustment mechanisms are needed 
for the stabilisation of the Eurozone in hard times- 
even if I am aware that this is easier said than done. 
But we should start from somewhere.
A complete monetary union is likely to relieve 
these conflicts and bring benefits also to the 
Germans. I may be wrong, but I do not seem to 
remember anyone in my life that has ever argued 
that Lombardy should undergo an internal appre-
ciation vis-à-vis Sicily (or vice versa). We do not 
even seem to discuss publicly whether Sicily runs 
a current account deficit or a surplus (although 
regional finance is indeed a hot topic, I agree). To 
those who argue that an EMU with pan-European 
automatic stabilizers will turn into a permanent 
structure of uni-directional fiscal transfers to the 
South, one should remind two points.
First, Germany is a big country with relatively 
deprived areas as much as Italy is a big country 
with relatively rich and prosperous areas. Shifting 
the political discourse around fiscal transfers to 
the regional dimension (NUTS 1 and 2) would 
probably help to avoid poisonous nationalist 
discourses and would enable us to see how all 
countries would stand to benefit from a system 
of supranational automatic stabilisers calibrate on 
a regional basis - even the “Wessi” Germans and 
the Northern Italians, the “non terroni”. Secondly, 
had the EMU had a system of supranational auto-
matic stabilisers in place since 1999, the Germans 
- or better parts of Germany - would have been 
net receivers for approximately half of the EMU’s 
existence. The simple intuition here is that insur-
ance systems exist exactly because we live in an 
uncertain world and cannot foresee exogenous 
shocks. Indeed, if we could, we wouldn’t let them 
occur – I guess just like in that Tom Cruise movie, 
Minority Report.
Given its high current account surplus, Germany 
is, today more than ever, a very fragile country 
in a world in which free trade and liberal values 
cannot be taken for granted anymore. Since 
German authorities are now under the impres-
sion of being immortal, they think that a pan-
European insurance system is not in Germany’s 
long-term interest. I wonder what the answer 
would have been, had one asked them about the 
merits of a pan-European unemployment bene-
fits scheme in 2001/2004. This is, basically, a time 
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